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ABSTRACT
Small enterprises are a major source of livelihood for most people in the developing world.
Their ability to grow is however, undermined by credit constraints. This has often been
attributed to the lack of registered property ownership which is argued to make property
insecure and unacceptable to lenders. Though several studies have been conducted on the
relationship between property registration and credit access, the focus is usually on the
demand side mainly involving households and the agricultural sector. Furthermore, no
studies have compared the developed and developing countries. Finally, the exact nature of
the credit constraint amongst businesses in countries such as Ghana for instance is not
known. This research therefore, set out to conduct a demand-side study into the nature of the
credit constraint amongst small businesses in Ghana and a supply-side investigation of the
influence of registration on small businesses access to credit.
The multi methodology was deemed most suitable approach for the investigation of the
objectives of the study. The quantitative approach was first used to investigate the objectives.
Part of the initial findings was validated through the quantitative approach whilst the other
part was validated through the qualitative approach. The results show amongst other things
that the existing credit constraint is almost entirely a supply side problem. The supply side
study showed that in Ghana, unregistered property is not eligible for use as collateral but this
is applicable only to the universal banks (UBs) and not the microfinance institutions (MFIs).
That said, the possession of registered property title was not found to influence the loan
terms that businesses are offered neither was there evidence that it guarantees access to
credit. Even though in England the eligibility of property was not dependent on whether it is
registered or not, lenders also did agree that the possession of registered property does not
guarantee credit access neither does it influence the credit terms businesses are offered. It
was concluded that since majority of small businesses in Ghana seek credit from MFIs, the
lack of registered property titles does not constitute a major barrier to credit access. The
main barriers to credit access identified are the poor repayment ability and high risk of
default amongst others.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Background
Credit plays a major role in the economic development of the world's economies. Such a
role is even more important in the developing countries where poverty exist in pandemic
proportions. Credit makes investment capital available to the poor and with the consequent
improvement in their income levels such poor households can accumulate their own capital
to engage in employment creating economic activities (Hossain, 1988). Improved access to
credit is pivotal in channelling resources to more productive use and is an important
mechanism for enhancing household incomes and livelihoods (Atieno, 2001). Increasing
credit access helps economic units to take greater advantage of growth opportunities.
Doubling the credit flow to the private sector could also cause a 2% increase in the GOP
growth rate (Caprio and Honohan, 200 I) and as aptly argued by Melzer (2007) any
disruption to the level of credit supply is capable of affecting the level of economic activities
significantly.
Two schools of taught appear to exist with regards to the role of credit in economic
development. At one end of the spectrum, the variation in economic growth rates between
countries is attributed to the differences in the role of finance in capital accumulation. At the
other end of the spectrum is the argument that there are other more important factors
responsible for the variation in the economic growth rates observed between countries and
that finance only responds passively to these factors (King, and Levine, 1993). Credit speeds
up the growth by eliminating the impediments to small businesses, allowing firms to expand
operations and setting an equal platform for all economic agents to operate (Klapper et al.,
2004). Some empirical studies have also shown that a significant number of Small and
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are failing as a result of reasons other than the lack of funding
(Abor and Quartey, 2010). With the latter argument, the role of credit can only become
material in an economy where the enabling environment for investment already exists. This
means that without the right property rights enforcing systems, adequate socioeconomic and
legal infrastructure and macroeconomic policy framework, credit alone may fail to induce
the productive investments required to promote growth and poverty reduction (Oomeher and
Abdulai, 2012a). Since credit alone may not be sufficient to stimulate growth, the focus
probably needs to be broadened to include all those factors that influence the investment
decision of small businesses. Nonetheless, the role of credit in SME development continues
to take centre stage in the literature.
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The SMEs sector has often been described as the engine of growth in Africa. In the
developing countries, the sector has been a major source of livelihood to most of the poor
households, about 70% of whom are said to reside in the rural areas (Atieno, 2001). This
makes the sector key to rural development efforts. These small businesses usually are more
labour intensive and highly linked to the local industries; they contribute to skill
development in entrepreneurship and the spread of technology and as a result are very
important in ensuring broad based economic growth on equitable basis (Bahar, 2001). Their
ability to stabilise incomes and reduce the rate of rural urban migration deserves mentioning;
apart from being suppliers, SMEs play an equally important role as consumers of industrial
output to further stimulate growth of other sectors (Abor and Quartey, 2010). In addition to
their role as prolific creators of jobs, they are seen as the beginning of larger businesses as
well as the fuel for the overall economic engine (Abor and Biepke, 2006). SMEs account for
over 60% of GOP and over 70% of total employment in low-income countries, while they
contribute over 95% of total employment and about 70% of GOP in middle-income countries
(Ayyagari et al., 2003). In Ghana, 85% of manufacturing related employment comes from
the SMEs; they contribute 70% to GOP, constitute 92% of all businesses and make up 80%
of the private sector (Abor and Quartey, 2010). About 90% of businesses registered at the
registrar generals department are SMEs and 90% of the private sector consists of small
businesses (Mensah, 2004).
Having said that, there is no denying the fact that, small enterprises (SEs) are continually
besieged by several challenges which constrain their overall development. As a result, the
sector could only be described as one performing below its potential. The important
constraint factors include the following: (a) the unfriendly nature of the business
environment - unnecessary bureaucracy, complexity and high cost of business licensing, lack
of effective and fair enforcement of business laws and socio-political uncertainty; (b) the
Complex tariff and non-tariff barriers impeding access to important export markets; and (c)
the lack of management and marketing skill as well as the capacity to compete (Gockel and
Akoena, 2002; Salisu, 2006). The World Bank (2006) notes that, 60% of the most difficult
countries for starting a business are in Africa. For instance, regarding the cost and
complexity of business registration or licensing in Ghana, business owners go through about
16 different procedures lasting a total of four months and one week. Such frustrations and
the associated cost do not auger well for efforts to integrate SEs into the formal system. The
challenges encountered by SEs are by no means limited to the ones stated above. Indeed, the
most prominent of the problems not yet mentioned is the difficulty SEs have in accessing
credit.
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The problem of access to credit is reflected by the following: (a) about 66% of all
microenterprise loan applications are most likely to be turned down (Aryeetey, 1998); (b)
about 90% of SMEs consider access to credit as the main barrier to new investments; Cc)
most African businesses fail in their first year due to lack of financial support (Abor and
Biekpe, 2006); (d) the limited access to credit required to finance working capital and long
term investment is the major constraint to promoting SME-sector led economic growth in
developing countries (Kakuru, 2008); and (e) the success rate for firms applying for bank
loans is almost 70% for large firms as against 45% for small-scale enterprises and 34% for
microenterprises; in Ghana, it is estimated that 79% and 83% of micro and small scale
enterprises respectively face credit constraints compared to 62% and 68% in Malawi and
also, 90% and 72% ofSEs are credit constrained in Senegal and Mali respectively (Aryeetey,
1998). Six out of the 10 countries where credit is most difficult to get are in Africa (The
World Bank 2006). This is evidence of the existence of regional variation in the intensity of
the credit constraint problem. Given the above statistics, it must be pointed out that the real
problem is the extent of the credit constraint and not just the existence of the constraint itself.
Even though there may be some more fundamental reasons for a business failing to start or
progress, the lack of funds is often the most immediate reason (Abor and Quartey, 20 I0).
This is the case because, if SEs had adequate funding they would be able to cater for most of
the other fundamental problems that could potentially cause their collapse. As a result of the
credit constraint, the growth rate of small businesses is reduced by 10% and that of large
businesses by 6% (Beck et al., 2006c). In line with the above, improved access to credit for
SEs is pivotal in the fight against poverty. As aptly observed by Claessens (2006), credit
provides the ladder on which the poor can climb out of poverty.
Attempts to support SE development in Ghana have often led to various policy interventions
which amongst other things aim at: reducing collateral requirements; providing safeguards
for the credit delivery system; and promoting access to funds through various direct funding
schemes (Mensah, 2004). State intervention programs such as direct lending schemes are
often criticised as vehicles for channelling funds to political party or government loyalists.
Although in theory the direct lending schemes are meant to provide capital to the small scale
businesses, it only improves access to credit for the large scale businesses and influential
individuals to the detriment of the small scale businesses (Sonne, 2010). The sustainability of
such state programs has always been threatened by poor repayment by beneficiaries (Mensah,
2004). The repayment incentive for such loans is reduced by the borrowers' perception that
no serious attempts will be made to collect loans and this is worsened by state leniency
towards defaulting borrowers (Yaron, 1992). There is therefore substantial amount of moral
hazard associated with such government lending schemes. It appears the aim of liberalising
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the financial sector across the developing world was to deal at least partly with the effects of
repressive policies (which characterised various direct lending schemes) which stifled the
development of vibrant and efficient private sector financial institutions. The involvement of
the private sector commercial banks does not appear to have solved the problem of credit
access for many small businesses. As observed in Ghana by Abor and Biepke (2006), access
to credit by small businesses remains a big challenge despite the introduction of several
intervention schemes. So what is the cause ofthe credit constraint amongst SEs?
The causes of credit constraint among small businesses in the developing world are wide
ranging. Whilst bankers attribute the problem to the lack of viable or profitable projects,
business owners attribute it to the lack of collateral (Aryeetey, 1998). In Africa, Aryeetey et
al. (1997) and Atieno (2001) put the blame on the high fragmentation of the credit markets
into informal and formal segments - where each segment of the market focuses on meeting
the credit requirements of specific groups of potential borrowers. The consequence is that
there are some potential borrowers from one segment of the market (informal sector) who
need specific kinds of credit not provided by the sector and at the same time are considered
unqualified for formal sector credit. Information asymmetries, lack of collateral and high
transaction cost have also been identified as the factors responsible for the credit constraint
(Beck, 2007; Beck et al., 2007; Bester, 1985; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Pearce et al., 2004;
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The weak legal framework for contract enforcement in the
developing countries make banks shy away from taking the risk of lending to small
businesses (Claessens, 2006; Sacerdoti, 2005; Varon, 1992). The legal framework does not
only limit the kind of assets that can be used as collateral but may also make foreclosure very
difficult. It is argued that though banks can function without a good legal system and
property ownership system, their operations are largely constrained by it (Honohan and Beck,
2007).
An estimated 51% of all firms refused credit in Africa is as a result of insufficient collateral;
in East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as
South Asia, the estimates stand at 70%, 72%, 39% and 72% respectively (Fleisig, 2006). The
author adds that 19% of people who do not apply for credit in Africa do so because of the
high collateral requirements. It thus appears that collateral forms an integral part of the
requirements for credit across the developing world. There is the easy tendency to attribute
the collateral problem at least in part to the high poverty levels which make it impossible for
most people to acquire valuable assets that can be used as security for credit. However, the
lack of property per se is not seen as the main cause of the collateral problem by some
authors. As noted by de Soto (2000) the collateral problem is not one of lack of property per
se because even the poor in the developing countries possess some form of landed property
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but rather, it is the lack of registered and secure property titles which renders the otherwise
valuable property unacceptable for collateral purposes. This is echoed by Deininger (2003)
who estimates that over 50% of the total housing stock in Sub-Saharan Africa has no formal
registered titles compared to 45% in Asia and 25% in Latin America. Indeed, Besley (1994)
argues that the collateral problem is due to the absence of secure property rights on land
which remains the most valuable asset of most households and small businesses in the
developing world. Whilst L1anto (2007) argues that secure property rights are a basic
requirement for a collateral based banking system, Deininger (2003) observes that the
possession of registered property titles is a precondition for access to formal credit. In fact,
landed property constitute the main source of livelihood of most people in the developing
world and as Bell (2006) notes, it accounts for 50% to 75% of the national wealth in many
developing countries. A large percentage of the average household's asset portfolio
especially in the developing countries is said to be made up of land (Davies and Shorrocks,
2005). In the advanced economies, about 33% to 50% of the average household assets are
said to be made up of land (MacGee, 2006).
De Soto (2000) thus argues that the lack of registered property titles in the developing world
is the cause of the credit constraint problem. According to him, though many of the poor
people possess valuable landed property that could enhance their access to credit, such
properties are made defective by the absence of formally registered property titles over them.
De Soto argues that these properties are therefore not a secure form of collateral for lenders
to accept. To buttress this point he argues that property ownership in developing countries
cannot be traced or validated and that no legal protection or enforcement of property rights
exists and as a result, such properties cannot be easily converted into money (either through
sale or mortgage). Describing property in the developing world as dead capital, de Soto
observes that landed property performs simple functions such as farming and shelter in the
developing world where as in the developed world this role is extended to the creation of
capital for the enhancement of productivity through its use as collateral. For instance, in the
United States, mortgage is said to be the most important source of funding for start-up
businesses (de Soto, 2000). The implications of the above arguments are threefold: (a) that
collateral is a necessary requirement that must be met in order to obtain credit; (b) that the
possession of a registered property title is necessary to make landed property an acceptable
collateral asset; and (c) since landed property is not the only form of collateral that could be
used to secure credit, the arguments above also presume that lenders prefer landed property
to other forms of collateral.
Given the significant contribution of landed property to the overall wealth status of people,
promoting secure property rights in the developing world could have a wide-spread positive
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effect on the well-being of many by solving the collateral problem and subsequently
enhancing access to credit for most businesses and households. It is probably in this light
that insecure property rights are believed to be a major hindrance to economic development
in the third world (World Bank, 1975).
De Soto posits that the western world is highly capitalised and developed because of the
existence of comprehensive land registration; he attributes the existence of high levels of
poverty and underdevelopment in the developing countries to the fact that a very small
proportion of landed property ownership is registered. In reference to the failed attempt to
raise the level of development in the third world, de Soto notes that the " ... third
world ...nations have balanced their budgets, cut subsidies, welcomed foreign investment and
dropped tariff barriers. Their efforts have been repaid with bitter disappointment". In de
Soto's own words, " ... in the West, every parcel of land, every building .. .is represented in a
property document that connects all these assets to the rest of the economy. Thanks to this
representational process ... they can be used as collateral for credit. Third world nations do
not have this representational process. As a result, most of them are undercapitalised" and
hence underdeveloped. Commenting on the history of development in the advanced world
the author notes that "the pioneers who opened the American west were undercapitalised
because they seldom possessed title to the lands they settled". Furthermore, comparing the
developed and developing nations in terms of the developmental impacts of property
registration, de Soto notes that "assets in the developing ... nations primarily serve immediate
physical purposes. In the west however, the same assets also lead a parallel life as capital
outside the physical world. They can be used to put into motion more production by securing
the interest of other parties as collateral for a mortgage, or by assuring the supply of other
forms of credit".
The argument of de Soto and his followers thus presume that the possession of collateral or
registered property titles is the panacea to the problem of credit constraint in the developing
world as it guarantee access to credit and enhance growth and poverty reduction. According
to de Soto, it takes the implementation of landed property registration to (a) make property
rights secure and (b) fix their capital potential because such a formal property rights system:
lays down the code of best practice regarding the use and transfer of property; makes room
for recording and storing the economic features of assets into a system which is then
embodied in a title; this, allows for a validation of the existence of assets as well as the their
associated transactions required to discover the hidden capital in them (de Soto, 2000).
Indeed, it is believed that property registration does not only influence lenders to make credit
available to borrowers but also influences the terms of the credit offered. For instance, De
Laiglesia (2004) argues that property registration through its ability to raise land values and
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increase its liquidity influences credit terms by increasing the amount of credit that is made
available to borrowers as well as reducing the interest rate charged and other loan terms.
Whilst Field and Torrero (2004) for instance, found that loan applicants with registered
property faced lower interest rates than untitled applicants, Place and Migot-Adholla (1998)
found no evidence that land titles significantly alter the terms of formal sector loans.
The argument linking property registration to credit access is premised on its ability to
amongst other things, make property ownership secure and reduce the associated transaction
cost (Adams et al., 1999; Deininger and Chamorrow, 2002; Kakuru, 2008). The World Bank
in its 1975 Land Reform Policy Paper thus recommended among other things, property
registration as a critical precondition for investment and modem economic development
particularly in Africa (Bromley, 2008). It is therefore not surprising that many developing
countries backed by the international donor community, particularly, the World Bank, have
been religiously pursuing land registration policies and programmes for many years. In 2001
alone, the World Bank funded land policy and administration projects in the third world up
to the tune of US$195 million, 92% of which was for land registration and administration
projects (World Bank, 2007). Available data on the expenditure on land registration as at
2004 range from US$ 20.51 m in Ghana, US$ 27m in Malawi, US$ 106m in Bolivia,
US$ 140m in the Dominican republic to US$ 195m in Ukraine (Griffith-Charles, 2004). The
above arguments have led to a number of studies into the relationship between landed
property registration and secure land rights on one hand and access to credit on the other
hand. Whilst registration is seen by some authors as the panacea to the problem of landed
property ownership insecurity (Feder and Nishio, 1998; MacGee, 2006; Sims, 2002; World
Development Report, 2006; World Bank, 2007) there is another school of thought which
argues that registration per se cannot guarantee property ownership security (Abdulai and
Domeher, 2012; Deininger, 2003; Durand-Lasserve and Payne, 2006; Fitzpatrick, 2005).
Despite many years of implementing land registration programmes in the third world
countries, they remain poor and underdeveloped. Indeed, poverty levels have been escalating.
For example, during the past two decades, the number of poor people in Africa has doubled
representing more than 40% of the region's population (World Bank, 2007) and access to
credit appears to remain a distant dream to most businesses.
Furthermore, irrespective of the strong argument often put up in support of the credit effects
of landed property registration, Deininger and Goyal (2009) report that related empirical
studies are few, outdated or non-existent in some instances. The available empirical studies
carried out across countries often emerge with mixed findings or conclusions. While some
studies have established a significant positive relation between land registration and credit
access (Boucher et al., 2005; Feder et al., 1988), several other studies across the developing
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world found that either no relation at all exist between the two or the established impact on
credit access was found to be insignificant (Broegaard et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2006; Carter
and Olinto, 2003; Galeana, 2004; Gilbert, 2000; Mighot-Adholla et al., 1991; Pender and
Kerr, 1999; Petracco and Pender, 2009; Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998). Byamugisha (1999
aptly observes that studies on property registration and credit access often tend to focus on
one sector - agriculture and though other sectors are affected they are often not accounted
for. The other problem with the existing empirical research is that, they all often tend to be
demand side studies (involving borrowers) to the unfortunate neglect of the supply side
(lenders). The existing demand side studies are often focused on whether or not the
possession of registered titles encourages people to participate in the credit market by
applying for funds and whether one is more likely to obtain credit with/without registered
title. Such studies also tend to concentrate on studying households and not businesses. There
is a problem with focusing on only the demand side because access to credit is affected by
both demand and supply side factors. Whilst the demand side includes factors such as the
desire or need to borrow, the supply side involve the decision of whether to lend or not and
how much to lend (Chen and Chivakul, 2008). Atieno (2001) also argues that credit
constraint is mainly a function of the supply side and not the demand side.
Therefore, there is the need to examine the supply side in order to obtain a complete picture
of the landed property rights and credit access nexus. Though people may be encouraged to
apply for credit on receiving a registered titles, whether or not they actually get the required
funds will depend on the action of the lenders. There is thus the need to study how the
possession of title also influences the lender. It appears that the only study that considered
the supply side is the pilot study by Abdulai and Hammond (2010) in Ghana. Previous
studies have also focused only on the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin
America. This highlights the need for a similar study in the developed countries. Studies that
have systematically investigated the link between landed property registration and access to
formal credit on a comparative basis between the developing and developed countries are
also notably non-existent. In addition, though businesses in the developing countries are
almost always associated with credit constraints, Berg (2010) argues that very little robust
evidence of this exists. Also, though studies (cited earlier) have revealed that most SEs are
credit constrained, it is worth mentioning that there are various dimensions of the credit
access problem and in Ghana, the exact nature of this constraint (whether it is a demand or
supply side problem) is not known. In order to tackle the problem of credit constraint, its
nature must be well understood. There is thus the need to for a demand side study into the
nature of the credit constraint amongst SEs in Ghana. Finally, no previous study has looked
at both the demand and supply sides of the credit market.
8
1.2 Research Questions
In the light of the preceding discourse, there are a number research questions that arise; these
include the following:
• What is the nature of the SE credit constraint problem in Ghana?
• Is collateral always necessary when dealing with SEs?
• Do lenders prefer landed property to other forms of collateral?
• Must landed property be registered to make it eligible for collateral purposes?
• Does the provision of registered landed property guarantee access to credit?
• Are there differences in the credit terms offered to registered and unregistered
landed property owners?
• Is there a significant difference between the developed and developing countries
regarding the credit effects of landed property registration?
• Is property registration the solution to poverty in the developing world?
• Do all advanced countries have comprehensive land registration systems?
• Are the advanced countries developed because of land registration?
1.3 Aim and Objectives
FoIIowing the research questions identified above, this research aims at investigating the
influence of registered landed property titles on access to SEs credit on a comparative basis
between Ghana and England. To achieve this aim the following individual objectives were
pursued:
• To investigate the nature of the credit constraint amongst SEs in Ghana.
• To examine what influence landed property registration has on SEs access to credit.
• To assess the underlying factors responsible for turning down SE credit demand and
the importance of landed property registration relative to other factors.
• To examine if a significant difference exist between the two countries with regards
to the credit effects of property registration.
Though this is a comparative study between Ghana and England the first objective above
focuses on only Ghana since the credit constraint problem is more pronounced in the Ghana.
Also, though the credit constraint in the developing nations is attributed to the lack of
registered titles, the exact nature of this constraint in the developing world such as Ghana is
not known. Finally, the main focus of this study was the supply side of the mortgage market,
there was thus no need to do a comparative study on the demand side.
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1.4 Methodology
There are three main research paradigms/approaches that could be adopted in conducting any
social research. These are the quantitative (positivist), qualitative (interpretive) and the
multi- methodology (pragmatic) approaches. The positivist approach assumes that
knowledge is real, and can be objectively measured in a manner which does not allow the
researcher's values to influence the process or the outcome; it therefore, emphasises on
numerical measurement of verifiable facts (Newman, 2007). Research under the positivist
paradigm is generally based on causal principle using a logical deductive approach with the
help of quantitative variables and statistical procedures (Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2009). On
the other hand, the qualitative approach regards reality as a social construct that can be
understood by studying people's beliefs, perceptions and reactions to various phenomena
(Bryman, 2008; Newman, 2007). The focus is usually not to test theories but rather to
develop them. The third approach (multi-methodology) involves the use of the above two
approaches in a single study which helps to off-set the weaknesses of using any single
approach in isolation (Creswell, 2009).
The multi-methodology was considered most appropriate for this research. The quantitative
approach was first used to investigate all of the stated objectives. Surveys involving officials
from various financial institutions were conducted in both Ghana and England. A separate
form of survey was also conducted amongst proprietors of SEs in Ghana to help determine
the nature of the credit constraint. Subsequently, the study employed both the quantitative
and qualitative approaches to validate the initial quantitative findings. In this case, the
quantitative approach was used to validate the findings on the nature of the credit constraint
in Ghana whilst the qualitative approach was used to validate all the other findings. The
qualitative approach involved the conduct of semi-structured interviews amongst loans
managers and business managers. The quantitative and qualitative data collected were
analysed with the help of SPSS and Nvivo respectively. Further details on the methodology
are provided in chapter five.
1.5 Significance of the Study
Even though there are studies on SE financing in the developing countries and particularly
Ghana, such studies fall short of revealing the true nature of the problem of access to finance.
The significance of this study therefore lies in the fact that, firstly, it fills in this knowledge
gap and provides clear evidence for the design of more appropriate policies that will target
the right sections of the credit market to produce better effects regarding the reduction of the
severity of the credit constraint problem. It also provides evidence on the relative importance
of property registration in causing the credit constraint problem. The findings thus provide
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Policy makers with a guide on the set of actions that could generate greater impacts on credit
access. It would also allow policy makers to promote landed property registration based on
its ability to facilitate ownership verification and related transaction but not on the basis of
the wrong assumption that it guarantees access to credit. The benefit of this study to
academia is not only derived from the fact that it adds to the existing literature on property
registration and credit access but also provides direction for future research. Finally the
financial institutions could benefit from the recommendations of this study.
1.6 Research Scope
The aim was to conduct a comparative study between a developed and developing country
on the second and third objectives stated in section 1.3 above. For the sake of convenience,
Ghana and England were selected to represent the developing and developed countries
respectively. The author's nationality as a Ghanaian and previous experience as an employee
in one of the Ghanaian financial intuitions influenced the choice of Ghana as his previous
contacts in industry were influential in recruiting respondents for all stages of the study.
Secondly, Ghana is one of the developing countries that started implementing land
registration programs since the pre-colonial era. However, several decades after the
introduction of such programs access to small business credit continues to be a problem
which makes it a fertile ground for this study. The selection of England was for the
convenience since the research was carried out in a university in England.
In Ghana there are ten administrative regions. Currently land title registration covers only
two of the ten administrative regions in Ghana (these are the Greater Accra and the Ashanti
regions). Even though other parts of the country are covered by deed registration,
Zevenbergen (2002) laments that its operations are over centralised in Accra (capital city of
Ghana) with only six deed registries in the whole country. Hence, the choice was between
only two regions - Greater Accra and Ashanti regions. The Ashanti region was eventually
selected by simple random sampling and the study was limited to the capital - Kumasi. The
choice of Kumasi was based on the author's familiarity with the area. Kumasi is widely
regarded as the second largest commercial city (after Accra) in the country and also the
second most populated. In England the study was limited to the North West which consists
of five counties: Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Lancashire and Cheshire. The
final sample was taken from only three of these counties - Merseyside, Lancashire and
Cheshire. The study covered all the research questions raised in section 1.2 except the last
three. It is also worth stating that though this study is about access to credit, the focus is on
access to formal credit and not informal credit. Finally, credit extended to SEs for investment
was the other focus of the study and the interest was not on personal or large corporate credit.
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There is no universal definition for SEs. Different criteria (such as number of employees,
turnover, and value of fixed assets) have been used by researchers and this may vary across
countries. In the developing countries for instance, UNIOO classifies businesses with 5-19
employees as SEs and below 5 employees as micro enterprises -MEs (Abor and Quartey,
2010). According to Abor and Quartey (2010) the Ghana Statistical Service classifies all
businesses with less than 10 employees as SEs; the Regional Project on Enterprise
Development Ghana manufacturing survey paper also classifies businesses with 5-29
employees as SEs whilst the National Board for Small Scale Industries - NBSSI, defines SEs
as businesses with nine or less employees as well as those with plant and machinery valuing
up to 10 million Ghana cedis. The number of employees appears to be the widely used
criteria in Ghana for defining SEs. Given that majority of the respondents in this survey were
traders (who typically do not employ large numbers of people) the definition by the Ghana
Statically Service was more suitable and was adopted in this study.
In the developed countries however, UNIOO defines SEs as businesses with up to 99
employees (Abor and Quartey, 2010). According to McQuaid (2003) the European
Commission defines them as businesses with employees ranging from 10-49 and businesses
with less than 10 employees as MEs whilst medium enterprises are defined as those with 50-
249 employees. In the UK, Urwin et al (2008) define SMEs as those generally having less
than 250 employees; and within this SME category, firms with I to 49 employees are
'Smail', whilst 'Micro' enterprises are those that employ less than 10 employees. The
contrast is thus clear that what is considered a small enterprise in the UK based on the
criteria above will be a medium or large enterprise in Ghana.
1.7 Limitations of the Study
The findings from the study cannot be said to be totally representative of the practices in the
developed and developing countries. As noted earlier, the data was obtained from only three
counties in England and one administrative region in Ghana. Having said that, the general
principles of lending tend to be the same within any given bank irrespective of which branch
one submits a credit application and this may permit the results to be generalised within each
case study area. However generalisation outside the case study countries must be done with
caution since specific practices of funding institutions may differ across countries.
Furthermore, there were some data inadequacies when it came to conducting the factor
analysis. Given the number of variables involved a higher sample size was required. As a
result some of the initial variables (about four of them) were dropped in an effort to improve
on the sampling adequacy for the factor analysis. The consequence is that the eventual factor
analysis did not include all the important variables. However, given the level of secrecy
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amongst funding institutions and the fact that supply side studies of this nature are virtually
non-existent, any data obtained irrespective of how small it may be, should be considered
very valuable.
The results also show that most of the businesses in this study generate very small amounts
of cash per month. Using cash amounts generated per month as a proxy for the size of the
business, the business in this study could be classified as micro-enterprises. The focus should
not have been limited to these businesses only as relatively larger businesses do appear
significantly different on the issues of credit worthiness and access to credit. Furthermore,
other business owners (such as building contractors, transport and hotel service providers)
that are quiet visible in the Kumasi metropolis were not considered. These other lines of
business tend to be larger in terms of the income they generate and should have been given
some consideration.
1.8 Organisation of the Thesis
The thesis has been structured into eight chapters. Apart from the introduction in chapter one,
chapters two to four cover literature review on various topics. Chapter two focuses on the
economics of property rights. The concept of property registration, its significance and
limitations are discussed in chapter three. Chapter four presents the theoretical framework
for this study whilst the methodology is discussed in chapter five. The results of the
quantitative and qualitative data collected are presented and discussed in chapter six and
seven respectively. Finally, the summary, conclusion and recommendations for policy and
further research are outlined in chapter eight. Below is a schematic representation of the
whole thesis
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CHAPTER2
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
The assertion that landed property has always remained an important productive resource
and great symbol of wealth in the history of mankind is common knowledge. As a result,
how much land one owns, the manner in which it is owned and the enforceability of
ownership rights are key factors that could influence productive investment, household
incomes and poverty reduction. It is therefore imperative to explore the systems of property
rights that exist to provide an understanding of the extent to which they mayor may not be a
disincentive to investment. The next section therefore looks at the definition of property
rights; section 2.2 discusses land tenure security and its various dimensions; the economic
implications of property rights systems are examined in section 2.3 and the summary of the
chapter is provided in section 2.4.
2.1 Defining Property Rights
Property is often thought of as a thing; according to Anderson and Huggins (2009) it
involves more than just tangible things like real estate and includes intangibles like
intellectual property. A right on the other hand is an entitlement to perform or not to perform
certain actions (Leif, 2011) and as Abdulai (2010) aptly observes, it reflects a sense of duty,
coercion and also restitution whenever violations occur. Therefore, pulling the two together,
one could say that whilst property refers to a tangible or intangible thing, a right establishes
the relationship between people and things in terms of who has an entitlement to the 'thing'.
The definition of property rights may not be entirely straight forward as one may expect.
Cole and Grossman (2002) lament the diverse and often inconsistent definitions of the
concept in economic literature and the fact that the concept appears to have contradictory
meanings when looked at from the economic and legal perspectives. The legal conception of
property rights as explained by the Hohfeldian theory of correlative property rights and
duties, is summarised by Cole and Grossman (2002, p. 318) as follows
.. .if one person holds a "right" to some-thing, at least one other person must have a
corresponding duty not to interfere with her possession and use, if she claims a
"right," but cannot point to a corresponding" duty" that is enforceable against at least
one other person, then what she possesses may not be a "right" at all but some lesser
entitlement such as a privilege, liberty, or mere use.
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... to claim that an industrial facility has a right to emit noxious substances into the
air would necessarily be to claim that others have an enforceable duty not to
interfere with their polluting activity.
From the perspective of this theory the term right has often been used very loosely in
economic literature to include lesser interests such as mere privileges, powers or immunity;
therefore to establish a true right, there is the need to identify another person with a
corresponding duty. Hence for every enforceable right, there must be a corresponding and
legally enforceable duty. The difference between rights on one hand and privileges or
liberties on the other hand is that having a liberty or privilege to something does not imply
that someone has the duty not to interfere since others may have the same privileges.
According to Cole and Grossman (2002) property rights economists try to distinguish
between economic rights and legal rights. For instance, as argued by one property rights
economist Barzel {I997), though a thief may not have legal rights to a property he
nonetheless has economic rights as evidenced in his ability to enjoy the stolen property,
prevent others from enjoying it, transfer it to others through sale or earn income from it
(which are all essential characteristics of property rights). Having the right to do something
is essentially different from being merely able to do it. Whilst these economists think of
property rights as arising from individual choices and claims, from the legal perspective,
property rights arise from legal and social recognition. In the words of Cole and Grossman
(2002, p. 325) "a claim only becomes a right when it is socially and legally recognised as
such"; and the mere use or control of something should not be seen as a right to it. The
economic and legal definitions are complementary to each other. This is because legal
recognition and enforcement gives rights a better economic value and without the ability to
use or control resources legal recognition may not be enough.
Therefore, Bromley (2005) defines property rights as a formal or informal institutional
arrangement that governs access to property and other resources as well as the claims on the
resources and their related benefits. Hence, the role of institutions (formal or informal)
cannot be ignored if a functional property right regime is to be established. Such institutions
will be needed for the purpose of setting the standards and enforcing them. When property
rights are properly assigned and enforced the rights holders have the consent of others that
permit them to act in certain ways in relation to the property. At the same time, other
individuals or members of the community are expected to prevent anybody from interfering
with the exercise of anyone's rights given that the manner in which such rights are exercised
is not prohibited (Demsetz, 1967). The above definitions draw a very close connection
between property rights and the legal system. In fact the legal system in part defines and
enforces property rights. Anderson and Huggins (2009, p. 2) sums up this argument by
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defining property rights as "the rules of the game that determine who gets to do what and
who must compensate whom if damages occur". It has also been argued that property rights
may exist without the law as physical force and strong traditions could be used to control
ownership of resources (Foss, and Foss, 2005). Even though Barzel (1997) agrees with this
notion, he rightly points out that the value of property rights is largely enhanced when they
are sanctioned and enforced by the law. Property ownership is about a set of 12 different
rights that can be exercised over a property which according to Honore (1961) include these.
• The right to possess or exclude
• The right to manage - ability to decide how the property should be used and by
whom.
• The right to income -benefits of forgoing personal use in favour of other people.
• The right to capital- the ability to transfer, consume, waste, modify or destroy.
• The right to security - ability to enjoy protection against expropriation.
• The right to transmissibility - ability to bequeath.
• The right to divisibility - ability to divide in any way desirable.
• The right to prohibit harmful use - responsibility to use in a manner not detrimental
to others.
• The right to absence of terms or duration - indeterminate length of ownership rights.
• The right of Liability to execution - liability to have ones land taken away for the
repayment of a debt or to satisfy a lawful action.
• The right to residual character - the right to reversion of lapsed ownership and
• Usufruct rights - right to use and personal enjoyment without interference
Each individual right above describes a different aspect of property ownership. The general
explanation of property rights above can be applied to any property. Applying them to
landed property, one can talk of property rights to land, land tenure or land ownership.
Therefore, land tenure or ownership is nothing but property rights in relation to land. This
includes the principles and underlying guidelines for land holding, usage and transactions
(Mzumara, 2003). Whenever the term land tenure or ownership is used one thing should be
noted, that, the thing that is actually owned is the set of rights to the land not the land itself;
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consequently what is owned is a social recognition of the right to undertake certain actions
(AIchian and Demsetz, 1973) and of course a legal recognition as explained earlier to relate
to the land in a certain manner.
2.2 Property Ownership Security
The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in its 2008 policy document
defines property right security as the enforceable claims on land where enforcement
emanates from national laws or local rules and where such local rules are supported by the
national laws - it refers to people's recognized ability to control and manage land. In other
words security refers to the certainty that a person's land rights will be recognized by law
and, especially, by members of the society and protected when there are disputes or
challenges to such rights (FAO, 2005; Abdulai, 2010). Security of land tenure therefore
involves two forms of validation or recognitions - state validation by legal recognition and
validation at the local level through recognition of one's rights by one's neighbours and
others based on a given set of values (Toulmin, 2008). These two forms of validation must
be both present to make property rights function most effectively. Without recognition at the
local level for instance, legal recognition alone may only succeed in making otherwise
legitimate rights illegal whilst local recognition alone may be weakened without the backing
of the national legal framework. In the absence of legal recognition many legitimate property
owners may be cut off from the formal economy. Integrating local values on property
ownership into the national legal framework will be the way to achieve both forms of
recognition.
Security has also been used to refer to a protected land ownership which cannot be
challenged or disputed (Petracco and Pender, 2009). Any set of actions geared towards
protecting ones ownership rights could be said to be promoting security. Hence where
ownership is secure, related rights are protected against counter claims from other
individuals, institutions and even government. Once this kind of protection is attained then,
the possibility of losing one's rights should be non-existent. Security also appears to be more
about people's perceptions or expectation about possible changes in their ownership status.
As Roth and Haase (1998) aptly observe security is a kind of perception held by individuals
regarding their ability to exercise their rights both now and in the future in a manner that is
devoid of interferences from others and at the same time allows them to benefit from any
investment made on the land. De Souza (1999) describes it as the perception regarding the
likelihood of eviction or expropriation. Individual views on the likelihood of losing their
land rights vary across persons, time and space; such perceptions are not static neither are the
factors that influence them. Perception is a subjective and qualitative variable; it is not like
temperature that can be measured by a thermometer. Different individuals with the same
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kind of land related characteristics are likely to exhibit different security sentiments.
However, how secure people feel their rights are, could arguably be observed indirectly as it
tends to be reflected in their actions and or inactions regarding investment.
Bloch (2003) however argues that security is objective and quantifiable. Those who believe
security can be measured often use various proxies of security such as the incidence of land
disputes and the possession of legal documentary evidence of ownership inter alia. The
possession of documentary evidence is strongly linked to the legal perspective of security as
articulated by Bruce (1998) and Roth and Haase (1998). The lawyers are more interested in
how to defend/argue cases in the law courts. A lot of the arguments are based on facts and
the ability to provide hard evidence to proof one's case beyond all reasonable doubts. To
such a group of people, the attainment of security is synonymous to the ability of property
owners to provide proof of their rights in the form of accepted documents issued by the state
agencies and with the backing of the law. Based on this legal perspective of security, an
attempt has been made by Wannasai and Shrestha (2007) to classify security of land tenure
into three levels as follows: (a) secure; (b) temporary secure; and (c) insecure. By the above
classification rights are described as secure if the owner has a formal land certificate as proof
of ownership usually issued by the appropriate land sector agency in this case the department
of lands. This category or level of security appears to be the ultimate (security is 100%) as it
is argued that it gives the landowner an unrestricted right to sell, transfer and bequeath the
property. The second level of security (temporary secure) is described as inferior to the first
and is attained when the land owner has other documents inferior to the ones stated in (a)
above as proof of ownership and these are documents which only grant the right to use and
inherit. Finally, rights are classified as insecure where there are no documents that are
recognised as a proof of one's ownership of a property.
By this classification it is only the possession of formally registered property titles that
qualifies one's rights to be classified as secure. Clearly, the basis of this classification is
flawed as documentary proof of ownership should not be equated to security at all. This is
because despite holding a certificate of ownership, different people are likely to exhibit
differences in their perceptions of how secure their rights are. This is particularly true in
parts of the developing world such as Ghana, where people have lost their land rights despite
possessing documentary proof of ownership. Secondly, in places where land disputes exist or
once existed, the history of the dispute and how it was resolved in the past may in itself
trigger a sense of insecurity even though people may possess documentary proof of
ownership. Furthermore, security is about both legal and societal recognition hence even
where the possession of documentary evidence provides land owners with the legal
recognition, it is unable to provide the social recognition and as such cannot be equated to
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security. Documentation per se should not be pursued with the aim of making property
ownership secure but to provide evidence of secure ownership. Apart from the legal
perspective of security, Bruce (1998) and Roth and Haase (1998) also explain the economists
perspective as follows: Unlike the lawyers, economists have a much broader conception of
land tenure security. To the economists, security involves three things: (a) the legal aspect;
(b) duration of the tenure - depth of rights; and (c) the scope or breadth of rights. Duration is
about how long one can exercise one's rights to a property to allow for the reaping of any
investments made - security is thus considered to be the degree of confidence with which
right holders expect to reap the fruits of their investments. Duration is important for investors
because it may take some time before their investments begin to generate enough returns to
at least cover initial cost and subsequently make reasonable profits. Therefore, from the
perspective of the economist, if property holders can exercise their rights for a considerable
period of time that will allow them to enjoy the fruits of their labour then the ownership
could be said to be secure. Thus any set of rights to property that can only be exercised over
a short duration which does not allow the benefits of investments to be reaped are regarded
insecure.
Though an individual may possess a legal documentary proof of right(s) to land, hislher
ownership may still be regarded insecure from the economist perspective if the duration of
the right(s) is short relative to the kind of investments the individual wants to undertake on
the land. Having said that, it should then be recognised that what is regarded as short or long
duration of tenure is dependent on the kind of investments the individual wishes to pursue.
This aspect of ownership security is often linked to the debate on the relationship between
security and investment; the kind of investment activity undertaken is seen to depend on the
duration of rights. The scope of land rights on the other hand, refers to the bundle or
combination of various individual rights that one possesses. Ownership is about the exercise
of a series of rights; one may only possess the right to use and or occupy a property but
cannot transfer or mortgage this land to another person or institution. If an individual does
not possess certain rights which are considered key to undertake certain economic decisions,
then hislher tenure is said to be insecure because he/she can only use the land in a limited
way. In terms of stimulating long term investments, the possession of certain strands of right
such as the right to bequeath is seen as very essential and as such, individuals who have only
use rights may nurture some sense of insecurity due to the restrictiveness in scope of their
land rights.
From earlier explanations of security, the economists perspectives on the duration or scope
of rights do not seem to matter in determining whether one's rights are secure or not.
Irrespective of how short the tenure may be or the limited scope of the rights, all that matters
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is for people to be assured that whatever rights they possess will be protected and enforced in
the time period within which they are valid. In the words of Bruce (1998, p. 2 ) " ... the tenure
itself may be short, for instance, a lease for one month, but if the leaseholders can be certain
that they will be able to keep the land for the one month, then the tenure is secure". The
duration and scope of rights could influence investor attitudes but the fact that one has a
longer duration and broader scope of rights does not make such rights secure if they are not
legally and socially recognised. However once an individual's rights are recognised both
legally and socially, he will choose the appropriate investment to match the scope and
duration of his rights.
Putting together both the legal and economist perspectives Place (2009) describes secure
property rights as a collection of rights in land along various dimensions including: type of
rights, breadth and duration of rights and the certainty with which these rights could be
exercised. It appears, however, that the emphasis on securing land rights has been skewed
towards the legal conception of security. Hence the legal definition of secure property rights
is what dominates the literature. A number of themes have emerged from the above
explanations of property rights security which include: legal and societal recognition;
protection and enforcement as well as perception of certainty regarding the above. Land
rights thus become insecure when: (a) they are not recognised by both the legal machinery
and local values; (b) they are not protected and enforced formally and informally and (c)
when there is a feeling of uncertainty regarding the recognition, protection and enforcement
of rights. Drawing from the arguments in the literature above, property ownership security in
this study will be used to refer to the perception of the likelihood that an individual's right to
a property will be protected and enforced both legally and socially irrespective of the scope
and duration of such rights. The element of enforceability in property ownership security is
very important. Thus, where rights are unenforceable, land owners are faced with a clear
case of insecurity (Kvitashvili, 2004). The answer to securing property rights partly lies in
this adopted definition and partly in the causes of insecurity or disputes.
One of the key elements required to strengthen property ownership security is the formal and
informal recognition of an individual's rights. Any set of policies that provide only formal
recognition whilst neglecting the informal recognition as argued earlier will fail to guarantee
security. In the absence of informal recognition (which is based on what the society
perceives as acceptable per their values) formal recognition alone is a recipe for greater
insecurity. The way forward could be to provide formal recognition to traditional property
rights systems by incorporating them into the law and any land formalisation programs
instead of trying to completely replace them. The second essential element of security
identified earlier is the element of enforceability of rights. Any given property rights system
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requires good level of enforcement of rights to make it effective (Anderson and Huggins,
2009). It goes without saying that the law or traditional values will be useless if they are not
well enforced. Commitment to consistent enforcement of rights will boost people's
confidence - an important component of security. One cannot be absolutely certain that
disputes will not occur but when rights are well enforced then even during disputes such
rights will be protected. Establishing well-equipped institutions for resolving disputes could
go a long way to help enhance security. This gives individuals the assurance that they will
not lose their rights and even when they do lose such rights, they are assured of some
reasonable form of compensation. This is what gives investors the confidence to commit
resources to productive use in the medium to long term.
Land disputes (an indicator of insecurity) could emanate from issues related to property
boundary demarcations; for instance a study in Kenya by Yamano and Deininger (2005)
found that though there were conflicts relating to property inheritance and sales, about half
of the land conflicts were made up of conflicts over boundaries that occur mainly with
neighbours. If clear property boundaries cannot be established then how can the associated
rights be enforced? To make enforcement easier, property rights must be well defined and in
this case, proper demarcation of property boundaries is a requirement for enhancing security.
It is in this light that Abdulai and Domeher (2012a) advocate for the replacement of
traditional methods of boundary demarcation based on temporary features such as footpaths,
rivers, trees etc. with more permanent boundaries properly surveyed with accompanying
maps and plans. Alternatively, Abdulai (2010) advocates for title insurance as practiced in
the United States and Canada as a way of promoting security. However, title insurance
carries with it similar cost implications often blamed for the failure of related programs in
the developing world. Its impact may therefore be insignificant in the developing world for
lack of wide-spread patronage.
2.3 The Economic Implications of Property Right Systems
Property rights as already observed play or have a major role to play in the economic
development process of a country through its provision of the necessary incentives required
for productive investment. This is however, believed to vary depending on the property
rights system that exist in an area as some property rights regimes are considered to be a
disincentive to investments. The World Bank (1997) points out that sustainable development
as well as efficient and equitable use of resources depends very much on the manner in
which property rights are defined and distributed. As far as landed property is concerned,
Feder and Feeny (1991) identify four kinds of property rights regimes and these are as
follows: open access, communal property, state and private property right systems.
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2.3.1 Open access and communal property rights
Under an open access property rights regime, no rights are assigned to any parcel of land but
rather as the name suggest, it is open to all to use in any manner as and when required. No
individual or group of individuals can exclude another from using the property. Feder and
Feeny, (1991) argue that such a system is a disincentive for conservation, the consequence of
which is degradation. This argument appears to make economic sense. Economic literature
shows that people tend to pursue their self-interest in their use and allocation of resources to
maximise their economic benefits and are thus likely to care less about what happens to other
parties. In a system of open access benefits arising from resource use accrue only to the
individual but part of the cost or effects may be borne by other individuals and the
community as a whole. The presence of such negative externalities implies that the
individual does not pay for or face the full cost of their actions and is thus more likely to
engage in unsustainable practices or use of the resource. The outcome is usually
overexploitation of the resource, quick degradation, and poor resource conservation. This
kind of system may only exist in areas where land is in abundant supply (Feder and Feeny,
1991). Therefore, Platteau (1996) argues that with abundant availability of land the absence
of property rights does not pose any damaging consequences for resource use. This is
probably because abundance of the resource gives it a low economic value and hence no
'rush' to exploit it.
In a communal property rights system, rights are assigned to a whole group other than an
individual and according to Feder and Feeny (1991) where such a group is so large it
becomes similar to an open access system. No one individual within the assigned group has
the right of exclusion and the resource use is based on first-come first-serve basis; others can
only be excluded through prior and continuous use of the resource (AJchian and Demsetz,
1973). This implies that once the resource is abandoned or not in use anymore, the previous
user cannot prevent anybody within that community or group from using it.
Communal rights are also exposed to the same issue of negative externalities explained
under the open access system; but one can think of the problem to be less pronounced under
a communal system than in an open access system since rights are limited to certain group of
people only. One way to tackle this problem of externalities according to AJchian and
Demsetz (1973) is to allow a communal right to the benefits arising from individual resource
use. If other individuals will suffer the consequences of one person's use of a common
resource, then it makes sense for such victims to also partake in the enjoyment of the
associated benefits generated. If no individual possesses the exclusive right to the benefits
derived from their resource use there will be no incentive for over-exploitation and this is
expected to effectively reduce the external cost of individual actions. As appealing as this
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argument may look, it is possible that such a move may also lead to under-utilisation of the
resource which in itself may not auger well for the economic wellbeing of the whole society
as it could lead to a situation whereby people are starving in a resource rich environment.
This is because the right to exclude other individuals from the benefit of one's resource use
appears to provide a strong incentive for people to work harder and to be more productive.
The economic being is self-centred and the absence of exclusive rights may thus discourage
sufficient individual effort required to maximise economic returns from available resources.
Another important question to ask is how the benefits will be shared between those
generating the benefits and those who contributed nothing to the generation of these benefits.
The argument even appears very unsustainable the larger the community becomes.
As a way of tackling the externality problem in a communal rights system, Alchian and
Demsetz (1973) alternatively call for individual resource use to be strongly regulated by the
state or influenced by strong adherence to culture. In small communities the cost of
regulating land use tends to be minimal as the community members know themselves and
intruders are easily recognised and it is easier to restrict individual land use to reduce
potential negative externalities (Feder and Feeny, 1991). Though the community is able to
reduce the external cost by agreeing on common rules for resource use, Demsetz (1967)
notes that, in large communities the cost of negotiations, implementation and monitoring
could be very high making regulation extremely difficult if not impossible. Informal
regulation as a solution to the externalities problem is more applicable to very remote and
sparsely populated rural areas where land remains sufficiently abundant and where there is
still a strong adherence to traditions. Given the difficulties that may be associated with
regulating resource use, Coase (1960) proposes that instead of relying on state intervention
in tackling the externality problem, all parties should be allowed to engage in negotiations or
voluntary exchange of resource rights assuming that transactions cost is zero. Depending on
the cost and benefits balance between the parties, the victims may be prepared to pay others
to stop producing the externality or the producer may pay the victims to waive their right to
stop the production of the externality. There are however, important question to ask on
coase's proposition. For instance, even if the victims are prepared to pay, is it fair to do so?
What about the vulnerable groups who cannot afford? Reliance on this kind of approach may
provide the powerful elites in society the license to undertake undesirable activities. Given
the problems associated with the open or communal right systems and the difficulty in
dealing with them the introduction of private property rights is seen as the best remedy.
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2.3.2 Private property rights system
A private property rights system unlike the communal and open access systems assigns the
exclusive rights to individuals. The individual is able at least in principle to prevent others
from using or benefiting from the property concerned. With private rights people try to
maximise the present value of their properties by taking into consideration the future stream
of returns and cost in their use of the property; by so doing, Demsetz (1967) believes that
private rights induce people to consider the social cost of their actions. Individualisation of
property rights to a large extent internalises the externalities associated with resource use
because unlike the communal system where individuals enjoyed the benefits of resource use
alone but pass on the cost to the rest of the society, when rights are privately assigned, the
owner bears both the cost and benefits associated with resource depletion. For instance
mismanagement of the resource will be most costly to the individual as that may affect
income levels now or in the future hence people are more likely to make judicious use of
such resources to minimise the cost.
Demsetz (1967) does concede however that some external cost may still exist even under
private property rights. This is because each individual only has control over his own parcel
and cannot interfere with the way another person exercises his private right. Therefore each
individual may act without considering how his actions may affect other rights owners.
Oestereich (2000) argues that private property rights do not always provide for resource
conservation and sustainability as thought; in fact the degradation of the Mediterranean
during the era of the Romans was the result of the activities of profit-seeking private mine,
forest and land owners. In further support of this point Oestereich states that, applying the
concept of unrestricted control over property to land tends to be insensitive towards the
environment and could subsequently destroy the available natural resources base. This
appears to contradict the general perception that externalities are internalised by assigning
property rights to private individuals. These externalities are however much smaller than that
in the open access and communal system. The private property rights and sustainable
resource use argument is usually made possibly with the assumption that all individuals are
'rational' and will allocate their resources in a way that will take into consideration the future.
However, in economic sense, a 'rational' individual could be seen as one who seeks to
maximise returns from resource use and such profit motives (especially in the short term)
may be inconsistent with conservation and sustainability. Individual rights undoubtedly will
make people more long term minded hence more sustainable in resource use.
Apart from its ability to at least minimise the externalities problem and enhance
sustainability in resource use, private property rights also work to lower resource transaction
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cost and makes such transactions both easier and faster. The extract below taken from the
work of Abdulai (20 I0) explains how this works:
IfA, an owner of private land right, in the process of tilling a parcel of land to grow
rice observes B, another owner of private land right constructing a dam across a
stream on another parcel of land contiguous 10 his, he (A) might prefer the stream as
it is and will ask B to stop the construction of the dam. B might agree to stop the
construction of the dam on condition that A pays him. IfA accepts and pays B, B will
stop. Another alternative is for A to buy off B completely. In either case, it will be a
simple negotiation between two parties and the transaction costs here will be low.
however, if A and B were owners of communal rights in land, B might stop the
construction of the dam if A pays him but since it is a communal property B cannot
guarantee that another engineer C will not take up the task; A and B have no right to
exclude C. This will involve a complex negotiation between A and invariably
everyone else and the transaction costs will be very high
2.3.3 Property ownership in Africa
Torhonen (2004) classifies property ownership in Africa into statutory and customary: a
statutory system exist where there are well written or documented rules which set the
guidelines for land ownership or define the exact relation between land and people; on the
other hand, customary tenure exist where these rules are based on custom and recognised by
the society even though they are not formally documented (informal). Based on this
explanation, property ownership in Africa could be described as predominantly customary.
For instance, about 80% of the land in Ghana is classified under customary tenure (Toulmin,
2008). In sub-Saharan Africa, customary landownership comprises lands vested in
communities or groups of people represented by their chiefs and families as well as
individual ownership; it is thus a dual system involving both communal and private
ownership (Abdulai, 20 I0). Having said that, it appears the former is more prominent than
the latter.
Landed property ownership in Africa has often been associated with certain characteristics
some which are worth mentioning. It is regarded as communal and as such, though the
individual may have the right to occupy and use land, the exclusive right and right to transfer
remains with the whole family or community (Payne, 2001; Torhonen, 2004). Platteau (1996)
as a result, describes the property ownership in Africa as a system in which individual rights
are still maturing. It may be rather too extreme to argue that the tenure systems in Africa do
not allow for individual ownership in that some amount of individual ownership exist
especially in the urban centres whilst the rural communities appear to remain mostly under
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communal ownership. Secondly, it is argued that in Africa land is regarded as a god and as
such cannot be traded. Payne (2001) observes that land is largely regarded as sacred with
man only playing the role of stewards to protect the interest of future generations. However,
there is empirical evidence of land sales growing bigger and bigger in Africa (Platteau, 1996)
and various forms of land transactions have existed in most parts of Africa for a long time
(Toulmin, 2008). Finally, the culmination of the above in addition to the fact that land
ownership in Africa is mostly not formally registered has led to the notion that customary
land ownership in Africa is insecure (De Soto, 2000 and MacGee, 2006). Quan (1997)
disagrees with this perception by noting that customary tenure generally provides secure
inheritable rights of occupation and use to individuals and groups alike. Furthermore, as
argued earlier insecurity of land ownership is a function of several factors other than the
absence of registered property titles.
Based on this argument that land ownership is communal and insecure, the customary
system in Africa is regarded as a disincentive for investment in especially agriculture and
thus responsible for the high incidence of poverty leading to the calls for individualisation of
land rights as a solution to the problem. The argument in favour of individualisation often
ends with reforms centred around various land registration programs in the developing world.
Instead of attempting to revolutionise the land ownership systems in the developing world by
replacing communal ownership with individual ownership through land registration, it
should be noted that from history, changes in land ownership systems tend to be gradual- an
evolution rather than a revolution. The various systems of property rights discussed above
are not static but evolve over time as society develops. Rising population pressure increases
the scarcity of land, raises land values as well as the benefits of clearly defining property
rights to land (Feder and Feeny, 1991). Different forms of Property rights emerge as a
response to the need to adjust to changing cost-benefit situations as the gains and benefits of
internalisation rise above the associated cost (Demsetz, 1967). Well defined and enforceable
property rights emerge whenever the associated benefits exceed the cost as land becomes
scarce.
Demsetz (1967) traces the emergence of private property rights among the Native Americans
to the development of the fur trade. It is said that the communal land rights before
commercialisation of the fur trade provided no incentive for any individual to try to conserve
the resource creating huge externalities leading to 'over hunting'. As the commercial trade in
furs increased, the value of furs did increase and each individual stepped up his hunting
activities to try to maximise his return from his right to hunt. This increased pressure on the
resource (scarcity) leading to overexploitation and creating huge external cost. This is said to
be the point at which the property right system began to change towards private rights
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system which begun with the allotment of hunting territories to smaller groups such as
families with each family having the exclusive right to its allotment. Similar experiences are
reported in Thailand during the rice export boom and in England during the period of rising
land values in the 12 century by (Feder and Feeny, 1991; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973).
In his evolutionary theory of land rights, Platteau (1996) explains that as land becomes
scarce, its value rises and in a communal rights regime, land rights become uncertain leading
to rising level of disputes and litigations which consequently lead to increased demand for
individual rights. Communal rights only become unstable creating mismanagement and
overexploitation as the population grows and resource demand begins to increase (Platteau,
1996) and this is the point where the state needs to intervene to facilitate the process of
change by introducing reform programs such as land registration. Note that registration on its
own is not what will convert communal ownership into private ownership. If this process is
forced then conferring private rights to property communally owned may spark off conflicts.
Platteau (1996) observes that this process of change is being experienced in Africa; the
growing population pressure on land and rising agricultural commercialisation with
introduction of cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, cotton and oil palm since colonial era have
worked together to change gradually the existing communal tenure towards individualisation
as the incidence of land sales has grown bigger and bigger. A systematic individualisation of
land rights has been taking place over the years in Burkina Faso, Guinea and other parts of
Africa (Toulmin and Longbottom, (2001).
2.4 Summary
This chapter has looked at the various issues on property rights with regards to land; apart
from defining the concept of property rights it has also looked at property rights security and
its various dimensions, the forms of property rights and their economic implications as well
as the nature of property ownership in Africa. The available literature has often classified
landownership in Africa as communal and insecure and as such a disincentive to investment
and development. The communal ownership of property creates externalities and increases
transactions cost. Studies show that land ownership systems evolve from usually an open
access system through communal ownership to private ownership regimes where exclusive
rights are vested in individuals. In Africa there are already signs of a gradual change in land
ownership towards individualisation. The several land disputes in the continent is an
indication of the rising demand for the resource and the need for more clearly defined
property rights system. The next chapter will look at the concept of property registration and
how it is linked to security and economic development.
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CHAPTER3
PROPERTY REGISTRATION
Land registration has assumed popularity globally and especially in the developing countries.
This is evident by the enthusiasm with which donor agencies such as the World Bank have
promoted the concept which has subsequently led to the roll out of several land registration
related programs around the developing world. It is considered as a critical precondition for
investment and modern economic development particularly in Africa. This chapter therefore
explores the concept of land registration, its economic importance and limitations. The
chapter is structured as follows. The next section explores the concept of land registration -
the meaning, principles and approaches to implementation. Section 3.2 looks at the systems
of land registration. Since this is a comparative study of Ghana and England, the subsequent
sections provide a brief history of land registration in England and Ghana, followed by the
link between registration and security, the economic significance of land registration and its
limitations respectively. The final section devoted to the summary of the chapter.
3.1 The Concept of Property Registration
The terms land registration and land titling are often used in the literature interchangeably. In
the words Atwood (1990, p. 659) "Land titling or registration ... refers to legally sanctioning
primary land claims which are already recognized informally by the local community
(although they may have been previously ignored or denied in formal law). It involves:
taking these claims out of the realm of informal lineage or community land ownership and
making them fully legal, formal and individual; measuring precisely the boundaries of each
claim and recording claims in a formal, state-administered land records system ... " MacGee
(2006) also uses the term land titling to encompass all processes needed to legally recognise,
protect and record trades of property as well as the legal and administrative processes
required to support their efficient operations. There is however the need to point out that the
use of the term land titling to mean land registration in the literature is inappropriate in that,
the two do not mean the same thing. The word title means ownership or a right to something
(Abdulai and Domeher, 20l2b) whilst registration is about recording property ownership
into a public database.
Land registration is described as a public system of records on legal land rights (Hanstad,
1998) or a process of recording legally valid land rights (Griffith-Charles, 2004). According
to Hogg (1920) land registration is a system of recording ownership of interest in land and or
land transaction from time to time in a public register. It has also been described as the
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unambiguous recording of the physical boundaries of land and ownership rights to land in a
public register as well as establishing and maintaining each individual interest to land
(Fiadzigbey, 2000). All the definitions of land registration appear to point to the same things
appropriately summarised by Domeher and Abdulai (2012a) as the process of recording all
land ownership data into a national or central database that can easily be accessed by the
general public, as well as the continuous update of such data to render the database a mirror
image of the actual land ownership. The registration process thus captures the particulars of
land owners and the land they own. For land registration to yield positive outcomes it should
be seen as a means to providing formal legal recognition to existing land rights that are
already recognised socially or informally in other words land registration should be
considered a process of recording land rights already recognised informally to integrate such
rights into the formal legal system.
Under any system of land registration, registered rights are given priority over unregistered
rights (Simpson, 1976). However, in instances where several registered rights to a land exist
or where a land is involved in a case of double transfer, priority may be established based on
the principles race and notice; in the race principle, the winner of the race to the registry as
evidenced by the order in which the instruments appear on the register is given priority over
everyone else, however, under the notice principle more attention appear to be directed
towards the provision of notice of an interest in a parcel (Zevenbergen, 2002). What this
means is that for instance, if Mr A registers his interest in a land first before Mr B, under the
race principle, Mr A has the prior claims over B. However, under the notice principle if the
fact of A's registration is not regarded to have provided sufficient notice, then B may have
the prior claim if his registration is considered sufficient notice to the public even though he
registered his interest at a much later date than Mr A. The notice principle thus emphasises
on providing sufficient public notice of various interests in land rather than merely recording
them. The first to provide sufficient notice of a particular interest obtains the priority over all
others.
There are different approaches to implementing land registration programs. The approach to
implementation may be compulsory or voluntary (Larson, 1991). Compulsory means people
have no choice but to register their properties whilst a voluntary approach gives people the
choice to register their properties or not. Compulsory registration is triggered only when
certain events (such as transfer of land) occur. In England for instance, a buyer's rights to a
land according to the Land Registration Act (LRA) 2002 are not recognised legally if the
transfer is not registered whilst in Ireland, the transaction cannot even take place if the land
is not already registered by the seller. Alternatively, Zevenbergen (2002) classifies the
implementation approaches into two - systematic and sporadic approaches. Janczyk (1979)
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explains the difference between the systematic and sporadic approaches as follows. In the
sporadic registration, usually, there is first an official declaration of an area as a registration
area. Once this is done, the public is expected to formally apply for registration of their lands.
Each land that is to be registered is surveyed individually. Apart from this initial action, the
State really does not do much. The assumption here is that the public understands the value
of registration and will patronise it; however, this does not happen often in reality especially
where people are reasonably happy with any previous systems (Larson, 1991). The sporadic
registration method thus appears similar to the voluntary registration. There are no index
maps in the sporadic registration and this could lead to a situation where various parcels of
land overlap as they are surveyed individually (Zevenbergen, 2002). Under systematic
registration, Janczyk (1979) observes that once an area is declared a registration zone, the
declaration is followed by preparation of a cadastral map of the whole registration zone.
Owners of land must indicate their land boundaries in this process as well as indicate the
exact rights they wish to claim with the relevant supporting written evidence or oral
evidence backed by sworn statements. In the systematic system, registration starts only in
one part of the country and gradually extends to other parts as previously declared
registration zones get covered.
Larson (1991) explains that in a compulsory systematic registration system, individual land
owners are not required to submit applications for their land to be registered; the State
simply registers all lands though the owners may be asked to pay the necessary fees. This is
said to be prevalent in areas where land reforms are aimed at transferring public lands to
private individuals or vice versa. This system involves a smaller per unit cost of registration
and the huge initial cost is mostly born by the State (Larson, 1991). Each approach has its
own challenges. A combination of these may be more helpful and effective than any of them
taken in isolation. For instance, both systematic and sporadic approaches could be adopted;
implementation of systematic registration could start from high economic potential zones
while sporadic registration is maintained at low to average economic potential areas
(Zevenbergen, 2002). Prioritisation of the registration process will depend on the expected
outcomes; if the aim is to help reduce litigations then priority should be given to areas with
high incidence of land disputes (Larson, 1991).
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3.2 Systems of Property Registration
Basically there are two forms of land registration - deed and title registration systems. A
distinction between these two systems can be found the explanations that follow.
3.2.1 Deed registration
Under the deed registration system, one is said to attain legally recognized rights to land
upon the conclusion of a transaction agreement or contract (Deininger, 2003). The
registration of a deed does not affect its legal status but merely stores it (Torhonen, 2004). It
is further observed that in deed registration, transactions may be offered for registration
without any enquiry regarding its contents and effect, and the fact of registration carries with
it no implication of title prior to registration (Larson, 1991). Deed registration thus merely
records instruments or land transactions as they occur without specific reference to the land
they affect; the deed itself is a legal document of the transaction as such its registration is
only to provide notice to the public.
Asiama (2000) reiterated this by observing that the deed registration system does not permit
sufficient effective investigation of title before registration. It is hence possible for
transactions to be recorded even though none of the parties involved is the rightful owner of
the land involved in the transaction. In other words, registration of a deed does not guarantee
that the registered owner is the rightful owner of the property involved. This is probably the
reason why the deed registration system according to Larson (1991) most often does not
provide any guarantees apart from providing evidence in times of double transfers. The
drawbacks of this system of registration need no mentioning. Having said that, the process
involved in deed registration is relatively easy and fast (Zevenbergen, 2002) and a good deed
registration system could be more useful than an improperly organised title registration
system (McLaughlin and Williamson, 1985). Very often, the deed registration system forms
the basis for the introduction of title registration; hence a pre-existing deed registration
system could facilitate the title registration process.
3.2.2 Title registration
Unlike deed registration, however, in title registration, it is the recording of land rights into
the register that makes such rights legally valid and qualifies the proprietors for state
compensation where it is available (Deininger, 2003). According to Hogg (1920), title
registration has the following four basic features:
• The land is initially recorded in the register as a unit of property;
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• Transactions are registered with reference to the land itself and not merely
as instruments executed by the owner; it is the title to the land and not
merely the instrument between the parties that is registered;
• Registration of transactions is essential for their legal validity and
• Registration acts to some degree as a warranty of title provided by the State
to the person registered as owner.
Though Hogg (1920) argues that the state warranty of title in the title registration system is
the single most important feature that distinguishes it from the deed system, Zevenbergen
(2002) explains that the title registration systems in countries like Germany, Sweden and
Denmark involve no title warranties as protection for registrants is only derived from 'public
faith'. The provision of State guarantee is said not to be relevant in all instances.
Zevenbergen (2002) argues that in order to maintain public confidence such guarantees
become necessary in a system where things are always likely to go wrong. Presumably, if the
registration system is well structured and proper mechanisms put in place to minimise the
occurrence of errors and fraud, then there will be no need for providing title warranties.
Abdulai and Domeher (2011) hence point out that the other critical difference between the
two systems stems from the source of legal validity; whilst the fact of registration is the
source of legal validity in the title registration system, in the deed system legal validity is
derived from the contract between the land grantor and grantee but not from registration.
As a result of the above the title registration system is sometimes considered superior to deed
registration. Zevenbergen (2002) however debunks that notion by arguing that title
registration will not be effective if introduced in an area without any meaningful pre-existing
form of registration such as a deed registration system. This gives the impression that title
registration only builds upon or modifies existing systems. Therefore title registration may
be more effective where they are introduced to streamline existing deed registration. In light
of this, Simpson (1976) argues that title registration is usually introduced to solve the
problems experienced in a deed registration system in order to simplify and secure land
transfer as weIl as eliminate repetitions and inefficiencies. The title registration system has
its own down sides. Apart from being more complex, Zevenbergen (2000) argues that it is
expensive especially where up-to-date cadastral surveys are not available and also may
involve a lot of delays due to the nature of the verification process involved.
The title registration system is often based on certain principles - the mirror, curtain and
guarantee or insurance principles. The lands register acts literally as a mirror reflecting
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accurately, the reality regarding ownership of land; anybody looking through the register
should easily obtain information regarding the identity of the land owner, nature of the
ownership and any limitations on such ownership (Lawrance, 1980; Zevenbergen, 2002).
The mirror principle must therefore rely heavily on the ability of the authorities concerned to
continuously update the register and where this works properly, it could be expected to
increase public confidence in the register by making it more reliable. The curtain principle
according to Henssen (1995) takes away the need to go beyond the register in search for
historical information on land ownership to a parcel of land. The register at least in theory
provides the public with a snap shot of land ownership data and once this data is guaranteed
to be accurate there will be no need to try to trace the historical roots of title to any land.
Under the guarantee principle, any registered land right is guaranteed by the state to be
accurate (McLaughlin and Williamson, 1985; Zevenbergen, 2002). The payment of
compensation to registered proprietors for losses arising from the operation of the register
appears to be a key feature of this principle. It is therefore imperative to take steps to
minimise errors and related loses in order to minimise the cost of compensation in the
registration process.
Conclusiveness of the title register
Once a land is registered under title registration system, it provides the registered owner with
a prima facie or conclusive evidence of ownership. The register is supreme and the rights so
registered indefeasible; registration provides protection for an individual's rights against all
other claims by 'the rest of the world' (Larson, 1991). It must be stated here however, that
the register drives its strength from the warranty provided by the State. The State basically
guarantees the accuracy of the data in the register and is committed to payout compensation
to anyone losing his registered right for one reason or the other as may be specified by the
law. However as previously argued there is no such provision under the title registration in
some countries. In reality, there are limitations on the extent to which the register can be
described as indefeasible. One of such limitations is the possibility of losing one's registered
land rights through adverse possession. In Ghana, the Limitation Decree of 1972 (NRCD 54),
permits the dispossession of a person's land (whether it is registered or not) if a squatter
occupies it for a minimum of 12 years and the owner fails to assert his ownership within that
period. In England a person in adverse possession of a registered land for a minimum period
of 10 years can apply to be registered as the new owner whilst adverse possession of
unregistered property requires a minimum of 12 years to qualify the occupier to be registered
as legal owner (Harpum and Bignell, 2002). This provision is thus a disadvantage to
registered property owners as they have fewer number of years within which a squatter can
take over legal ownership of their properties.
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It may be impossible to record every single interest in land into the register. Some
unregistered interests are not invalidated by the fact of non-registration and may remain
enforceable; these are referred to as overriding interests and in Ghana include things like: the
rights of compulsory acquisition, rights of way, customary rights that existed at the time of
registration, rights acquired under the Limitations Decree (LTRL, 1986). In Ghana, the State
Lands Act 1962 and the 1992 Constitution empowers the State to compulsorily acquire the
absolute interest in any private land for purposes that are deemed to be in the interest of the
wider society while making provision for the payment of appropriate compensation. The
extent to which the register is indefeasible is thus subject to the extent to which the state
honours its obligation to compensate land owners. However, there are several cases of
unpaid compensation in Ghana (Abdulai et al., 2007; Toulmin and longbottom, 2001).
Mistakes made in the registration process and fraud or forgery could also make the register
inconclusive. If the 'owner' of a property is considered to have been registered by mistake,
or through fraud or forgery, the register may be subject to rectification in favour of the 'real
owner' (Coveney, 2003). In that case the register would have failed to protect the original
registered owner. Where rectification is not thought to be the best option, the registered
owner may be liable to pay compensation to the 'real owner' by paying for the value of the
land (Coveney, 2003). The exception is that if the registered owner (who acquired the title
through fraud or a mistake) goes on to sell this land to another person, the register may be
conclusive for the purchaser who could plead bona fide purchaser for value without notice;
but the 'real owner' may then qualify for compensation (Clarke, 2002; Coveney, 2003;
Larson, 1991). This implies that the purchaser's rights are protected provided they can plead
bona fide purchaser for value without notice. However, if the registered owner transfers the
land to another person without valuable consideration, the rights of all such transferees
without valuable consideration cannot be said to be indefeasible. Title registration is thus
said to be essentially a purchasers' system with the aim of facilitating land transfer through
the elimination of the risk of financial loss to purchasers (Clarke, 2002). Any efforts at
minimising the extent of error, fraud or forgery in the registration process will be essential in
enhancing its indefeasibility and this may require adequately trained personnel equipped
with the right tools to operate. In addition, governments' commitment to enforce the law as
well as pay compensation where it is due will both be crucial; since one cannot always guard
against the above events from occurring one way forward will be to honour the promise of
compensation as defined in the law. This will stimulate confidence in the system, make the
register truly conclusive and provide the kind of protection required to guarantee security of
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land rights. That said, the limited budgets of the developing countries could make this a
heinous task to achieve.
3.3 Landed Property Registration in England
Various authors have given a systematic account of the history of land registration in
England and their accounts have been summarised below. The earliest record of land
ownership was introduced in England by the Romans in 397 which culminated into the
doomsday book of 1086 - a comprehensive compilation of land ownership information
(Mayer and Pemberton, 2000). To a large extent land registration in England has always
been an attempt to improve on the conveyancing system but before 1535, land transfers took
place in the presence of public witnesses (Mayer and Pemberton, 2000). The essence of
public conveyancing was probably due to the need to give such transactions the societal
recognition required to enhance security of land rights and eliminate potential fraudulent
deals. However, the inconveniences involved in carrying out transactions in the public are
obvious as it denies the parties involved the benefits of confidentiality. In 1535 an Act was
passed to permit private land transfer. Private conveyancing thus replaced public
conveyancing after 1535; but to avoid secret conveyancing the Statute of Enrolment passed
in 1535 made it compulsory for all deeds to be enrolled with the keeper of rolls or one of the
courts -this was a prelude the land registration acts that followed (Mayer and Pemberton,
2000).
Private conveyancing was not without its own problems. For instance to carry out a given
transaction, the purchaser by necessity had to research into the history of title to that land for
the previous 30 years making conveyancing complex for the ordinary individual who relied
heavily on lawyers (at an extra cost) in the transfer of land rights (Larson, 1991). Itwas in an
attempt to make land transfers simpler that various initiatives were taken to improve land
registration. The deed registration system preceded title registration in England (Hanstad,
1998), the first deed registries were established in Bedford, Middlesex and Yorkshire in 1663,
1708 and 1703 respectively (Mayer and Pemberton, 2000). The deed registers according to
Zevenbergen (2002) were closed to the public (did not permit inspection by the public) for
the purpose of protecting the privacy of parties involved, the only exception was where the
consent of the owner was given; this inevitably defeated the very purpose of registration but
this closed register principle continued even under title registration until 1990.
A system of land registration based on the ship registration system (title registration) which
was introduced in 1858 in Southern Australia by Sir Robert Torrens was subsequently
replicated in England through the enactment of the Land Registry Act 1862 followed by the
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enactment of the Land Transfer Act in 1875 (Hanstad, 1998; Larson, 1991). Registration at
this time was still voluntary. It was not until the passage of the Land Transfer Act of 1897
that compulsory registration was introduced; this was however a selective compulsory
registration system as it was only introduced in an area upon the request of the County
Council (Larson, 1991). The Lands Registration Act (LRA) of 1925, however, designated
some areas as compulsory registration areas and this was slowly extended to other areas until
1990 when compulsory registration was extended to cover the whole of England (Larson,
1991). Presently all lands that have not yet gone through the initial registration process may
be registered by their owners voluntarily; however, compulsory registration is triggered by
the occurrence of seven events amongst which are the sale or purchase of an unregistered
land. The 1925 Act was criticised for the obscurity and confusion of its principles and was
said to be difficult to understand even for professionals; these according to Harpum and
Bignell (2002) were among some of the arguments that led to various amendments
culminating into the Land Registration Act (LRA) 2002. Before 2002, however, the 1925
law was amended severally by the Land Registration Acts of 1936, 1986, 1988 and 1997
(Harpum and Bignell, 2002). The LRA 2002 replaced all existing laws on land registration
and introduced electronic conveyancing; its aim is to simplify and modernise land
registration laws, make the register a more accurate reflection of land ownership and speed
up the rate of registration (Harpum and Bignell, 2002). Currently an average of about 75% of
land in England and Wales is registered; there are however variations from one county to the
other from as high as 98.14% in Brighton and Hove to a lowest of 46.33% in Torbay (HM
Land Registry, 2012).
3.4 Landed Property Registration in Ghana
Records show that facilities for deed registration have always been in existence during the
18th century. Land registration in Ghana was first introduced by the British and as such is
very similar to the system that exists in England. This began by the passing of the Land
Registration Ordinance of 1883 which first introduced a deed registration system in Ghana -
this was later repealed by the Land Registry Ordinance of 1895 to further strengthen the deed
registration system (Sittie, 2006). The Land Registry Act (Act 122) was enacted in 1962 and
According to Sittie (2006), Act 122 was only to serve the purpose of providing evidence of
which instruments were registered and did not provide or confer title on the registrants; it
attempted to solve the problem of multiple sales by giving priority to registered instruments
according to when they were registered. Deed registration in Ghana, was beset with such
problems as the lack of land plans and maps for accurate identification which led to multiple
registrations for the same land (Sittie, 2006). As part of the attempts to enhance land
transfers under the deed registration the system, the Conveyancing Decree of 1973 was
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passed; it required amongst other things that all customary transaction be written since
almost all such transaction were not documented but this was never implemented and was
subsequently repealed (Blocher, 2006). Under the current conveyancing decree, customary
transactions do not need to be documented for legal validity. Indeed the constitution does
recognise customary ownership as evidenced by current occupation and use.
Land title registration was introduced by the enactment of the Title Registration Law
(PNDCL 152) in 1986; this law required that cadastral maps be produced to reduce fraud and
conflicts. The main purpose of this law was to facilitate proof of title and make land
transactions simple, safe and inexpensive (Karikari, 2000). PNDCL 152 introduced
systematic title registration which currently covers only two regions (Greater Accra and
Ashanti) out of the ten regions in the country. Currently 20 districts in the greater Accra
Region and one in the Ashanti region (Kumasi) are declared as compulsory registration
districts (Larbi et al., 2010). In the other eight regions where title registration has not yet
been introduced, deed registration remains the system of land registration in operation.
There are about seven different steps involved in title registration in Ghana and according to
Sittie (2006) these include: (a) formally submitting an application to the title registry
together with fees and required documents; (b) the Registry issues a receipt to the applicant
as well as a letter to be submitted to the Survey Department to request site plans to be
prepared; (c) thirdly, applicant picks up the completed plans upon paying required fees and
submits the plan to the Title Registry; (d) the title registry again issues the applicant with a
photocopy of the plan and a search report form which has to be submitted to the Lands
Commission; (e) if the search reports indicates no objection to the applicants claim, the Title
Registry publishes the application in the newspapers; (t) ifno objections are raised after two
weeks the registry proceeds with the registration and finally (g) the title certificate is issued
and the particulars recorded on sectional plans. As part of the process, the applicant is also
required to provide a tax clearance certificate.
The challenges in this process are glaring; the problem is just not the number of steps
involved but also, the inconvenience of shuffling from one agency to the other as well as the
cost implications. The documentary requirement such as the need to provide a tax clearance
certificate in itself could be a big disincentive for people to patronise the system. On the
other hand, the deed registration process is quiet short. All that is required is for the land
owner to present the deed to the deed registry; upon payment of the required fee the deed is
registered by placing an official stamp at the back page. Therefore, the absence of the stamp
on any deed is an indication that it is not registered. Though title registration was introduced
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to solve the problems of deed registration in Ghana, the system is still be beset with several
problems not very different from those experienced under the deed registration; for instance,
registration is still undertaken without the help of planning schemes and layouts or area maps
- the results have been the registration of open spaces, public access areas and public lands to
individuals (Fiadzigbey, 2000). Another problem is the unnecessary bureaucracy one has to
go through to get land registered. According to Zevenbergen (2002) several organisations are
still involved in the registration process with a very poor level of cooperation amongst them,
and operations are said to be over-centralised in Accra.
Blocher (2006) reports that about 50% of registered land owners spent up to 10 years to get
their lands registered at a cost that most Ghanaians cannot afford. It is therefore not
surprising that as at 2001 (15 years after the enactment of the title registration law), less than
5% of the country was registered (Blocher, 2006). From the time this law was enacted up to
the year 2000, a little less than half of the total applications received have been processed
and its impact has been described as negligible (Toulmin, 2006). Only six deed registry
offices and four title registry offices were established in the country by 2002; in addition,
only one title registry actually issued certificates as at that time), some of these registries
lacked registrars and, the official process involved is too lengthy and expensive
(Zevenbergen, 2002). In 1997, attention was directed towards improving land registration
with specific emphasis on the introduction of aerial photographs and computerisation of title
plans, which was followed in 1998 by a study commissioned by the government on how to
improve the land registration system within the short, medium and long terms (Zevenbergen,
2002). This study recommended the elimination of the requirement for tax clearance for
registration as well as clearly defining and recording boundaries among others (Kuntu-
Mensah, 2006).
The current estimate of the proportion of the country registered stands at only 8% (World
Bank, 2010). The introduction of the Ghana Land Administration Project (LAP) since 2004
has brought about some reported improvements to land registration in Ghana. The deed
registration has now been decentralised to all the regional capitals and is said to have brought
the registration of deeds closer to the people, resulting in a reduction in the time it takes to
register a deed from 36 months to two months; since 2006 the time it takes to register deeds
of sale with the Lands Commission has been reduced from 135 days to 34 days (World Bank,
2010). Registration of titles in declared registration districts has been reduced to about 6
months from 36 months as at 2011; as at this same time the number of land litigation is said
to have reduced by 70% and customary boundary demarcation in most pilot areas have been
completed (World Bank, 2010). The lands Commission Act passed in 2008 paved the way
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for the merging of four land sector agencies into one body (the Lands Commission); other
successes include the completion of the first phase of the Geodetic Reference Network
(GRN) covering the golden triangle of Accra, Kumasi and also the first phase of the Land
Information System (LIS), development and piloting of the three tier land use planning
models in six (6) pilot districts (World Bank, 2011). The implementation of the LAP thus
appears to have provided solutions to some of the teething problems that beset land
registration in Ghana. Though a lot remains to be done, the future looks bright with
continues commitment from all stakeholders.
3.5 Landed Property Registration and Security
Property registration is most often wrongly perceived as the panacea to the problem of
insecure property rights in the developing countries. The legal perspective of property rights
and security (discussed in chapter 2) appears to be the driving force behind the advocacy for
mass land registration programs especially in developing countries. According to Griffith-
Charles (2004) this has already led to huge expenditures on providing landholders with
ownership certificates which serve as proof of ownership in the law courts. Even though
secure property rights as previously explained involves both formal and informal recognition
and enforcement of property rights, programs designed to create secure rights based on the
legal perspective especially in developing countries do appear to ignore the informal
recognition aspect. Indeed, land registration programs often are introduced to replace
indigenous systems instead of integrating the two into a more formidable security enhancing
tool.
The provision of documentary proof of ownership through registration does not solve the
problem of land disputes especially in the continent of Africa. As noted by Payne et al (2009)
in several areas including India, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Tanzania, Senegal and Egypt,
de facto security already existed before the introduction of land registration programs;
indeed in Afghanistan and India for instance, it is reported that registration actually led to a
reduction in tenure security. It is probably in this regard that Atwood (1990) argues that land
registration could actually reduce security and lead to more conflicts. In fact, Abdulai (2010)
observes that out of the 12,380 cases ofland disputes filed at the law courts of Ghana within
the 8 year period from 1999 to 2006, 17% of such lands were registered; out of this number,
about 195 of such cases were resolved in court but 53% of these cases were decided against
the registered owners. Elsewhere in Honduras and the Philippines the World Bank (2005b)
further estimates that about 10% and 15% of registered lands respectively remain under
ownership disputes.
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Also, in Kenya where extensive land registration programs have been embarked on for quite
some time now, a new legislation was passed which referred land disputes first to elders of
the community and the law now recognises certificates only as one piece of evidence of
ownership (Migot-Adholla et al., 1991). What this means is that the possession of a land title
certificate alone does not protect the holder from disputes and the holder could actually lose
his or her rights. The failure of land registration programs geared towards enhancing security
of tenure to a very large extent is a reflection of how narrowly security has been
conceptualised in the design of such programs. Indeed any program designed to enhance
property rights security that focuses on formal legal recognitions alone to the neglect of
societal recognition based on the values of the people will only succeed in creating more
disputes and making such right more insecure. There is thus the need to expand the scope to
bring other aspects of security of tenure to the fore. Abdulai and Domeher (20 12b) observe
that the argument which portrays land registration as if it guarantees ownership security is
often based on a number of things such as: the state provision of title warranty under the title
registration system; the publicity function of the lands register and the provision of legal
recognition of land ownership. However, an understanding of what constitutes real security
as discussed in the previous chapter clearly shows the flaws in such arguments. Under the
title registration system already discussed, the state guarantees the accuracy of land
ownership information stored in the register and promises to compensate registered land
owners if they incur any loses relating to their ownership rights; this provides certainty to
land owners. However, this argument is limited only to the title registration and cannot be
extended to the deed system. Furthermore, as mentioned before, in some countries such
warranties of title are non-existent and in other jurisdictions though the warranties exist on
paper in practice several cases of unpaid compensation exist.
Land registration is also one way of formalising customary ownership and through that
process provides legal recognition to land ownership. Since formal legal recognition and
enforcement of land rights is a key component of security, land registration is capable of
contributing to the enhancement of land ownership security; that said, registration alone does
not cater for societal recognition which is also an essential aspect of security. Using
Zimbabwe as an example Toulmin (2008) observes that paper title is not sufficient condition
for land tenure security. Instead of increasing the level of ownership security Atwood (1990)
argues that land registration could actually reduce security and lead to more conflicts in
instances where overlapping customary and residual right of women, uneducated, nomadic
and other marginalised groups are not recognised and recorded in the process. As a result, it
must be pointed out that registration of property per se is not what makes land rights secure.
Hence efforts should be appropriately directed towards securing ownership before pursuing
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registration and not the other way round. The parameters of property ownership security
have been discussed in chapter two.
3.6 The Economics of Property Registration
Land registration is being promoted in the developing world as a tool for providing tenure
security for land owners, lenders and traders; securing investments; unifying land markets;
improving access to formal credit; reducing poverty and promoting economic development
(Payne et al., 2009; UNECE, 2005). The earliest attempts at establishing land records in
Europe were fuelled by the need to use such data to tax land owners (Hanstad, 1998). Its
significance has since been highly linked to economic growth and poverty reduction as
explained by Feder et al. (1988) and Brasselle et al. (2001) in the paragraphs below.
The economic impact of registration is derived from the assurance effect - certainty that
landowners will be able to reap the fruits of their investment and the collateralisation effect-
the ability of land owners to use their lands as collateral for credit (Brasselle et al., 2001; de
Soto, 2000). Both the assurance and collateralisation effects and their ultimate impact on
economic growth and poverty reduction are dependent on the argument that land registration
guarantees security. By enhancing security, land registration triggers the assurance effect,
provides the incentive to invest and increases investment demand. From Figure 2 below, it
can be seen that as investment demand increases, the demand for other complementary
variable inputs such as labour, equipment, fertilizers and improved seeds also increase. The
higher demand eventually leads to greater use of inputs, more investment and greater output
levels. The end product is higher land values, higher income levels and growth. For instance,
Brown et al (2006) observe that land values could appreciate by about 25% or higher upon
registration. Durand-Lasserve and Payne (2006) also estimate that the market value of land
appreciates by at least 20 to 60% upon registration. The introduction of land registration in
Holland in 1529 resulted in higher land values and made arrangement of mortgages quicker
(Mayer and Pemberton, 2000). Such appreciation in land values makes theoretical sense. If
registration enhances security, then people should be willing to pay a premium for the
enhanced security.
Given two properties (A and B) with the same characteristics, people are expected generally
to be willing to offer a higher price for the property that has ownership rights security. An
implicit assumption from the assurance effect explained above is that the land owners
already have the funds to invest but this may not always be the case and in reality the desired
effects may not be realised. Byamugisha (1999) however, argues that land registration
reduces information asymmetry and uncertainty regarding property ownership and as a
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result, lowers transaction cost and speeds up land transaction. This is said to facilitate land
market operations which permits land to be transferred from less efficient to more efficient
users. Therefore even where land owners do not have their own funds to invest, the vibrant
land markets should ensure that such lands are transferred to others who are not only willing
but also financially capable to invest.
Figure 2: Security of land ownership and farm productivity: A conceptual framework. Source: Feder et al.
(1988).
Alternatively, land owners who do not have funds to invest could obtain credit to undertake
desired investment activities through the collateralisation effect of land registration. Land
registration through its security enhancing ability, is said to improve on the collateral
properties of land - making it a better, more secure and acceptable form of collateral that can
used to secure investment credit (de Soto, 2000). The readily available credit coupled with
the higher investment demand could then work together to increase output and household
incomes as shown in Figure 2 above. Registration therefore by implication reduces the
problem of lack of collateral which is perceived to be the main factor responsible for the
limited access to credit (Berger, 1989; de Soto, 2000; Kakuru, 2008; Pearce et al., 2004).
Land registration in effect is argued to make borrowers more credit worthy to attract funding
from private financial institutions for investment that will improve output and revenues. On
the contrary Domeher and Abdulai (2012b) argue that in rural Africa providing registered
titles will on its own not make them that credit worthy.
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Arguing in support of the credit effect of land registration, Domeher and Abdulai (2012a)
observe that if registration is capable of reducing land conflicts, it will provide a boost to
lenders taking land as collateral since such conflicts could be very costly to them. Not only
can such conflicts prevent lenders from repossessing the land or delay the process of doing
so but also it could make foreclosure difficult. Buyers may be less willing to purchase lands
known to be involved in ownership disputes as those who purchase such lands may be
exposed to reprisal actions from disputing parties. Without land disputes however, it should
be relatively easier for lenders to sell any land based collateral that they hold. Since the only
interest lenders may have in the collateral they hold is to sell it to recover loans on default,
the ease with which an asset can be liquidated must be a highly desirable feature considered
in accepting an asset as collateral for credit. Registration provides lenders with the assurance
that the borrower has at least the legal right to mortgage a given property and that there will
be no disputes whenever foreclosure becomes necessary.
Foreclosure is further made easy by the earlier argument that registration facilitates the
operation of land markets and this is particularly important because banks may not grant
investment credit where active land markets are absent (Barrows and Roth, 1990). The
earlier argument that land registration raises land values is another medium through which
the credit effect may be realised. According to Domeher and Abdulai (2012a) the amount of
credit granted often constitutes a fraction of the property's value (eg 80% LTV) hence any
rise in land value as a consequence of land registration will increase the amount of credit that
one could potentially borrow. The average household land size in Africa is small ranging
from one hectare per household in Ethiopia, two hectares in Tanzania and two and half
hectares in Uganda and Kenya (Salami et al., 20 I0). Therefore appreciation in property
values will be good news for landowners because the widespread land fragmentation leaves
many people with small land holdings and land values that may not be substantially high to
secure the credit needed (Domeher and Abdulai, 20l2a).
More importantly, land registration could also be used as a tool to help lenders manage their
risk. This is achieved by providing lenders the opportunity to check for the existence of
encumbrances (such as mortgages) on the property presented for use as collateral (Domeher
and Abdulai, 20l2a). In the absence of land and collateral registries, a borrower who in the
past may have presented his landed property to a lender (A) for credit could decide
afterwards to present the same property to a different lender (B) even though they have not
finished paying the loan owed to lender (A). With land registration the assignment of land as
collateral for a loan will be recorded as charge on the land and where the second lender (B)
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decides to use the same property to secure a loan for the borrower, that would be done with
knowledge of the fact that prior claim to the property belongs to Lender A.
This allows Lender B to take any necessary measures required to protect itself from the risk
of not having prior claim to the property. Furthermore, land registration makes it easier and
less costly to verify land ownership therefore in credit markets where lenders tend to push all
or a greater proportion of cost to the borrowers in the form of interest rates and other charges
such as commissions (which cover processing or administrative expenses), the potential of
land registration to reduce the cost of verifying land ownership could lower the cost of credit
for borrowers and make credit more affordable (Domeher and Abdulai, 2012a; MacGee,
2006). Even though arguments on the effects of land registration illustrated in Figure 2 above
tend to focus on the agricultural sector, Byamugisha (1999) points out that the investment
incentive generated by land registration is not limited to agriculture but cuts across all
sectors of the whole economy; most economic activities such as those in agriculture, fishing,
manufacturing, mining, construction and services sector involve the use of land either
directly or indirectly. Therefore, land registration can generate investment incentives across
all these sectors through the assurance and coIIateraIisation effects. To explain why land
registration affects all sectors in the economy and not just agriculture, Byamugisha (1999)
pointed to the following reasons: (a) the fact that non-agricultural land tend to be more
secure, transferable and valuable making it a more attractive collateral asset; (b) non-
agricultural sectors of the economy are also more profitable with less risk and (c) the
combination of the first two makes the non-agricultural sectors attract more bank credit.
The role of property registration in economic development is given even much emphasis by
de Soto (2000) who attributes the existence of high levels of poverty and underdevelopment
in the developing countries to the fact that a very small proportion of land ownership is
registered. De Soto posits that the western world is highly capitalised and developed because
of the existence of comprehensive land registration systems. The modern economic
development of Britain was kick-started by the industrial revolution from 1750 to 1850
(Allen, 2006). The industrial revolution which later spread to other parts of the western
world led to a structural change as manifested by the shift of resources away from agriculture
to industry and the fast economic growth which translated into considerable and progressive
increase in real income levels (Crafts, and Mills, 1994). There was a change in social values
as people moved away from traditionalism to risk taking and profit making attitudes
(Hartwell, 1965).
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The revolution is attributed to factors such as: technological advancement/innovations;
availability of resources; as well as economic and geographic factors; capital accumulation;
laissez fair; market expansion and miscellaneous factors such as the wars which favoured
England; the growth in knowledge and the decline in plague and good harvest (Adams, 20 I0;
Hartwell, 1965). A wide range of unprecedented micro-inventions (such as the spinning
jenny, the steam engine and coke smelting) occurred at the time in Britain. The invention of
new machinery and sources of power made large scale production possible (Allen, 2006;
Hartwell, 1965). Britain's achievements in international also trade opened up a whole range
of profitable and unique opportunities which generated the economic incentive required to
invent (Allen, 2006). Trade was also boosted by domestic demand created by the massive
rise in population; urbanisation and rising income levels as well as the slave trade the
triangular trade involving Britain, West Africa and the West Indies (Allen, 2006). Much
recent works have attributed the industrial revolution to such factors as: the political
structure; the security of property rights and the flexibility of the legal system which together
created a favourable investment climate that made the industrial revolution possible (Allen,
2006). Securing property rights at the time was based on the use of patents as a tool to
incentivise the introduction of new technology by ensuring the whole stream of returns from
an invention could be reaped by the inventor (Allen, 2006). However, most of the
innovations were better protected as trade secrets and as such were never patented; indeed,
property rights in France and even China at the time were equally as secure as in England but
France and China were not experiencing the revolution as England (Pomeranz, 2000).
The second face of the industrial revolution which started around 1850 covered the chemical
and electric industries, petroleum refining and distribution and automotive industries. The
new wave of technology during this era was led by the United States and Germany as the
importance of coal declined with increasing availability of petroleum products (Allen, 2002).
A survey of the literature on economic development of the Western World does not show
that property registration played any significant role. Therefore the argument attributing the
economic development in the Western world to property registration appears to be an
exaggeration. Taking the case of Britain for example, there is no need stressing that no
comprehensive system of registration exists albeit it is a developed economy. Despite the
long history of land registration in England and wales for example, as high as about 40% of
land is still not registered in some counties. Furthermore, around the time of the industrial
revolution in Britain, property registration was not that developed. Indeed, the first deed
registries were established in Bedford, Middlesex and Yorkshire in 1663, 1708 and 1703
respectively (Mayer and Pemberton, 2000) and title registration was introduced around the
end of the revolution in 1862. The events which culminated into the modern economic
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development in Britain and other developed nations are well documented in the literature and
landed property registration does not appear to have played a role.
3.7 Limitations of the Effects of Property Registration
The economic impacts of land registration discussed in the previous section have a number
of limitations. It is thus not surprising that most studies (cited in chapter one) in the
developing world especially Africa have not been able to identify the existence of both the
security and credit effects. The linkage between land registration, credit, investment and
poverty reduction is based strongly on the argument that land registration is the panacea to
land ownership insecurity. As argue in section 3.5, the arguments linking land registration to
property ownership security are fundamentally flawed as they do not give due recognition to
the real parameters of security as discussed in chapter two. Therefore, property registration
cannot guarantee security and as a result any time land registration fails to solve the problem
of insecurity, its relation with credit, investment and poverty reduction is bound to be
weakened.
However, assuming that land registration succeeds in enhancing security and provides the
incentive to invest, the strength of this incentive (in terms of leading to actual investment
demand) will depend on other factors such as the overall friendliness of the investment
climate; the availability of appropriate infrastructure; and availability of profitability
investment opportunities amongst others. Not only will these affect the decision to actually
invest but also it will affect the decision of lenders to make credit available to investors
(Domeher and Abdulai, 2012b). Consequently, Adams et al. (1999) argue that improving
security within an environment full of various constraint factors will not bring about the
desired effects. Given the wave of discussion so far, it must clearly be pointed out that
registration per se will not make land the perfect collateral that will trigger credit supply
because apart from its inability to guarantee security, there are also many other factors
which are more important in influencing the decision to advance credit. These factors
include: the ability to repay advanced credit, the nature and location of the property amongst
others. Land registration does not change the nature and location of the properties (which
influence the ease of foreclosure) that people hold; therefore foreclosure of registered
property could still be difficult. If such properties are in deprived rural location lenders may
be deterred from accepting them even if they are registered. In Bogota for instance, Gilbert
(2002) notes that the challenge for lenders is the nature of the assets often offered as
collateral and not the absence of registered property titles.
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Adding to the debate on the collateralisation effect of land registration, Wannasai and
Shrestha (2007) explain that it is not applicable to all investors as some limiting factors may
undermine profitability and make it difficult for some investors to access formal credit.
Atwood (1990) therefore, argues that providing registered titles for as many people as
possible will not in many situations especially in Africa increase the number of potential
borrowers. Even though land registration may be able to enhance access to credit for
investment, Carter and Olinto (2003) on the basis of evidence in Paraguay, argue that in the
agricultural sector for example, biases usually exist in the credit market in favour of the more
affluent large scale farmers to the disadvantage of the poor majority small scale farmers.
Land registration will not change the cash flows and profitability of investments. Formal
lenders are not NGOs and every penny advanced is based on the conviction that it can be
recovered with no significant problems. The main reason why people may be denied credit
according to Brown et al (2006) is the low borrower repayment capacity. Gilbert (2002) also
establishes that the formal lending decision making process is based on the ability of
borrowers to demonstrate that they have a regular income source. Formal lenders thus seek
the assurance that a loan will be repaid. It may be difficult to find such an assurance from
Africa's majority poor households and small business owners. Formal lenders usually do not
have confidence in the repayment capacity of such borrowers as lending to them often turns
out to be unprofitable (Gilbert, 2002).
Furthermore, land registration does not change people's attitudes. Place and Migot-Adholla
(1998) establish in Kenya that there exists a very limited use of land titles as collateral for
credit purposes. The unwillingness to use land titles as collateral will limit its impact. The
ability of land registration to promote greater access to credit is dependent on the policies,
traditions and culture in different countries; for instance, where the customs, traditions,
culture or policies prohibit the use of land as collateral, there is no way registration will
promote credit access (Feder and Nishio, 1999). Also, since registered landowners
sometimes have very little or no interest in taking formal credit (Durand-Lasserve and
Payne, 2006), the preference for informal credit could limit the potential credit effect
associated with land registration. As a result, Deininger (2003) points out that certain
preconditions must exist to realise the credit effects of land registration; these conditions
include the existence of: (a) an informal credit market; and (b) a latent demand for formal
credit that is not met because of lack of registered title. The implication is that for land
registration to influence credit access, not only must people have a higher preference for
formal credit but also they must be willing to use their registered property titles as collateral
and the possession of registered land titles should be a necessary requirement for obtaining
formal credit. Hence in areas where these conditions are not met, obtaining a registered title
48
may not enhance an individual's chance of getting formal credit. For instance in Indonesia,
Dower and Potamites (2005) find that unregistered land is acceptable as collateral as people
are able to use informal documents to demonstrate property ownership and this reduces the
potential impact that land registration could have.
Land registration does not also eradicate all the significant cost elements involved in
collateralising a loan. Such cost could still be high enough to deter lenders from granting
credit even when the borrower possesses registered title to land. Collateral cost incurred by
the lender may include cost of evaluation and monitoring, filling fees for collateral
registration, cost of liquidation and asset utilisation and other administrative expenses
(Menkhoff et al., 2003). In the developing countries, apart from the collateralisation process
being complex, the liquidation process is also time consuming and costly (Menkhoff et al.,
2003). Whenever the legal framework complicates or delays the process of creating,
repossessing or sale of collateral and enforcing collateral agreements, the economic value of
the collateral asset is affected and this makes such assets less acceptable by lenders (Fleisig
et al., 2006).
Fleisig et al. (2006) identify three main stages in the collateral enforcement process which
may be a big hindrance to lenders. Firstly, on default of a loan, the lender files a court
complaint. Secondly the court must give a ruling on the case. If judgement favours the
lender, an order is issued for the seizure and sale of the property. Kibodya (2006) observes
for instance that amendments to the Lands Act of Tanzania in 2004 required all banks to
seek approval of the courts for any intended repossession of residential property or
agricultural lands. Finally the appraisal and sale of the assets involved is usually
administered by the courts. There is no need stressing that the outcome of such court
proceedings could be very uncertain. The likelihood of losing the legal battle to recover
outstanding loans through the sale of collateral presents a big challenge to lenders.
Therefore, the mere fact that a loan is collateralised does not mean that the property will
certainly be foreclosed in times of default. Uncertainties of this nature could make even
registered property unacceptable to banks. Apart from the fact that the law may prohibit the
sale of certain assets, another legal barrier arises when the law prohibits the sale of the
property below a certain value with the aim of protecting the borrower (Fleisig et al., 2006).
It is thus apparent that even the best forms and programs of land registration may not in any
way take away these very important legal and other elements of cost associated with
collateral use.
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3.8 Summary
In this chapter the author explains the concept of land registration, its principles, systems and
approaches to implementation. On the economic significance of land registration, available
literature often underscores its ability to increase investment, enhance economic growth and
reduce poverty through the assurance and collateralisation effects. Such arguments are
however based on the assumption that registration guarantees security of property
ownership. As already discussed this argument is flawed because registration per se does not
cater for all the dimension of security and hence weakens its economic impacts. It is thus not
surprising that in the developing world especially Africa, several studies have found no
significant relationship between land registration and security or access to credit. Other
limitations emanate from the overall investment climate, availability of appropriate
infrastructure and profitable investment opportunities amongst others. The next chapter will
focus on the theoretical framework for this study.
so
CHAPTER4
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The absence of registered property titles is often regarded as the factor responsible for the
credit constraint faced by many businesses and households in the developing countries. To
gain a better understanding of this argument, there is the need to provide a conceptual
explanation of credit constraint and how it is linked to registered property titles. The
concepts of market equilibrium and information asymmetry are central to the credit
constraint theory and require an equal level of attention. The next section thus explains what
market equilibrium is and how it works. Section 4.2 examines the concept of information
asymmetry. Whilst section 4.3 looks at the credit constraint theory; the need for collateral in
credit contracts is discussed in section 4.4. In section 4.5 the link between credit constraint,
collateral and land registration is outlined and the chapter is summarised in section 4.6.
4.1 Market Equilibrium
A market is the medium that allows interaction between buyers and sellers of a good;
demand is the amount of the good that consumers are willing and able to buy at various
prices whilst supply refers to the amount of the good that sellers are willing and able to offer
for sale at these prices (Sloman, 2008). In a free and competitive market (where there is no
government intervention), the interaction between demand and supply determines the prices
of goods in the market; these prices provide signals to the market regarding the decisions of
buyers and sellers (Sloman, 2008). Prices are therefore sensitive to any surpluses or
shortages in the market. When supply exceeds demand, it results in a surplus whilst a
shortage is the result of demand exceeding supply. A shortage is an incentive for sellers to
increase prices. As prices go up, demand falls whilst supply increases until the whole
shortage is completely eliminated. On the contrary, a surplus wiII put downward pressure on
prices, as prices fall, demand wiII rise whilst supply declines until the surplus is eliminated.
Prices keep rising and falling in response to shortages and surpluses respectively until such a
point where neither a shortage nor a surplus exist in the market (i.e demand and supply are
equal). When the market is stabilised and there is no tendency for change, the market is said
to be in equilibrium; the price at which demand equal supply is the equilibrium price and the
quantity is the equilibrium quantity (Sloman, 2008). At the point of equilibrium all traders
are able to buy or sell as much as they want and everyone is satisfied (Perloff, 1999). The
market thus has a self-adjusting mechanism that automatically responds to changing
behaviours of buyers and sellers; this is only possible if prices are allowed to freely move in
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response to demand and supply (Browning and Zupan, 2002). This self-adjusting system is
illustrated in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3: Demand and Supply Equilibrium: Adopted from Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1995)
In the market represented in Figure 3 above, equilibrium is established only at P* Q* and it
is only at this price and quantity that both consumers and suppliers are satisfied. Any change
in the price will cause an imbalance in demand and supply. At PI. the supply (Ql) exceeds
demand (less than Qo) and the resulting surplus pushes the price downward to P* where
equilibrium is re-established. If the price were to reduce to po. demand (Q/) would exceed
supply (Qo), the shortage would tend to push the price upwards and back to P* where the
whole shortage is eliminated and market returns to equilibrium. The above illustration shows
how the market equilibrium may be distorted by changes in price. However, these distortions
could also be the result of changes in either demand or supply. Given the supply curve So and
the current ruling market price of P* and assuming that there is an increase in demand, this
will cause a shift in the demand curve from Do to DJ as shown in Figure 4 below. The
increase in demand creates a shortage in the market equal to QrQ* which puts the market
into disequilibrium. The shortage drives prices upwards tP" towards PJ) and demand
gradually declines from Ql and supply increases from Q*. The movement continues until a
new equilibrium is established at El. The new equilibrium price and quantity are PJ and QJ
respectively. A decrease in demand will create a directly opposite effect. Any changes in
supply at the ruling market price will also distort the equilibrium and the same mechanism
will work to re-establish a new equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Effects of an Increase in Demand on Market Equilibrium. Pindyck and Ruhinfeld
(1995)
The explanations so far imply that any distortion in the market is temporary because demand
and supply through the price mechanism will always interact to return the market to a state
of equilibrium. That notwithstanding, when government intervenes in the operations of the
market through the imposition of price controls, the market is supplanted and results in a
persistent shortage or surplus (Salvatore, 2008). In other words, government's intervention
either prevents or delays the process of re-establishing equilibrium and keeps the market in a
permanent state of disequilibrium. The introduction of repressive financial policies such as
interest rate and other price controls prevent prices from changing freely in response to
demand and supply and consequently distorts the working of the free market discussed above.
The concept of market equilibrium is applicable to different markets but its application in the
credit market is of particular interest in this research. The supply side of the credit market
involves lenders (banks) whilst the demand side involves individuals, households and
business who require credit facilities.
4.2 Information Asymmetry
The concept of information asymmetry which was first discussed by George Akerlof (1970)
constitutes a common feature in financial markets and is often used to describe a situation
where by one party to a transaction does not have relatively sufficient information about the
other to enable him make the right decisions in dealing with the other party (Mishkin and
Eakins, 2006). According to Hubbard (2002) when there is information asymmetry, one
party possesses information about his opportunities and activities that he fails to disclose to
the other and can thus take advantage of this undisclosed information. Alternatively,
information asymmetry occurs where one party to a transaction has information that the
other party either ignores or does not have access to with the effect that this information is
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used to profit at the other's expense (Bebczuk, 2003). Access to information is a key
component that facilitates the operation of all markets, especially, financial markets. The
amount and kind of information that people possess is an essential factor influencing their
behaviour and decisions in the market; for instance a seller may adjust the price of his goods
based on his knowledge of the prices of other similar goods and the price a buyer may be
prepared to pay may also vary given his knowledge of the price charged by other sellers
(Auronen, 2003). Hence Information asymmetry affects both the internal organization of
firms and its external relations with labour, capital, and product markets (Greenwald and
Stiglitz, 1990). The presence of imperfect information in the market gives rise to problems
adverse selection and moral hazard.
4.2.1 Adverse selection
Adverse selection occurs whenever the party likely to produce an undesirable outcome with
regard to a transaction is the one most likely to be picked for the transaction; for instance in a
loan transaction the bad credit risk borrowers are the ones who actively seek credit and hence
are more likely to be selected for a loan (Mishkin and Eakins, 2006). When lenders are
unable to differentiate between projects of different credit risk, they are exposed to adverse
selection (Bebezuk (2003). A lender will usually prefer safer projects in advancing credit;
however, risky borrowers may conceal the risky nature of their projects and exploit the
lender's lack of information to their advantage. The problem of adverse selection is
illustrated by Hubbard (2002) and slightly modified in the following example. Suppose that
Mr. D wants to sell his 2000 model of Toyota Corolla. For all 2000 Toyota Corolla adverts
there will be good cars and "lemons" (cars always at the repair shop). Mr D and all other
individual sellers are more informed about the quality of their cars than all potential buyers.
Since buyers cannot differentiate between good cars and lemons, they tend to offer a price
for an average quality 2000 Toyota Corolla to all sellers. Mr D (whose car is a good car)
believes the price is too low and his car is undervalued. However, another seller Mr. S whose
car is a lemon is happy with that price because his lemon has been overvalued. Because of
the pricing process involved, sellers of good cars like Mr D may decide not to sell their cars
at all. The pool of used 2000 Toyota Corollas available in the market will thus consist mainly
of lemons. The implication is that a potential buyer in this market is likely to select or buy a
below average car (a lemon) and this is the adverse selection problem. Akerlof (1970) thus
argues that the presence of information asymmetry eventually leads to a situation where bad
cars derive out good cars from the market because they are priced the same as the good cars.
The effect of adverse selection on credit markets can be inferred from the above illustration.
Since lenders are unable to distinguish between good and bad borrowers they may not be
able to reward good borrowers with lower rates and bad borrowers with higher rates.
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Information asymmetry causes lenders to require higher rates of return due to an over
exaggeration of borrower risk. As a result of this, the average interest rate that will be
charged may be higher than what a low risk borrower would expect or deserves. Good
borrower (low risk) may feel they are being over charged given their lower likelihood to
default and as a result may decide not to apply for credit at all. However, bad borrowers
(high risk) will be happy to borrow at that rate of interest because they may even count
themselves lucky to be able to borrow at that rate. As a result, the demand side of the credit
market will consist of mainly high risk borrowers and increase the lenders' chances of
advancing credit to a bad borrower. The high risk borrowers are the most active seekers of
credit because they have so much to gain if their risky adventures become successful and
little to lose if they fail.
On the contrary, risk-averse borrowers are more conservative and will most likely go for
safer projects with low risk. Such borrowers therefore, may only go for credit only when
they have a safe project to invest in. Given the high possibility of granting loans to high risk
borrowers, lenders may decide to advance no loans at all despite the fact that some low risk
borrowers are also out there seeking for loans (Mishkin and Eakins, 2006). Good and honest
borrowers are thus made to suffer for the threat posed by the presence of bad borrowers
through information asymmetry. If there were no information asymmetries each borrower
would be charged the right price and the above effects would not happen. Adverse selection
thus affects the allocation of funds, business growth and the economy as a whole (Hubbard,
2002). Asymmetrically distributed information between buyers and sellers of financial
instruments is capable of causing the operations of such financial markets to break down or
be severely limited (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990).
4.2.2 Moral hazard
If the parties in a transaction manage to go round the adverse selection problem to undertake
a financial transaction, they remain exposed to the risk of moral hazard after the transaction
has been undertaken. Moral hazard, basically, is the risk that one party and in this case the
borrower may resort to undesirably risky activities at least from the point of view of the
lender after the credit is disbursed (Mishkin and Eakins, 2006). Moral hazard occurs because
the borrower has more information regarding how the loan will actually be used than the
lender. Alternatively, the moral hazard problem is seen as one of a problem of conflict of
interest where one party to a transaction is motivated to act in its own interest without
regards to the interest of the other party. In the credit market such a change in borrower
attitude reduces the chance of the loan being repaid (Hubbard, 2002).
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A sudden change in borrower attitude may be very attractive in that, as explained earlier,
risky investments have a high return if they are successful. That incentive of a very high
return may cause borrowers to divert the funds away from the original purpose for which it
was secured. After all, what the borrower may lose on default is his reputation. Depending
therefore on how valuable this reputation is to the borrower, the risk of moral hazard may be
high or low. This issue of moral hazard arises because it may be practically impossible for
the lender to know what the borrower is actually going to do with the funds, otherwise the
lender could take steps to prevent any diversion of the funds. Since the lender is not well
informed with all certainty what actions the borrower will undertake after obtaining the loan,
Mishkin and Eakins (2006) argue that a decision might be taken not to advance the loan at all
even though the probability of repayment may be high. Asymmetric information thus
increases the cost for savers and borrowers in financial markets. Though the cost of moral
hazard and adverse selection could actually be high enough to cause lenders to stop lending
or to lend to only governments and well-known borrowers, Hubbard (2002) concedes that in
practice, lenders find ways to lower these costs so as to expand their lending opportunities.
The way a debt contract is designed could lower or increase the moral hazard problem.
Furthermore, asking borrowers to invest a certain amount of their own funds into projects
will also put them at risk in case of failure and this may reduce their likelihood of
undertaking risky activities (Hubbard, 2002).
4.3 Credit Constraint
The focus of this section is to look at the theory of credit constraint. The World Bank (2008)
describes access to finance as the absence of both price and non-price barriers to the actual
use of financial services - credit. The phrase 'access to credit' may also be used to refer to a
situation where credit is made available to potential borrowers at a reasonable quantity and
cost (Claessens, 2006). Credit access is thus multifaceted and could be defined in terms of
not only the availability of credit but also in terms of the amount of credit made available,
the cost of the available credit, the type of credit made available. According to Claessens
(2006), these dimensions could alternatively be described in terms of the degree of access
reliability- whether credit can be obtained when needed; the convenience of access - ease of
access and continuity in terms of ability to repeatedly access funds; and flexibility - whether
or not credit products are tailor made. Access to credit is affected by both demand and
supply side factors. The demand side includes factors such as the desire or need to borrow.
Demand for credit is determined by the desire to expand operations, profitability of
investment relative to the cost of capital, availability and cost of other sources of funding
(Bigsten et al., 2003). The supply side involves the decision of whether to lend or not and
how much to lend (Chen and Chivakul, 2008).
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Under what circumstance can one be said to have credit access problems or face a credit
constraint? From the above discourse, a credit constraint exist if one cannot obtain the
needed credit due to following; the fact that it is unaffordable, unreliable or inflexible as well
as other barriers that do permit the amount of credit desired to be met by the suppliers. Thus
a credit constraint exists wherever the desired level of credit is higher than the amount
offered by the market (Ruiz- Tagle, 2005). When a firm is unable to borrow as much as it
would like to at the going market rate, then the firm is credit constrained (Banerjee and
Duflo, 2004). The terms credit constraint and credit rationing are used interchangeably in the
literature as reflected in the quotation below:
In the economic literature credit constraints or credit rationing are defined as a
situation in which interest rates do not fully adjust to equalize the demand and
supply of loans. Some borrowers are denied credit even though they are willing to
pay market interest rates (or more), whereas apparently similar borrowers are able to
obtain credit; the borrowers who are denied credit (either fully or partially) are
referred to as credit constrained (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1981 cited in Love and Sanche,
2009; p. 2).
However, other authors argue that the two are slightly different; credit rationing exists where
there is a gap between the amount the lender is willing to offer and what they are able to
offer; this only leads to credit constraint for borrowers if they are unable to borrow the
optimal amount they wanted (Diagne et al., 2000). In this study the term credit constraint is
used to describe a situation where excess demand for credit is not met because of a decision
by suppliers not to advance more credit or because they are constrained from doing so as
well as a situation where people do not obtain the needed credit because of a decision not to
apply. The concepts of imperfect information and market equilibrium discussed above are'
fundamental to the theory of credit constraint. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) combine the two
concepts to provide the following explanation of the theory of credit constraint. Starting
from a state of equilibrium in the credit market, any increase in demand will create
disequilibrium as the credit demand curve shifts to the right (where demand exceeds supply).
As a result, interest rate (price of credit) will be expected to rise to trigger a fall in demand or
an increase in supply or both so as to re-establish equilibrium at a higher interest rate. The
interest rate is thus assumed to be flexible both upwards and downwards. The flexibility of
interest rate is expected to eliminate the excess demand for credit anytime there is a
temporary distortion, re-establish equilibrium and remove any existing credit constraints.
In reality, there are limits to the extent to which lenders could raise the rate of interest which
means the market could settle in disequilibrium. Information asymmetry distorts the credit
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market operations. Though lenders would like to raise interest rates to return the credit
market to equilibrium whenever there is excess demand, doing so under information
asymmetry would lead to adverse selection where only risky borrowers are attracted to apply
for credit. The interest that borrowers are willing to pay is an indicator of their riskiness. The
higher the rate they are willing to pay the more risky they are likely to be. Unfortunately,
therefore, credit market interest rates cannot increase beyond a certain optimum point. There
is an optimum rate of interest beyond which lenders will not supply credit. At this optimum
interest rate, if demand exceeds supply, borrowers will be prepared to pay higher rates to
obtain credit but raising the interest rate will reduce the expected returns of the lender.
Secondly, the interest rates charged have an effect on the incentive to repay the loan. Higher
interest may wipe out the expected returns accruing to the borrower. This motivates
borrowers to undertake high risk projects with high pay-offs but low probability of success
(moral hazard problem). Higher interest rates also lead to debt overhang where a highly
indebted borrower has very little incentive to work hard (Ghosh et al., 2000) and at the same
time induces borrowers to undertake high risk projects and other actions that are not
promoting the interest of the lender. Therefore, lenders cannot freely increase interest rates
as a response to the rise in demand. The market may as a result settle in disequilibrium
where demand outweighs supply even though some borrowers would have been willing to
pay a higher interest rate to increase the supply of credit and remove any existing credit
constraints. This is illustrated in the figure below.
Figure 5: Interest Rate and Expected Returns to Banks. Source: Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Figure 5 above shows that the maximum return that can accrue to the bank is achieved at the
optimum interest rate of r*; any attempt to increase interest rate above this optimum will
actually cause a decline in expected returns. Hence, at the optimal rate of interest shown
above any increase in demand for credit will not be met creating a credit constraint. Apart
from the limitations imposed on the credit market by the presence of information asymmetry
as explained by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), repressive financial policies such as interest rate
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controls as pointed out earlier could also limit the ability of lenders to respond to rising
demand for credit through increasing interest rates. Interest rate controls do not only lead to a
credit constraint but also perpetuates the constraint. To overcome the credit constraint in the
credit market, a remedy to the problem of information asymmetry must be found. It is
essential to device a blend of strategies capable of minimising its impacts. Auronen (2003)
recommends the use of mechanisms such as guarantees for goods and services, brand names
and franchising to reduce information asymmetry. Such mechanisms carry product quality
information relevant to the buyer and as such help sellers of high quality goods to get the full
value for their goods when sold. Guarantees for instance, give buyers sufficient time to be
well informed about product quality as the seller before assuming full risk of the good being
a 'lemon'. Government regulations could be used to require information disclosure by
dealers in the market and to set some kind of minimum quality requirements for goods and
services (Auronen, 2003; Hubbard, 2002). Leaving markets unregulated in the presence of
information asymmetry affects their efficiency (Auronen, 2003).
Lenders can rely on credit records, accounts transactions, cash flow statements and other
records to screen borrowers (Pearce et al., 2004). Unfortunately, however, in the developing
world obtaining such data may be an insurmountable challenge in itself because, apart from
the fact that functional credit reference bureaus are mostly absent, most small business
operators are not well educated and cannot keep basic records and several others do not have
access to bank accounts (Sacerdoti, 2005). Unfortunately, interest rates cannot also be used
as a screening device due to previous explanations given. Hence, the need for an alternative
device for tackling the information asymmetry problem and this is where collateral comes in.
The problem is solved by incorporating collateral into the design of credit contracts (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981).
4.4 The Need for Collateral in Credit Contracts
Collateral is generally perceived as any asset that is pledged to a lender to guarantee a loan
should the borrower fail to repay. This gives the lender the right to sell the asset to recover
any outstanding debts. Several properties could be used as collateral but are generally
classified into movable assets including: goods, machinery, account receivables, warehouse
receipts, shares, life policy and immovable assets such as landed property (Fleisig et. al.,
2006). The preference for one form of collateral or the other may thus be a result of the
associated legal restrictions as well as specific attributes of the asset. A good and hence an
acceptable collateral asset is usually identified by the following key attributes: firstly, it must
have an adequate and stable value that is expected to rise over time (Rouse, 2002). The
certainty with which an assets value is expected to appreciate is relevant in the decision to
accept an asset as collateral (Benjamin, 1978). A more stable asset value represents lower
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risk of losses to the lender and makes related assets more acceptable; hence banks prefer
assets that are not likely to depreciate significantly in value over the term of the facility (Foss,
2012). Secondly, a good security should be easy to measure (Rouse, 2002), some assets are
easy to value relative to others; the easier it is to value an asset the lesser the possibility of
errors. Thirdly a good security should be easy to charge (Rouse, 2002); fourthly, collateral is
more valuable the more immobile and immune to damage it is (Feder and Feeny, 199).
Fifthly, a good security should also be easy to realise (Rouse, 2002). The availability of
secondary markets and their depth determines how easily the lender can dispose collateral in
case of default. Assets that have well developed markets are better collateral (Foss, 2012;
Kibodya, 2006)
Furthermore, apart from being highly marketable Balkenhol and Schutte (2001) note that the
transactions cost involved in verifying ownership, valuing and enforcing security interest
affects the quality of the collateral and must be considered when taking the asset. Since most
of such cost is passed on to the borrower, it may not be too much of a problem for the
lenders provided borrowers are willing to pay. finally, a good collateral must also be easily
identifiable; lenders want to be able to identify pledged assets even in the midst of other
similar assets and identification is made easier if the asset has unique features such as serial
numbers, make, model or marks that cannot be erased - such assets are preferred to others
with no distinguishing features (Foss, 2012). The question now is whether or not lenders can
do without collateral. According to Nirmala (2008) and Rouse (2002) there are four specific
circumstances when collateral may be required to secure a loan and these are as follows: the
first involves a situation where the realisation of an asset represents the source of repayment.
The lender in this case will require control over the source of repayment which is the asset.
The second is where the purpose of the loan is to acquire an asset. Mortgage is a typical
example. The lender retains ownership right of the assets until the borrower has fully repaid
the loan. Thirdly the lender may seek collateral where the amount involved is substantial.
Lenders should be 'amount conscious' when seeking security for a lending facility. It might
not be cost effective to take security for small amounts given the transactions cost associated
with the taking and enforcement of collateral contracts. Finally, collateral is required where
the risk and consequences of the repayment plan failing are substantial.
The economic significance of collateral could be better understood by considering the
consequences of unsecured loan transactions. In the event of a default involving an
unsecured loan agreement, the only resort for the lender may be to go to court to make a
legal claim on the borrower's property (if he has any) and as Fleisig et at. (2006) notes, the
nature of the judicial process may make this very costly even though the outcome cannot be
certain; the problem is worsened where the borrower has no valuable assets at all or where
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such assets were lost in the events leading to the default in which case the lender completely
loses the total amount outstanding. Quiet apart from that, the risk of unsecured loans for any
particular lender (X) is that another lender (Y) may have similar claims against the same
borrower and it is possible that lender Y may be the first to secure a court ruling to get the
assets to defray its outstanding loans; alternatively, the proceeds from the sale of the
borrower's property may be divided evenly among all lenders. (Fleisig et al., 2006). The
amount received by each unsecured lender may not be sufficient to cover the outstanding
amounts owed by the borrower. The advantage that the secured lender has is that he has the
prior claim on the borrower's property over all other claimants including the unsecure
lenders (Balkenhol and Schutte, 2001). In countries with security archiving systems,
establishing priority among several secure lenders is done on the basis of the order in which
such lenders filed a notice of the existence of their security interest in the property (Fleisig et
al., 2006). The first to file is given the priority.
4.4.1 Borrower-based Collateral Theory
The borrower-based collateral theory regards the use of collateral as a function of
information asymmetry and the borrowers' characteristics. It is the assumption of this theory
that all lenders in the credit market face the same information asymmetry where no one
particular lender has an information "advantage over other lenders regarding the borrowers
(Bester, 1985; Boot et al., 1991; Jimenez et al., 2008). Proponents of the theory argue that
there will be no need for collateral in loan contracts if there exists a competitive credit
market with risk neutral borrowers and lenders where both lender and borrower possess the
same information regarding creditworthiness of the borrower (Chan and kanatas, 1985).
Using collateral in loan contracts under perfect information will be inefficient given the cost
involved (Bester, 1985). How then does collateral solve the problems of information
asymmetry? Under information asymmetry, the use of interest rates as screening device is
ineffective; collateral thus acts as a screening or signalling device by inducing the borrower
to reveal any inherent risk of default and thus providing the lender with relevant signals to
help tackle adverse selection (Balkenhol and Schutte, 2001; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004;
Menkhoff et al., 2003). This theory postulates that, low risk borrowers will always use
collateral to signal their credit quality to enable them obtain lower interest rates (Bester,
1985; Hainz et al., 2008). Hence, if a lender offers a menu of loan contracts comprising: a
secured loan with low interest rate and an unsecured loan with a high interest rate, low risk
borrowers are expected to go for the former while the high risk borrower is expected to go
for the latter (Menkhoff et al., 2003).
The prospect of losing assets pledged as collateral is what deters risky borrowers from
accepting credit contracts involving the provision of collateral. Therefore by allowing
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borrowers to choose from a menu of credit contracts with different collateral requirement,
lenders are able to put them into their respective risk classes (something that lenders are
unable to do under information asymmetry). In this regard, the willingness to provide
collateral acts as a substitute for information on the borrower's creditworthiness where there
is information asymmetry (Fleisig et al., 2006). Collateralising loans allows the design of
loan contracts to ensure that high risk borrowers are not provided the incentive to demand
credit. Apart from being a signalling device, collateral is also a tool for motivating credit
repayment, aligning the interest of the borrower to that of the lender and encouraging good
borrower behaviour (Jimenez and Saurina, 2004). After credit is disbursed, collateral is the
tool used by lenders for controlling the risk of asset substitution on the part of the borrower
(Scott, 1986). The moral hazard model maintains that the use of collateral compels the
borrowers to work harder to avoid default or reduce the risk of default. The reason is that the
lenders have the right to seize the underlying asset on default thus passing the cost of default
back to the borrower. Having said that, the borrower only has a stronger incentive to fulfil
his obligation in a collateralised contract if he has a greater equity stake in the asset than the
lender (Scott, 1986).
Therefore, moral hazard according to Boot et al. (1991) can only be eliminated completely if
borrowers pledge "sufficient" collateral to make the loan riskless. Since lenders may not be
able to control the actual behaviour or actions of borrowers after a loan has been advanced,
the loan contracts should be designed in a way to attract low risk borrowers and also compel
the borrower to take those actions which are in the interest of the lender through
collateralisation (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The main implication of the borrower-based
theory is that a reduction in the extent of information asymmetry in the market will lower the
demand for collateral (Berger et al., 20 II).
A potential borrower with valuable assets has two options to raise funds to finance an
impending project. The asset could be used as security for a loan to finance the project;
alternatively, it could be sold and the proceeds used to finance the project (Benjamin, 1978);
this will do away with the need to borrow. The borrower will prefer to use his asset as
collateral if only its sale is more costly than the value of the forgone rights to the asset
attenuated by the collateral contract (Benjamin, 1978). A borrower will however, prefer to
pledge an asset as collateral where the cost of selling it is higher than the cost of pledging it
as security and vice versa. Benjamin (1978) provides the following illustration to explain the
above argument. If an asset to be used as collateral has an existing market. Assume the net
market value of the asset is P". Pm is the gross market price and S is the fixed cost of selling
the asset, then, Po = Pm - S. This means that selling the asset will fetch the owner PD'
Assuming also that all lenders consider the used value of the asset to be below Po, if a lender
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thus offers a loan amount (L) greater than Pn. (i.e. L>Pn) then all borrowers who would
otherwise have sold the asset for Pn will find it more profitable to pledge it to the lender in
return of L. This will however be unprofitable to the lender. The reverse is true if L< Pn.
Thus whenever L< Pm repaying the debt is valuable to the borrower and the default rate on
such a debt should be zero; except for circumstances beyond control of the borrower.
Advancing amounts less than the net market value of the collateral reduces moral hazard and
defaults are more likely to be caused by factors that are external to the borrower. This is why
in reality lenders tend to lend only a fraction of the assets value.
Focusing on the borrower specific characteristics that influence the use of collateral in credit
contracts, reference is often made to the risk of default as the overarching determinant of the
collateral demand by lenders. Collateral offsets the weaknesses in the borrower's cash flows,
character and other important borrower attributes; it is only used as the last resort to
recouping outstanding loan amounts should the borrower default in repayment (Balkenhol
and Schutte, 2001). Hence any uncertainty about repayment will lead to a demand for
collateral to provide cushion for the lender against the possibility of default. Under the
assumption of information asymmetry, a negative correlation exists between the willingness
to offer collateral and the perceived riskiness of the borrower. However, when information is
not asymmetric and the risk of a borrower is observable, the actual or observed risk of the
borrower is positively correlated with collateral use and the lower the observed risk of a
borrower, the lesser the likelihood of collateral use and vice versa (Boot et al., 1991). When
the risk of default is deemed unacceptably high, the need to reduce it leads to the demand for
collateral by lenders (Scott, 1986). This presupposes that a certain class of borrowers (with
unacceptable risk of default) will fail to obtain credit if they do not provide collateral. As a
result of the significant role of collateral in the credit markets, Balkenhol and Schutte (2001)
argue that the lack of collateral is to blame for the demand and supply mismatch in the
market for small scale enterprises. Even though information asymmetry is the underlying of
cause of credit constraints, the absence of collateral is what exacerbates the situation because
the provision of collateral would have solved the problem and helped many people obtain
credit all other things being equal.
4.5 Credit Constraint, Collateral and Property Registration
A clear linkage between land registration and credit constraint can be deduced from the
concepts discussed above. Information asymmetry is central to the theory of credit constraint.
The lack of information creates uncertainties in the credit market and negatively affects the
lending decision making process. Though there are several ways of mitigating the
information imbalance between lenders and borrowers, collateral is often regarded as the
most effective tool for fighting the twin problems associated with information asymmetry.
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Collateral acts as a substitute for information on the borrower's creditworthiness where there
is information asymmetry (Fleisig et al., 2006). That notwithstanding, the taking of collateral
in itself is also constrained by information asymmetry. In the developing world, property
ownership cannot be traced or validated; one cannot identify who owns what and addresses
are difficult to verify (de Soto, 2000). For every asset that is to be used as collateral, lenders
require essential information not only on its value or quality but most importantly its
ownership and any third party interest in it.
This ownership information is crucial to determine whether or not the potential borrower has
the legal right to present that asset as security for a loan. De Soto (2000) argues that in
developing countries a lot of effort is required to tackle simple issues such as whether or not
a seller really owns the asset being put up for sale and whether he has the right to transfer or
pledge it. The difficulty or inability to ascertain the right owner due to the lack of public
information as in all cases of information asymmetry will create uncertainty and eventually,
lenders will decline to accept such properties as collateral. The reason is that if banks cannot
accurately ascertain and provide proof of the borrower's rights to the assigned property, the
bank stands to lose its rights to foreclose the property for the purpose of recovering any
outstanding debt.
Until the information asymmetry involving property ownership is appropriately addressed
property will not be accepted as collateral because they (the collateral assets) will be unable
to solve the teething problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. When property
ownership information is not publicly available for easy verification, emphasis on collateral
will rather create adverse selection and moral hazard where potential borrowers are most
likely to present to the banks, properties that are under ownership disputes or some forms of
encumbrances. In such a scenario, since the potential borrower's claims to the property may
be fraudulent or in dispute, incorporating the property into a loan contract will not provide
the repayment incentive required to avoid moral hazard. In a nutshell information asymmetry
on property ownership weakens the ability of collateral to reduce the credit constraint
problem. As far as landed property is concerned, land registration: solves the problem of
information asymmetry on property ownership and allows lenders to accept land as collateral
and all other things being equal eases the credit constraint problem. Furthermore, as argued
in previous sections, information asymmetry often justifies the intervention of government to
encourage information disclosure to make otherwise private information publically available.
As far as landed property is concerned, land registration is the medium through which
government could intervene to make land ownership information public.
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Registered property titles are important because they generate useful signals about the
borrower's credit worthiness not only by merely serving as collateral but by providing
information on unobservable borrower characteristics (Dower and Potamites, 2005). The
cost and inconveniences of the land registration process (in terms of time and resources spent)
in the developing world is commonly known to be high (Toulmin, 2008). Given the high
levels of poverty in the developing world, the incidence of registered titles is likely to be
higher amongst the economically affluent and socially connected individuals. Therefore,
under conditions of information asymmetry, the possession of a registered title other things
being equal may provide signals of the likely economic status of the property's owner. Such
information will be of interest to the lender by reducing the information deficiency to some
extent and improving the chances of the property owner obtaining credit.
Another way to solve the problem of information asymmetry as pointed out earlier is the
provision of guarantee for goods and services sold in the market. The title registration system
discussed in chapter three provides this kind of guarantee; all land ownership information
under this system (apart from some exceptions identified in chapter 3) are guaranteed to be
accurate and this guarantee is sometimes backed by a promise of compensation. The
provision of such guarantees through the title registration system gives lenders confidence in
the information provided by borrowers and acts as a direct remedy to the information
deficiency in the credit market. As Field and Torero, (2004) rightly note, the lack of formal
registration creates mistrust among lenders with regard to the validity of ownership rights
and increases the cost of verification to prohibitive levels.
An asset is more acceptable as collateral the easier it is to sell and title registration could
make that possible. Given the guarantee provided by the title registration system it will be
much easier to sell registered property than unregistered property all other things being equal,
making registered property more acceptable to lenders. Once the property is accepted and
incorporated into the loan contract, it helps to solve the problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard which paves the way for credit to be made available to potential borrowers.
Not only may credit be made available but the terms of the credit may also be influenced. De
Laiglesia (2004) argues that property registration through its ability to raise land values and
increase its liquidity could influence credit terms by increasing the amount of credit that is
made available to borrowers as well as reducing the interest rate charged. The linkage
between land registration (specific emphasis on title registration) and credit access is
summarised in the diagram below.
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Figure 6: Link between Land Registration and Access to Credit
4.6 Summary
The credit constraint amongst businesses and households has often been linked to several
factors but at the centre of the theory are the concepts of information asymmetry and market
equilibrium. The most viable option to overcoming the information asymmetry and hence the
credit constraint is to incorporate collateral into credit contracts. However, when the
ownership of property is shrouded by information asymmetry they become less acceptable
forms of collateral to lenders. Property registration thus provides publicalJy available data on
property ownership which makes it easier for lenders to verify the ownership of any property
presented for collateral purposes at a faster rate and lower cost. The next chapter will now
consider the methodological underpinning of this study.
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CHAPTERS
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The previous chapters have outlined the background, the objectives as well as the theoretical
underpinnings of this study. This chapter provides an insight into the pproach/methodologies
available and the ones adopted to investigate the stated objectives. The next section looks at
the research paradigms. The strategies of enquiry are discussed in section 5.2. In section 5.3,
the available techniques for sampling and data collection in both qualitative and quantitative
research are outlined. The penultimate section outlines the specific methodology adopted and
finally, section 5.6 gives a summary of the chapter
5.1 Research Paradigms
A research paradigm refers to the set of assumptions and beliefs that constitute a good way
of conducting research and this includes data collection and analysis techniques (Newman,
2007). Paradigm defines the philosophical world views that guide the conduct of research
(Saunders et al., 2009). These worldviews constitute the researcher's orientation about the
nature of research (Creswell, 2009). There are three main research paradigms in conducting
social science research. They are: positivism - quantitative; constructivism - qualitative; and
pragmatism - multi-methodology. These philosophical standpoints are helpful in
understanding social phenomenon in terms of their nature and the way they operate. The
distinction between these paradigms is often based on epistemological and ontological
considerations as well as the approach of the whole research process - deductive or inductive
(Newman, 2007). Epistemology, according to Bryman (2008) is about what constitutes
warranted or acceptable knowledge. It also bothers on the following questions: what is the
relationship between the researcher and the subject being researched? and how do we know
what we know? (Krauss, 2005); Ontological considerations however, focus on the nature of
reality (Creswell, 1994).
5.1.1 Quantitative approach
The positivist paradigm assumes that the social world can be objectively measured in a
manner that does not allow the researcher's values to influence the process or the outcome; it
emphasises on numerical measurement of facts (Newman, 2007). Social phenomenon is thus
regarded as an ontologically objective and verifiable fact; there is only one truth and it is
objective (Creswell, 1994). On the assumptions of epistemology, the positivists try to
maintain an independent stance to avoid biases in the research process (Creswell. 2008). In
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the positivist research, therefore, the researcher does not interact with the subject of the
research; this clearly, is not applicable when dealing with social research and is more
suitable for laboratory based research. Research under the positivist paradigm is generally
based on causal principle using a logical deductive approach; as a way of studying social
reality, it involves the testing of known theories against hard empirical evidence with the
help of quantitative variables and statistical procedures (Bryman, 20081; Creswell, 1994).
Causality, generalisation and replication are most often the preoccupation of research under
this paradigm (Bryman, 2008). The positivist researcher is thus predominantly quantitative
minded.
5.1.2 Qualitative approach
The proponents of the constructivist/qualitative approach often regard the positivist approach
to research as applicable in the natural sciences and therefore do not agree with the
wholesale adoption of the positivist approach in the conduct of social science research. It is
argued that people and institutions which are the main subjects of social research are
uniquely distinct from natural science phenomena and related studies should involve
different set of logic or procedures that reflect that uniqueness (Bryman, 2008; Newman,
2007). Researchers in favour of this paradigm are of the view that people interact and
respond to situations based on their beliefs about reality other than what is objectively real
(Newman, 2007). Therefore, reality is nothing more than a social construct. The social world
can thus be well understood by studying the way people perceive it. Kraus (2005) aptly
observes that the best way to gain a good understanding of any social phenomenon is to look
at it within its own context. The ontological assumption of this paradigm is one of
subjectivity of social phenomenon based on changing perceptions. Reality or truthfulness is
not singular; rather, multiple realities exist in the social world. Since each individual has
different sets of experiences and perception, reality could be said to vary for different people
(Kraus, 2005). In qualitative research truthfulness could therefore be said to emanate from
peoples experiences and perceptions of the phenomenon being studied; in short reality is
what people say it is.
Unlike the positivist, in this approach, the researcher interacts with the subject being studied
with the view to obtain an in-depth understanding of reality from the point of view of those
living it (Creswell, 2008). It is in this regard that this approach is seen as value laden as the
researcher's own values may influence the research process and outcomes through the
interaction with the subjects of the study. The interpretations or meanings derived from this
interaction are influenced by the researcher's own background. The overall process of
conducting research under the qualitative paradigm is inductive; the focus is not to test
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theories but rather to develop them. The inductive approach begins with observation or
information gathering, interviews, categorising data, identifying patterns and comparing
patterns with other theories; hypothesis and theories are the products that emerge from this
whole process of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2008). Furthermore, this approach
involves explaining social reality by giving a detailed or holistic picture or description of the
setting, process or relationships; qualitative data involve mostly written/spoken words,
symbols and visual images even though sometimes the researcher may also use numbers
(Newman, 2007). The debate over qualitative and quantitative approaches to research is still
on-going with followers of each approach pointing a finger at the weaknesses of the other.
These weaknesses are summarised by Bryman (2008) and Morse et al. (2002) as follows.
Qualitative research has often been criticised for been too subjective, difficult to generalise
and replicate and lacking transparency and rigor. Quantitative research on the other hand has
its own criticisms: firstly it is said not to recognise the inherent difference that exists between
nature and the social world; secondly the process of measuring variables provides a false
sense of precision and accuracy and finally, in the process of analysing the relationship
existing between variables the social world is presented as static.
5.1.3 Multi-methodology
Given the weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, a third
methodology - pragmatic or multi-methodology has emerged which emphasises the need to
focus on the research problem and using all the available approaches to produce a better
understanding of the problem at stake (Creswell, 2009). The multi-methodology approach to
research therefore is a combination of both qualitative and quantitative approaches already
discussed to conduct a given study. The methodology therefore allows the use of different
world views, and different forms of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2009); this is a
methodological triangulation. Triangulation is possible because no research question fits
perfectly into anyone paradigm. Nevertheless, one approach may be more suitable for a
particular question than the other (Saunders et al., 2009). In doing this kind of research one
approach (either the quantitative or qualitative) may dominate the other. The two approaches
could be considered to be compatible and complementary to each other. Triangulation allows
the biases and weaknesses associated with specific methodologies to be offset by using other
approaches simultaneously (Jick, 1979). It also allows the research questions at stake to be
thoroughly addressed compared to using any single approach in isolation (Creswell, 2009).
Adopting the multi- methodology adds to the scope and breadth of the study and allows
contradictions or new perspectives to emerge and may also permit convergence of results
(Swanson, 1992). In this regard, the results obtained from one approach could be cross-
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checked by using the other approach. This does not only promote confidence in the research
findings but also improves reliability and validity (Bryman, 2008). Despite the advantages of
methodological triangulation, there is also a problem with its use in any research. Apart from
the fact that triangulation could be expensive and time consuming Creswell (2009) notes that
the researcher may not also have the requisite skills to use both qualitative and quantitative
approaches. Selecting an appropriate methodology for any given research is a big challenge
for all researchers. Creswell (2009) identifies the key factors that should inform a
researcher's choice as follows: the researcher's own worldview, training and experience; the
research audience; and above all nature of the research problem or research objectives.
5.2 Strategies of Enquiry
Research strategy provides the basis for data collection and analysis in any research project
(David and Sutton, 2004). The research paradigm adopted determines which strategies the
researcher will employ and all will depend on the nature of the research questions or
objectives. That apart the amount of time and resources available to the researcher also
influence the choice of research strategy (Saunders et al., 2009). Since the choice of a
strategy depends on the research philosophy, some strategies are associated with the
quantitative research paradigm whilst others are related with qualitative paradigm. However,
no one strategy can be said to be superior and they all tend to be mutually inclusive
(Saunders et al., 2009). One strategy may only be more appropriate than the other depending
on the research question or objective involved.
5.2.1 Quantitative research strategies
There are mainly two kinds of strategies in quantitative research namely: experiments and
surveys. Experiments are built on the positivist principles discussed earlier; though they are
predominant in the natural sciences, they are sometimes also used in social science research
(Newman, 2007). The focus of experiments is to determine if there is a causal link between
two variables and whether the introduction of a particular treatment affects the outcomes
(Creswell, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009). Usually, subjects under study are assigned to groups
randomly whilst one or more of the independent variables are manipulated to determine if
they influence the outcome given that all other factors or variables that could influence the
come are controlled (Creswell, 2009). These same principles are applied in social science
experiments as explained by Newman (2009) below. The observed participants are often put
into two groups; both groups are given the same treatment. However, the researcher
introduces a particular condition of interest to only one of the groups and measures the
responses of the two groups. The researcher is then able to attribute variations in the
responses of the two groups to the condition or treatment introduced to the other group.
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Experiments are thus useful in making comparison between any entities of interest to the
researcher. Surveys on the other hand provide a quantitative description of the opinions,
trends and or attitudes of a given population based on generalisations from the findings of a
sample of that population (Creswell, 2009). Contrary to Creswell's description, survey is a
system of collecting data and could also provide qualitative description with the aim of
making generalisation. Though surveys are common in quantitative studies they can also be
used in qualitative studies and can be combined with other qualitative strategies. A survey
could either be cross sectional - collects data on different cases at a point in time or
longitudinal - collects data on a particular case over two or more points in time to allow for
comparison and determination of change over the period (David and Sutton, 2004).
5.2.2 Qualitative research strategies
The main qualitative strategies identified by Creswell (2009), Newman, (2007). Saunders et
al. (2009), Strauss and Corbin, (1990) and Willig (2008) include: case studies;
phenomenology; ethnography; grounded theory and narrative. Detailed descriptions of each
of these strategies are provided by the above authors and have been summarised below. Case
studies provide detailed investigation of a particular phenomenon within its context and
using a combination of methods to collect the needed data. The study of two or more cases at
the same time allows the researcher to make comparisons. Phenomenology is used where
one intends to do a detailed description of the experiences of a group of people and involves
an attempt to understand reality from the perspective of those living it. Phenomenology is
interested in the world as it is experienced by human beings within particular contexts and at
particular times, rather than in abstract statements about the nature of the world in general. In
other words, it is concerned with the phenomena that appear in our consciousness as we
engage with the world around us. Attempting to understand social phenomena from the
perspective of the entities living it reduces researcher biases by removing any preconceived
ideas. When using the grounded theory, the target is to develop theories through a multi
layered data collection process, refinement and categorisation of data to establish
relationships through comparisons of data with the emerging categories. With this strategy,
theories emerge and are rooted in the data from which they emerged rather than from
analytical construct or pre-existing theories. Ethnography refers to the act of describing a
particular culture and understanding the way of life from the native point of view. In
studying different cultural groups ethnographic studies involve the collection of
observational data over a considerable time period. Ethnography is sometimes also referred
to as participant observations; the researcher basically plants himself into the group being
studied while observing their behaviour and asking questions over a period of time. Finally,
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the narrative strategy involves the researcher studying the lives of some individuals through
stories about the individual's life being told by the individuals themselves and then retold by
the researcher in narrative chronology (Creswell, 2009).
5.2.3 Multi-methodology research strategies
The multi-methodology has three fundamental strategies explained by Creswell (2009) as
follows: first is the sequential strategy where the findings of one methodology are expanded
on using another approach; secondly the researcher could adopt concurrent strategy where
both quantitative and qualitative data are collected at the same time; and finally, the
transformative strategy where a theoretical lens provides the overall perspective in a study
with both qualitative and quantitative data. It is important to note that though the above
strategies are often classified under the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms, they
are not mutually exclusive. For instance, the survey strategy could be used in qualitative
research just as the case study strategy could also be used in quantitative research.
5.3 Sampling and Methods of data Collection
5.3.1 Sampling techniques
Sampling involves the selection of a small group of participants from a larger target group.
The aim of sampling in quantitative research is to obtain a representative sample of the
population, reduce biases and to permit accurate generalisation (Baker, 1999; Bryman,
2008). There are two broad sampling techniques - probability sampling (simple random
sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling and cluster sampling) and nonprobability
sampling techniques (haphazard, quota, purposive and snowball sampling techniques).
According to Newman (2007) quantitative researchers focus more on the representativeness
of a sample and tend to lean towards probability/random sampling techniques; On the other
hand, sampling in qualitative research is not so much bothered about how representative the
selected sample is but rather emphasis is on whether or not the chosen sample helps in
explaining the issues at stake. The result is that qualitative researchers mostly use non-
probability sampling techniques. The main difference is that unlike non-probability
sampling, probability sampling seeks to give each participant an equal chance of being
selected to avoid biases. Hence probability sampling relies a lot on sampling frames which
define the elements in the target population from which a representative sample could be
chosen (Newman, 2007). In practice however, it appears quantitative researchers may be
faced with situations where such a sampling frame does not exist or cannot be closely
estimated and may have to rely on non-probability sampling techniques.
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Probability Sampling Techniques
In a simple random sampling technique, a sampling frame is developed and a random
process is used to select elements from the frame. An example is the lottery system where
names are put in a container and the winner drawn out randomly (Malhotra and Birks, 2009).
Systematic sampling as explained by Newman (2007) starts with allocating numbers to each
element in the sampling frame; a sampling interval is then used as the random way of
selecting elements from the sampling frame. For instance, a simple random sampling method
is used to select the first element after which every nth element (eg. every 5th person) is
selected for inclusion into the sample. Stratified sampling technique involves subdividing the
population into several layers or sub-groups after which the simple random sampling or
systematic sampling could then be used to select elements from each of the subgroups
(Newman, 2007). It is thus more suitable where various sub-categories exist within the target
population. By so doing the researcher is able to ensure that each sub group is well
represented in the final sample. Finally, the cluster sampling technique is used where the
population is dispersed; the population is first put into various clusters. A number of the
clusters are randomly selected and elements within each cluster are further selected
randomly to the final sample to be studied (Malhotra and Birks, 2009).
Non-probability Sampling Techniques
The non-probability sampling techniques have been well explained by Newman (2007) and a
summary is provided below. Haphazard sampling involves selecting cases in any convenient
manner. The participants are selected because they are in the right place at the right time.
This technique is cheap, easy and convenient. Under quota sampling, the target population is
divided in various categories of interest (eg. Male and female) and a predetermined number
of people under each category is selected to reflect the composition of the population. It thus
has some resemblance with the stratified sampling technique. Purposive sampling is often
used to select unique informative individuals or institutions. Purposive sampling is
appropriate if members of the population are difficult to reach or specific individuals are
considered key informants in a study. Snowball sampling technique is also a convenience
sampling which often starts with a few respondents. These initial respondents then provide
the researcher with contacts to other respondents. One respondent links the researcher to
another and the process goes on and on. Just like all other non-probability sampling, this
technique is mostly used where no sampling frame is available or easily accessible for use.
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Sample Size
The size of the final sample is one area of interest to all researchers. The question of how
large or small the sample should be has no simple or straight forward answer. It depends on
factors such as the analysis techniques to be adopted, how accurate the sample needs to be
for the given purpose and also the peculiar characteristics of the population (Newman, 2007).
For high accuracy and more diverse population, a large sample size is usually recommended
but where the population is more homogenous a smaller size may also be acceptable
(Newman, 2007). However, a good sample is not necessarily one that is large because, a
large sample does not necessarily guarantee precision (Byrman, 2008). Therefore, a
representative sample may not be strictly about the size of the sample.
5.3.2 Methods of data collection
All researchers require data to investigate their research objectives. One purpose of sampling
is to select a group of individuals from whom the relevant information will be obtained to
investigate the research objectives. It is therefore imperative to design instruments that can
accurately capture the required information. Just like the research strategies discussed
already, there are data collection methods peculiar to quantitative research and others
peculiar to qualitative research. However, these methods are also not mutually exclusive to
anyone research paradigm. The various methods for data collection are compatible with
both quantitative and qualitative studies and the one to choose ultimately depends on the
research objectives, the available resources and time.
Quantitative data collection
In quantitative research, experiments and surveys in addition to being strategies of enquiries
also act as methods of data collection (Creswell, 2009). Structured observations are also a
quantitative data collection tool (Saunders et al., 2009). The experiments conducted provide
the researcher with data which is then analysed. In surveys, the researcher has at his disposal
various techniques to use. Quantitative survey techniques typically are based on structured
questionnaires which ask different questions relating to the behaviour, intentions, attitudes,
awareness, motivation and demographic characteristics of respondents (Malhotra and Birks,
2009). Questionnaires in quantitative research often involve the use of closed ended
questions where each question has a predetermined set of responses from which the
respondents choose an appropriate answer (Saunders et al., 2009). Questionnaire design
differs according to how it is administered or the amount of contact one has with the
respondents; the questionnaires could be self-administered or interviewer administered
questionnaires (Saunders et al., 2009). The differences between them as provided by
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Saunders et al. (2009) are outlined below. Self-administered questionnaires are often
completed by the respondents and are administered electronically - internet based, sent
through the post - mail/postal questionnaire or delivery and collection questionnaire where
the questionnaire is delivered by hand to the respondents and collected at later date. In the
case of interviewer administered questionnaires, the responses to questions are recorded by
the interviewer and this could be done via telephone and face-to-face interviews. Indeed,
quantitative researchers use these structured interviews which are based on standardised
questions usually with pre-coded responses; the interviewer reads out the exact questions and
records the answers given
As observed by Malhotra and Birks (2009) each of these techniques has its own strengths
and weaknesses which are as follows. Telephone interviews allow contact to be made with
respondents spread over a wide geographical area; however such interviews are shorter and
questions should often have fewer responses to choose from so as not to confuse the
respondent. Mail and electronic techniques can also reach wide spread respondents and could
be relatively cheaper. In the case of face-to-face interviews, the researcher has the
opportunity to provide explanations to clarify anything not understood to ensure that the
right answers are given. This opportunity is not present when the other techniques are being
used. However, face-to-face interviews could be expensive and time consuming. Self-
administered questionnaires such as mail and electronic based questionnaires as well as
telephone interviews usually have a lower response rate than face-to-face interviews
(Saunders et al., 2009). Due to the various limitations encountered in capturing data through
any of the above data collection mechanisms, Saunders et al. (2009) argue that a researcher's
choice will be influenced amongst other things by the type and number of questions to be
asked, the sample size, the amount of time and financial resources available. Finally, the
focus of structured observations conducted in quantitative studies is to determine how often
something is occurring and not why it is happening (Saunders et al., 2009). Observations
could take a long time to conduct.
Qualitative data collection
In qualitative research, the main tools or techniques for data collection are: observations,
interviews as well as the use of documents and audio-visual materials (Creswell, 2008).
Qualitative interviews could be in different forms. It could be a one off interview or
cumulative where the researcher returns to interview the same person a number of times; it
could also be a one on one or group based interview as in the case of focus group discussions
(David and Sutton, 2004). The quest for detail responses in qualitative research requires such
interviews to be of an unstructured or semi-structured nature and involving the use of open
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ended questions. In semi-structured interviews, there is always a list of themes on which
questions will be asked during the interview; the exact question asked and the order in which
they are asked may vary from one interview to the other (Saunders et al., 2009).
Unstructured interviews (in-depth interviews) are non-standardised and are informal, the
researcher uses it to explore in detail a general area of interest and even though there is no
predetermined list of questions the interviewer is clear on the general issues of interest; the
interviewee essential determines the direction of the questioning based on what they say
(Saunders et al., 2009). Unstructured and semi-structured interviews could also be conducted
via telephone or face-to-face. Observations could also be used to collect qualitative data.
After all, the best way to know how people do something is to watch as they do it; It
involves systematically observing, recording, describing analysing and interpreting people's
behaviour (Saunders et al., 2009). Observation as a data collection method in qualitative
research takes the form of participant observation which is explained by Saunders et al.
(2009) as follows. In participant observation the researcher plants himself into the group of
people or institution being studied and part-take in their daily lives and activities. The
researcher thus understands the issues better because he does not just observe the activities
but also gets a first-hand feeling of the experiences of the people. The data is collected by
keeping a diary of whatever the researcher sees at various times and his perceptions or
feelings about the issue being observed. There are no formal interviews but all information
may be obtained through informal discussions. Under the multi-methodology, the researcher
may combine a number of the above data collection methods.
5.4. Data Analysis
There are a variety ways to analyse data in both quantitative and qualitative studies. Both
quantitative and qualitative data analysis are often facilitated by the use of computer
software such as SPSS and Nvivo respectively.
5.4.1 Quantitative data analysis
The techniques of data analysis adopted in quantitative research inevitably depend on the
nature of the data or the level of measurement (nominal, ordinal, and interval and ratio data).
Nominal or categorical data cannot be ranked in any order and are not capable of
mathematical manipulations - addition, subtraction, division or multiplication (David and
Sutton, 2004). Questionnaire responses to YES or NO questions or questions which allow
respondents to choose a category or option from a set of multiple choice responses involve
nominal level measurements (McQueen and Knusses, 2006). Though respondents in each
group are different from others, such differences are not quantifiable and one group cannot
be said to be better than another (McQueen and Knusses, 2006). Ordinal level measurement
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involves ranking of data. Unlike nominal data, it is possible to say that one category is more
preferred, better or worse than another; even though ordinal variables can also be seen as
nominal they have quantitative elements (McQueen and Knusses, 2006). Though it is
possible to determine if one category is better than the other, one cannot determine the size
of the difference between categories. An example is the Likert scales used to provide
measures of people's attitudes (Newman, 2007). Finally, interval and ratio variables are
made up of continuous data which can be ranked in order of importance where the difference
or distance between variables or categories can also be measured; the only difference
between interval and ration level measurement is that ratio measurement has a true zero
whilst interval measurement does not have a true zero (David and Sutton, 2004). It has thus
been argued that in practice distinguishing between ratio and interval levels of measurement
makes little difference (Newman, 2007).
Any quantitative data collected could be analysed statistically and the analysis could be
based on parametric or non-parametric techniques. Field (2009) explains the conditions
under which these techniques can be used as follows. To use parametric techniques, the data
must meet the assumptions of parametric data which are that the data must be measured at
least at interval level; nominal and ordinal data therefore do not qualify to be analysed based
on parametric techniques. Secondly the data must be independent - that is to say, data from
various participants must be independent of each other. The data must also be normally
distributed and there should be homogeneity of variance. In reality not all data meet these
conditions; whenever these conditions are not met, non-parametric test is recommended
because they work based on fewer assumptions about the nature of the data. Non-parametric
tests are applicable on ranked data where each score is given a rank (higher scores represent
higher ranks and vice versa); the analysis is based on the ranks and not the actual data. It is
important to point out that for each parametric test conducted there is an equivalent non-
parametric test that could be carried out. The parametric statistics include the Pearson's
correlation (r); t-test; ANOVA etc. There are also a number of non-parametric statistical test
namely: the Spearman's rho, Mann-Whitney test, Wilcoxon rank sum test, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test; kruskal-Wallis test and the Friedman's ANOVA. Field (2009) provides a good
explanation of these tests which have been summarised below. The t-test and ANOVA are
both statistical techniques used to test for differences between groups of people or
respondents or variables that allow causal inferences to be made. The t-test looks for
differences between the means of any two groups in a study. In a situation where different
participants or groups are assigned to two different experimental conditions, the independent
sample t-test is used. However when the same participants are put through the two
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experimental conditions, the paired sample t-test is more appropriate. The formula for the t-
test is given below:
D-Ud
t == Sd..JN
Where D is the observed difference between the means of the two samples; Ud is the
expected difference between the population means given that the null hypothesis is true (Ud
= 0) and the denominator represents the estimated standard error of the difference between
the two sample means. If the two samples are from the same population, their means are
expected to be similar. As the difference between the samples means gets bigger the more
likely it is that the null hypothesis will be rejected which is an indication that a genuine
difference exist between the samples. SPSS estimates the probability that the value of t was
obtained by chance; if the probability is less than 5% (0.05) that means there is a very small
likelihood that the difference observed occurred by chance. One can then conclude that the
observed difference between the two samples is significant and did not occur by chance. The
reverse is true if the probability is greater than 5%.
ANOVA works in a similar way like the t-test, the difference is that it compares the means
of three or more groups. The outcome is the F-statistic or ratio which compares the
systematic variance in the data to the unsystematic variance. One limitation of the F-statistic
is that it doesn't indicate exactly where a difference may come from amongst the groups.
This problem is solved by doing a post hoc test where a t-test is performed for all possible
pairs of the groups to find where the differences are. One popular post hoc test is the
Bonferroni correction where the 5% probability is divided by the number of paired test
conducted; so for instance, if 10 tests were conducted, the critical value becomes 0.005 and
not 0.05. Mention needs to be made of the two forms of ANOVA: the one way independent
ANDVA where the participants or groups are independent of each other and the dependent
ANDVA where the same participants are put through three or more experimental
conditions.Apart from testing for difference between groups, the data can also be tested for
existing relationships between variables using correlation or regression analysis. The
correlation between two variables could take one of three forms: positive correlation -
variables change or move in the same direction; negative correlation - variables move in
opposite directions and no correlation - a change in one variable leaves the other remaining
the same. The correlation coefficient therefore assumes a value ranging from - 1 to + 1. For
data that meet the assumptions of parametric test, the Pearson's correlation coefficient is
applied; otherwise the spearman's rho or the Kendall's tau (used with a small data set) is
more appropriate. Correlation values of 0 to .2 are considered weak, .3 to .6 moderate and .7
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to 1 strong. Regression also help establish relationships between variables however unlike
correlation, regression analysis help determine the existence of causal relationships.
The non-parametric equivalents of these tests are explained as follows. In the case of the
independent t-test, the non-parametric equivalents are the Mann-Whitney test and Wilcoxon
rank sum test which also test for differences between two independent samples. These two
tests work on the same principles. The Mann-Whitney test (U) looks for differences in the
ranked positions of the scores in the two groups. The scores are ranked from lowest to
highest. Hence the group with the lowest mean rank has the highest number of low scores
and vice versa. A comparison between the mean ranks determines if they are significantly
different or not. On the other hand the Wilcoxon signed-rank test - a non-parametric
equivalent of the dependent t-test (Z) is used to compare two sets of scores where the scores
are obtained from the same participants. Finally, the Kruskal-Wallis test is used to find the
difference between several independent groups just like the independent ANOVA whilst the
Friedman's ANOVA is the equivalent of the one-way related ANOVA used to test for
differences between several related groups.
The test statistic for the Kruskal-Wallis test (H) is labelled by SPSS as chi-square (X2)
because it has a chi-square distribution. Similarly, the test statistic for the Friedman'S
ANOVA is not labelled as F, but rather as chi-square. The output of these tests are reported
as X2(degrees of freedom) = chi-square value, significance value (p); an example is provided
as follows; X2(3) = 8.5, P < O.05.Parametric statistical analysis can only be applied to ratio
and interval level data whilst non-parametric test can be applied to ordinal, interval and ratio
level data. How then can one deal with categorical data? They are often analysed
descriptively based on frequencies. Having said that, it is possible to test for relationships
between categorical variables using the Pearson' chi-squared test (X); this test simply
compares the observed frequencies of the categories under investigation to the frequencies
one would expect to get by chance. The only condition of the test is that the expected
frequency in each cell must be greater than S. Alternatively, with larger contingency tables
(more than 2x2 tables) the rule is that expected counts should be greater than 1 and the
expected counts less than 1 must not exceed 20%. Where this condition is not met, the
fisher's exact test is rather recommended. How strong the relationship between two
categorical variables is, can be measured by the Cramer's' V.
Statistical analysis also provides mechanisms for data reduction; a typical example is factor
analysis. The explanation of this analytical tool is provided in detail by Field (2009) and
Malhotra and Birks (2007) and below is a summary. Factor analysis is a data reduction
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technique; any time there is a large number of variables most of which are correlated, factor
analysis is used to reduce them to manageable size. Essentially factor analysis examines the
relationships among groups of interrelated variables and represents them with fewer
underlying factors or components. The technique is thus used amongst other things to
identify the underlying factors that explain the correlation of a set of variables and to identify
a smaller set of important variables for use in subsequent regression or discriminant analysis.
Since each factor is expressed as a linear combination of observed variables, this technique is
similar to multiple regression. The conduct of factor analysis begins by: identifying its
purpose and the variables to be factor analysed; an appropriate sample size required; a
correlation matrix for the variables is constructed and a method of factor analysis selected
and a decision is made on how many factors should be extracted and which rotation method
to use.
The KMO test of sampling adequacy is often used to determine if the sample is appropriate
for factor analysis. It assumes a value between 0 and 1; values closer to one indicate that
factor analysis will produce distinct and reliable factors and vice versa. Generally factor
analysis is considered appropriate when KMO value is 0.5 or greater. Secondly factor
analysis works based on the correlation between variables; cluster of variables that measure
similar things must be significantly correlated. Hence if there is no significant correlation
between the variables under consideration, factor analysis will not be reliable. This is
checked using the Bartlett's test of sphericity; if the test is significant, it means the
correlation is significantly different from zero and factor analysis will be reliable. Even
though the variables need to be correlated to permit factor analysis to be conducted when
they are too highly correlated there could be a problem of multicollinearity; though mild
multicollinearity is not a problem, extreme ones should be avoided. Multicollinearity makes
it impossible to determine the unique contribution of highly correlated variables to a factor
(component). In factor analysis, multicollinearity is detected by looking at the determinant of
the Rsmatrix which should be greater than 0.00001. The value of the determinant is between
o (perfectly correlated) and 1 (perfectly uncorrelated) the closer it is to zero the more severe
the multicollinearity.
Furthermore the rotation method allows the maximisation of the loading of each variable on
one of the extracted factors whilst at the same time minimising the loading on all other
factors. The process of rotation thus makes it easier to determine which variables relate to
which factors. If the factors are expected to correlate a priori, an oblique rotation is
recommended otherwise the orthogonal rotation (especially, Varimax rotation) is
recommendable. Another essential element is the selection of a method of factor analysis.
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There are several methods of extracting factors from any data set but an individual's choice
is often based on what the analysis will be used for; that is, whether the analysis will be
generalised beyond the sample or whether the aim is to explore the data and test specific
hypothesis. Originally, factor analysis was developed to explore data and generate
hypothesis for future analysis; some of the methods (principal component analysis, principal
axis factoring) assume that the sample used in the factor analysis is the population and as
such the results are not to be extended beyond the sample. However, confirmatory factor
analysis is used if the aim is to test for specific hypothesis.
The number of factors to extract could be decided a priori; other ways of selecting factors are
the use of the scree plot and the Kaiser's criteria. The scree plot is a graph of the factors and
their Eigenvalues; all factors to the left of the inflexion point are selected. Alternatively, the
Kaiser's criteria advocates for the selection of only factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1.
The result of the two methods could be compared and a decision taken on which is
appropriate. The reliability of extracted factors could be tested using the split-half reliability
test or the Cronbach's alpha; the two work in similar ways. The more popular of the two -
Cronbach's alpha, is used in this study. This approach splits up the data into two in every
possible way and computes the correlation coefficient for each split; the average of these
values is equivalent to Cronbach's alpha (Field, 2009). Generally a value of 0.7 or above is
considered acceptable and values substantially below 0.7 indicate unreliability.
5.4.2 Qualitative data analysis
The focus so far has been on the analysis of quantitative data; the approaches to analysing
qualitative data are quite different. Audio and textual material for instance, could be analysed
through conversation analysis (CA), discourse analysis (DA) and content analysis.
Conversation analysis attempts to describe people's methods for producing an orderly social
interaction: its assumption is that the talk shows stable and organised patterns. A speaker's
action is shaped in context, contributions to an on-going sequence of actions is not clear
unless reference is made to its context (Silverman, 2001). CA is often used to analyse
naturally occurring talk. It is a formal analysis of everyday situations and is the focus of
ethnomethodology; there is less emphasis on the content of the conversation but focus is on
the formal process through which the content is communicated (Flick, 2009). Hence, CA
focuses on how the content of a conversation is communicated and so the choice of words,
pauses, and body language are all very essential (Flick, 2009). The problem here is that notes
written by an interviewer during the course of a semi-structured interview cannot be used to
do conversation analysis (Willig, 2008). Willig (2008) explains what DA entails. Discourse
analysis shows the manner in which in a conversation, the participant's conversational
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version of events are constructed to do communicative interactive work. Unlike conversation
analysis however, it focuses on the content of the talk and its social order and not the
linguistic organisation. This analysis does not only involve everyday conversations but
others like interviews. Analysis is focused on the context, variability and constructions in the
text.
Though the ideal thing is to use discourse analysis to analyse naturally occurring talk or text,
the practical difficulties involved has led to the use of semi structured interview data. The
disadvantage is that interviewees reorient themselves to suit the interview settings and do not
react as in their everyday setting. Since the way in which something is said could affect its
meaning, transcripts meant for discourse analysis should contain some amount of non-
linguistic aspect of the conversation which together make discourse analysis very labour-
intensive. Discourse analysis is similar to conversation analysis; some DA researchers are
thus against the use of non-naturally occurring data such as interviews for the conduct of DA
(Silverman, 2001). Finally, researchers may also use content analysis to analyse qualitative
data. As explained by Flick (2009), content analysis is a procedure for analysing textual data
irrespective of its source; it is based on the use of categories often derived from theory or
identified from the empirical data. The categories identified from theory are repeatedly
examined against empirical data and modified where necessary. The goal of content analysis
unlike the other approaches is to reduce the material being analysed. Content analysis could
be conceptual where the focus is on establishing the existence of concepts and their
frequencies or relational where attempts are made to examine relationships amongst the
concepts. Content analysis essentially attempts to introduce some form of quantification into
qualitative data. The adoption of content analysis techniques in any given research is due the
fact that compared to other techniques for analysing qualitative data, it is clearer, relatively
unambiguous and easier to do than other analysis techniques. It yields a uniform scheme of
categories and facilitates comparison; in a text
5.5 Reliability, Validity and Ethical Issues
The reliability and validity of a study are often the bases for evaluating any study. Reliability
refers to how consistent or dependable something is; if something is reliable it implies that it
can be replicated under similar conditions (Bryman, 2008; Newman, 2007). According to
Malhotra and Birks (2007) Reliability can be tested using the test-retest method where the
same instrument is administered to the same respondents at different times or to different
sets of respondents; other methods include the split-half method and the Cronbach's alpha.
The split-half method is where a test is only conducted once on a sample which is then split
into two and the results compared (McQueen and Knusses, 2006). Since qualitative research
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involves processes that are unstable over time, replication may not be possible; hence
reliability is achieved by being consistent through the techniques adopted to collect and
analyse data (Newman 2007). Newman also argues that the use of pilot studies to streamline
the final study is another way to enhance reliability in conducting social research.
Validity refers to the integrity of the research findings or conclusions - that is whether the
instruments measure what they were intending to measure (Newman, 2007). It has several
dimensions described by Bryman (2008) as follows: face validity - based on the judgement
of the scientific community as to whether or not an indicator actually measures what it
intends to measure, content validity - based on whether or not a measure captures the full
content of what it intends to measure and criterion validity - based on comparing the
indicator with other accepted indicators of the same construct. Where it agrees with an
accepted pre-existing measure then concurrent validity is achieved but where it predict
correctly the associated future behaviour of a construct then we have predictive validity
(Newman, 2007). External validity however, refers to the generalisability of the findings of a
research (Newman, 2007). The credibility of findings is an issue of internal validity
(Bryman, 2008). Newman (2007) observes that content validity can be improved by using
different indicators that measure the same thing or different aspects of the same thing. To
improve reliability and validity in a study, Creswell (2008) recommends among other things,
the triangulation of data sources and analysis procedures. As important as reliability and
validity may be, Newman (2007) notes that one cannot achieve perfect reliability or validity.
Apart from the issues of research reliability and validity, ethical issues in research are
becoming increasingly important as a result of rising public concerns and changing
legislation on human rights and data protection (Iphofen, 2003). Researchers are thus
expected to act responsibly when dealing with people in the research process. Ethical issues
also bother on what constitutes a legitimate or moral way of conducting research; this
includes issues of plagiarism and falsifying data (Newman, 2007).
5.6 Adopted Methodology
The focus of this section is to explain the actual approach adopted in an attempt to
investigate the research objectives in this study. The nature of the research
question/objectives under investigation indicate that the first objective could only be
appropriately investigated through the quantitative approach. Therefore, this approach was
employed to investigate the first objective at both phases two and three of the study (see
Figure 1). The fourth objective which sort to examine if a statistically significant difference
existed between the two case study countries was purely quantitative in nature and was
appropriately investigated based on the quantitative approach. Finally, the second and third
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objectives were such that they could be investigated using both quantitative and qualitative
approaches. However, the quantitative approach was deemed more suitable and was
employed as the primary approach to investigate these objectives. The qualitative approach
was subsequently used to validate the quantitative findings.
Therefore, overall, the multi-methodology was adopted for the study. The nature of the
research objectives in this study coupled with the potential benefits of methodological
triangulation (stated earlier) were the main factors that informed the adoption of this
approach in the conduct of the research. The adopted approach was also more pragmatic as it
allowed the researcher to choose from a wide range of research strategies and sampling
techniques which was critical in overcoming various barriers especially during data
collection. Three different strategies of enquiry were employed in the study. Apart from the
survey strategy, the researcher also adopted the case study strategy where Ghana and
England were chosen as the case study countries to permit a comparison between the
developing and developed countries. Also, the sequential strategy was employed; the
qualitative approach was used only after the completion of the quantitative investigation of
the objectives with the aim of validating the quantitative findings.
5.6.1 Sampling
The target population for this study was the proprietors of small enterprises in Ghana as well
as the officials involved in handling lending requests within the lending institutions in both
Ghana and England.
Sampling - Ghana
The small business owners in this study were all sampled from Kumasi. According to the
Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly -KMA (2011), the local economy of the Metropolis is
dominated by the services sector consisting mainly of traders who make 71% of the
economy. This is followed by manufacturing (which includes carpenters and auto-
mechanics) who also make up 24% of the economy. Though there are other quiet visible
businesses such as building contractors, transport and hotel service providers within the
metropolis, the focus was on businesses identified by the KMA as key players in the local
economy. The above KMA classification was thus adopted in selecting the sample for this
study. The number of respondents from each line of business was made to roughly reflect
their relative importance to the local economy. For instance, the respondents from the service
sector involved traders and caterers who respectively constituted 66.4% and 13% of the
whole sample whilst those from the manufacturing sector involved carpenters and auto-
mechanics who also constituted 20.6% of the sample. The inclusion of caterers (providing
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restaurant services) in this sample was due to the fact that they were easily accessible; they
were often found around the areas where the traders were located.
The traders in the city are mainly located in various markets such as the Adum central
business district, the Kumasi Central Market (single largest market in West Africa) with
linkages to the satellite markets at Asafo, Bantama, Asawase, Ayigya, Ahinsan, Oforikrom,
Tafo, Atonsu-Agogo, Santasi, Suame, Amakom, Bomso and Tarkwa (KMA, 201 I). The
traders in this study were selected from the two main markets - the Kumasi Central Market
and the Adum central business district not only because they are the major markets but also
because they are quiet easily accessible. The caterers were selected from the central business
district. The mechanics were also sampled from the famous Suame Magazine where small
engineering based industries are sited specialised in vehicular parts production and servicing.
Finally, the main sites for the woodworking industries specialised in the production of
furniture are Anloga and Sokoban. Anloga was sample using the simple random sampling
technique. Since there was no list of the businesses in each market or site visited, the
researcher adopted a convenience sampling technique. On the day the researcher visited any
site, SE owners who were both willing and available to participate in the research were
selected accordingly. A combined total of 131 proprietors of SEs were involved in the survey
but this was made up predominantly of traders since majority of the businesses are related to
commerce. Indeed, the study could have focused on only the traders but a decision was made
to add a few of the other businesses to permit the researcher to explore any differences that
may exist in credit access.
With regards to the lending officials who participated in the survey, below is an explanation
of how they were sampled. In Ghana, the lending institutions were grouped into Universal
Banks (UBs) Rural banks (RBs) and savings and Loans Companies (SLCs). The RBs and
SLCs were classified as Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) since they are often preoccupied
with the business of providing micro loans to individuals, groups of individuals and small
enterprises. The participating officials within the lending institutions included the credit
officers, loans managers and branch managers all of whom are involved in loan processing at
one stage or the other. The credit officers are usually the first point of contact for potential
borrowers; they do the initial assessment of the client and advise on the borrowing options
that may be suitable for the client or which option the client qualifies for. The initial
assessment is passed on to the loans manager in the form of a report; the loans manager in
turn will assess the application and when satisfied approves the application. Depending on
the structure within the institution, the branch manager who has overall responsibility for the
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branch may also be required to take an independent look at the approved application. This
process may however vary from one institution to the other.
The participating bank officials were recruited from Kumasi (the capital of the Ashanti
region). According to the Bank of Ghana (2011), there are a total of 29 UBs, 136 fully
operational RBs and 19 SLCs in Ghana. These institutions have several branches spread
across the country. In Kumasi, there were eight SLCs with a combined total of 30 branches;
there were also 25 RBs with 29 branches and 23 UBs with 69 branches (GHIPSS, 2011).
This gives a total of 128 branches of all the lending institutions considered in this study. To
increase the response rate so as to obtain a sample size suitable for some of the analysis
intended to be carried out (factor analysis) the researcher did not only visit all 128 branches
but also in some instances (involving 73 of the branches) where more than one official was
willing to participate two questionnaires were given to any two of the officials. In the other
55 branches however, only one questionnaire was issued. Hence a total of201 questionnaires
were distributed. An overall response rate of 53.7% (108 respondents) was achieved; 57 of
these respondents were from UBs and 51 from MFls (27 from SLCs and 24 from RBs).
Different sets of samples were chosen later on to validate the findings of the first surveys
conducted. To validate the findings on the nature of the SE credit constraint in Ghana,
another set of small business owners were interviewed face-to-face using the same
questionnaire. This time the focus was only on traders since an overwhelming majority of the
small businesses in Kumasi are into commerce. Secondly, the first round of analysis did not
reveal any differences between the various businesses regarding their access to credit.
Twenty-seven traders (a quarter of the sample in the first survey) were haphazardly sampled
from a different market (Bantama market). The Bantama market was selected based on a
simple random sampling technique from the available markets listed earlier. To validate the
findings on the survey involving officials of the lending institutions, semi-structured
interviews were conducted. Loans managers were considered as key informants because
mostly the final decision on whether to lend or not rest with them and were thus better placed
to validate the findings of the earlier survey. The snowball sampling technique was used here
in that the researcher first made contact with friends in management positions in some banks
who then provided the link to other managers from other institutions willing to participate.
Ten loans managers (six from UBs and four from MFIs) eventually took part in this
validation survey.
86
Sampling - England
In England the lending institutions involved were the main high street banks. The
participating bank officials were the loans advisors, business managers and branch managers.
The loan advisors are often the first point of contact for clients seeking credit and tend to be
sales officers. The business managers are relationship managers assigned a portfolio of
business clients with the aim of helping to meet the credit needs of such businesses whilst
the branch managers are in charge of running the whole branch. Participants were sampled
from institutions within three counties in the North West - Merseyside, Lancashire and
Cheshire. In each of these counties, the major cities or towns were selected for the study.
These included Liverpool, St Helens and South Port in Merseyside; Manchester in
Lancashire and Chester in Cheshire. The choice of these cities and towns was influenced by
their proximity to where the researcher resided at the time (Liverpool). A total of nine
different high street banks were identified within the selected cities and towns with several
branches; the total number of bank branches in Liverpool was 119; 14 in St. Helens; 21 in
Southport; 162 in Manchester and 90 in Chester (the investing site, 2011). There were thus a
total of 406 bank branches in the selected areas. A decision was made to distribute a total of
200 questionnaires in England but the exact number distributed in each town was influenced
by the proportion of the total bank branches located in the town. The bank branches were
selected in each city or town using simple random sampling technique. Ninety five of the
questionnaires were successfully completed and returned representing a response rate of
48%. A breakdown of the number of questionnaires distributed in each area as well as the
number completed and returned can be found in Appendix A. Just as in Ghana, there was
also the need to validate the findings of the survey conducted amongst the bank officials in
England. Seven business managers were haphazardly sampled in Liverpool for this part of
the study.
5.6.2 Data Collection
Phase /- Pilot
The pilot questionnaires were a combination of both closed and open ended questions. The
aim of the pilot survey (which involved five relevant bank officials in England and five SE
proprietors in Ghana) was to find out if the questions were clearly worded for easy
understanding and whether respondents will be willing to provide the required information.
The SE questionnaire was piloted in Ghana whilst the bank officials' questionnaire was
piloted in England. The pilot was done from January to February 2011. A number of issues
were highlighted. The SE questionnaire was originally made up of 21 questions. During the
pilot, it was found that two of the questions had been repeated (a question on why one had
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not applied for any credit in the past, and a question on the main reason why one's
application was unsuccessful). Also two question which asked respondents to report their
maximum cash amount generated per month and their minimum amounts per month
respectively were merged into one question - the average cash generated per month. The
final SE questionnaire was thus made up of 17 questions (see Appendix A). The issue that
emerged with regards to the bank officials' questionnaire was that respondents generally
avoided open ended questions or gave very short responses which did not fully explain
issues. For instance, respondents were asked to explain the circumstances under which they
will not take collateral and the conditions under which landed property will not be acceptable
to them. As a result, a decision was made to remove all the open ended questions. The final
bank official's questionnaire was made up of only closed ended questions and was used in
both countries. All such open ended questions which were eliminated were covered in the
semi-structured interviews conducted later (in stage three of the data collection) for
validation purposes. Having made the necessary amendments to the questionnaires, the way
was cleared for phase two of data collection which lasted from February 2011 to June 2011.
Phase 1/- Full scale data collection
In England only one set of questionnaire (the bank officials' questionnaire) was used. In
Ghana however, given the nature of the objectives under investigation, two sets of
questionnaires were administered (one set for bank officials and another for proprietors of
SE). The bank officials' questionnaire sought for information on various issues including:
their attitudes towards the use of collateral in credit contracts; preferences for various forms
of collateral; whether or not registered and unregistered property are eligible for use as
collateral; attributes that make landed property eligible for use as collateral; the influence of
registered property titles on SE loan terms and finally the factors responsible for turning
down SE loan applications. Respondents attitudes/perceptions were measured using the likert
scale (see Appendix A for questionnaire). In Ghana, the bank officials' questionnaire was
delivered by hand to respondents on a first visit and an appointment was booked to return on
a later date to collect the completed questionnaires. Three assistants were recruited to help
with questionnaire administration; two of them administered the SE questionnaire whilst the
other joined the researcher for the purpose of distributing and returning to collect the bank
officials' questionnaire. However, in England, the researcher personally visited the selected
bank branches located within the North West. The questionnaires were handed over to the
selected respondents together with prepaid envelopes to return the completed questionnaires.
This method was chosen because it was convenient for both the researcher and respondents.
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On the other hand, the focus of the SE questionnaire was to seek information on their credit
market activities or experiences: whether or not they participate in the market; their
experiences in terms of the success or failure in loan applications; and for respondents who
did not report credit market activity, to find out why they did not participate. Structured
interviews were conducted with the SE owners as most of them could not administer the
questionnaires themselves. The data obtained was coded and entered into SPSS (version 17)
as and when each completed questionnaire was returned. After analysing the data obtained
there was the need to validate the findings which led to stage three of the data collection
process.
Phase III - Data collection for validation
The third phase of data collection span from October to November 2011. In Ghana, only one
research assistant was used to conduct structured interviews amongst the 27 selected traders
from the Bantama market. It essentially involved a replication of the earlier survey but this
time with a different set of participants. The findings from the bank officials' survey were
validated through semi-structured interviews (see Appendix A for interview guide)
conducted with loans managers via the telephone. For England, the semi-structured
interviews were conducted amongst 7 selected business managers of the main high street
banks. Four of these managers were interviewed via telephone whilst the other 3 were
interviewed face-to-face.
5.6.3 Data Analysis
Phase I
Just like the data collection process, the analysis was divided into two phases. The first phase
involved statistical analysis of quantitative data (using SPSS) collected through the surveys
conducted during stage two of data collection whilst the second phase dealt with analysis of
qualitative data collected at stage three of the data collection process with the help of Nvivo.
Prior to the start of actual analysis, the quantitative data was coded into SPSS and screened
for possible errors. The screening revealed a few missing data which were dealt with using
EM algorithm method for missing data analysis in SPSS. This method uses a complex and
very rigorous approach to replace missing values based on trends identified in the data; it
uses maximum likelihood estimators to produce estimates of the missing data and is more
robust than replacing missing values with the mean (Borman, 2009). The objectives of the
study formed the broad themes for the statistical analysis; as such each objective was
analysed using techniques considered most appropriate in achieving them. It is hence
important to re-state each objective and explain how it was analysed.
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Objective 1: To determine the nature of the small enterprise's credit constraint in
Ghana.
Diagne et al. (2000) identify two approaches to detecting household credit constraint which
could easily be adopted in measuring constraints amongst SEs. They are the direct and
indirect approaches. Whilst the first solicits household perceptions on whether or not they
are credit constrained the second seeks to test for possible violations of the assumptions of
the permanent income hypothesis that consumption expenditure should not be affected by
temporary shocks in income ifthere are no credit constraints. Based on the indirect approach
a credit constraint exists if consumption is significantly dependant on short term incomes.
The indirect method involves the estimation of disequilibrium models of demand and supply
of loans whilst the direct approach involves surveys that provide data on loan applications
and the outcome of such applications (Love and Sanchez, 2009). In the developing countries
SEs are owned by sole proprietors where its quiet difficult to separate the owner from the
business itself - the business is personalised. As a result, the above methods could be applied
to SE studies of this nature.
The credit constraint amongst SEs could be estimated by looking at the influence of
temporary shock in investible funds on SE investment activity. However such information is
difficult to get especially in the developing world where such businesses rarely keep records.
Therefore, the direct method was rather adopted in this study where the reported credit
market experiences of the SEs within the past 2 years was used to determine if they are
constrained and the nature of the constraint. This period was chosen because it's short
enough to allow participants to recall their credit market activities. The participants were
classified into those who have applied for credit and those who have not. Respondents who
had applied for credit were considered not to face a credit constraint if they were able to
obtain the full credit amount needed. However, those who applied for credit but were refused
(either partiaIly or completely) were considered to be constrained. These constraints were
classified as supply side constraints in that, they did not get the needed credit due to a
decision by lenders not to grant their request. The supply side became the barrier to
accessing the required credit.
The other participants who had not applied for credit were further divided into two groups -
the unconstrained and the constrained groups. According to Atieno (2001) and Banerjee and
Duflo (2004), people who do not apply for credit because they have no need for it should be
considered unconstrained whilst those citing any other reason should be considered as
constrained. The constrained group were further classified into supply-side and demand-side
constraints base on the exact reason why they did not apply even though they needed credit.
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Those that did not apply due to other reasons such lack of information were classified as
demand side constrained and finally respondents who did not apply for credit because of
reasons such as: high cost of credit, process inconveniences, lack of required documents and
the lack of tailor made facilities were classified under supply-side constraint. In this study
businesses were considered to face a supply-side constraint if (a) they applied for credit but
did not get the full amount required or (b) did not apply for credit because of barriers
emanating from the supply side. The demand-side constraint involved those that did not
apply for credit because of barriers emanating from the demand side. The data was
descriptively analysed; in addition, the chi-square test and spearman's rho were also used to
explore relationships. For instances, the test explored the existence of relationships between
demographic characteristics of the respondents and the participation in the credit market,
their selection of a lending institution and constraint status (see next chapter for details).
Objective 2: to examine what influence (if any) property registration has on SEs
access to credit.
Most existing studies stated in chapter one such as Petracco and Pender (2009) attempt to
evaluate the impact of property registration on access to credit in an experiment type before
and after study where households which are similar in every respect but differ only in terms
of their possession of registered titles are compared. Usually a longitudinal study is
conducted involving households who at the start of the study had no registered titles to land;
some of them are later issued with registered titles. They then try to investigate whether the
issued titles have enhanced credit access. Boucher et al (2005) examine the issue by looking
at the relationship between the possession of a registered title and the possibility of being
credit constrained based on longitudinal studies of households. To measure the effect of
receiving a property title on credit access, Field and Torero (2004) used household surveys to
collect detailed information on household and individual characteristics. Their survey
involved an extensive array of self-reported data on all loan applications requested by the
household between 1997 and 1999 including bank requirements and the terms of loans
provided. Using such micro level data, they estimated the impact of land registration on
credit access by modelling the outcome of individual credit application to determine the
probability that a loan application will be approved with or without registered title.
The approaches described above are only suitable in conducting demand side studies. Since
the focus of this objective is to study the issue from the supply side the above approaches
could not be adopted. The approach used in this study is thus explained below. The
possession of registered property title may only guarantee or at least influence access to SEs
credit under the following conditions: (a) Collateral must be a necessary requirement for
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granting such loans and the provision of registered property titles on its own should be a
sufficient criteria for approving credit application. This is premised on the argument that
registration guarantees access to credit through the use of property as collateral; (b) landed
property must be preferred to other forms of collateral in that, if other forms of collateral are
preferred then the possession of registered titles may not enhance credit access; and finally
(c) landed property must be registered to make it eligible for use as collateral. Indeed where
registered property titles are not required by lenders, their possession will be of no
consequence on credit access.
The possession of registered property titles will enhance one's chance of obtaining credit
from lenders who meet the above criteria. This is because these lenders would not even
consider SE loan applicants if they (SEs) fail to provide registered property titles for use as
collateral. This was used as the first evidence of the possible impact of property titles on
credit access. This study therefore investigated the extent to which these conditions are met
through the following: (a) A four point Likert scale was used to determine how necessary
collateral is considered to be in lending to SEs. a five point was also used to determine the
extent to which respondents agree that the provision of collateral per se is not sufficient to
trigger credit supply; (b) participants were asked to indicate on a four point scale, their level
of preference for various forms of collateral including landed property and; (c) respondents
were asked to indicate the kind of property documents accepted as proof of ownership
amongst other things to determine whether unregistered property is eligible for use as
collateral or not. They were also asked to rank in order of importance the various features of
landed property (including property registration) they look for when accepting such property
as collateral. To determine the exact form of this impact, respondents were given a scenario
involving two SEs similar in every relevant aspect except that one possesses a registered title
and the other an unregistered title. Respondents were asked whether they will treat the two
borrowers differently in terms of the interest rates and fees charged, the repayment time
allowed and the loan amount each is allowed to borrow.
The Mann-Whitney test and Wilcoxon signed rank test were both used amongst other things
to determine if there were differences between different lenders and their attitudes towards
the use of landed property as collateral whilst the chi-square test and spearman's correlation
were used to test for relationships between the illegibility of unregistered property and the
preference for landed property, the ease of verifying property ownership and the likelihood
of repossession problems occurring during default amongst other things.
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Objective 3: to identify the underlying factors responsible for turning down SE credit
demand and the importance of property registration relative to the other factors.
The attainment of this objective will permit the land registration and access to credit
argument to be looked at in a much broader context by giving a clear idea of its relative
importance. About 14 different reasons for turning down loan applications were identified
from literature and respondents were asked to rank these factors in order of importance on a
14-point scale. The data was analysed descriptively using the median ranks of these factors.
The test for differences was conducted for the level of importance of the individual reasons
as rated by respondents using the Friedman's ANOVA, Man-Whitney test, and the Wilcoxon
test. As in other cases the chi-square test and spearman's rho were also used to explore
relationships. After looking at the individual reasons, the study also used exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) to explore any interrelationship that may exist amongst the 14 variables so as
to reduce to them to a smaller number of underlying components/factors. The relative
importance of each component was determined by the proportion of the total variance
explained by each component.
Objective 4: To examine if a significant difference exist between the two countries
with regards to the credit effects of property registration.
The Mann-Whitney test was used to test for differences in responses from the two countries
on the various issues under investigation. For instance, the test was used to explore
differences in: lenders' perceptions on how necessary collateral is; preferences for various
forms of collateral; perceptions on the eligibility of unregistered property for use as
collateral; perceptions on the influence of landed property registration on loan terms; and the
important reasons responsible for turning down SE credit applications amongst others.
Overall, the choice of the specific statistical tools adopted in investigating the various
objectives was informed by the nature of the data obtained. Since this study collected only
categorical and ordinal level data, parametric test (such as Hest and ANOVA) which require
at least interval level data could not be conducted. Therefore, the non-parametric statistical
tools were adopted because they were more suitable for the kind of data obtained in this
study. The nonparametric tools adopted are the Man-Whitney and Wilcoxon's signed rank
tests, Friedman's ANOVA test, Spearman's rho and Chi square test. Though the Man-
Whitney and Wilcoxon's signed rank tests both test for differences between any two
samples, the Man-Whitney test was used were the two samples of interest were considered to
be independent of each other. The Wilcoxon's signed rank test was however used where the
two samples were not independent of each other. The Friedman's ANOVA test was similarly
used to test for differences amongst three or more dependent samples of interest. To test for
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correlation between variables, the spearman's rho (non-parametric equivalent of Pearson's
correlation - r) was used were the two variables involved were both measured at ordinal
level. However, in cases where: the two variables were both categorical or where one was
categorical and the other ordinal, the chi square test was used to test for associations.
Phasell
The second phase of the analysis involved analysis of data collected for the purpose of
validating the findings from phase one of the analyses. This included qualitative data
collected through semi-structured interviews and quantitative data from structured
interviews. The semi-structured interview was sub-divided into different topic areas
depending on the questions asked. Under each topic area, the responses to each question
were examined to identify main themes whilst reading through the transcripts. All categories
identified were later re-examined leading to the merger of some categories and others
became subcategories of the main ones. These categories were created in Nvivo as nodes and
sub-nodes using a tree node structure. The transcripts were then imported into Nvivo for
coding (see Appendix A for the coding summary report). During the coding process, new
categories were identified and coded appropriately. The coding was done systematically
according to responses to questions in each topic area. The data was then analysed using
conceptual content analysis.
5.6.4 Reliability, Validity and Ethical Issues
In this study, the use of pilot studies helped to restructure the final questionnaire to ensure
that reliable responses were obtained. In addition, the use of the different data collection and
analysis methods permitted the quantitative findings to be validated by qualitative findings.
The findings on the nature of the SE credit constraint were validated through a replication of
the survey amongst a much smaller group of participants. The design of the questionnaire
also permitted the researcher to check for consistency in responses as the same question was
sometimes asked in different forms. For instance respondents were asked to indicate how
much they agree that unregistered property is eligible for use as collateral. Subsequently they
were again asked to identify the kind of property documents which they accept as proof of
property ownership. Furthermore, the coding of the interview transcripts was done several
times and in a very consistent manner. Another person was asked to independently cross
check the initial coding to ensure it was reliable. Regarding ethical issues, Liverpool John
Moores University as an institution has stringent requirements that must be met to obtain
ethical approval for the conduct of research. This study met the requirements and received
full ethical approval before the research data collection even began. Each participant was
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given adequate information on what the research is about and an assurance was given to each
respondent regarding their confidentiality. As such, no personal details such as name,
institution name addresses etc. were required. During the conduct of the semi structured
interviews participants consents were sought to record the interviews (see Appendix A for
consent form and participant information sheet)
5.6 Summary
This chapter has provided a detailed insight into the methodologies, sampling, data
collection and analysis techniques adopted in the study to investigate the stipulated
objectives set out in chapter one. This was preceded by a broad analysis of the available
methodologies. This chapter has thus provided the answer to the question of how the
researcher went about investigating the objectives of the study. This chapter has set the stage
for the results obtained to be presented and discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER6
Quantitative Data Analysis And Discussion
This chapter presents and discusses the results from the questionnaire surveys conducted
amongst proprietors of small enterprises (SEs) and officials of various lending institutions.
The top three objectives of the study outlined in chapter one form the main themes around
which the analysis and discussions are conducted. There is therefore the need to restate these
objectives which are as follows:
• To investigate the nature of the credit constraint amongst SEs in Ghana.
• To examine what influence landed property registration has on SEs access to credit.
• To assess the underlying factors responsible for turning down SE credit demand and
the importance of property registration relative to the other factors.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.1 looks at the nature of the small
enterprise's credit constraint in Ghana. Section 6.2 examines the influence of property
registration on small enterprise's access to credit and finally, section 6.3 examines the
underlying factors which explain why lenders tum down small enterprise's credit
applications.
6.1 Nature of the SE Credit Constraint in Ghana
The focus is on only Ghana because the provision of registered property titles is perceived as
the panacea to the problem of credit access in the developing world and thus calls for the
need to study the nature of the constraint in these countries if the right solution is to be found.
To determine the nature of the credit constraint amongst SEs, selected proprietors of small
businesses were asked various questions about their credit market experiences. The results
are presented below.
6.1.1 Respondent characteristics
A summary of the respondents' characteristics can be found in Table 1 below. A total of 131
SE owners were involved in this survey; the sample consisted of 74 females (56.5%) and 57
males (43.5%). About 46.6% of respondents were between 30-45 years old. On the level of
education, the results show that 23.7% have no formal education at all. Whilst 36.6% have
only basic education, only 7.6% have tertiary education. The median number of dependants
per respondent is 5-10 (64.1%). Respondents were engaged in various businesses in the areas
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of trading, mechanics, carpentry and catering. Majority of participants (66%) were into
trading. Approximately 62% of respondents employ less than five people. Most of the
businesses in this sample could thus be classified as small enterprises. These businesses
reported a median monthly cash ofGHC SOO-1000(3S%) and a median monthly expenditure
of GHC 300-S00 (36%).
Table I: A Summary of Respondents' Characteristics - Small Business Owners
Categories N-131 Valid %
Gender Fernale 74 56.5
Male 57 43.5
Age <3Oyrs 21 16
3O-45yrs 61 46.6
46-60yrs 36 27.5
>60\'rs 13 9.9
Level of education No forrrral education 31 23.7
Basic education 48 36.6
Secondary /technical/vocational 42 32.1
Tertiar T 10 7.6
NUInber of <5 33 25.2
dependants 5-10 84 64.1
>10 14 10.7
Business Type Trader 87 66.4
Mechanic 17 13.0
Carpenter 14 10.7
Catering 13 9.9
NUInber of <5 81 61.8
Employees 5-10 37 28.2
>10 13 9.9
Cash generated per <500GHC 25 19.1
Inonth 500-1000 GHC 46 35.1
1001-1500 GHC 38 29.0
>1500GHC 22 16.8
Monthly <300GHC 33 25.2
expenditure 300-500GHC 47 35.9
501-700GHC 28 21.4
>700GHC 23 17.6
About 28% of the females have no formal education at all, compared to 17.S% of their male
counterparts but the chi square test did not identify any significant association between level
of education and gender. There was also no correlation with age (see Tables 1 & 2 of
appendix B). The number of dependants was found to rise with age [rho = .573. p < .001}; it
was negatively correlated with educational level [rho =.-192. p < .05]. However, it did not
vary with gender (see appendix B). The number of employees reported was associated with
the business type Ll (6) =54.7. P < .001]. For instance, 81% of traders employed less than
five people whilst about 62% of mechanics employ above ten people. It was established that
those reporting higher numbers of employees included their apprentices (this is particularly
true for respondents in carpentry and mechanics related businesses). Gender was
significantly associated with the reported business type [/ (6) =54.7. P < .001]. Some of the
businesses (carpentry and mechanics) are male dominated whilst others - trading are
97
dominated by females (see Appendix B). Finally, the reported average amount of cash the
business is able to generate per month was not found to vary depending on the business type
[/ (9) =6.2, P >.05].
6.1.2 Credit market experiences
To determine the constraint status of participants, their opinions were sought with regards to
what they considered to be the most important problem facing the growth of their businesses.
Though several (seven) factors were identified as shown in Table 2 below, one problem (the
lack of funds) stood out distinctively from the rest (see Table 2 below). A little less than half
of the respondents (45.8%) identified funding as their most critical problem. The remaining
54.2% of the respondents reported other problems. Comparing the individual problems
reported, the lack of funds emerged as the single most important problem. The seriousness of
this problem is reflected in the fact that the other individual problems identified were less
widely spread or reported.
Table 2: Most Important Business Problem Encountered by Respondents
most Important business problem
Cumulath.e
Freouenc Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid lack of funds 60 45.8 45.8 45.8
frequent price Increament 17 13.0 13.0 58.8
by suppliers
lack of business space & 12 9.2 9.2 67.9
poor location
high 1mport duty & 14 10.7 10.7 78.6
bureaucracy
competition 12 9.2 9.2 87.8
lack of raw material 10 7.6 7.6 95.4
others 6 4.6 4.6 100.0
Total 131 100.0 100.0
The lack of funds also emerged as the only problem that cuts across all business types whilst
each of the other six problems tend to be associated more with particular business types (see
Appendix B, Table 9). Respondents were asked to report whether they had applied for credit
in past two years. The results show that about 72% of all 131 respondents had participated in
the credit market through the submission of credit applications at some point. There was
however, no credit market activity reported by the remaining 28%. This demonstrates a high
need and demand for formal credit amongst small businesses in the country contrary to
findings elsewhere by Love and Sanchez (2009) that microenterprises have a very limited
demand for formal credit. Elsewhere in rural Romania, Chaves et al. (200 I) also found a
very low participation rate (20%) of enterprises in the loans market. Given that this study
was conducted in the urban centre, it was not surprising to find very high participation rates
amongst small businesses.
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As shown in Appendix B, about 78% of females had applied for credit compared to 63% of
their male counterparts. There was however, no significant association between gender and
the reported participation in the credit market [/ (1) = 3.68, P >.05J. This contradicts the
findings that in rural Ghana, the demand for credit is lower for female headed households as
they are often poorer than their male counterparts (Bendig et al., 2009). The likelihood that a
respondent had made a loan application in the past two years also had no significant
association with the respondent's age [i (3) =6.77, P > .05J; level of education [i (3) = 2.78,
P > .05J; number of employees [/ (2) = 2.36, p > .05J; monthly cash generated [.l (3) =
1.95, P > .05J; and the most important business problem ri (6) = 2.04, P > .05J; (see
Appendix B). These results reiterate the argument that the key determinants of credit demand
is the availability of profitable venture and the need to expand or finance working capital
(Bigsten et al., 2003). Irrespective of the age, gender, education, the amount of cash
generated and number of employees, a business will not borrow if they do not have
difficulties in financing working capital or if they do not have a need to expand or invest in
new profitable projects. Contrary to the above findings, Bendig et at. (2009) argue that a
lower level of education is associated with lower credit demand because, the less educated
often have less productive jobs, lower incomes and may often not understand the need for
such financial services or how to access them.
For ease of analysis, the most important business problems reported by respondents in Table
2 above were re-categorised into two: the lack of funds and other factors (involving the other
six problems reported in Table 2). Almost 72% of respondents in each category had made a
loan application (see Appendix B, Table 15). Therefore, even though in general 54% of the
respondents cited various problems other than the lack of funds (see Table 2 above), most of
them had an active demand for credit nonetheless. About 28% of respondents cited the lack
of funds as their main problem but did not apply for credit. These are the respondents whose
potential demand for credit according Aryeetey (I996b) could not be transformed into
revealed demand due to a number of barriers from either the demand or supply side; these
barriers are examined later.
The 94 participants who had applied for loans (loan applicants) were asked to report where
they submitted their applications. Most of them (41.5%) applied for the credit from Savings
and Loans Companies. About 34% from Rural Banks, 21.3% from the main Universal Banks
and only 3.2% from other institutions (credit unions). For ease of analysis, the lending
institutions were reclassified into universal banks and MFls (rural banks, Savings and loans
companies and credit unions) The institutions from which credit is being sought could
influence success rate of the application as they tend to have different requirements.
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Compared to the Universal banks, the other institutions do have relatively less stringent
requirements and they tend to take financial services to the door steps of these businesses
making them the more convenient choice when credit is needed. Indeed, Atieno (2001)
observes that non-bank financial institutions are the main sources of formal credit for small
enterprises as their loan application procedures are shorter and loans tend to have longer
maturities. The universal banks place much emphasis on collateral based lending when
dealing with small businesses. Therefore given the fact that women make up a greater
proportion of landless population (Karanja, 1991), one would have expected that female
borrowers will be attracted more to the other institutions but there was no significant
association between gender and the selected lending institution [/ (1) = 1.5, P > .05).
Furthermore, one would expect that given the high level of formal procedures involved in
dealing with universal banks, the people with lower levels of education would shy away
from them. However, this study did not establish a significant association between
educational level and the selected lending institution [/ (3) = 3.6, P > .05J (see Appendix B,
Tables 16&17).
6.1.3 Constraint status of loan applicants
The loan applicants were thus asked to indicate how much they applied for and the
proportion of this amount they actually received. Only 7% of the applicants wanted to
borrow amounts less than GHC 500 and about 27% wanted above GHC 2,000. 33% of the
loan applicants each wanted loan amounts ofGHC500-1000 and GHC 1001-2000. The loan
amount applied for had a significant association with the selected lending institution [l (3) =
13.61, p < .01. Cramer's V = .380, P < .01). For instance, 52% of the universal banks
received applications for loan amounts in excess of GHC 2,000 compared to 18% of MFls
(Appendix B, Table 19). Hence, business owners who required larger loan amounts went to
the universal banks. The other lenders (MFIs) tend to provide micro loans which may only
increase gradually overtime as each loan amount is successfully repaid. Businesses that
cannot wait to go through this process are most likely to approach a universal bank for credit.
The loan amount that the respondents wanted to borrow was also found to have a significant
association with the average amount of cash the business generates per month [/ (12) =
70.39, P < .001. Cramer's V = .421 P < .001). This is confirmed by the correlation test
which shows that as the amount of cash generated increased so did the loan amount applied
for and vice versa [rho = .342, P < .001). This is an indication that these small businesses
are only borrowing as much as they can afford and this is good for the lenders and the
economy as a whole. Another explanation is that those businesses generating higher cash per
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month are relatively bigger and thus have bigger financing needs, hence, their decision to
approach universal banks for credit.
Table 3 below shows the proportion of the loan amounts that applicants actually received.
About 28% of the 94 loan applicants obtained the full amount of the loans they wanted and
were therefore not facing a credit constraint (unconstrained applicants). At the other extreme,
almost 11% had their loan applications completely rejected and were classified as fully
constrained and about 62% were classified as partially constrained since they only received
fractions of the amounts they applied for. A total of about 72% of the loan applicants in this
survey were thus credit constrained.
Table 3: Proportion of Loan Amount Actually Received and Constraint Status of Loan Applicants
Proportion of loan N-94 Valid % Constraint
amount received Status
zero 10 10.6 Fully constrain.ed
a licants
< 50% > zero 16 17 Partially
constrain.ed
applicants
50-75% 31 33
>76% but <100% 11 11.7
100% 26 27.7 Unconstrained
El Heants
The Wilcoxon's test shows that a significant difference exist between the amount applied for
and the amount received, [Z = -4.03, P < .001). The amount received was significantly lower
than what was applied for and according to Atieno (2001) this is an indication of the
existence of loan quantity rationing in the credit market. The results reiterate that
participation in the credit market does not guarantee access to credit. Indeed, elsewhere in
Bangladesh and Malawi, 31% and 40% of households respectively did not receive any
formal loan even though they reported some credit market activity (Diagne et al., 2000). The
extent of the constraint is much higher in this study relative to that reported in other
developing countries like Mexico where Love and Sanchez (2009) report a relatively lower
percentage (7%) of completely rejected loan applications; they also reported a lower
percentage (42%) of constrained businesses. In Romania however, Chaves et al. (2001)
established that the proportion of application completely rejected is 29% much higher than
the 10.6% reported in Table 3 above.
The chi square test conducted shows that the possibility of being a constrained or
unconstrained applicant did vary significantly based on the average monthly cash generated
[} (3) = 13.04. p < .Ol} and the loan amount applied for [/ (3) = 18.87. P < .001). Small
business with the ability to generate larger cash amounts are more likely to receive the full
loan amount desired and vice versa. For instance. about 73% of all unconstrained loan
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applicants were generating above GHC 1,000 a month whilst only 26.9% were generating
monthly cash amounts ofGHC 1,000 or less. Furthermore, about 81% of the unconstrained
borrowers wanted loan amounts above GHC 1,000 (see Appendix B, Tables 23 & 24). There
are two implications here. Firstly, applicants desiring to borrow relatively smaller amounts
are more likely to be constrained and secondly, the degree of the constraint is likely to be
higher for such borrowers than those desiring larger amounts. This is quite surprising in that,
lenders should be more capable to meet borrowing requirements involving smaller amounts
than those involving larger amounts and the smaller the amount the lesser the consequences
of default will be for the lender. However, earlier results revealed that respondents who
desired to borrow smaller amounts are mostly those that generate relatively small amounts of
cash per month from their businesses. Therefore, applicants seeking smaller amounts are
relatively smaller and less credit worthy. This could be the reason why most of those
desiring to borrow small amounts did not receive the entire amounts they applied for.
In addition, the constraint status of the borrower had a significant association with the
selected lending institution [/ (4) = 9.8, p < .05]. The degree of the credit constraint is
higher for applicants seeking credit from universal banks than their counterparts seeking
credit from MFls. For instance, about 22% of all applicants who sought for credit from
universal banks were completely turned down compared to only 7% of those who
approached MFIs. Also, only 13% of universal bank loan applicants got the full amount
applied for relative to the 32% of MFI loan applicants. The strict lending policies of the
universal banks possibly are the underlying factors responsible for this difference (see
appendix B Table 30). However, as displayed in Appendix B (Tables 25-29 - Appendix B),
there was no association between the possibility of being a constrained or unconstrained
borrower and the respondents' age [/ (3) = 5.81, p > .05]; gender [/ (1) = .01, p > .05];
education Ll (3) = 3.45, p > .05]: number of dependants, [/ (3) = 5.34, p > .05J; monthly
expenditure [/ (3) = 2.24, p > .05]. As far as gender is concerned, a world bank study
reported by the B&FT (2012) shows that women are particularly disadvantaged when it
comes to accessing financial services but this study did not establish any difference between
male and female in terms of their constraint status.
To find out how reliable credit access is, participants were asked whether or not they are able
to obtain credit anytime it is needed. Of the 94 loan applicants, about 46% indicated that they
do not have reliable supply of credit compared to 30% with reliable supply. As much as an
estimated 39% of respondent who received the full loan amount applied for, do not have
reliable supply vis-a-vis 48.6% of respondents who received less than the full amount (see
Appendix B, Tables 31 & 32). The most worrying issue is that, a large proportion of the
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most credit worthy loan applicants in this study (those obtaining the full amount) still faces
problems of supply reliability. This may be due to factors external to the borrowers such as
the macroeconomic environment.
6.1.4 Reported causes of the constraint faced by loan applicants
Sixty-eight of the loan applicants were credit constrained in one way or the other (see Table
3 above) and were asked to report on the main reason for which their applications were
unsuccessful. Table 4 below gives a breakdown of the reported factors responsible for the
constraint. The single most important reason responsible for unsuccessful loan applications
as reported by the loan applicants themselves was the lack of landed property (31%)
followed by difficulties encountered in repaying past loans (25%). Cash flow problems
accounted for about 16% of the unsuccessful applications. The results reveal that the lack of
collateral alone (including: lack of landed property, insufficient funds for use as lien and lack
of guarantor) account for about 52% of the credit constraint amongst small businesses who
applied for credit. This confirms the argument by Fleisig et al (2006) that in Africa,
insufficient collateral accounts for 51% of all firms refused credit whilst 19% of people who
don't apply for credit do so because of the high collateral requirements.
Table 4: Perceived Causes of the Credit Constraint amongst Constrained Loan Applicants
Reasons N=68 Valid %
Lack of landed property 21 30.9
Past rE'payment difficulties 17 25.0
Cash flow problems 11 16.2
Insufficient funds in Alc for lien 8 11.8
ur oses
Inability to provide guarantor 6 8.8
Lack rE'gistered property documents 3 4.4
Don't know 2 2.9
The lack of formal registered property documents only accounted for 4% of the reported
constraints. This appears contradictory to the assertion that the absence of registered landed
property titles but not the lack property per se is to blame for the credit constraints in the
developing countries (de Soto, 2000). All business owners who perceive the lack of
registered property titles as the main cause of their constraint also reported to have sought for
credit from the Universal Banks and none applied for credit from the MFIs. The lack of
landed property was the most frequently reported reason for the credit constraints amongst
businesses seeking credit from commercial banks (31%). For those seeking credit from the
MFIs, difficulties encountered in repaying past loans was the most frequently (27%) reported
cause of their credit constraint (see Appendix B, Table 33)
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6.1.5 Constraint status of non-loan applicants
Apart from the 94 participants who had applied for loans, there were 37 participants in this
survey who did not apply for credit within the two year period leading to the time of the
survey. Their credit status could only be determined by examining the reasons why they did
not apply for credit. Participants who stated that they did not need credit are considered
unconstrained whilst those stating any other reason are constrained (Banerjee and Duflo,
2004; Diagne et al., 2000; Love and Sanche, 2009). Table 5 below shows that 27% (10) of
the non-loan applicants (non-applicants) did not apply for credit because they had no need
for it and were appropriately classified as unconstrained non-applicants since they had no
demand for credit. These are probably people who had their own funds to invest or did not
have any profitable venture that would necessitate a demand for credit. The remaining 73%
(27) were constrained because though they needed credit (had a demand for credit), there
were some factors (identified in Table 5 below) that prevented them from making a credit
application.
Table 5: Reason for not applying for a Loan and Constraint Status
Fr...qu ...ncy Valid percentag ... Constraint status
Don't n......d it 10 27.0 Unconstrain ...d
Non-applicants
Can't afford cost 11 29.7
Could not find one 8 21.6
that suits ln~ needs
Think I don't 9ualif~ 3 8.1
Don't knov..r "",h.ere 2 5.4 Constrained Non-
and ho",",to get it applicants
Procedure tilne 2 5.4
consutning
Don't have required 1 2.7
documents
Total 37 100
Of the 27 constrained non-applicants, the most important reported reason why they did not
apply for credit is because they could not afford the cost involved (40.7%) followed by the
fact that: they could not find one that met their specific requirements (29.6%) and they think
they are unqualified (11%). The rest are displayed in Table 6 below. These reasons indicate
that these respondents have sometime in the past applied for credit, made enquiries from
friends or lenders and as such have an idea of what the requirements for credit are. This
confirms findings in Kenya that most non-applicants are credit constrained; indeed only 15%
of non-applicants is this Kenyan study were unconstrained (Atieno, 2001). In a similar study
amongst micro enterprises in Brazil, 39% of respondent did not apply for credit due to lack
of need for it whilst 61% reported other reasons (Kumar and Francisco, 2005). The incidence
of credit constraint amongst non-applicants in this current study is lower than that reported in
the Kenyan study but higher than that in Brazil. In Kenya, Atieno (2001) reports that the
most important reason for not applying for credit is the lack of information. This is expected
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as the study was conducted in rural Kenya. This current study was conducted in a major city
(Kumasi) and one would rightly expect that information on where to get credit would not be
much of a problem.
Table 6: Constrained Non-applicants and the Perceived Causes of the Constraint
Frequency Valid percentage
Can't afford cost 11 40.7
Could not find one 'With 8 29.6
terms that suits my needs
Think I don't qualify 3 11.1
Don't krrow where and 2 7.4
ho'W to get it
Procedure time 2 7.4
consuming
Don't have required 1 3.7
doculnents
Total 27 100
Given the high interest rates of25% and above in Ghana (Kpodo and Valdmanis, 2010), it is
not difficult to understand why it is the most reported barrier to participation in the credit
market. This confirms findings of Love and Sanchez (2009) that higher interest rates and
transaction cost are the main barriers to participation in the credit market for small
enterprises. In Brazil, Kumar and Francisco (2005) also report cost as the main reason why
some microenterprises do not apply for credit. Apart from cost been a major barrier to credit
access, the above result also appears to suggest that lenders provide standardised products.
Almost 30% of constrained non-applicants did not apply for credit because they could not
find facilities with the right amounts, maturities and repayment schedules that suit their
needs. These people would rather not seek credit than to go for credit that does not meet their
needs. The lack of tailor-made products could actually create repayment problems for
borrowers. In the Mexican study reported earlier, only 9% of non-applicants were hindered
from participating in the market by the lack of tailor-made facilities (Love and Sanchez,
2009). The problem of documentary requirements was not a major cause of the constraint
reported by constrained non-applicants (3.7%).
6.1.6 Demand and supply constraints
A detailed breakdown of the above results into the supply and demand side components is
provided in the Figure 7 below. From the results discussed so far in this study, 72.5% (95) of
all the 131 small businesses surveyed are credit constrained (involves 68 loan applicants and
27 non-applicants). This is relatively higher than the 48% reported in Brazil (Kumar and
Francisco, 2005). Of the 95 constrained respondents, 93 of them (97.9%) faced a supply-side
constraint. These included the partially and fully constrained applicants as well as non -
applicants who did not apply for credit because of: high cost, lack of tailor made facilities;
fear of rejection (those who think they don't qualify); process inconveniences and lack of
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required documents). Only 2 respondents (2.1%) reported a demand side constraint (those
who cited lack of knowledge of where and how to get credit). On the other hand, 36
participants (27.5%) made up of 26 loan applicants and 10 non-applicants were
unconstrained. Hence, the small businesses surveyed face predominantly a supply-side
constraint. Demand-side constraints are almost non-existent amongst the sample surveyed.
This also confirms the argument in the literature that credit constraint is mainly caused by
supply-side factors (Atieno, 2001). Contrary to the results of this study Chaves et al. (2001)
found that demand side factors were responsible for the limited participation of the small
enterprises in the Romanian credit market. This survey has established that the SEs in Ghana
are mostly faced with a supply side credit constraint and that the lack of registered property
titles is not recognised by borrowers as a prominent cause of their credit constraints,
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Figure 7: A Summary of the Credit Constraint amongst SEs. Source: Field Data
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6.1.7 Nature ofthe SE Credit Constraint - Validation
This sample consisted of 27 traders, 70% of whom were females. Though this sample is not
large enough to permit any meaningful statistics to be conducted, the descriptive analysis is
meant to determine whether there are similar trends compared to that of the main survey.
The median age was 30-45years (55.6%). About 48% had basic education, 30% had no
formal education whilst 22% had vocation or technical education. A majority of about 44%
of these businesses were generating between GHC 1001-1500 per month and 74% employed
less than 5 workers. The participants identified a number of challenges in the conduct of
their businesses but the one that featured most prominently was the lack of funds (55.6%)
which is a confirmation of the findings of the main survey. The original SPSS tables
containing the results discussed here are attached to Appendix B, Tables 35-51.
Credit market experiences constraint status
Once again there was evidence of small businesses active participation in the formal credit
market. About 81% of the sample submitted a credit application in the two year period to the
time of the survey; only 18.5% never applied for credit within the period. Of the 22 loan
applicants, an estimated 68% sought for credit form MFls compared to 32% who approached
UBs. A majority of respondents wanted loan amounts above GHC2000; only 9% wanted to
borrow amounts less than GHC500 whilst 27% each wanted to borrow between GHC500-
1000 and GHCI001-2000. Unfortunately however for all loan applicants only 13.6%
actually received the full amount they wanted the rest were constrained as they received less
than the desired amount. Appendix B provides a breakdown of the loan proportion obtained.
Though these results are not exactly the same as that obtained from the main survey, the
general trend appears very similar. For instance only a small percentage of loan applicants is
unconstrained vis-A-vis 86% (19 respondents) that faces different degrees of constraint. The
seriousness of the constraint can also be seen in the fact that, of the 19 constrained applicants
about 53% obtain less than 50% of the amount they desired whilst 47% obtained amounts
greater than 50% but fell short of 100%. This indicates that a sizeable proportion is seriously
constrained. In the main survey however majority of the constrained applicants (62%)
obtained above 50% of the amount wanted. On the participants' perception of the causes of
the constraint they experienced, approximately 26% did not know why their applications
were unsuccessful, 31.6% related it to the fact they had repayment difficulties in the past but
a majority 42% identified their inability to provide collateral as the reason why they couldn't
obtain their needed credit. This was also the case in the main survey as 56% of respondents
~ also attributed the credit constraints to the lack of collateral. From the perspective of the loan
applicants, the lack of collateral is the main cause of the credit constraint.
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For the five participants who reported no credit market activity, 80% indicated that their non-
participation in the market was due to the high cost involved whilst only 20% expressed no
need for credit and as such was unconstrained. The other 80% were however constrained
since they had an unrevealed demand for credit. Overall, four participants - three loan
applicants and one non-applicant (representing a total of 14.8%) were unconstrained. The
constrained businesses constituted 85% of the sample and involved 19 loan applicants and
four non-applicants. There was no reported case of a demand side constraint which confirms
the main survey finding that the constraint problem is almost entirely a supply-side problem.
Hence, whilst the main cause of the constraint for loan applicants is the lack of collateral,
affordability is the main barrier for non-applicants. About 70% of all the participants did not
have a reliable access to credit which is to say they are not able to obtain credit anytime they
are in need. Only 11% reported a reliable access to credit. All the three unconstrained loan
applicants did not have a reliable access to credit. The above results thus highlights that not
only should authorities be worried about the extent of the constraint but also the reliability
and affordability issues.
6.2 Property Registration and Credit Access
This section presents results on the second objective of the study which is to investigate the
influence of registered property titles (if any) on access to credit. As explained in chapter
five, the achievement of this objective involved an investigation into lenders' attitudes to
collateral as a requirement for small business credit (this includes how necessary they regard
collateral in credit contracts and their preferred forms of collateral), perceptions on the
important attributes of landed property based collateral as well as the influence of registered
property titles on the loan terms that lenders offer. The results are presented below.
6.2.1 Respondent characteristics
Ghana
Table 7 below displays the demographic information of the 108 lending officials who
participated in this study. An overwhelming majority of these respondents (64.8%) were
males. the median age of respondents was 30-45years (48%). A little more than half of the
sample (about 53%) was made up of respondents from universal banks (VBs), 22% were
from rural banks (RBs) and the rest from savings and loans companies (SLCs). For the
purpose of the analysis here, the respondents from RUs and SLCs were classified as
microfinance institutions (MFIs). The number of years a participant had spent with the
current employer was used as a proxy for the level of familiarity with the institution's
policies on the subject matter whilst the number of years the reported position has been held
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was used as a measure of the level of experience. Only 31.5% of these respondents have
been with their current institutions for less than five years compared to 68.5% who have
been at their current institution for at least five years.
This could be an indication of a good staff retention rate within the lending institutions. The
majority of these participants thus had ample knowledge of the policies and practices of their
institutions as far as lending to small businesses is concerned. About 50% gave their job
designation as credit officers. The other 50% were either loans managers or branch managers.
The results also show that apart from 36% of the respondents who had held their current
reported positions for less than five years, 64% have been in their position for five or more
years. The median number of years in the reported position was 5-10 years. This indicates
that the sampled respondents have good amount of experience in dealing with credit issues
and were as such well placed to respond to the question posed. The responses given could
thus be considered as very reliable.
Table 7: Demographic Characteristics or Lending Officials - Ghana
Demographics of categories N=108
officials from
lending
institutions
Valid %
Gender Male 70 64.8
35.2Female 38
Age <30yrs 23
30-45yrs 52
Above 45\"rs 33
Institution type UB 57
Rural bank 24
Savings & Loans 27
Years at current <5yrs 34
institution 5-10yrs 42
Above 10yrs 32
position Credit officer 54
Loans manager 41
Branch manager 13
Years at current <5yrs 39
position 5-10yrs 46
Above lflvrs 23
21.3
48.1
30.6
52.8
22.2
25.0
31.5
38.9
29.6
50
38
12
36.1
42.6
21.3
The analysis revealed a significant association between the level of experience of the
officials (number of years spent at current position) and the lending institution they work for
[} (2) = 7.1, p < .05]. For instance, about 64% of all participants with less than five years'
experience work for MFIs. The UB respondents in this study therefore have a higher level of
experience than their MFI counterparts. There was however no significant association
between the number of years respondents spent at their current institutions and whether they
109
work for a VB or MFI [} (2) = 4.2, P > .05]. About 70% of all participants under the age of
30 were credit officers whilst 56% of loans managers and 85% of branch managers were
between 30-45years old and above 45 years respectively; a significant relationship existed
between the respondents' age and the position held [} (4) = 23.9, P >.001] (see Appendix C,
Tables 1-3). The position of managers requires experience amongst other things and
experience is gained with time, hence the older respondents are more likely to be more
experienced.
England
A total of 95 officials from the high street banks participated in the survey conducted in
England and Table 8 below presents their demographic characteristics. Majority of the
participants were males demonstrating the dominance of men in the banking profession.
About 45% were aged above 45 years and about 43% have been with their current
institutions for less than five years. Also, 43% have held their reported positions for between
five to ten years. About 48% of the respondents were business managers, 40% were loans
advisors; branch managers constituted only 11% of the sample
Tahle 8: Demograrhic~ or lending officials - England
categories N-95 Valid 0/0
Gender Male 68 71.6
Female 27 28.4
Age <30yrs 17 17.9
30-45yrs 35 36.8
Above 45yrs 43 45.3
Years at current <5yrs 41 43.2
institution 5-10yrs 36 37.9
Above 10yrs 18 18.9
position Loans advisors 38 40
Business managers 46 48.4
Branch manager 11 11.6
Years at current <5yrs 26 27.4
position 5-10yrs 41 43.2
Above 10yrs 28 29.5
There was no significant association between respondents experience and position held [} (4)
= 8.8, p> .05] and experience and gender [i (2) = 3.1, P > .05]. Respondents' experience
was however, significantly associated with age [x2 (4) = 89.0, P < .001], (see Appendix, C,
Tables 4-6). Comparing respondents from Ghana and England, it appears that males
dominate their female counterparts in the lending business. Both sets of respondents are also
highly experienced in handling credit issues.
6.2.2 Attitudes to collateral as a requirement for SEs credit
A four point Likert scale (where 1 = not necessary, 2 = seldom necessary, 3 = mostly
necessary and 4 = always necessary) was used to establish the extent to which participants
considered collateral as a necessary requirement in granting small businesses credit. A five
point scale (where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree) was also used to determine
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whether or not, respondents perceived the provision of collateral as a sufficient requirement
to trigger approval of a credit request. Below are the findings for the two countries.
Ghana
Out of the 108 respondents, about 51% indicated that collateral is always necessary and as
such will not approve a SE loan request unless collateral is provided. About 34% perceived
collateral to be mostly necessary and may only ignore collateral in exceptional situations,
probably, depending on their relationship with the client. Whilst 12% perceived collateral as
seldom necessary only 2.8% think it not necessary at all (Appendix C, Table 7). The results
thus indicate that most lenders (85%) in most instances make the provision of collateral a
necessary requirement when dealing with small businesses. This confirms the earlier
findings on SE owners that the lack of collateral accounted for about 52% of the credit
constraint reported by small business owners (see Table 4). It also confirms arguments in the
literature that about 70% to 80% of firms applying for loans in the low and middle income
economies are required to provide collateral (Inderst and Mueller, 2007). In Ghana, there
appears to be acute level of information asymmetry in the credit markets. This is evidenced
amongst other things, by the fact that about 70% of Ghanaians adults still do not have a bank
account (B&FT, 2012). Since information asymmetry is often blamed for the existence of
credit constraints (see chapter 4), in the developing countries where information asymmetry
is more pronounced, it will be difficult if not impossible for small businesses to obtain credit
without providing collateral.
Even though majority of the participants in this study considered collateral as always
necessary in designing credit contracts for small businesses, there appears to be variations
from one institution type to the other. For instance, 70.2% of VB-based respondents believe
that collateral is always necessary vis-a-vis 29.4% for MFIs. A majority of the MFI
respondents (43%) rather believe it is mostly necessary but not always. The chi square test
shows a significant association between institution type and perception on how necessary
collateral is, [x2 (3) = 21.7 P < .001]. This was confirmed by the Mann-Whitney test [V = 775,
Z = - 4.6, P < .001]. One thing needs reemphasising. VBs appear to be more reliant on
Collateral when dealing with small businesses than MFls. Indeed Cull et at. (2006) argue
that MFI's are more flexible with collateral requirements than traditional banks. Reed (2012)
also observed that MFIs operate on a model different from the traditional collateral-based
lending used by commercial banks. The MFIs model according to Reed focuses on what the
businesses readily have such as the viability of the business and the seriousness and
credibility of the managers. Having said that, most MFI respondents in this study as already
stated did indicate that collateral is mostly necessary.
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This appears contradictory to the argument that microfinance emerged to provide a solution
to the lack of collateral problem, responsible for the inability of many low income
households and businesses to obtain credit (Sonne, 2010). Explaining why MFIs still
demand collateral sometimes Reed (2012) admits that though the MFIs model is not reliant
on collateral, very often they tend to take collateral because, " ... if you came and said you
would like to borrow some money from us and you had collateral to pledge and you weren't
prepared to pledge it, the first question I'd ask is, do you believe in your business?". That
said, there was no association between respondents' perception on how necessary collateral
is considered to be and gender [i (3) = 1.8, p >.05]; age [rho = .01 p >.05]; number of
years at institution [rho = .03, p >.05] and; level of experience [rho = .06, p >.05], (see
Appendix C, Tables 10-13). On the other hand, 72% of the lending officials do generally
agree that the provision of collateral per se is not sufficient to guarantee access to credit.
About 21% neither agreed nor disagreed but only 7% disagreed. Given the small proportion
of respondents who disagree that collateral alone is insufficient, granting credit to small
business on the sole basis of the availability of collateral is an extreme exception rather a
norm in the credit market. The use of collateral per se does not solve all the problems that
lenders are more concerned about and according to Scott (1986) no lender will grant a loan
against a basket of gold bricks if the lender is certain that the collateral will be foreclosed.
This result thus points to one thing, that, though most lenders will require collateral from
small businesses, to actually succeed in obtaining the needed credit, other factors or
conditions will also have to be met.
There was no statistical difference established between UBs and MFIs in terms of their
perceptions on whether the provision of collateral is sufficient to trigger approval of
application or not [U = 1449, Z = - .03, P >.05]. Therefore lenders irrespective of whether
they are UBs or MFIs will not supply small businesses with credit if all they can provide is
collateral. There are thus other equally important issues that both UBs and MFIs are
interested in when granting credit. The perceptions on whether the provision of collateral is
sufficient or not was not associated with respondents' gender [i (3) = 1.6, P >.05] neither
was it correlated with the level of experience [rho = -.05, p >.05]; age [rho = .001, P >.05];
and number of years at institution [rho = -.01, p >.05] (see Appendix C, Tables 16-19).
England
Investigations on the attitudes to the importance of collateral in granting credit to small
businesses revealed that only 21% consider collateral as always necessary and 24% regard it
as seldom necessary but a majority (55%) did perceive collateral as mostly necessary when
dealing with small businesses. None perceived collateral as not been necessary at all. The
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correlation test showed a significant difference between respondents with different levels of
experience in terms of how important collateral is perceived [rho = -.35, P < .OJ). This
shows that more experienced lending officers may be relatively less stringent on their
collateral requirements. The chi square test did not find an association between the
perception on the importance of collateral and gender [x2 (2) = 1.6, p >.05J (see Appendix C,
Tables 20-22). The above confirms statistics available in the literature that an estimated 60%
to 70% of bank loans in the developed economies are collateralised (Menkhoff et al., 2003).
In the United States for instance, 80% of small business loans are said to be collateralised
(lnderst and Mueller, 2007). Even though most participants indicated that they would
demand collateral when dealing with most small businesses, an overwhelming majority
(73.7%) do agree that the provision of collateral per se is not sufficient to warrant credit
supply to such businesses. Only 11.6% did agree that collateral is sufficient but 14.7%
neither agreed nor disagreed. The level of experience of participants had no significant
association with the perception of whether or not collateral is sufficient to trigger credit
supply, [rho = -.J77,p >.05J (see Appendix C, Tables 23-24).
A comparison between Ghana and England on lenders' attitudes to collateral shows that their
perceptions on how important collateral is, when dealing with small businesses are
significantly different. Ghanaian based lenders in this study did regard collateral more highly
than their counterparts in England (see Appendix G). Whilst both sets of respondents did
generally consider collateral as not sufficient to trigger credit supply, lenders in England had
a significantly stronger disagreement to the assertion that collateral is a sufficient
requirement. This is an indication that collateral based lending is more pronounced amongst
the Ghanaian lenders. The theory of credit constraint identifies information asymmetry as the
underlying factor responsible for the use of collateral in credit contracts. Going by this
theory (explained in chapter four), one could argue that in the developed world like England
where better information systems exist to help lenders in assessing credit applicants,
collateral will be a less important part of credit contracts than in the developing world and
this is what the results above appear to be pointing to.
6.2.3 Preferred forms of collateral when dealing with small businesses
Having established that most lending officials will in most cases require collateral when
lending to small businesses, there is now the need to examine which forms of collateral they
prefer most. Participants were asked to indicate on a four point scale, their level of
preference for various forms of collateral (where 1was least preferred and 4 most preferred).
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Ghana
The results displayed in Table 9 below show that most respondents (about 64%) ranked
landed property as a most preferred form of collateral. An estimated 95% ranked landed
property as highly and most preferred. Landed property, treasury bills (T-bills) and
cash/fixed deposits were the only forms of collateral that no respondent rated as least
preferred. Third party guarantee (TPG), T-bills and cash deposits were also rated as most
preferred respectively by 36%, 32% and 29% of the respondents. For all the other forms of
collateral listed in Table 9 below, less than 20% of respondents rated each as most preferred.
Landed property thus stands out above all the other forms of collateral as the most preferred.
Table 9: Level of Preference for Different Forms of Collateral When Dealing with SEs - Ghana
N-108
Fonns of Least Preferred Highly Most Median Categol'Y
collateral Prefel'red prefe rr'ed preferred
(%) (%) (%) (%)
(1)
Landed 0 4.6 31.5 63.9 4 Most
£ropertv EI'eferred
(2)
T-Bills 0 30.6 38.0 31.5 3 Highly
Cash/fixed 0 28.7 42.6 28.7 3 prefelTed
deposits
Third party 9.3 19.4 35.2 36.1 3
uarantee (3)
unclassified
Automobiles 13.0 34.3 34.3 18.5 3
Machinery & 28.7 30.6 32.4 8.3 2 (4)
tools
Preferred
Shares/bonds 36.1 33.3 23.1 7.4 2
General Goods 36.1 34.3 26.9 2.8 2
(stock
(5)
Account 50.9 39.8 6.5 2.8 1 Least
Receivables preferred
Life EoJiCY 55.6 30.6 13.9 0 1
More than 30% of respondents in each instance ranked life policy, account receivables and
shareslbonds and stock as least preferred. Based on the median ranks of each collateral type
above, they were classified into those that are least preferred, preferred, highly preferred and
most preferred. Only landed property falls into the most preferred category. T'-bills,
cash/fixed deposits and TPG were classified as highly preferred. The least preferred category
involves life policy and account receivables (see Table 9 above). To confirm whether there is
a significant difference in preferences for these forms of collateral to warrant the
classifications above, the Friedman's ANOVA test was conducted and the outcome indicates
that a significant difference did exist in respondents' preferences [x2 (9) = 410.97, P < .001].
To determine where the actual differences were, the Wilcoxon and Friedman's tests were
conducted for the different combinations of the forms of collateral shown in Table 9 above.
The Wilcoxon's test shows that respondents had a significantly higher level of preference for
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landed property (Mn=3.59) than T-bill (Mn=3.0l) [Z = -5.1, p < .00l]. Though the
Friedman's test showed a significant difference in the preference for T-bills, cash/fixed
deposits, TPG and automobiles £1 (3) = 17.32, P < .001], when automobiles are taken out of
the group, the test becomes insignificant for T-bills (Mn=3.0l), cash/fixed deposits (Mn=3.0)
and TPG (Mn=2.98), [/ (2) = .48, p >.05]. This shows that T-bills, cash/fixed deposits and
TPG belong to the same category as there is no difference in the level of preference attached
to them.
The Friedman's tests did not also show a significant difference in preference for
machinery/tools (Mn=2.20), shareslbond (Mn=2.02) and general goods (Mn=1.96) [l (2) =
2.12, p >.05}. Finally, there was no difference in preference for account receivables
(Mn=1.6l) and life policy (Mn=1.58) [Z = -.32, P >.05J (see Appendix C, Tables 25-31).
However, automobiles were statistically rated lower than the category 2 items but higher
than the category 4 items. As such automobiles were put separately as the only item in
category 3 (see Appendix C, Tables 27-29). Hence any group of items that had no
significant difference between them were classified together under the same level of
preference. Lenders in this study would generally go for a form of collateral in a higher
category as shown in Table 9 if they had all the above options available to them. The actual
form of collateral that may be taken may depend on other factors such as availability.
Respondents who had been at their current institution for much longer showed a higher
preference for landed property than those who have spent fewer years at their current
institution [rho = .244, P < .05] but the preference for land was not associated with the level
of experience of the respondents [rho = .07, P >.05J (see Appendix C, Tables 32 &33).
The very high preference attached to landed property relative to other forms of collateral in
this study supports the argument in the literature that, collateral is more valuable the more
immobile and immune to damage it is (Feder and Feeny, 199). The advantage of landed
property over movable assets is articulated by Chaves (2001) who established that though
assets such as equipment, machinery, inventories, livestock, and accounts receivable
represented about 48% of the aggregate book value of assets of rural enterprises, they often
have very limited capacity to carry debt because of imperfections in the country's legal
regime, which severely limit the creation, perfection, and enforcement of security interests in
moveable property. For instance, de Laiglesia (2004) observes in a study in Nicaragua that
60% of formal credit transactions were secured by land whilst moveable assets like harvest
and cattle constituted only 7% and 12% respectively. In many countries, legal barriers
restrict the use of movable property as collateral; as such real estate is the only viable form
of security that may be widely available (Fleisig and de la Pena, 1996)
l1S
Furthermore, the certainty with which an assets' value is expected to appreciate or at least
stay stable is relevant in the decision to accept it as collateral (Benjamin, 1978). As aptly
observed by Rouse (2002) even though a crash in property prices is possible, the value of
landed property could still be relatively considerable and can also be expected to generally
rise over time. On the other hand, the saleability and ease with which a charge can be taken
over an asset are equally important when taking collateral as argued in chapter four. Landed
property doesn't appear to be the best when assessed against this latter criterion. Lenders
thus have to choose between the immovability of the property, its virtual indestructibility and
stability in value on one hand and the ease of foreclosure and perfection on the other hand.
Table 10 below compares the UBs and MFIs in terms of their level of preference for the
various forms of collateral. Apart from automobiles, there was a difference between UBs and
MFIs in terms of their level of preference for all the others shown in Table IObelow.
Table 10: Mann-Whitney test between MFls and UBs for the various forms of collateral
Rank.
,......,.... ,......T"", ... N M:tan rootnnk SUI1'1 of r~"'nks
L.. nd Un'\IIIIr· •• 1bank 57 59.76 3406.60
MFI 151 48.62 2479.50
TotA' 10R
Ca&hlfi_d Deposll Universal bank 57 3B.96 2221.00
MF. 61 71.86 3665.00
Toto. 108
Stock Uni"VWtraal blink 67 40.70 2320.00
MF. 51 69.92 3566.00
Tota' 108
,....tol1'1ool ..... UnlversA' bank 67 63.84 3069.00
MF. 51 55.24 2817.00
Tala. 108
Machinery Unlver.al bank 67 66.72 3746.00
MF' 51 41.96 2140.00
Tot ... 108
AccounIRucl .. "..b' ... Unlvur .... ' b .. "k 57 60.14 3428.00
MFI 61 48.20 2458.00
TotA' 108
LllePolicy Unlvarasl bank 57 59.61 3397.50
MFI 61 48.79 2488.50
Tota' 108
.h.r •• lbond. Unlver •• ' bank 57 67.03 3820.50
MFI 151 40.50 2065.50
Toto' 108
T-Rills Unh ... r.A' bAnk 67 43.03 2452.50
MF. 51 157.32 3433.50
Tal ... 108
third party Guar .. nl"' .... Unlvers .. ' bank 67 42.47 2421.00
MF. 51 67.94 3466.00
'Tota' 108
Test Statistics'
Cash,fi~ kcount third party
Land Deposit Stock Altomobiles ~chinery Reciewbles lifePolicy sharestllonds T·Bilis Guarantees
~nn·\'_11iIney U 1153.500 568.000 667.000 1416.000 814.000 1132.000 1162.500 739.500 799.500 768.000
WilcolDnW 2479.500 2221.000 2320.000 3069.000 2140.000 2458.000 2488.500 2065.500 2452.500 2421.000
Z ·2.194 ·5.824 ·5.121 -142 ..4.118 -2.206 ·2.005 ....624 ...177 -4.444
16)f1lp. Sig. (2·tailed) .028 .000 .000 .809 .000 .027 .045 .000 .000 .000
a. Grouping Variable: Instilution TWe
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The Mann-Whitney test above shows that UBs have a higher level of preference for the
following forms of collateral compared to their MFI counterparts; land, shareslbonds,
[account receivables, machinery and tools and life policy. On the contrary, compared to the
VBs, MFIs revealed a higher preference for the other forms of collateral (cash/fixed deposits,
T-bills TPG, and general goods).
Within the MFI sub-group, the Friedman's test (see Appendix C, Table 34) shows there was
no difference in the level of preference for landed property, T-bills, cash/fixed deposits and
TPG which were generally rated as most preferred, [} (3) = 1.38, p >.05). Hence, MFI
based lenders did have an equal level of preference for these forms of collateral and appear
to have an equal level of satisfaction from accepting any of the above four forms of collateral.
On the contrary, landed property was the only form of collateral that VB based lenders on
average rated as most preferred. The results depicted by Table 10 above reveal that the
universal banks regard landed property more highly than the MFls. The MFIs however,
exhibited higher preference for the non-traditional forms of collateral such as cash deposits
and guarantees. This is consistent with the argument in the literature that MFIs unlike the
banks, specialise in the use of character-based and other specialised techniques to provide
credit (Aryeetey, 2008). MFls incorporate some of the features of informal lending into their
credit schemes through the use of the solidarity group strategy and other character-based
substitute for collateral (Berger, 1989).
The solidarity groups involve a joint liability for loans disbursed to the group; each member
acts as a guarantor for the others. Since failure to repay on schedule affects each member's
chance of getting any future credit, there is the strong incentive to keep up with repayment.
Most microfinance schemes also involve a compulsory savings scheme. To qualify for a loan
as an individual or a group, clients must show a track record of consistent savings in a
savings account for a period. The accumulated savings serves as cash collateral for the loan
to be advanced.
Eng/and
The levels of preference for the different forms of collateral in England are displayed in
Table 11 below and it reveals that lenders in England do have a higher preference for some
collateral over others. Based on the median ratings, landed property, cash deposits and T-
bills were generally rated as most preferred. In fact, none of the participants rated landed
property or T-bills as least preferred. Only 2% rated cash deposits as least preferred. The
forms of collateral in category 2 (Shares, TPa and account receivables) were rated
significantly lower than the category 1 items and were categorised as highly preferred.
Further down the perking order is the third group of collateral made up of
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machinery/equipment and life policy. Finally two items involving: automobiles and stock
were rated as least important. In the least preferred category, no one rated automobiles either
as highly preferred or most preferred. Whilst only 4% rated stock as highly preferred, no one
rated it as most preferred.
Table 11: Preference for individual forms of collateral- England
~-95
L.ast Pr.ferred Highly 2..1ost
Preferred prefe:rred
Fonns of (%) pr.ferred (%) Median Category
Collateral
(%)
Land/ Building 0 7.4 .32.6 60.0 4 (1)
Cash deposits 2.1 9.5 32.6 55.8 4 2..1ost
T-bills 0 13.7 3!5.5 50.5 4 prefe:rred
Sh.res/bonds 12.6 27.4 46.3 13.7 3 (2)
Highly
lhirdp&rty 13.7 29.5 40.0 16.8 .3 Prefe:rred
guarant_
.Account 16.5 26.3 41.1 15.8 3
ntceivable.
M.dU.nery & 12.6 53.7 24-2.1 9.5 2 (3)
tool. Prefe:rred
life policy 22.1 .38.9 34.7 4.2 2
Autolnobil •• 45.4 51.6 0 0 1 (4)
G......ralGood. 61.1 .34-7 4.2 0 1 L.ast
(stoel<.) Pr.!'rr.d
The Friedman's test was conducted to test for differences between items in categories I and
2 whilst the Wilcoxon's test was conducted for categories 3 and 4. The results (see Appendix
C, Tables 35-38) show that there were no significant differences in respondents' level of
preference for items in each of the categories in Table 11 above. This thus justifies the
classifications above. Further analysis on the preferences exhibited for landed property
shows that it was not associated with the respondents': level of experience [rho = .14, p >
0.05J; level of familiarity with the institutions' policies [rho = .11, p >.05J; perception of
how necessary collateral is in dealing with small businesses [rho = .11, p >.05J(see
Appendix C, Tables 39-41).
Unlike Ghana where only landed property was rated as the most preferred over all the other
forms of collateral, in England, the most important form of collateral to lenders was not only
landed property but also, cash deposits and T-bills. Indeed, apart from landed property and
machinery/equipment, lenders from the two countries exhibited differences in their level of
preference for the other forms of collateral (see Appendix G). Lenders in England showed a
higher level of preference for cash deposits, T-bills, life policy, account receivables and
shareslbonds. The Ghanaian lenders on the other hand had higher preferences for stock,
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automobiles and guarantees. Landed property was however equally rated as most preferred
in both countries.
6.2.4 Eligibility of landed property for use as collateral
Having established that landed property is most preferred by majority of lenders, the next
stage of the analysis focused on whether or not property registration is required to make land
eligible for use as collateral. To do this, respondents were first asked to indicate how much
they agree or disagree that unregistered property is eligible for use as collateral (using a 5
point scale: 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). To check for consistency in the
responses, participants were later asked to indicate which kind of documents they accept as
proof of property ownership (this was used as a proxy for whether the lender accepts only
registered property or both registered and unregistered property). They were also asked to
indicate in order of importance which attributes they look out for when accepting landed
property for collateral purposes using a six point scale (where ranks of 5 and above meant
the attribute is critically important and cannot be ignored, from 3 - 4 meant factor may be
ignored though important and below 3 meant the attribute was of least importance and
should be ignored).
Ghana
A total of 45.4% of all 108 participants disagreed with the assertion that registration is not
necessary to make landed property an acceptable collateral asset. In other words these
respondents do regard registration as a necessary requirement when taking landed property.
Those who agree that registration is not necessary constitute 38% of the sample whilst the
remaining 17% neither agreed nor disagreed. However, respondents' attitude to the statement
that registration is not necessary to make property eligible for use as collateral varied
between VBs and MFls. For the MFls, 56.8% agree that registration is not necessary to make
property eligible collateral compared to 21.6% who disagree. On the contrary, only 21.1% of
VBs agree that registration is not necessary vis-a-vis 66.7% who disagree. The chi square
test thus confirmed that a significant association exists between the perception on the
eligibility of unregistered property as collateral and the type of lender [/ (4) = 23.7, P
< .001} (see Appendix D, Table 1 & 2).
Thus unlike MFIs, VBs on average disagree that unregistered landed property is eligible for
collateral purposes. The extent to which respondents agree that unregistered property is
eligible collateral was negatively correlated to: respondents' level of preference for landed
property [rho = -.190, P < .Ol}; the perception on how easy it is to verify ownership of
landed property [rho = -.208, P < .05} (see Appendix D, Tables 3 & 4). Hence, the above
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results show that the more highly landed property is rated as a form of collateral, the less
respondents agree that unregistered property can be used as collateral and vice versa. In other
words respondent with a higher preference for landed property, disagree more or agree less
with the assertion that registration is not necessary to make land and acceptable collateral
and vice versa. Also, the easier lenders perceived verification of property ownership to be,
the less they agree that unregistered property is eligible collateral. This is an indication of the
influence of registration on property ownership verification.
All the respondents (l08) in this study indicated that they require documentary proof of
property ownership when taking landed peoprety as collateral to secure credit. Since about
70% of landed property ownership in Ghana is under customary system and as such
undocumented (Toulmin and Longbottom, 2001), most property owners especially in the
rural areas may not have documentary evidence of their land rights and such properties by
this finding are not eligible for collateral purposes. The kinds of documentation lenders
require however vary but were broadly classified into three groups: registered documents
only, unregistered documents only and a combination of registered and unregistered
documents. The results in Table 12 indicate that overall, 53% accept both registered and
unregistered documents as proof of ownership, 47% accept only registered documents such
as title certificates or registered deeds/lease but none of the respondents accept only
unregistered documents like allocation papers and unregistered deeds.
From Table 12 below, about 82% of all 51 lenders who accept only registered documents are
UBs. About 74% of those who accept both registered and unregistered documents are MFIs.
74% of UB based respondents accept only registered documents vis-a-vis the 17.6% from
MFIs. Therefore the probability that both registered and unregistered property will be
accepted by lenders was 26% for UBs and 82% for MFls. The chi square test in Table 12
below thus revealed a significant relationship between institution type and the type of
documents accepted [x2 (I) = 33.91, P < .001]. UBs are more likely than MFIs to ask for
only registered documents. This is consistent with earlier results (already reported) that UBs
unlike MFIs generally did not consider unregistered property as eligible for use as collateral.
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Table 12: Chi square Test for Accepted Property Documents and Institution Type
Documentation type •• institution TlIP8 CrOll.tabulatlon
Ins titution TI.Oe
Uniwrsal
bank MFI Total
Documentation twas ONLYregislared Count 42 9 51
documents
% within Documentation 62.4% 17.6% 100.0%
twes
0" within Institution T~e 73.7% 17.6% 47.2°'"
0" or Total 36.9% 63% 47.2°"
Both registered & Count 15 42 57
unregistered documents
% within Documentation 26.3% 73.7% 100.0%
twes
% within Institution T~" 26.3% 62.4% 52.6%
% or Total 13.9% 389% 52.8%
Total Count 57 51 108
0,4 within Documentation 52.6% 47.2% 100.0·'"
twes
% within Institution T~e 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
%orTolal 52.6% 47.2% 100.0%
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value <if Alsrai~ie~ir' E_~i~~1J' (2- Exa;:d~l[rJ (1-
Pearaon Chi-Square 33.914- 1 .000
Continuity Correctlonb 31.703 1 .000
Likelihood Ratio 36.152 1 .000
Flaher". Exact T•• t .000 .000
~n.e~~I-:do'nln.ar 33.600 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 108
•. 0 cell. (.0%) have expected count Ie•• than IS.The minimum eJCPectedcount 1.24.08.
b. Computed only for _ 2»<2tabl.
Landed property registration has the ability to make independent verification of property
ownership easier. Therefore one would expect that lenders who accept only registered
property will have no problems with verifying their ownership. Respondents were asked to
report on how easy it is to verify ownership of property presented for collateral purposes.
About 56.4% of all the participants were able to verify property ownership with relative ease;
only 23% could not verify property ownership with ease (see Appendix D, Table 8). From
the chi square test a significant association was found between institution type and how easy
it is to verify property ownership [/ (4) = 11.82, P < .05]. For instance, only 10.5% of UB
respondents did not find ownership verification easy compared to 37% of MFI respondents
and whilst 68.5% of UB respondents found verification easy less than half (43%) of MFI
respondents did (see Appendix D, Table 9).
Linking this with earlier results that UBs often accept only registered documents whilst MFIs
accept both registered and unregistered documents, it could be argued that the acceptance of
only registered documents is the reason why most UBs found it easier to verify ownership
relative to MFIs. Indeed, how easy respondents found verification of property ownership had
a significantly association with the kind of documents accepted [i (4) = 15.1, p < .01].
About 75% of all respondents who accept only registered documents found it easy to verify
ownership compared to 40% of those who accept both registered and unregistered
documents (see Appendix D, Table 10). The question then is, why do some lenders accept
unregistered property even though verification of ownership is most likely to be difficult?
The answer is quiet simple; if they can pass on the cost of verification (in terms of time and
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resources spent) to the borrower then they wouldn't be deterred from accepting unregistered
property. The Chi square test however, did not find an association between the type of
landed property accepted by lenders on one hand and the respondents' number of years spent
at their current institution [/ (2) = .30,p >.05} or level of experience on the other hand [i (2)
= 3.2,p >.05} (see Appendix D, Tables 13 & 14).
The land register is intended to provide the public with accurate information on all existing
encumbrances such as mortgages. If the register is well functional and well patronised then
each lender should be able to verify whether or not a given property has already been
pledged to another lender. In general, about 82% of respondents in were able to verify
whether or not a prior mortgage exists on the landed property in question but 18% could not
do so. The chi square test shows that the ability to verify the existence of a prior mortgage
was not significantly associated with the institution type [/ (I) = 2.35,p >.05} neither was it
associated with the type of documents accepted, [x2 (1) = .27, P >.05} (see Appendix D,
Tables 11 & 12). Since the ability to verify the existence of prior mortgages was not found
to be dependent on the acceptance of registered property, there must be an alternative
explanation of how lenders verify whether a mortgage already exists on the property. This
may be an indication that lenders are relying on the collateral register at the Bank of Ghana
(and not the lands register) to verify existing mortgages. Any property whether registered or
not can be filed at the collateral registry when used to secure credit. However, at the lands
registry until the property itself is registered, no encumbrance can be registered on it. Hence
the collateral registry is a better database for recording and verifying the existence of
mortgages.
All the 108 participants were further asked whether there were instances during default
where they experienced significant problems with taking over possession of accepted
property and foreclosing it as a result of ownership disputes. About 74% of respondents said
no. 57.5% of those who said no, were from UBs whilst 42.5% were from MFls.
Consequently, no significant association was found from the chi square test between the type
of lender and whether or not there have been property repossession problems in the past [x2
(1) = 2.76, P > .05] (see Appendix D, Table 15) . However, in terms of the type of property
accepted, just 10% of the respondents accepting only registered property has had such
repossession problems compared 40% of respondents accepting both registered and
unregistered land. The Chi-squared test that followed (see Appendix D, Table 16) showed
that the kind of landed property accepted by lenders had a significant relationship with
whether or not the lender had in the past encountered difficulties in repossessing and
foreclosing property due to ownership conflicts [x2 (1) = 13.08, P < .001}. Therefore, the
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likelihood of encountering property repossession and foreclosure problems was higher for
lenders accepting both registered and unregistered property as compared to those accepting
only registered property. Even though the incidence of property foreclosure problems arising
from ownership disputes was lower for lenders accepting only registered property, this does
not imply that property registration guarantees ownership security as argued in the literature
(see chapter 2). This is because there were still other lenders who encountered disputes
despite the fact that they accept only registered property. From the evidence above however,
one could say that registration does reduce (not eliminate) ownership conflicts to some
extent.
Overall, the result on the eligibility of unregistered landed property appear to confirm
arguments by Dower and Potamites (2005) that landed property can be used as collateral
even if it is not formally registered as people are able to use informal documents to
demonstrate ownership. This appears to contradict a counter argument that unregistered
property are dead capital and cannot be used as collateral for credit (de Soto, 2000).
However, the results from this study show that each of these arguments is true only to a
certain extent. De Soto's argument is valid for most of the Universal Banks in this study, but
invalid for majority of the MFI. Indeed de Laiglesia (2004) establishes that 68% of the
private banks in his study required registered land whilst only 6.7% accepted unregistered
land. The argument concerning the eligibility of unregistered property therefore should be
made within the context of the kind of lending institution under consideration.
The eligibility of landed property for use as collateral should not be limited to the issue of
registration alone as there are other attributes that lenders consider before accepting any
given property. Hence, there is the need to compare these other attributes to property
registration in terms of their level of importance. Table 12 below shows the various attributes
of landed property that lenders look out for when accepting such property as collateral. The
attributes were first classified based on the median ranks and then confirmed using the
Friedman and Wilcoxon's tests. Three attributes (the market value of the property,
availability of documentary evidence of ownership as well as the property' location) were all
generally rated as critically important. The average lender in this study will therefore not
ignore any of these three attributes when accepting a landed property as security for
advancing credit. The availability of insurance cover and whether or not the property is
registered were generally rated to be less important than the critical attributes. Though these
two were considered as important respondents agree they could be ignored. However, the
nature of the rights held (whether leasehold or freehold) was of least importance and as such
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was considered by majority of the lenders as the attributes that should be ignored when
taking land-based collateral.
Table 13: Attributes of Land-Based Collateral in Decreasing Order of Importance - Ghana
Attributes Mean Median Level of importance
Market value 5.18 6
Documentation 5.13 6 Critically important: cannot
Location 4.56 5 be ignored
Registration 4.02 4 Important but rnay be
Insurance 3.81 4 ignored
Leasehold/ freehold 2.51 2 Least important: should be
i 10red
The Friedman's test confirmed that lenders attach different levels of importance to the six
attributes in Table 13 above [.l (5) = 194.2, P < .001]. To determine exactly where the
differences are, the Wilcoxon test was used to compare various combinations of these
attributes. The availability of documentary proof of ownership was equally important to
lenders as the market value of the property involved [Z = - .58, P > .05]. Even though
location was also rated as critically important, the Wilcoxon test showed that it was less
critical than both the market value [Z = - 4.25, P < .001] and documentary evidence of
ownership [Z = - 3.88, p < .001] Compared to property registration and insurance however,
location had a significantly higher rating. The ratings did not show any difference in the
level of importance of property registration and insurance [Z= - 1.32,p >.05}.
Finally, the nature of the land rights (leasehold/freehold) was rated much lower than all the
other factors (see Table 13); for instance it was significantly less important than property
insurance [Z = - 5.9, p < .001] (see Appendix D, Tables 17-24). The level of importance
attached to the six attributes of land-based collateral did vary in some instances between UBs
and MFIs. For instance, Table 14 below shows that all the attributes except the kind of land
rights held are rated as critically important by UBs - an indication that UBs will not accept a
landed property if there are significant deficiencies in any of the top five attributes in Table
14. MFls on the other hand only rated market value and availability of documentary proof of
property ownership as the only critical attributes. Registration insurance and location were
however rated as attributes that may be ignored even though they are important.
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Table 14: Important Attributes of Land-based Collateral by Institution Type-Ghana
VBs MFIs
Attributes Mean Median Mean Median
Market value 5.33 6 5.00 5
Documentation 5.21 6 5.04 6
Location 4.98 5 4.08 4
Registration 4.56 5 3.49 3
Insurance 4.40 5 3.14 3
Leasehold/ freehold 2.60 2 2.41 2
The Man-Whiteny test (see Appendix D, Table 25) showed no statistical difference between
UBs and MFIs in terms of the level of importance attached to the property's market value [U
= 1325.5, Z = -.87, p. >.05}, nature of the rights held [U = 1309.5, Z = -.91, p. >.05} and
availability of documentary proof of ownership [U = 1379.5, Z = -.50, p. >.05}. However,
compared to MFls, UBs attached a much higher level of importance to the following
attributes: location [U = 1065.5, Z = -2.47 p < .05}; property insurance [U = 669, Z = -.76 P
< .001} and property registration [U = 884, Z = -3.58 p < .001}. The level of importance
attached to property registration thus varies depending on the type of lender. The level of
importance attached to property registration as an attribute of land based collateral had a
significantly negative correlation with: the respondents' level of experience [rho = -.195, P
< .05]; how much respondents agreed or disagreed that registration is unnecessary to make
landed property an acceptable collateral [rho = -.331, P < .001] but positively correlated with
the relative ease with which lenders are able to verify property ownership [rho = .241, P
< .05} (see Appendix D, Tables 26-28). This implies that, the more experienced respondents
attached a lower level of importance to property registration than their less experienced
counterparts. Also lenders who attached lower level of importance to registration often
agreed more to the argument that registration is not necessary to make property eligible
collateral. Finally, the easier respondents perceived property ownership verification to be,
the more highly they rated property registration and vice versa.
The above results are consistent with what one would expect in practice because when
lenders take collateral, they do so with the intention that during default the forced sale value
will be sufficient to repay the outstanding debt. This explains why lenders typically lend
amounts less than the estimated forced sale value of the collateral. Hence, the value of the
property in itself may determine how much debt could be granted. This presupposes that
lenders would equally be concerned with the ease of foreclosure of the property which is
affected by the location of the property. Of course if the potential borrower cannot provide
documentary proof of their entitlement to the property, the above arguments will not even be
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considered. It is thus not surprising that these three attributes were duly rated as critically
important (see Table 13 above). Indeed, location may affect demand for and the value of the
property. A property must be located in an area that can attract buyers more quickly to make
it more acceptable collateral to lenders. For instance, Lenders in Colombia are reported to
have strict rules about the kinds of building as well as their locations that can be considered
in advancing loans (Gilbert, 2000). Durand-Lasserve and Payne (2006) observe that there is
a significant reduction in efficiency gains of taking land-based collateral where the lender for
instance, places a value on the location of a land parcel as a slum. Bromley (2005) also notes
that a good house in a bad neighbourhood is always burdened by its surroundings and as
such less acceptable to lenders.
Whether the rights to the property is a leasehold or freehold was considered to be of very
little importance possibly because some leases (such as 99 years and 999) are as good as a
freehold. In addition, the Ghanaian constitution does not permit the granting of freehold on
stool/skin lands but only on family lands. However, the number of years left for the lease to
expire may be critical where a very long term credit facility is being sought. It was however,
surprising that respondents considered property insurance as a factor that may be ignored in
that, without property insurance, the lender is exposed to risks similar to that of an unsecured
lender when a fire outbreak or a natural disaster destroys the property. This attitude however
may be due to the fact that in Ghana the insurance culture is still poor (Appiatu-Ankrah,
20 II). Acceptance of landed property could be more risky for MFIs than their UBs
counterparts because they (MFIs) consider insurance as a factor that can be ignored whilst
UBs will not accept a property unless it is insured at least for the term of the loan. For the
MFIs however, this may not tum into actual losses as they tend to rely on other specialised
techniques to ensure loan repayment. This could possibly be one of the reasons why MFIs
also consider property registration as a factor that can be ignored when taking landed
property. The finding that property registration is not a critical attribute that lenders look out
for is consistent with the observation by Gilbert (2000) that in Bogota, the most serious
problem faced by formal lenders is not the absence of registered property title but the nature
of the property which people often offer as collateral. These findings re-enforce the
argument by Brown et at. (2006) that though registered property title may be a necessary
condition for using the property as collateral for a loan, it is by no means a sufficient one.
England
Just as in the case of Ghana, all the 95 participating lenders in England also revealed that
they always require documentary proof of property ownership when they consider taking the
property as collateral to secure a loan. Unlike the case of Ghana where most properties are
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under customary ownership and not documented, documentation of property ownership in
England is generally not a serious challenge for both lenders and borrowers as this appears to
be widely available. Lenders were asked to indicate how much they agree or disagree with
the assertion that registration is not necessary to make landed property an acceptable form of
collateral. About 68% agreed that registration is not necessary but only 4% disagreed, in
other words only 4% considered registration as a necessary requirement to make property an
acceptable form of collateral (see Appendix D, Table 29). The extent to which participants
agreed with the assertion that registration is not necessary was not influenced by their: level
of experience [rho = -.002, P >.05]; preference for landed property [rho = -.16, P >.05]; and
the perception on the ease of verifying property ownership [rho = -.03, p >.05] (see
Appendix D, Tables 30-32).
Participants were asked to also indicate the kind of documents they often accept as proof of
property ownership. Only 20% of the respondents indicated that they accept only property
formally registered at HM Land Registry but a whopping 80% do accept both registered and
unregistered property (see Appendix 0, Table 33). Given that an average of about 75% of
properties in England and Wales has already been registered (HM Land Registry, 2011), it
appears that lenders will naturally have a rare encounter with situations involving
unregistered property. Therefore those who indicated that they only accept registered
property might be lenders who have only encountered registered property over the years. The
rare incidence of land ownership disputes in this country indicates that ownership is quiet
secure irrespective of whether it is registered or not. This might be the reason why majority
of the lenders are not deterred from accepting unregistered property. The chi square tests (see
Appendix D, Tables 34-37) found that the kind of landed property accepted had no relation
with the respondents' experience [/ (2) = 2.033, p > .05]; level of familiarity with
institutions' policies, [/ (2) = 2.5, p > .05]; and position held [/ (2) = .2, p > .05}. The chi
square test also showed that the kind of property accepted was not associated with the extent
to which respondents' agreed that registration is not necessary to make property eligible for
use as collateral [/ (3) = 2.5, P > .05}. For instance, about 63%all the 19 respondents who
said they accept only registered documents also agreed that registration is not necessary to
make property an acceptable form of collateral. This is possibly a confirmation of the initial
argument made above that people who accept only registered documents did so not because
they consider unregistered property to be unsuitable for use as collateral but it was merely an
indication that such respondents had only encountered situations involving only registered
property.
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When all 95 participants were asked how easy it is to verify property ownership, most of
them (about 72%) indicated it was easy to do so. Whilst only 5% indicated it was not easy to
verify property ownership. The correlation test shows that the perception on the ease with
which property ownership can be verified was not associated with respondents: level of
experience, [rho = 0.03, p >.05J; and familiarity with the institution's policies [rho = 0.27,
p >.05]. It was however, established from the chi square test that, the perception on the ease
with which property ownership can be verified was significantly associated with the kind of
landed property accepted [/ (3) = 9.44, P < 0.05]. For instance, all the 19 respondents who
accept only registered property are able to verify ownership with relative ease compared to
65.8% of the 76 respondents who accept both registered and unregistered documents (see
Appendix D, Tables 38-40). Only four of the 95 respondents have reported repossession and
foreclosure problems arising from ownership disputes. About 75% of these respondents
accept both registered and unregistered property whilst 25% accept only registered property.
However the chi square test did not establish a significant association between kind of
property accepted and the possibility of encountering such repossession and foreclosure
difficulties (see Appendix D, Table 41). This is further evidence that secure ownership in
England is not dependent on registration.
Property registration was also compared to the other attributes of land-based collateral in
terms of their level of importance. The results are displayed in Table 15 below. Four out of
the six attributes were rated as critically important. The sampled lenders in England would
therefore not compromise on issues regarding the property's value, location, insurance and
documentary proof of ownership.
Table 15: Perception of the Importance of Various Attributes of Property - England
Attributes l".1ean l".ledian Level of im.portance
~larket value 5.38 6
DOC\l.n'lentation 5.23 6 Critically itnportant: cannot
Location 5.19 5 be ignored
Insurance 5.15 5
Registration 3.00 3 hnportant but !nay be
ignored
Leasehold/ freehold 2.47 2 Least itnpartant: should be
ignored
Property registration was considered as an attribute that is important but could be ignored
whilst the nature of the rights (leasehold/freehold) was rated as least important one that they
recommend should be ignored. All the top four attributes (see Table 15 above) were rated as
critically important based on the median ranks. Further analysis based on the Friedman'S test
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revealed there was no difference in the level of importance lenders attached to these
critically important attributes The Wilcoxon's test however showed a significant higher
rating for property insurance compared to registration whilst registration was also rated
much higher than the nature of land rights held (see Appendix D, Table 42-44). How
important registration is as a sought for attribute of land-based collateral was found not to be
significantly associated with the level of preference for landed property [rho = -0.09.
p >.05]; experience [rho = 0.1. p >.05]; familiarity with institutions policies [rho = 0.04.
P >.05]; the perception on the ease with which ownership can be verified [rho =- 0.04.
P >.05]; and the kind of property documents accepted [/ (5) = 1.3, p > .05] (see Appendix
D, Tables 45-49).
There was a significant difference between lenders in the two countries regarding their
perception on the eligibility of landed property for use as collateral (see appendix G).
Lenders in England had a significantly greater disregard for registration when it comes to
eligibility of property than their Ghanaian counterparts in that majority agreed much strongly
that registration is not necessary to make property eligible for use as collateral. Indeed, there
was a significant association between the kind of property accepted (registered or
unregistered) and the country where the lender is based. The likelihood of a lender
demanding for only registered property was significantly higher for Ghanaian lenders.
Furthermore, when lenders were asked to indicate the importance of the various attributes of
property which they look for when accepting any property for use as collateral, the Mann-
Whitney test showed that lenders in both countries attached the same level of importance to
the following: the market value of the property; the availability of documentary evidence of
ownership; and the kind of rights held over the property (see Appendix G). Whilst the
England based lenders attached a relatively higher level of importance to attributes such as
the availability of property insurance and location of the property, the availability of a
registered title over the given property was significantly more important to Ghanaian lenders.
Overall, the issue of property registration emerged as more important to the Ghanaian
lenders than their England based counterparts. This could be attributed to two reasons. First
is the fact that in England property ownership disputes are virtually absent even though some
properties are not yet registered. Also, even for properties that are not registered, there are
other forms of documentary evidence of ownership (lease/deed) which are also legally
recognised. Hence lenders are able to rely on the other documentary evidence of ownership
to take a charge over a property even where a registered title certificate is absent. The
opposite is true in Ghana, not only is there a high prevalence of property disputes but also
the customary system in existence means that most ownership is not documented in any form
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and customary land transfers are not documented. Hence lenders might have equated the
presence of a registered title to the availability of documentary proof of ownership albeit the
two are slightly different. Secondly given the prevalence of land disputes, some lenders in
Ghana may be accepting only registered property based on the somewhat wrong impression
that registration is an indication of secure ownership. Even though registration per se is not a
panacea to disputes as argued from chapter two to three, this may admittedly be the reason
why some Ghanaian lenders place such a high value on property registration when it comes
to taking land-based collateral.
The probability that a lender in the past had encountered property repossession and
foreclosure problems arising from ownership dispute was also significantly higher for Ghana
(26%) than for England (4%).1t can thus be seen that even though lenders in England mostly
accept both registered and unregistered property, very few have reported difficulties with
such properties in the past. In the case of Ghana the distribution of past repossession
problems arising from ownership disputes was significantly different for lenders accepting
only registered property and those accepting both registered and unregistered property.
Hence, in Ghana, the acceptance of only registered property per the findings of this study
does appear to reduce the likelihood of the lender encountering repossession problems. This
may thus explain why some lenders in Ghana accept only registered property whilst most
lenders in England accept both registered and unregistered property.
6.2.5 Property registration and loan conditions
To investigate whether or not the possession of registered property titles enhances credit
access by influencing the loan conditions that borrowers are offered, the lenders were given a
scenario involving two identical borrowers who only differ in terms of the kind of property
they possess (registered or unregistered) and asked to indicate the extent to which they either
agree or disagree that borrowers with registered property titles are offered lower interest
rates, lower fees, allowed to borrow larger amounts or offered different repayment periods.
This was done using a five point likert scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly
agree.
Ghana
The results shown in Table 16 below indicate that about 59% of the respondents in each case
disagreed that registered property owners are offered larger loan amounts or different loan
repayment times. Also, 62% and about 56% of respondents disagreed that registered
property owners are charged lower fees and interest rates respectively. Only a minority of
respondents in each case agreed that registered property owners may be offered different
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loan conditions relative to unregistered property owners (see Table 16 below). These lenders
could be considered as exceptions given that they constitute less than 20% of the total
respondents in each case. On average therefore, respondents in this study indicated that they
would not offer registered property owners better loan condition compared to unregistered
property owners.
Table 16: Impact of Property Registration on Loan Conditions - Ghana
Loan % of total respondents (108)
I conditions I Disagree I Neutral I Agree I Mean I Median
Lower
interest rate 55.6 25.9 18.5 2.47 2
Lower
fees 62.0 21.3 16.7 2.41 2
Larger
arrl.ounts 59.3 23.1 17.6 2.27 2
RepaYrrl.ent
tirrl.e 59.3 36.1 4.6 2.15 2
The result of the Friedman's test (see Appendix E, Table 1) shows that there was no
significant difference in respondents attitude on the extent to which the possession of
registered property titles influences the conditions of the loan the offer borrowers, Ll (3) =
5.5, P >.05]. If the possession of registered titles influences the loan conditions offered, this
will be reflected in the responses of the group of lenders who accept both registered and
unregistered documents. However, an examination of the responses by this group of lenders
(see Appendix E, Tables 2-6) revealed that as far as each of the loan condition stated above
is concerned, very few respondents (less than 16%) agreed that registered property owners
may be offered better terms vis-A-vis over 60% who disagreed. There was no difference in
the attitude of these respondents on the influence of registration on the above loan terms Ll
(3) = 1.9, p > .05]. Between lenders who accept only registered property and those who
accept both registered and unregistered property, the Mann-Whitney test (see Table 17 below)
did not find any difference in respondents' attitudes on the impact of registration on the loan
terms. There was also no difference between VBs and MFls regarding their attitudes on the
impact of registration on loan terms (see Table 18).
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Table 17: Mann-Whitney test for accepted property documents and loan conditions - Ghana
Rank.
n~~,,~ ,tvnA" N fv1ean Rank Sum of Ranks
Intereat ONLY registered 61 69.33 3026.00
documents
Both registered & 67 60.18 2860.00
unregistered documents
Total 108
fee. ONLY registered 61 65.28 2819.50
documents
Both registered & 67 53.80 3066.50
un,-eglstered documents
Total 108
Amount ONLY registered 61 60.18 3069.00
documents
Both registered & 57 49.42 2817.00
unregistered documents
Total 108
reps)"Tlsnt time ONLY registered 51 53.24 2715.00
documents
Both registered & 67 55.63 3171.00
unregistered documents
Total 108
Test Statistics-
Interest fees Amount
repayment
time
Mann-Whitney U 1207.000 1413.500 1164.000 1389.000
Wilco>GOnW 2660.000 3066.500 2617.000 2715.000
Z -1.577 -.257 -1.848 -.418
Asymp. 81g. (2-talled) .115 .797 .065 .676
8. Grouping Variable: Documentation twes
Table 18: Mann-Whitney test for type of lender and loan conditions - Ghana
Ranks
In~ta, ,Hnn T. N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Interest Uni_raal bank 57 56.96 3247.00
MFI 51 51.75 2639.00
Total 108
fees Uni_raal bank 57 57.46 3275.50
MFI 51 51.19 2610.50
Total 108
Amount Unl_raal bank 57 58.51 3335.00
MFI 51 50.02 2551.00
Total 108
reps>,,"ent tima Uni_raal bank 57 53.68 3060.00
MFI 51 55.41 2826.00
Total 108
Test Statistics·
Interest fees Ivnount
repa~ent
time
Mann-Whitney U 1313.000 1284.500 1225.000 1407.000
Wilcol«lnW 2639.000 2610.500 2551.000 3060.000
Z -.899 -1.085 -1.458 -.302
As~p. Sig. (2-tailed) .369 .278 .145 .763
a. Grouping Variable: Institution Type
De Laiglesia (2004) outlines that property registration through its ability to raise land values
and increase its liquidity could increase the amount of credit that is made available to
borrowers as well as reduce the interest rate charged and influence other loan terms. The
above finding on interest rates contradicts that found in Peru by Field and Torrero (2004)
that, loan applicants with registered property on condition of receiving a loan, faced interest
rates that were on average 9 percentage points lower than untitled applicants but the
measured effect was independent of banks' reported use of registered titles in loan
transactions. Place and Migot-Adholla (1998) also investigated the impact of registered
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property titles on loan size, interest rates and maturities and the extract below is what they
established from their study .
. ..Concerning loan maturities, the mean number of months for repayment of loan is
19.6 on land-secured loans and 24.8 for others. As for loan amounts, the mean size
of land-secured loans is 10,146 Kenya shillings as compared to 8,753 shillings for
others ($1 = Ksh 22 during the time of the study). Neither result is statistically
significant, and thus there is no evidence that land titles significantly alter the terms
offormal sector loans (Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998, p.368).
In this study by Place and Migot-Adholla no evidence was found to support the argument
that land registration significantly affects the terms of formal loans such as loan size, interest
payment and maturity. The authors however, advised that the results be viewed with some
caution since they did not stratify the loans according to the type of lender. This current
research does not only show findings that are consistent with that of Place and Migot-
Adholla but also goes an extra step to test for differences between types of lenders regarding
the impact of property registration on loan terms as shown in Table 18 above. In another
study conducted in Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda, Migot-Adholla et al. (1991) found that the
average maturity of loans to the households surveyed was less than a year and the possession
of registered title did not increase loan maturities for the sampled households. The possible
explanation of the result on the impact of registration on loan terms in this study may be the
fact that lenders decisions on the kind of loan terms to offer are determined by other more
important factors such as regulatory requirements, institutional lending policy, competition
amongst lenders, the cost of funds, risk, lender borrower relationship and the overall
macroeconomic environment amongst others. In the case of MFIs for instance, the decision
to offer better loan terms comes with every successful repayment made by the borrower.
MFIs adopt a progressive approach to lending as a key for building long term relationships
and trust to ensure continuous flow of funds to clients. Such relationship lending begins with
smaller loan amounts which increase with each successive round of repayment success
(Morduch, 1999). Clients have the assurance that the successful repayment of each loan
received will pave the way for them to receive much larger loan amounts in the future. On
the contrary, when they default on a current loan, in the future, they may only obtain lesser
amounts or nothing at all.
Eng/and
Investigation on whether or not the possession of registered property influences the loan
terms that small businesses are offered (see Table 19 below) shows that only a minority of
lenders may consider offering better loan conditions to borrowers that possess registered
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property. From Table 19 below, over half of the respondents in each case disagreed that the
possession of registered property will attract lower interest rates, lower fees, larger loan
amounts or different loan maturity. On average therefore, lenders in this sample will not
offer borrowers different loan terms purely on the basis of whether they possess registered or
unregistered property.
Table 19: Lenders Perceptions on the Influence of Registration on Loan Terms- England
Loan % of total respondents (108)
I conditions IDisagree INeutral I Agree IMean I Median
Lo we-r
interest rate 56.8 21.1 22.1 2.48 2
Low'er
fees 57.9 21.1 21.1 2.49 2
Larger
amounts 61.1 22.1 16.8 2.25 2
RepayD'\ent
time 62.1 32.6 5.3 2.08 2
Attitude towards the influence of property registration on the interest rates offered was not
associated with experience [rho =- 0.09, P >.05}; level familiarity with policies [rho =.02,
p >.05}; and the kind of property documents accepted [/ (4) = 2.04, P > .05}. Attitude to the
influence of registration on the fees/commission charged was not also associated with
experience [rho =-.OS, p >.OS}; familiarity with policies [rho =.12, p >.OS}; and the kind of
property documents accepted [/ (4) = 3.2S, p > .OS}. Similarly attitudes towards the
influence of registration on loan amount was not associated with either experience, level of
familiarity with policies, level of importance of registration as a sought for attribute of land-
based collateral and the kind of property documents accepted. On the issue of loan maturity,
the results were largely the same except that it was found to have a significantly negative
correlation with experience, [rho = -.22, P < .OS} (see Appendix E, Tables 7-18). Regardless
of the differences exhibited by lenders from Ghana and England regarding the eligibility of
landed property for use as collateral, both sets of respondents agreed that the possession of
registered property per se witt not influence their decision to offer small businesses different
loan terms vis-A-vis the terms they would offer borrowers with unregistered property. There
was no significant difference in lenders perception on the influence of property registration
on the loan terms offered to small businesses in the two countries (see Appendix G). this is
an indication that lenders in both countries take their decision on the terms to offer based not
on the kind of property borrowers possess but on factors that are sometimes beyond the
control of the borrowers such as the overall state of the macro-economy regulation and
institutional policy issues amongst others.
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6.3 Why Lenders Turn down Small Business Credit Applications
The results so far have shown that whilst property registration does not influence the credit
terms that lenders are willing to offer, in some instances involving mostly UBs, registration
is required to make landed property eligible for use as collateral. The credit effects of land
registration as proposed by de Soto (2000) and his followers often attribute the incidence of
credit constraints amongst small business and households in the developing world to the
absence of formally registered property titles. Indeed, they argue as if the possession of
registered property will guarantee access to credit. In this section, the reasons for turning
down small businesses' credit applications and their levels of importance relative to the lack
of registered property titles were investigated.
Respondents were required to rank 14 reasons that may be responsible for not granting credit
to small businesses in order of importance on a 14 point scale (where ranks of 12 and above
are of critical importance; 9-11 are classified as very important; 6-8 are important; 3-5 are
least important; and finally, 2-1 are unimportant). Based on this the 14 point scale was
recalibrated into a 5 point scale (where a score of I is unimportant, 2 is least important, 3 is
important, 4 is very important and 5 is critically important). The critically important reasons
are those that will always cause an application to be unsuccessful, the very important reasons
will mostly (but not always) cause an application to be unsuccessful, the reasons rated as
important are those that will sometimes cause an application to fail. The least important
reasons on the other hand will rarely cause a failure whilst the unimportant reasons are not
responsible for application failure.
6.3.1 Ghana
The reasons rated by respondents were classified according to the median ranks shown on
Table 20 below. It reveals that there are four critically important reasons why some small
businesses are denied credit either fully or partially. In other words, anytime small
businesses fail to obtain the credit they require, this is always due to reasons such as: poor
cash flows; low profitability; past loan repayment difficulties and the high vulnerability of
such businesses to unforeseen future events. Unlike the critically important reasons, there
were only two reasons which were rated as very important. Whilst six reasons were rated as
important, two were rated as unimportant.
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Table 20: Reasons Responsible for Turning down Credit Request and Their Levels of Importance - Ghana
Level N=108 Overall
of importance Factors
Mean Median
Critically poor cash flow 4.91 5
important poor profitability 4.89 5
high vulnerability 4.82 5
Past default 4.82 5
Very lack of property 4.27 4
important lack of guarantor 3.96 4
customer still new to bank 3.20 3
lack of records 3.13 3
Inadeguate Borrower's eguity 3.13 3
Important Lack of required documents 2.92 3
lack of registered property 2.71 3
Inadeguate Borrower's experience 2.65 3
Unimportant Kind of business to be financed 1.51 1
high transaction cost involved 1.43 1
The Friedman's test amongst the critically important reasons (see Appendix F, Table 1)
established that no difference exists in respondents' perception on the level of importance of
these four reasons (poor cash flows, poor profitability, high vulnerability and past loan
defaults). The inability of a business to generate sufficient cash, or proof that the business is
sufficiently profitable to payoff the requested loan amount, high susceptibility to external
events and the inability to meet past repayment arrangements would without a doubt cause
credit application to be unsuccessful in one way or the other. Since cash flow and
profitability are related to the financial health of the business and high vulnerability and past
default relate to riskiness of the borrower, it could be said that high risk as wen as poor state
of a businesses' finances are critical to the failure of credit applications. Lenders are thus not
only concerned with how profitable a venture is but whether or not it can also generate
sufficient cash at least over the term of the loan to pay off the debt. Any doubt regarding the
repayment ability of the borrowing business (as measured by the profitability, net cash flows
amongst others) will increase the chances of a loan application being unsuccessful. That
aside, lenders are also interested in the safety of the funds they lend. Evidence of past
difficulties in meeting repayment obligations do not give lenders the assurance that their
funds are safe and will thus affect success rate or the conditions of the loan.
For the very important reasons in Table 20 above, the Wilcoxon's test show that the lack of
any acceptable property (that could be used as collateral) was a perceived by lenders as a
more important reason for turning down loan applications compared to the inability to
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provide a guarantor [Z = -4.2 P < .001] (see Appendix F, Table 2). These two reasons will
mostly reduce the probability of success for businesses applying for loans partly because of
the inherent risk of such businesses. Small businesses are often regarded as very vulnerable
to external events; this increases the need for a safety net in the form of collateral. Indeed, an
earlier section of this chapter has already revealed that most lenders in this study will not
advance credit unless some form of collateral is provided. Since most small businesses are
considered as risky, the lack of any acceptable form of collateral will mostly lead to failure
in terms of access to credit.
Six reasons were generally rated as important (see table 20). However, the Friedman's test
shows that the top three (customer new to lender, lack of record and inadequate borrower's
equity) were perceived to be of an equal level of importance [} (2) = 2.2, p > .05]. They
were however rated more highly as causes of loan application failure than the other three
(lack of required documents, lack of registered landed property title and inadequate
experience) which were also of an equal level of importance [} (2) = 5.7, p > .05] (see
Appendix F, Tables 3-4). These six reasons mayor may not constitute a barrier to the
approval of a loan application depending on the extent to which the critical and very
important requirements are met. For instance the lack of registered land title may only be a
barrier if the provision of landed property were the main requirement needed to trigger loan
approval. Also being a new client to the lender will not necessarily constitute a barrier unless
the credit history or strength of cash flow cannot be ascertained or the borrower is unable to
provide any acceptable collateral. Finally, two of the 14 reasons (high transaction cost and
the kind of business to be financed) were generally rated as unimportant when it comes to
turning down small business loan applications. This was confirmed by the Wilcoxon's test
which found no significant difference in the level of importance attached to them [Z = - .64,
p > .05] (see Appendix F, Table 5).
This however appears to contradict the argument that links small business credit constraint to
high transaction cost. There is a fixed transaction cost involved in loan processing and
monitoring and this cost reduces as the loan size increases (Beck, 2007). Therefore lending
to small businesses involves higher administrative cost relative to the returns. Lending to
small businesses could thus be unattractive especially where the lenders are unable to pass
this cost on to the borrower (Berger, 1989). However where lenders are able to pass on this
cost to the borrowers through higher interest rates or other charges, then cost will not cause
lenders to limit the credit made available to small businesses. This is possibly the main
reason why participants rated transaction cost as unimportant. It should be pointed out
however that though high transaction cost may not cause lenders to limit the amount of credit
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made available to small business, it could affect demand and actual use of credit as such'
facilities may become unaffordable to these businesses.
It is now important to compare the relative importance of the lack of registered property
titles as a reason for not approving a small business loan request to the other reasons as
shown in Table 20. It was pointed out in chapter four that the pursuit of mass land
registration across the developing world is often premised on the belief that businesses are
unable to access credit to finance investment activities due to the absence of registered
property titles. The results here show however, that the lack of property registration though
rated as important was perceived as a factor that mayor may not hinder credit access
depending on the extent to which some other more critical factors are met. It was generally
ranked as 11th in the order of importance out of the 14 reasons shown in Table 20 above.
There are therefore, 10 other more important factors responsible for explaining why small
business loan applications are unsuccessful. The absence of registered property is thus of
considerably less importance relative to the others presented in Table 20 above. Stressing on
the critical importance of the other factors such as repayment ability, Deininger (2003)
established that the credit effect of property registration depends on the individual wealth of
borrowers. Indeed, Brown et al. (2006) observe that the main reason why people may be
denied credit is the low borrower repayment capacity and not the absence of registered
property titles; they report that among all studies in Peru, none found a direct causal link
between land registration and credit access. Gilbert (2002) also established that the formal
lending decision making process is based on the ability of borrowers to demonstrate that they
have a regular income source and that in Bogota the possession of registered title either made
very little or no difference to formal credit availability.
Galeana (2004) did not also find any significant link between land registration and credit
access in Mexico. In Argentina another study by Durand-Lasserve and Payne (2006) found
that no significant changes in credit access occurred after the introduction of land registration.
Other studies that have found no positive impact of land registration on credit access include:
Place and Migot-Adholla (1998) and Mighot-Adholla et al., (1991) in Ghana, Rwanda and
Kenya, Senegal, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Somalia; Broegaard et al (2002) in
Nicaragua; Pender and Kerr (1999) in rural India and carter and Olinto (2003) in Paraguay.
Consequently, Field and Torero (2004) establish from their study that land registration does
not automatically make collateral-based lending viable for the majority of formal-sector
credit applicants. Explaining this point further Dower and Potamites (2005) observe on the
basis of evidence from Indonesia that registered property titles are not the most important
factor determining credit supply. The Mann-Whitney test was conducted (see Appendix F) to
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determine if MFIs and UBs attached different levels of importance to the 14 reasons shown
in Table 20 above. The test showed no differences for the following: business type for which
funding is being sought, lack of records; high transaction cost, lack of guarantors as well as
the top four critically important reasons shown in Table 20 above. However there was a
significant difference between the two groups of lenders in terms of the level of importance
of: lack of property; lack of registered title; inadequate experience; lack of required
documents; inadequate borrower equity as well as short borrower-lender relationship as
evidenced by the client being relatively new to the lender. Though overall, the lack of
registered titles is considered a tier three factor in terms of its level of importance, the results
show that UBs generally gave it a much higher rating as very important compared to MFls
majority of who rated it as least important. This difference also reflects the earlier finding
that, whilst property registration is a critical attribute of land based collateral that cannot be
ignored for UBs, for MFIs it is considered as an attribute that may be ignored though
important.
About 75% of all 51 lenders who accept only registered property also rated the lack of
registered property titles as a very important cause of the failure of some business to obtain
credit whilst 84% of the 57 lenders who accept both registered and unregistered documents
rated it as unimportant or least important (unimportant - 42% and least important - 42%).
The resultant chi square test showed a significant association II(3) = 8004, p <.001] (see
Appendix F, Table 6). In addition, where land registration positively influences the outcome
of a credit application, one would expect that lenders with higher preference for land-based
collateral would also rate the lack of registered titles more highly as a reason for the failure
to obtain loans and vice versa. In this study however, no significant correlation was
established [rho = .07, p > .05] (see Appendix F, Table 7). Given the argument that
registration of property enhances credit access by reducing the transaction cost, one would
also expect lenders accepting only registered property to rate high transaction cost more
highly as a cause of the failure of some businesses to obtain credit vis-A-vis those accepting
both registered and unregistered property. This study also did not find any such association
as per the chi square test [} (2) = .76, P > .05J (see Appendix F, Table 8). The fact that
transaction cost has emerged as an unimportant factor influencing the success or failure of a
loan application could be the reason why some lenders still accept both registered and
unregistered property. Since the processing unregistered property is associated with a
relatively higher cost, lenders may try as much as possible to avoid them. However if such
cost can easily be transferred then some lenders may consider accepting them as indicated
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earlier. Hence the acceptance or refusal to accept unregistered property may not be
influenced by the cost of processing it.
Based on the ratings of the 14 reasons above, factor analysis was conducted to explore the
interrelationships between them and to reduce them into fewer underlying components or
factors responsible for the small business credit constraint. To begin with, since the study
wanted to identify the important factors that are responsible for the credit constraint amongst
small businesses, the two variables that were rated as unimportant (see Table 20 above) were
first removed from the list. In the first test run, the KMO test of sampling adequacy was
0.576 and the Bartlett's test was significant [} (66) = 694.5, P < .001]. This first test
extracted five components; there was a problem detected with one of the components which
included the following variables: lack of records on business transactions; new customer;
lack of registered property titles and lack of required documents. The problem with this
component is that one variable (new customer) describes a completely different thing
(lender-borrower relationship) from the others which are more of issues relating to
documentary requirements. Consequently this variable was taken out and the test was
conducted using II of the 14 variables in Table 20. As a result the there was a slight
improvement in the KMO test which increased to 0.579; the Bartlett's test remained
significant [x2 (55) = 664.9, P < .001]. Furthermore, the determinant of the R-matrix was
0.002 which indicates that no serious problem of multicollinearity existed (see Appendix F).
The data was subsequently considered as fit for the conduct of factor analysis. Principal
component analysis and varimax rotation were used. The number of components to be
extracted was not determined a priori but was allowed to emerge from the data through the
use of both the scree plot and the Kaiser's criteria
The scree plot shown in Figure 8 below appears to support the extraction of six components
whilst the Kaiser's criteria came up with five (see the rotated component matrix in Appendix
F). The scree plot becomes a reliable criterion for selecting factors if the sample size is more
than 200 participants (Stevens, 2002 in Field, 2009, p.640). Given that the sample here was
less than 200 a decision was made to go with the outcome of the Kaiser's criteria because,
eigenvalues represent the variation explained by each factor and values of 1 or above are said
to represent a significant amount of variation (Field, 2009). The five components extracted
through the Kaisers criteria (see Table 21 below) were named by looking at the particular
issue that each set of variables describe. An examination of the variables under each
component suggests that component one represents poor financial strength, component two
represents high default risk, component three represents lack of collateral, component four
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represents lack of documentary requirements and component five represents the nature of the
business (business start-ups).
Se..... Plot
" e
Component Number
Figure 8: Scree Plot - Ghana
Table 21: Factors Responsible for the Credit Constraint amongst SEs - Ghana
Factor Critically Very Important Least Unimportant
Components Loading important important (%) (%) Important (%)
% %
Poor financial strength (repayment
ability)
Cronbach's Alpha = .948
Poor cash flow .970 90.7 9.3 0 0 0
Poor Erofitabili~ of venture .971 88.90 11.10 0 0 0
High default risk
Cronbach's Alpha = .903
High vulnerability to unforeseen future .945 83.30 15.70 .90 0
events
Difficulty in fulfilling past payment .942 78.7 20.4 .90 0 0
obli ations
Lack of acceptable collateral
Cronbach's Alpha =.918
Lack of property .920 38.90 50.00 11.10 0 0
Lack of ~arantor .947 32.40 45.40 22.20 0 0
Lack of documentary requirement
(informality)
Cronbach's Alpha =.677
Lack of business records .741 0 46.3 38.9 14.80
Lack of required documents (personal .793 0 16.70 58.30 25.00
IDs, proof of address, bank statements,
Lack of registered titles .765 0 38.00 19.40 22.20 20.4
Nature of Business (start-ups)
Cronbach's Alpha = .830
Lack of experience .881 0.90 19.40 31.50 39.80 8.30
Inadequate borrower equity .918 4.60 24.10 56.50 9.30 5.60
Table 21 above shows the extracted components, their factor loadings, frequencies for the
variables under each component as well as the Cronbach's alpha for each component. All the
components except the fourth one have alpha values substantially above 0.7. The lowest
value ofO.677 for component four was not significantly less than the acceptable threshold of
0.7 and as such was considered as reliable. Table 22 below also shows the relative
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importance of each of the five components in terms of the proportion of the total variance
explained. The five components accounted for a combined total of 85% of the variance. In
other words 85% of the cases of unsuccessful loan applications were perceived by lenders to
be attributable to these five components. Component I was the most important accounting
for 27.6% of the total variance, followed by component two 19.4%, component three 17%,
component four 11% and component five 9.96%.
Table 22: Percentage of Variance Explained by Each Component
Total Variance Explained
Com Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadinqs Relation Sums of Squared l.cadlncspont
Tot31 % of \h!riance Cumulative % Total %ofVMlancent Cumulative % Total % ofVarlance Cumulative ~
1 3036 27599 27,599 3,036 27,599 27,599 1,923 17.465 17,465
2 2,139 19448 47.047 2.139 19448 47.047 1,896 17,235 34,720
3 1.871 17.009 64.055 1.871 17.009 64,055 1.883 17.122 51.842
4 1.223 11.121 75.176 1.223 11.121 75,176 1.854 16.852 68,694
5 1.096 9,966 85.142 1.096 9.966 85,142 1,809 16,448 85.142
6 ,704 6,404 91546
7 .288 2619 94,165
8 .272 2.471 96.637
9 .167 1.517 98.154
10 .114 1.036 99.189
11 .089 .811 100.000
Extractionfmthod: Principal ComponentMal~is.
Therefore, going back to the debate on the influence of property registration on credit access,
this factor model shows that though registration is important, its absence does not constitute
a major cause of the credit constraint experienced by small businesses. The lack of registered
title was classified under component four which together with the two other variables
contributes only 11% of the variance. The lack of collateral (component 3) emerged as a
more important cause of credit constraints relative to the absence of registered titles. This
again, does not confirm de Soto's argument that credit constraints in the developing world is
attributable to the lack of registered titles but not the lack of assets to be used as collateral.
The factor model above is however consistent with the result of the survey involving
proprietors of small businesses reported earlier, that only 4% of all constrained applicants
attributed their failure to obtain credit to the lack of registered property titles. Hence, results
from both the supply and demand sides of the credit market are pointing to the fact that the
absence of registered property is not a major cause of credit constraint. The most likely
reason why property registration has been found not to be a major cause of the credit
constraint in this study is found in earlier results which revealed that most of the lenders
admit to being able to verify property ownership and the existence of encumbrances. Even
though this may be costly in the absence of registered titles, they do not appear to limit the
credit available to businesses since this cost can be recouped through charges. The other
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reasons can be found in the arguments concerning the limitations of property registration
discussed in chapter three.
The above results are consistent with the findings of Durand-Lasserve and Payne (2006) who
reviewed several cases of land registration and concluded that there was no evidence that
registration had significantly increased access to formal credit. The authors attributed this
finding to the fact that low income households are generally reluctant to borrow and the
lenders are also reluctant to lend to such borrowers. They attributed this to: the fact that even
people with registered freehold titles still exhibited income levels too low to attract formal
lenders; the low market price of mortgaged land; and inappropriate locations amongst others.
In India for instance, registered land owners were unable to obtain formal credit because
their plots and settlement conditions did not meet the standards for building permission
(Durand-Lasserve and Payne, 2006). Durand-Lasserve and Payne (2006) also found in their
study that that the form of financial institution have more influence on access to credit than
the possession of registered titles in that micro-credit institution were found to be successful
in lending even though they rarely demand registered titles. However, limitations in the
sample size did not permit the conduct of factor analysis for the different groups of lenders
(UBs and MFls). Since UBs initially rated registered titles much higher than MFIs, the
outcome of the factor analysis could differ for each group of lenders.
6.3.2 England
Just as in the case of Ghana, lenders in England were also asked to rank 14 different reasons
why they may turn down a loan application in order of importance. The results are shown in
Table 23 below. Based on the median ranks assigned to each reason, four of them were
classified as critically important and these were the same as those classified by the Ghanaian
lenders as critically important. The Friedman's test conducted (see Appendix F, Table 9) for
the reasons rated as critically important showed that a significant difference exist amongst
these top four items [} (3) = 36.2, p <.DOI). Only one reason (the lack of any acceptable
property) was on average rated as very important and was significantly less important than
the top four items [Z = -7.6, P <.OOI} (see Appendix F, Table 10). The next lower tier of
items rated as important involved reasons such as inadequate equity, lack of experiences and
the short lender-borrower relationship; based on the Friedman's test, these were not
statistically distinct in terms of lenders perception on their level of importance [i (2) = 4.5,
p>.05}.
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Table 23: Reasons Responsible for Turning down Credit Request and their Levels of J mportance-
England
Level
of importance
N=95 Ranks
Factors Mean Median
low profitability 4.97 5
poor cash flow 4.93 5
high vulnerability 4.85 5
Past default 4.71 5
Lack of property 3.54 4
Inadequate equity 2.93 3
experience 2.85 3
customer still new to bank 2.59 3
Lack of guarantor 2.39 2
Lack of records 2.16 2
Lack of required documents 1.62 2
high transaction cost involved 1.40 1
lack of registered title 1.34 1
Kind of business to be
financed 1.33 1
Critically
important
Very important
Important
Least Important
Unimportant
They were however perceived to be less important than the reasons rated as very important
(see Appendix F, Table 11-12). There was also a difference in level of importance of the
least important factors shown in Table 23 above [/ (2) = 61.7, P <.001}. Finally, the three
reasons that were each rated as unimportant include the absence of a registered title over the
property to be used as collateral and the high transaction cost involved in lending to SEs
amongst others. There was no difference in the level of importance of the factors rated as
unimportant [/ (2) = 2.15, p >.05} (see Appendix F, Table 13-14). Since majority of the
respondents in England accept both registered and unregistered property documents it was
not surprising that they rated the lack of registered title as an unimportant factor when
deciding on whether or not to approve a small business loan request. The chi square test
conducted did not identify an association between the kind of landed property accepted by
lenders and their perceptions on the level of importance of the absence of registered property
titles [/ (2) = 1.6, p >.05} neither was the accepted property associated with lenders rating
of transaction cost as a reason for turning down credit application [/ (1) = 0.70, P >.05} (see
Appendix F, Table 15-16). As explained earlier these are indications that registration does
not playa major role in the lending decision making process.
Base on the ratings assigned to the 14 reasons in Table 23 above, factor analysis was then
conducted to also explore interrelationships amongst them and reduce to them into fewer
underlying components. To begin with the conduct of the analysis, the three reasons rated as
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unimportant in Table 23 above were eliminated from the list and the initial analysis was done
using the remaining II reasons. Though the Bartlett's test was significant and the KMO test
marginally above 0.5 (0.533), one of the reasons (lack of required documents) had a KMO
value significantly below 0.5 and was appropriately removed. In the second round of test
conducted, four components were extracted but there were two odd items (lack of records on
business transactions and new customer respectively) in component two. These two items
were thus removed since their inclusion did not make any sense in terms of the general
issues being described by the other items within the components (see Appendix F, Tables 17-
19). Finally, the actual analysis was conducted using eight variables and the outcome is
reported below. The Bartlett's test was significant [/ (28) == 196.8, p <.05} and the KMO
test was 0.542; the determinant was 0.114 (see Appendix F). Four factors were extracted
using both the scree plot and the Kaiser's criteria. There was a convergence of the results
from the two criteria as both suggested the extraction of four factors (see Figure 9 and Table
24 below).
Table 24: Extracted components -England
Scree Plot Rotated Component Matrix·
Component
1 2 3 4
past default .907
high wlnerability .699
poor cash flow .904
poor profitability .892
Inadequate equity .904
inadequate e>q>erience .874
Lack property .871
Lack of guarantor .861
COf11lOnent Nurmar
Extraction Metl1od: Principal Component Analy.>is.
Rotation Method: Varimaxwith Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation con""rged in 5 iterations.
Figure 9: Scree Plot - England
Component one represents the risk of default; component two represents the poor financial
strength (poor repayment capability); component three represents the nature of the business
(start-ups); and component four, lack of collateral. These four components are represented
again in Table 25 below together with their factor loadings, Cronbach's Alpha and the
frequencies of the items under each component. Each of the components has an alpha value
greater than the recommended 0.7 which indicates that they are reliable.
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Table 25: Factors Responsible for Credit Constraint amongst SEs - England
N=95 Factor Critically Very Important Least Unimportant
Loading important important (%) (%) Important (%)
Components (%) (%)
High default risk
Cronbach's Alpha· .768
High vulnerability to unforeseen future .899 85.3 14.7 0 0 0
events
Difficulty in fulfilling past payment .907 70.5 29.5 0 0 0
obli ations
Poor financial strength
Cronbach's Alpha· .744
Poor cash flow .904 92.6 7.4 0 0 0
Poor £rofitability of venture .892 96.8 3.2 0 0 0
Business start-ups
Cronbach's Alpha = .711
Lack of experience .874 1.1 16.8 49.5 31.6 1.1
Inadeguate borrower ~ui!l' .904 11.6 22.1 25.3 29.5 11.6
Lack of acceptable collateral
Cronbach's Alpha =.714
Lack of property .871 5.3 SO.5 36.8 7.4 0
Lack of fi!!arantor .861 0 4.2 38.9 48.4 8.4
The analysis also shows that the four extracted components above together explained about
81% of the variance. Component one (high risk of default) contributes the highest proportion
of the explained variance (27.5%) and is thus the most important component responsible for
the credit constraint amongst small businesses in England. This is followed by the poor
financial strength of businesses (21.8%). The nature of the business in terms of whether it is
a start-up or an established business was third in the order of importance (18.5%). The lack
of collateral accounted for 13.5% of the explained variance and is the least important of the
extracted components (see Appendix F).
A comparison between Ghana and England revealed that differences and similarities do exist
between lenders in terms of the reasons why they turn down small business applications (see
appendix G). Indeed the four critically important reasons identified by Ghanaian lenders
were the same as those identified by their counterparts in England. The statistical test
showed that there was no significant difference in the perception of both sets of lenders on
the importance of the following reasons: poor cash flows, high vulnerability and past
defaults. There was however a marginally significant difference in relation to poor
profitability. Similarly, there was no significant difference between both sets of lenders
regarding the business type and the high transactions cost involved in lending to small
businesses (these were both rated as unimportant by both sets of lenders). There was also no
difference in the perceived level of importance of inadequate equity and experience of the
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borrower as causes of small business credit constraint. However, compared to England, all
the other reasons were rated significantly higher by Ghanaian lenders as underlying causes of
credit constraint. For instance, whilst lenders in Ghana rated the lack of registered title as
important, those in England rated it as unimportant. Eventually, the factor analysis for data
from the two countries yielded five factors for Ghana and four for England. The results show
that whilst the lack of collateral is a problem for lenders in both countries, it is a much bigger
problem for the Ghanaian lenders.
6.4 Summary
This chapter has discussed the quantitative results obtained from the study and made a
comparison of the finding between the two countries. The survey amongst small business
owners in Ghana showed that a majority of loan applicants were credit constrained. The lack
of collateral was identified by most small businesses as the reason why they were either fully
or partially constrained. Regarding the influence of registration on credit access, it was
established that significant differences exist between Ghana and England in terms of the
eligibility of landed property for use as collateral. Whilst lenders in England did not largely
consider registration as necessary to make landed property acceptable the opposite was true
for Ghana. Despite this difference, both sets of lenders did agree that the possession of
registered property title per se does not influence the loan terms they offer borrowers.
Finally, there were similarities between lenders in the two countries regarding the factors
responsible for the credit constraint amongst small businesses. It emerged that as far as the
critical factors are concerned no difference existed between the two groups of lenders.
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CHAPTER 7
QUALITATIVE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter presents the findings from the qualitative data collected through semi-structured
interviews. The aim of the qualitative study was to validate the findings from the earlier
survey conducted amongst officials of various lending institutions. The participants were
loans managers who were not part of the initial quantitative surveys. Interviews lasted for
about 30 minutes. Interviews were conducted over the phone and recorded using a digital
voice recorder. They were later transcribed and coded into Nvivo (see Appendix A for the
coding summary report). The data was analysed based on predetermined topic areas related
to the objectives of this research. The transcripts were thoroughly read to identify the main
themes into which the various responses could be classified. The responses were then coded
appropriately into the identified categories. In the case of Ghana there were 10 interviewees,
all of whom were males. Four of the respondents were mangers of MFIs and the other six
were managers of Universal Banks. However, seven business managers in the main high
street banks were interviewed in England. The findings for both countries are discussed
below.
7. 1 Attitude to Collateral as a Requirement for SE Credit
7.1.1 Ghana
Respondents were asked if they always required collateral when dealing with small
businesses' credit request and why. The responses were varied but were coded into two main
categories (collateral always necessary and collateral sometimes necessary). The results (see
Table 26 below) show that 50% of the participants perceived the provision of collateral as a
requirement that must always be met if SEs are to succeed in obtaining credit, whilst another
50% regarded collateral as sometimes necessary but not always necessary. About 80% of the
five participants who perceived collateral as always necessary were from UBs and 20% from
MFIs. Furthermore, 66.7% of all six UB based participants (GHUB) did regard collateral as
always necessary whilst 75% of the MFI participants (GHMFI) regarded it as sometimes
necessary. This to a large extent is similar to the quantitative results which revealed that
significant differences existed between the UBs and MFIs in terms of how necessary they
perceive collateral to be when dealing with small businesses. The above also confirms that
UBs are more reliant on collateral when dealing with small businesses than MFIs.
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Table 26: Participant's Attitude to the Taking of Collateral - Ghana
Na10 Collateral ahvays Collateral Collateral alone not
Intervie""ees
necessary sometimes sufficient
necessary
GHUB1
GHUB2 '"GHUB3 '" '"GHUB4 ..J ..J
GHUB5 '" '"GHUB6 ..J '"GHMFIl ::.; ::.;
GHMFI2 '" '"GHMFI3 '" '"GHMFI4 ..J '"percentage 50% 50 100%
Even though half of the interviewees always require collateral from small business
borrowers, some of these participants (60%) were quick to admit that though they always
take collateral there may be a few exceptions. One UB participant, noted for instance that,
... in extreme cases, our big men may want to guarantee the loan for somebody or for
instance, if an MP needs a facility the bosses can ask us to grant it. We call them clean
facilities they are not secured but we do that because of the calibre of person we are dealing
with. We believe that the MP wouldn't come for a loan and then default because he wouldn't
want his name to be tarnished.
The use of the word "extreme" in the above quote implies that it is very rare for these
participants to provide credit without taking collateral. From the quote above, two instances
were cited to explain what may lead to this exceptional situation. It was revealed that the
personality or profile of the potential borrower is the critical factor that may influence such a
rare decision to waive the collateral requirement. The potential of dragging one's image into
disrepute should one default could be very costly for high profile individuals. Such cost
could be equivalent to the cost of default incurred by a borrower in a secured loan situation.
Also, the benefits of maintaining one's public reputation and especially reputation with the
lender may be sufficient to motivate one to repay. Small business owners within the low
income brackets may not have such a public reputation to protect and the only feasible way
lenders can transfer the cost of default and motivate loan repayment is to take collateral.
The other instance is where top management within the financial institutions may use their
personal relations with and knowledge of the customer to waive the collateral requirement.
In that case however such top managers appear to provide some kind of guarantee (formal or
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informal) that the facility will be repaid. The lender thus has some repayment assurances
from the 'top management' who has a better knowledge of the customer through their
personal relations. This of course could reduce the information asymmetry problem that then
makes it possible for the lender to waive the collateral requirement whilst having the
assurance that when things get difficult informal pressure could be used by the manager
involved to encourage repayment. All participants irrespective of whether they were from
UBs or MFIs were unanimous in their opinion that the provision of collateral per se is not
sufficient to trigger loan supply (see Table 26 above). Indeed all of them did indicate that the
provision of collateral alone is not good enough to warrant the granting of credit. The
interviewees who considered collateral as always necessary and all those who also
considered collateral as sometimes necessary were of the opinion that borrowers cannot
simply provide collateral and expect to get credit (see Table 26). Though majority of lenders
will not grant credit to businesses unless they are able to provide some form of acceptable
collateral, the results show that the provision of collateral per se is not enough to convince
lenders to provide the needed credit. The above generally reflects the results of the
quantitative survey which established that though collateral is necessary in granting SE
loans, it is not a sufficient condition in itself. This attitude is epitomised in the comments of
one participant as follows:
...some people can provide 100% even 200% collateral cover but we can appraise them and
say that you don't have the right character to be given a loan ...
Another also said,
... Assuming you have a huge building you can't just come to us that because you have this
building you want a loan, we will not grant it ...
It was deemed necessary to try to establish the reasons why lenders exhibited the above
attitudes with regards to collateral. The five participants who always require collateral from
SEs (four from VBs and one from MFIs) cited a number of reasons for their actions and
these have been displayed in Table 27 below. These reasons ranged from the risk involved in
lending to SEs (80%), the need for a back-up (60%), motivating repayment (40%), and the
policy of the bank (20%) to the lack of financial data (20%). The MFI participant cited only
risk as the reason for always taking collateral. The other reason in Table 27 were reported by
VB respondents
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Table 27: Reasons Why Collateral is Always Required from SEs - Ghana
N 5 Reasons for always taking collateral
Interviewees Risk No financial data Bank policy
GHUBI
GHUB2
GHUB5 ..;
GHUB6 ..;
GHMFI4 ..;
Percentage 80 60 40 20 20
For these participants, risk emerged as their most prominent reason for always taking
collateral. This is evidenced by the number that made reference to it. The risk mainly
referred to here, was about the possibility of things going wrong after granting the credit
facility. As one of the respondents aptly observed ... these small businesses cannot be trusted
that much because they are highly susceptible to very petty issues. they can look good today
and tomorrow they are gone ...Such high level vulnerability must be of concern to any lender
dealing with these businesses. Therefore even where the finances of the business look good,
these lenders may still insist on getting collateral to offset the possible effects of something
unpredictable happening in the future and this was what one participant appeared to be
referring to in the following statement,
... Thefacl is when we assess your finances and ability to service the loan. we cannot be very
sure of what tomorrow holds and that is a big concern especially when we are dealing with
SMEs ...
The high level of uncertainty surrounding such small businesses underscores the need for a
back-up or what may be referred to as a plan B - which is an alternative plan to loan
recovery should the repayment plan fail. As already stated above, 60% of respondents
identified this as the reason for always taking collateral. By acting as a back-up plan,
collateral provides a safety net for these lenders in case things do not work out as planned. In
this regard, a participant noted ... Collateral is always the plan B out of a default ... we need
to cushion ourselves against any shocks in terms of default. About 50% of respondents who
identified risk as the reason for always taking collateral also made reference to the need for a
back-up whilst another 50% talked about using collateral to motivate loan repayment (see
Table 27 above). Lenders do not just require collateral for its own sake but to encourage loan
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repayment. The fear of losing a priced asset will make one to strive to honour one's
repayment obligations to the lender. One participant demonstrated the effect collateral can
have on willingness to repay a loan in the statement that
... they will always try to find excuses as to why they cannot repay expecting you to be
sympathetic, but we are not NGOs so the only way to force them to stop the excuses and pay
the money is to take the collateral. When there is a problem and you tell them you will sell
the property the next day they will find money to come and pay.
Only one participant each also pointed to the lack of financial records and institutional policy
of the lender as other reasons reason why collateral is always necessary in SE lending (see
Table 27 above). Regarding the lack of financial record the participant lamented ...however,
because we don't have financials to back the payments we need to cushion ourselves against
any shocks. Without financial records lenders are less capable of determining the repayment
capability of the borrower and such uncertainties also demand that collateral be taken. On the
issue of policy the other participant emphatically stated that ... it is a standard, a policy of my
bank, every loan we give out we need to secure it as much as possible. This attitude could be
due to the earlier explanations given. All the reasons identified above are related to risk in
one way or the other. One could thus say that the risk involved in SE lending is the reason
why most lenders always ask for collateral.
The five participants who indicated they sometimes demand collateral from small businesses
but not always, often cited the fact that they provide both secured and unsecured credit
facilities to such businesses as their evidence. This group of respondents were of the view
that collateral requirement is triggered only by some factors or the occurrence of some
events (see Table 28 below). It can be seen from Table 28 below that UBs mainly identified
the amount required, the ability to repay a loan, risk of default and need to motivate
borrowers as the reasons for not demanding collateral sometimes whilst the MFIs mainly
pointed to their relationship with the client and the absence of suitable collateral. The most
prominently reported reason why a lender mayor may not take collateral sometimes is the
relationship and trust between the lender and borrower (60%).
The lender-borrower relationship as may be evidenced by the length of time the lender has
been dealing with a particular client provides benefits for both parties. The established
relationship and trust allows the borrowers to be more honest with the lender. This provides
lenders with the opportunity to detect any potential problems and device solutions for them
before they escalate into loan default.
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Table 28: Why Collateral is Sometimes Necessary but not Always - Ghana
N=5 Interviewees
Reasons Percentage
UB3 I UB4 I MFIl I MFI2 I MFI3
Relationship " " " 60Lack suitable V V 40
collateral
Policy V V 40
Amount V V 40
Ability to repay v 20
Risk V 20
Motivation V 20
In the long run customers can benefit from this trust as it may open the gate for more
facilities and better conditions. This is aptly observed by one MFI participant as per the
quote that follows ...we also prefer 10 build a relationship with our customers over lime
which allows us to know our customers very well and develop trust; with this mutual trust we
may not worry too much about the collateral. Some of the lenders (40%) who were all UBs,
indicated they may not demand for collateral depending on the loan amount required. For
instance, one participant stated that ...There is a ceiling 10 which we do unsecured loans
beyond which any amount you are askingfor must be secured. So let's say if currently we do
up 10 GH10,OOOunsecured any amount above that then you have to present security. The
consequences of default for any lender could rise with the amount being advanced. Hence, to
limit their potential losses, lenders may tend to put a cap on how much they can lend without
security. As the amount increases so is the likelihood that collateral will be required. The risk
tolerance of the lender will determine how much they are prepared to lend without collateral.
With relatively smaller amounts lenders may not be willing to go through the sometimes
costly process of taking collateral.
The lack of appropriate collateral also accounts for the reason why some lenders decide not
to take collateral but to rely on other non-traditional forms of security. Some lenders (40%)
all from MFIs were of the view that SE owners either do not possess collateral at all or the
kind of collateral they possess is not considered suitable. This was one respondent's reaction
to the question of whether his institution was not concerned about default given his earlier
statement that they don't always require collateral.
We would have preferred collateral but these SMEs are people who do not even have any
suitable collateral. Just give me an example of collateral, like a car, just imagine a trotro, it
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is a risk in itself. No third party comprehensive insurance cover over these cars. How many
of them own good landed property none at all. Give me other examples, shares, the least said
about it the better, we are talking about raisingfunds to support their micro businesses and
you are talking about shares, these are people who operate on table. Fixed deposits, where,
if they had fixed deposits they wouldn't come to you for a loan, you get it? So because of
these things we are not even motivated to take these forms of collateral because of the
collateral problem and their inappropriateness. Also most of the landed properties are not
properly registered with the lands commission. The statement above appears to imply that
some lenders would prefer not to take any of these traditional forms of collateral at all rather
than accept one that they consider unsuitable. Accepting an unsuitable form of collateral may
provide a false sense of security which could be detrimental to the institution.
Furthermore, some of these lenders (20%) may sometimes not require collateral if they have
sufficient proof that the borrower will be able to comfortably repay the facility. According to
one participant, " ... the amount you can access unsecured depends on the turnover on your
account". This shows that collateral may only be required where the lender has no sufficient
confidence in the cash flows of the business and hence the ability to repay. About 20% of the
lenders also mentioned the need to motivate borrowers to repay a facility as the reason why
they sometimes demand collateral. This is portrayed in the following statement about the
need for collateral...it psychologically influences the repayment of the loan facility,
especially where the value of the collateral is higher than the loan facility and especially
where the person has shown signs of unwillingness to repay a loan in the past. The past loan
repayment behaviour of a borrower could raise concerns about not only ability to repay but
also willingness to do so. This may cause lenders to look for other means of motivating
repayment. Hence where a particular borrower is identified as having a motivation issue, the
lender may also ask for collateral otherwise there will be no need to do so.
All the ten lenders interviewed did agree that they do not supply credit just because the client
is able to provide collateral (see Table 26 above). The interviewees identified three broad
categories of reasons to explain this behaviour. Whilst all ten interviewees did attribute this
to the fact that there are other more critical factors they consider when lending to small
businesses, about 40% also attributed this to the fact that collateral is considered just as a last
resort to loan recovery. Another 20% also pointed to the possibility of encountering
foreclosure difficulties. One of the participants who spoke about foreclosure difficulties
related it to the time wasted in going through foreclosure procedures as seen in this
statement ...no one wants to waste time going through foreclosure procedure. Another
participant related it to the implications of persistent foreclosure for the reputation of the
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lender as reflected by this explanation ...one thing about security is that if you keep
foreclosing on security your image is at stake, it affects your reputation ... so since I joined
my new bank .... I have not seen a security beingforeclosed.
This implies that even though lenders may take collateral before advancing credit, in reality
they may not be willing to foreclose because of the perceived damage it could have on their
reputation. If that is the case, then it will be disastrous for them to grant credit on the mere
basis that the borrower is able to provide collateral. This is because, the cost involved in the
foreclosure procedure coupled with the fact that the taking of collateral does not mean it will
definitely be foreclosed. Lenders must be more interested in factors that will prevent the
credit facility from going bad. Some lenders as stated earlier saw collateral as a secondary
requirement - a last resort to loan recovery. This is an indication that there are primary issues
of concern that must be attended to before consideration is given to collateral; this is
captured in one participant's statement below,
...we will rather want to know the kind of business that the person is doing with the money ...
we wilJ look at the account performance ... that will tell us whether you warrant the facility
or not. Because you may have the security alright but the business may not be able to have
the needed cash flow to service the loan we are granting, so the cash flow to us is more
important ...
Since all participants (both MFI and UBs) indicated that collateral alone is not sufficient
because there are other critical factors they consider in lending, they were probed further to
identify the other critical factors that they were referring to and these are displayed in Table
29 below. Amongst these reasons identified, the ability of the client to repay the facility
stood out as 90% of the interviewees made reference to it. Various terms such as cash flow,
account performance or turnover were generally used by interviewees when referring to
repayment ability. 40% of the respondents each referred to the lender-borrower relation and
the business involved whilst 30% talked about the borrower's character. Table 29 below
shows that UBs dominantly related the issue to the borrower's repayment capability and the
business to be financed whilst MFIs were more critical about the repayment ability,
relationship with borrowers and the borrower's character.
When a loan is granted, the ultimate aim of the lender is to get the money back within a
scheduled time. It is thus not surprising that almost all the participants (see Table 29 below)
regarded the ability to repay as more critical than the provision of collateral. Indeed, it was
revealed earlier that the collateral requirement may even be waived if the client is able to
demonstrate beyond doubt that repayment will not be a problem.
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T hi 29 Tha e : e more eritica reasons W IV eo atera a one IS not sufficient - Ghana
Reasons why Collateral alone is not sufficient: the other more critical factors
N=)O Ability to repay Relationship with Borrower's The business
loan borrower character
Interviewees
UBI " " " "
.. I h II I I
UB2 ...J
UB3 ...J
UB4 ...J
UBS ...J
UB6 ...J
MFI
MFI2 ...J
MFI3 ...J ...J
MFI4 ...J ...J
Percentage 90% 40%
(%)
30% 40%
It was in this regard that one participant said, ...First, we consider the ability of the SME to
finance their repayment monthly before we go on to look at the security they are using to
back the loan. Ok, so if we assess the ability to pay back the loan based on the account
turnovers for one year and it is not very strong however the person has collateral which is
enough to cover the loan the person might not get the loan, they might get a lower amount or
they might not even get the loan at all ...
With regards to the business, references were made not only to the type of business but its
financial performance as well. In fact, almost all of the participants (75%) who talked about
the business of the borrower also mentioned the ability to repay the loan (see Table 29
above) which probably points to the high interconnectivity between the two factors. One
participant demonstrated this in the statement that follows ... Ifyou provide col/ateral but we
see that you cannot pay the loan back may be, because your business finances are not good
enough or maybe we are not interested in your type of business, then we will still not give
you the facility.
The lender-borrower relationship in this case was used to refer to how long and how well the
borrower has been known to the lender as reflected in this comment by an MFI
participant... we have to study all customers for a period to know their savings character and
learn more about them and their businesses and be sure that ifwe give them a loan they will
not disappear. Finally, 30% of interviewees cited the character of the borrower as one
critical reason why collateral alone may not be sufficient to make them approve a loan
request. This covered a range of issues from the borrower's ability to manage the facility,
credit history and willingness to repay. Referring to this issue an MFI respondent said ...we
have 10 look at other things: let's say your loans history how you performed on your
previous loan, if there were major problems then we may not grant you the loan even if you
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had collateral. The above results have provided a confirmation of the quantitative results on
lenders' attitudes towards collateral as a requirement for SE credit and also given insights
into why they exhibit certain attitudes.
7.1.2 England
Participants in were also asked to indicate how necessary they consider collateral to be when
granting credit to SEs. When asked whether they mostly require collateral before advancing
credit to SEs, all the seven participants involved disagreed. Instead, they observed that
collateral mayor may not be necessary when dealing with such enterprises. This was what
one participant had to say when asked if they mostly require collateral from SEs ...deflnitely
no, as I have said before there are a range of credit products some of which do not require
security ... looking at our products, there are several credit products we advance without
asking for security. Another also said that... it will vary depending on the nature of each
individual proposition that we receive. It can be inferred from the above quotes that
participants were pointing to the fact that there are instances or certain conditions that trigger
the demand for collateral and as long as the trigger event does not occur in a particular
situation, collateral will not be a necessary requirement. This was what a participant was
trying to say when he made this comment... two people can apply for the same facility one
may be required to provide security the other may not so it depends largely on each
individual case we receive.
The quantitative results indicated that lenders in England consider collateral as mostly
necessary when dealing with SEs. In this part of the study however, participants fell short of
admitting that they mostly take collateral preferring rather to say that they sometimes take
collateral (that is less often than that reported in the quantitative findings). However,
compared to the results from Ghana, this is still a demonstration that collateral-based lending
is less entrenched amongst the lenders in England. This is much easier to understand given
that information on borrowers' creditworthiness is much widely available (from credit
reference bureaus) which reduces the information asymmetry problem and the need for
collateral. The seven participants together, provided seven different reasons to explain why
collateral is not mostly considered a necessary requirement when dealing with small
businesses (see Table 30 below). A majority of the participant (about 71%) were of the view
that the demand for collateral is dependent on the amount required as well as the risk of
default. The 'amount' was linked to the amount of money the bank stands to lose should
there be a default. The failure to require collateral when granting credit exposes lenders to
the risk of losing funds if there is a default. There appears to be a level of risk acceptable to
all the participants. This is determined by how much losses they can accept as evidenced by
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the maximum amount they are prepared to advance without collateral. Beyond this threshold,
they will seek to take some form of collateral. This was echoed by a participant when he
noted that...for amounts under £3,000 for instance, no security is required; this is the
maximum risk we are prepared to take.
Hence, the amount required by the business will influence the lender's decision whether to
take collateral or not and in the example above, SEs seeking loan amounts below £3,000 will
most likely not have to provide collateral. According to a participant, the amount that can be
granted on unsecured basis varies from £3,000 up to £25,000 depending on the credit facility
involved. Generally, £25,000 appeared to be the ceiling for unsecure credit. For instance,
one respondent said ...we also provide arranged overdraft involving amounts from £500 to
£25,000 without taking any security but overdrafts above £25,000 we take security. Another
participant when asked a question on the circumstances under which collateral must be taken
responded ...usually when the amount exceeds £25,000 ... Therefore, for these participants
any credit request involving amounts in excess of £25,000 must be secure and this according
to one participant is because ... the larger the amount involved the more difficult it may be for
small businesses to proof that repayment will not be a problem and this makes it more likely
for us to ask for security,
c· d h' h II b , dEl dTable 30: ircumstanees un er W IC co atera mayor may not e require - n21an
Interviewees (N=7) I
Factors ENG1 ENG2 ENG3 ENG4 ENG5 ENG6 ENG7 %
Amount V V V V v 71
Risk v v v v v 71
Type of v v v v 57
facility
Repayment v v v 43
capability
Relationship V V 29
with
borrower
Cost v v 29
Purpose of V V 29
facility
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The type of facility required was also identified by 57% of the participants as another reason
why banks may not ask for collateral sometimes. The responses under this category were
related to; the fact that some credit products are provided on secured basis whilst others are
on unsecured basis; and the term of the facility under consideration. For instance, according
to one participant...Some of the facilities are relatively short term and may not be worth the
pain ... it is often less likely that something very dramatic will happen in a year or two that
will make default inevitable but this may be a different story for facilities that will take say
JOyrs or more to repay. It is more difficult to predict what may happen in such a distant
future and for that reason we may not be able to rely on only the track record and cash flow
projections this is where security may be very relevant. These participants also revealed that
some credit facilities are provided under certain government guarantee programs (such as the
Enterprise Guarantee Scheme). Therefore, any borrower applying for credit under such a
scheme is not required to provide collateral as government provides a guarantee for all such
loans. This scheme exists to support people who are unable to provide the required collateral
on their own.
Furthermore, according to 43% of the participants, the ability to make the scheduled
repayments will influence the decision on whether to take collateral or not. This was what a
participant had to say in this regard ... ifwe are sure that you have the capacity to repay the
amount involved we may not need to take security. Another indicated that ...the importance of
security becomes an issue when there are doubts about the repayment of the facility. It
should be noted that collateral acts as a back-up in case repayments are not met. So once the
bank is certain that repayment obligation can be met comfortably, it loses its significance to
some extent. About 29% of participants each identified the cost of taking collateral, the
purpose for which the funding is being sought and the bank's relationship with the borrower
as the other factors accounting for why collateral may not be required all the time (see Table
30 above). The cost item included the processing cost of taking collateral, the cost of
monitoring its suitability over time and cost of foreclosure. The reason why cost is
considered when taking a decision on whether to require collateral or not is found in the
words of one participant who said ...you can't always askfor security because there are cost
implications, though some of this cost could be passed to the client in fees charged, not all
costs can be recouped in this manner. Therefore the interviews have shown that collateral is
sometimes necessary when dealing with SEs and that some other times it may not be
necessary. The most important factor that influences whether or not collateral will be
required is the amount required and the risk of default then followed by the type of facility,
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the repayment ability and then the cost, purpose of the facility as well as the relationship
with the bank.
The interviews further sort to establish whether or not participants perceived the provision of
collateral as a sufficient requirement; that is to say that the ability to provide collateral
triggers the approval of the needed credit. All the seven participants did not regard the
provision of collateral alone as sufficient to cause the credit request to be granted because of
these three main reasons: (a) there are other more critical factors (b) the need to be
responsible lenders and (c) the problems associated with collateral foreclosure (see Table 31
below). Almost all participants alluded to the fact that other factors are more critical in
deciding whether to grant credit or not whilst 57% talked about the need to be responsible
lenders as the reason why collateral per se is not sufficient.
Table 31: Why Collateral Alone is not Sufficient - England
Interviewees
Factors %
Other
factors more
critical
85
Need to be
responsible
lender
57
Foreclosure
difficulties
29
About 57% of the participants perceived any attempt to grant credit based on the client's
ability to provide collateral as irresponsible on the part of the lender and a disregard for the
lending code. The need for creating an image as a responsible lender or maintaining such a
public image appears to be so important to them and as such they will not grant credit on the
basis that a borrower has provided collateral so as to create or protect such an image. This
was what one person had to say in relation to the issue ...we adhere strictly 10 the lending
code which requires us to be responsible in lending not only to businesses but individuals.
To maintain our status as a responsible lender we have to ensure that the business can repay
the amount involved and notjust the mere/act that they have provided collateral".
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Furthermore, 29% of participants were of the view that collateral per se is not sufficient
because of issues regarding the willingness to pursue foreclosure when there is a default. The
question to ask is, why do banks take collateral and yet are unwilling or less willing to
pursue foreclosure? The answer may lie in the quote below by one participant... I will tell you
another reason why we cannot bank purely on security. As part of being a responsible
lender, society expects us to act sympathetically and positively when things go wrong with
repayments especially when dealing with small businesses. This means that though we may
take security,Joreclosure is not always the best available option.
One participant noted that... we don't allow people to hide behind their properties and
pretend as if they were credit worthy. This is an indication that collateral cannot be a
substitute for the borrower's creditworthiness. One must thus be credit worthy even without
collateral to qualify for crdit. It can hence be deduced that credit worthiness is the key
criterion when granting credit to SEs and the ability to provide collateral per se is not what
makes one creditworthy but other factors identified below. About six participants indicated
that there are more critical factors that influence the approval of a loan request. These more
critical factors were divided into two groups. Whilst all the six participants mentioned the
repayment capacity of the borrower, 67% talked about the credit history of the business and
particularly the proprietor of the business (see Table32 below).
Table 32: the other critical reasons wh
Repayment
capacity
Credit history 57
The importance of these critical factors is seen in one participant's statement to the effect
that... if you have a bad credit history no bank will grant you a loan even ifyou had dozens of
security to provide". Also, another participant makes it clear that... we lend because we
believe people can repay not because they have security. Banks thus tend to focus more on
how the facility will be repaid by ensuring there is adequate repayment cover as described by
some participant below,
... there should be sufficient repayment cover; for example if the business is required to make
a monthly repayment of £1000 (amounting £12,000 p.a.) we expect cash generated or at
least profits 10 be 2 or 2.5 times the annual repayment amount; for existing customers and
new customers respectively. Another respondent observed that... we have to ensure that the
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business can repay the amount involved and to do this we are more concerned with things
like the cash flows, profitability, the business and personal financial commitments, how past
finances have been handled and also taking a look at what information the credit bureaus
hold on the customer. Participants as indicated by Table 32 above thus made it clear that the
ability to repay as well as the credit history of the borrower are the two most critical factors
that underpin every credit decision taken. According to one participant ...my performance is
assessed by the proportion of approved loans that are successfully repaid.
The interviews thus confirm that collateral is more of a necessary requirement for Ghanaian
based lenders (especially UBs) than lenders in England. However, both sets of participants
observed that the provision of collateral is never sufficient for any business that is seeking
credit and the reasons advanced were very similar for both countries.
7.2 Lenders' Preferred Forms of Collateral
This section seeks to identify if lenders have certain preferences for the kind of collateral
presented by borrowers and why. Interviewees were directly asked if they had preferences
when it comes to collateral and why they prefer some forms of collateral to others.
7.2.1 Ghana
The responses were categorised into two. Whilst all 10 participants did make references to
the form of collateral they prefer in practice, about 40% of them (all from UBs) went on to
also make reference to the collateral they would ideally have preferred. All the four
participants who made references to the collateral they would have preferred in an ideal
world did identify cash or cash equivalents (such as fixed deposits and T-bills) as their ideal
preference. Indeed, 66.7% of all the six UB participants did indicate that they would have
preferred collateral in the form of cash or its equivalents when dealing with small businesses.
In line with this, one interviewee noted ... well I think rather, if the bank had a choice, we
will prefer cash covered security, we would prefer a cash covered security to landed
property actually. Another also said ...so ideally I would say that cash or cash equivalents
are better. When I say cash equivalents I'm referring to things like government bills or fixed
deposits. So ideally, what we prefer most is the customer's deposits in the special savings
account and also others like thefixed deposits.
Three main reasons were cited to explain why cash and its equivalents are considered ideal
for small businesses. First, is the ease of foreclosure, followed by the ease with which
security interest in such collateral could be perfected as well as the inappropriateness of
other forms of collateral. All four interviewees who ideally would have preferred cash or its
equivalents did attribute this to the ease with which it could be foreclosed as well as the ease
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of perfection. Perfection refers to the set of actions taken to ensure that a lender's security
interest in an asset is enforceable. Only 25% attributed this to the inappropriateness of other
forms of collateral in terms of the problems encountered in dealing with them as lamented by
one participant...such tangible assets are taken in practice but there are too many problems
associated with them... This was presumably referring to the problems of perfecting and
foreclosing security interest in other forms of security such as landed property. Given the
fact that collateral may be sold during default to recover amounts of the debt outstanding,
foreclosure will be of critical importance to any lender accepting collateral and of course, if
the processes involved in taking a charge over the security are complex, it might hinder
perfection and consequently make the security difficult to foreclose.
In reality however, 50% of all 10 respondents indicated that landed property was their most
preferred form of collateral whilst the other 50% identified cash or its equivalents as their
preferred collateral (see Table 33 below). All the participants who most preferred cash in
practice also talked about having preference for other forms of collateral such as personal
and group guarantees and automobiles. Such participants were all from MFls. All the VB
participants except one preferred landed property in practice. Indeed, all those who said they
ideally would have preferred cash collateral, in practice, indicated they prefer landed
property and the reason for that is discussed later. Irrespective of the fact that MFIs do accept
landed property sometimes, none of the MFI participants did indicate landed property as
their most preferred form of collateral.
Table 33: Forms of Collateral Preferred in Practice by Lenders - Ghana
Preferences for forms of collateral in practice
Interviewees Cash/near cash Landed property Others
GHUBI
GHUB2 '"GHUB3 '"GHUB4 '"GHUB5 '"GHUB6 '"OHMFI
GHMFI2 '" '"GHMFI3 '" '"GHMFI4 '" '"Percentage 50% 50% 40%
The findings of the interviews thus throw light on the fact that when it comes to the issue of
lenders' preference for various forms of collateral, the answer may not be as straight forward
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as the quantitative findings seem to indicate. Having said that, the results from Table 33
above, clearly confirm the quantitative findings that UBs have a much higher preference for
landed property than MFIs. Though this may be true in practice, the interviews reveal that
ideally, most of the UBs would also have preferred more liquid forms of collateral to landed
property. Though the quantitative findings show that landed property is most preferred over
other forms of collateral for both UBs and MFls, the qualitative results above show that as
far as MFls are concerned this is not true. The MFls prefer to combine the liquid collateral
with other forms of security such as guarantees as can be seen from the statement below by
one MFI participant... before you qualify to be considered for a loan we ask you to start
depositing money into a savings accounts on a daily basis for a period ... this is to help them
build up a pool of savings that can be used as security ...for first time borrowers we ask for 2
or 3guarantors in addition to this deposit".
The reasons for which some lenders in practice prefer cash and near cash collateral are the
same as those explained earlier namely the ease of foreclosure and ease of perfection. As can
be seen from Table 34 below, the reason why in practice, most UBs prefer landed property to
others were identified as follows: its immovability (60%); persistent appreciation in its value
(40%); the fact that it is readily available (60%) and the fact that it provides a greater
motivation for repayment than other forms of collateral (40%).
Table 34: Why landed property is preferred to others in practice - Ghana
(N=5) Why landed property is preferred to others inpractice
Interviewees Its Widely Persistent Value Greater
immovable available appreciation motivation to
repay
GHUB2 ~ V
GHUB3 ..j
GHUB4 ..j
GHUB5 ..j
GHUB6 ..j ..j
Percentage 60% 60% 40% 40%
Respondents appeared to appreciate the immovability of property which makes it more
reliable compared to other assets like automobiles. Comparing these two assets one
participant noted ...when you secure a loan with landed property and the borrower runs
away, he cannot take the property along with him. This certainty in the first place may even
prevent borrowers from trying to abscond. Secondly, the acceptance of landed property
appears to provide a sufficient sense of security for lenders due to not only its market value
164
being substantial but also the fact that it is likely to rise over time; this is captured in the
words of a participant that... in our part of the world such properties appreciate, they don't
depreciate. Land in our part of the world keeps appreciating all the time unlike vehicles. You
see a vehicle may be costing GHCJO, 000 today but due to depreciation after a year or two
you cannot value it the same. For landed property they keep on appreciating all the time and
if you use that as a fall back it is better for the bank.
In relation to the motivation it gives borrowers to repay the loan, one interviewee
said ...People will not want to lose their property. You know it is not easy to put up a building
in this country, so they wouldn't want to put their investment in jeopardy. Another
stated ...people value their buildings so much that they are more prepared to cooperate with
us in terms of repaying the loan. In the developing world given the low income levels, it
might take some people a life time to build a property and those who use them to secure
loans are less likely to allow the facility to go bad because of the fear that they will lose their
lifetime investment. The property may be the only precious asset the borrower has and he
will do everything to get the loan repaid in order not to lose their most priced asset.
Finally some of these lenders (60%) also go for landed property even though they would
have preferred other more liquid assets because of availability issues. Whilst landed property
may be widely available in various forms, participants lamented that cash collateral or its
equivalents may not be widely available and hence they have to make do with what is
available. Responding to this issue one participant noted ...but of course cash covered
security is rare, if the person had the money in the form of cash somewhere they wouldn't
come and take a loan anyway. In the kind of market that we work in, things like shares and
bonds are very rare and when it comes to SME owners they are non-starters. Another also
observed thaLIor the small business, they most prefer to use their houses as security for the
loans they want because that is all most of them have. So mostly we have to make do with
what is presented to us. Therefore, these lenders in many instances are settling for what
would be their second best forms of collateral due to the constraint factors just discussed
above.
7.2.2 England
From the quantitative results discussed earlier, three different forms of collateral (landed
property, cash deposits and T-bills) were generally rated by respondents as what they most
prefer. There was no difference in the level of preference for these three items. The seven
participants in the interviews were thus asked to reveal which formes) of collateral they most
prefer when dealing with SEs. Majority of the participants (57%) could not give a straight
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forward answer. The quotes that follow exemplify their reaction when ask the above
question ... this is a difficult one because it depends on the number of factors. Another
participant also commented that... this will depend on each individual case. In one case I may
say property in another I will say a more liquid security may be cash deposits or fixed
deposits or its equivalent. These participants identified a number of factors that may
influence their choice of collateral to include the following: the amount required; the type of
facility; and availability (see Table 35 below).
Table 35: Factors that Influence Lenders Choice of Collateral- England
Factors
Interviewees (N-4)
Percentage
Amount
required
Type of facility
Availability
75%
50%
25%
From Table 35 above only a minority of the participant observed that the preferred form of
collateral was dependent on what the borrower is able to provide. This is an indication that
though lenders may have their own preferences they are often not so rigid with such
preferences but rather they tend to be flexible and try to make the best out of the options
available to them. The amount of money the borrower requires will determine which form of
collateral the banks will prefer most. Various references were made to the effect that where
small amounts are involved banks tend to prefer guarantees as a form of security as well as
more liquid forms of security such as cash or its equivalents (fixed deposits or bonds).
Though what is regarded a small amount is very subjective, it appears generally that
participants were referring to amounts below £25,000. This is reflected by a participant who
stated that...for smaller amounts, I will say a guarantee will be ok. For amount of about
£25,000, if the client has shares, fixed deposits or some bonds [will be happy. For amounts
above this, we can still consider these securities but not many small businesses will have
such security with large values. For that reason you will be looking at whether there are
some assets of considerable value such as an office block or residential property.
It could be deduced from this and previous results discussed above that there is a limit to
which unsecured lending could be done. Beyond this limit, banks may start with just taking a
guarantee and more liquid security but also up to some limited amount. As far as small
businesses are concerned, the provision of sufficient security cover becomes a problem as
the amount increases even further to about £30,000 and beyond and that is when banks'
preference may be switched towards landed property. One participant explains why this is
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so ...small business owners tend to have liquid investments that provide sufficient security
cover for small loans under say £30,000 but with larger amounts such liquid investments are
often not sufficient and they will have to provide some more tangible and high value assets.
Another reason why the preference only shifts to landed property when the credit amount
required is relatively huge, according to a participant is because ...landed property is good
but unless the amount is so huge I won't consider it given the processing and administration
cost involved The taking of landed property could be relatively more costly than other forms
of collateral. Some lenders therefore do not find it economic to take landed property unless
the loan amount involved is large enough to yield returns that will offset such cost. Apart
from the loan amount, the type of credit facility required is an essential determining factor of
which form of security banks will prefer (see Table 35 above). The type of credit facility was
described in terms of whether the borrower is asking for a conventional mortgage or invoice
financing. Where the facility being sought for is that of invoice financing, the preferred
security is the invoices and for commercial or residential mortgages the property in question
will be the preferred security. Some lenders will tend to prefer different forms of collateral
for different credit facilities. A participant's statement quoted below confirms this
conclusion, "we also offer fixed rate business loans for small businesses that need amounts
between £25,000 and £250, 000; ... there is one condition though, to qualify for this facility,
it must befully secured by owner occupied property ",
Despite the fact that most interviewees could not give a straight forward answer as to which
collateral was most preferred to other, further probing revealed that in general, 57% of the all
seven participants involved prefer cash or its equivalents when lending to SEs whilst the
remaining 43% would prefer landed property. The preference for liquid security according to
the participants is due to the absence of complicated administrative procedures in taking a
charge or foreclosing on such security. As one participant observed, Taking liquid security
virtually involves no cost. Reference was also made to the difficulty in foreclosing other
securities like landed property - the time it takes to sell as well as the cost involved. Finally
the value of other securities such as landed property, shares or bonds can be volatile but as a
participant observed the value of cash does not decline. Whilst this may be true, it only refers
to the face value and not the real value of money.
That notwithstanding, other banks may prefer to go for the landed property because of its
intrinsic value to the borrower especially small business owners. It is believed to be the most
valuable asset of many small business owners and that they will only use it to secure a
facility if they know they can repay. This is the idea portrayed by one participant when he
said ...no one wants to lose what could be their most priced asset and that will put pressure
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on them to keep to the repayment plan and quickly discuss any difficulties with the bank for
prompt action to prevent things going wrong. The market value of property is also
considered to be substantial that even when its value falls the bank could still recoup a good
amount of the outstanding debt. Results from this section show that in general many banks
prefer cash security or its equivalent when dealing with SEs. However, at any point in time
the preference for any form of security depends on different factors. So whilst one form of
collateral may be preferred in one instance, the same bank may prefer a different form of
security in another instance.
7.3 Issues of Concern When Taking Landed Property
To help the researcher determine whether property registration in any way affects the
acceptability of landed property-based collateral, participants were asked to identify the
issues that concern them most when taking landed property as collateral. In other words they
were to identify the factors that will influence their decision to either accept or reject a
landed property that is being offered for collateral purposes.
7.3.1 Ghana
The interview revealed five factors that lenders are most concerned about when taking
landed property as security for a credit facility (see Table 36 below). The most prominent of
these is the issue of property ownership. This is followed by the saleability of the property,
value of the property, encumbrances on the property and insurance.
Table 36: Factors Influencing the Acceptability of Landed Property - Ghana
(N-IO)
Interviewees
GIIUI3I
GHUB2 '"GHUB3 '"GHUB4 '"CHUBS '"GHUB6 '"
GHMFII
GHMFI2 '"GHMFI3 '"GHMFI4 '"
Percentage 100%
'" '"
'" '"'" '"'" '"
'" '"'" '"
70% 70% 40~'O 300/0
Property ownership
The issue of property ownership appeared more prominently than the others as all
respondents were worried about one ownership issue or the other. The main concerns about
landed property ownership were further split into four sub categories shown in Table 37
below. These concerns included: documentary evidence of ownership; verification of
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ownership; ownership disputes; and family owned properties. The difference between MFls
and UBs responses is also clear from the table below.
Table 37: Concerns about Property Ownership - Ghana
Factors
(N=IO) Documentary Verification Ownership Family property
Interviewees Evidence of of property disputes
ownership ownership
GHUBI " " " "
GHUB2 ~ ~ ~
GHUB3 ~ ~ ~
GHUB4 ~ ~ ~
GHUB5 ~ V ~
GHUB6 ~ V ~
GHMFll
GHMFI2 ~ V
GHMFI3 ~ V ~
GHMFI4 ~ V ~
Percentage 100% 80% 70% 500/0
The concerns over documentary evidence of ownership were related to the kind of landed
property documents which were regarded as acceptable to the various lenders. The
documents identified ranged from the land title certificate, the lease/indenture, site plan, the
statutory declaration and allocation papers. About 60% of the 10 interviewees with concerns
over the documentary evidence of ownership would only accept the land title certificate and
the official lease on the property registered at the Lands Registry and can independently be
verified. Only 20% of the interviewees (all of whom were from MFIs) indicated that they
accept both registered and unregistered documents but the remaining 20% did not indicate
which documents are acceptable to them. As noted by one of these interviewees ...for my
bank, the land must be registered with the lands commission before we can take it as
security ...we only accept registered property. All those who accept only documents certified
by the Lands Registry were from Universal banks. The extract below explains why
unregistered landed property documents are not accepted .
...Before we accept a landed property ... we must see the title certificate. If there is a lease
that can be verified from the Lands Registry, then we can accept it too. This is because, in
Ghana if you don 'I have this official lease or title certificate, your legal ownership of the
property is in. Some people have the allocation papers alright but we don 'I lake them. With
these kinds of documents somebody can spring up anywhere and challenge the ownership.
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When a respondent was asked if he would accept the other unregistered documents, his
response was, No I won't, without the registration, it means it is a recipe for litigation one
day. You see earlier on, we used to accept even allocation papers and experience showed
that for most of these properties when the owners defaulted and we requested the property to
be sold, they ended in ligations. The registered documents are thus seen by some lenders as
the only ones that properly confer legal ownership of a property to an individual as well as
being perceived to be immune to ownership disputes. Even though there is evidence in
Ghana that some registered titles have been quashed in the law courts it appears that lenders
nonetheless uphold them highly at least in comparison to the unregistered documents.
Indeed, Alhassan (2006b) argues that the unregistered documents available remain
unstandardized and often interpreted differently. The lack of a common benchmark for
interpretation and application he argues reduces their relevance. Another reason for not
accepting unregistered land documents like statutory declaration and allocation notes is
related to the problem of multiple sales and ownership uncertainty. This is explained by one
participant as follows ...somebody can sell the land to Mr A and sell to Mr B and to Mr C, he
will give all of them the allocation papers or and they can all get the statutory declaration
but when you go to the Lands Registry for the title certificate it will just be for one person.
Another participant also noted ...for the borrower whose property is not registered, we
cannot take that property as security because we cannot be 100% sure that the property
belongs to him/her.
Property ownership verification
The other concern raised about property ownership had to do with verifying ownership. Six
of the eight respondents who cited such concerns conduct a formal search through the
records at the Lands Registry and were all from UBs. The rest (all from MFIs) do an
informal verification of the property ownership and according to one of them this is what it
involves:
... we ascertain that it belongs to the customer through going to the local area and speaking
to people around or even the elders and chiefs of the area or the indigenes ... ifwe do not
have much time to investigate we ask for guarantors to back the property they offer as
security. The above is an admission that the informal verification process may be time
consuming and the outcome could still be uncertain. To counter the effects of this, these
lenders tend to take additional precautionary measures to protect themselves. Such actions as
pointed out in the quote above may include asking the borrower to provide a guarantor in
addition to the property should there be problems with the property ownership later within
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the term of the facility, the guarantor could be liable for the outstanding debt. About 67% of
the six interviewees who conduct a formal search as the means of verifying ownership made
references to the use of insiders within the lands Registry to facilitate the search process.
When asked about how difficult it is to verify ownership regarding the time involved, one
interviewee confessed that...As a bank we have also established our links in terms of those
who carry out the search; so it takes a relatively shorter lime.
Ownership disputes
Another property ownership concern for lenders is the prevalence of disputes over who owns
the property and for that matter, whether or not one has the right to mortgage it. Not only are
lenders concerned about the issue of multiple sales of the same property but also they try to
earmark certain locations that are noted for land disputes and avoid properties located in
such areas as much as possible; this is shown in the following statement by one
participant... there are also some areas that are well known for land disputes and so if the
building is in such an area we are a bit hesitant to accept it. Another aspect of ownership
disputes identified is litigation and the ability to proof legal ownership of the property in a
law court. Lenders are mainly concerned with being able to challenge any counter claims to
an assigned property in the court and the only way they believe that could be done is by
accepting registered properties as the title certificate serves as the ultimate legal proof of
ownership. Indeed a participant in reference to this stated ...you may build your own house
and have the necessary allocation papers but without the properly registered at the Lands
Registry, you are not regarded as owner legally. Even though the 1992 constitution gives
recognition to customary ownership as evidenced by current occupation and use, lenders
mostly from UBs as per the results of this interview appear to be driven by the perception
that legal ownership is derived from the possession of registered documentary evidence of
ownership.
Family ownership
Finally, the issue of family owned properties was of importance to 50% of interviewees. It
was noted that any property documents being presented for use as security are expected to
bear the names of the prospective borrowers. Properties that are communally owned by the
whole family are not accepted mostly because of the likelihood of litigation by other
members of the family and the time and effort involved in trying to get the consent of all
family members. An interviewee noted that... when you even investigate, you find out it isfor
afamily made up of their fathers, uncles and others. How can we take such aproperty ...how
long do you think it will take to find all the family members to get their consent. if we ignore
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this we will be found wanting in the law court. This is evidence that the problem may not be
just about the issue of registration but rather the fundamental nature of property ownership.
With the evidence that the tenure system in most parts of Africa is fast evolving due to rapid
urbanisation (see chapter two), this problem is not expected to be an issue in the medium to
long term.
Saleability of property
Apart from the several issues of property ownership discussed above, the next most
important worry for lenders when taking landed property was identified to be how quickly
the property can be liquidated. This, as one respondent noted is because ... if we can't sell it
quickly, then our capital is locked up. The property may also depreciate in value over the
time we take to look for a buyer and that can be costly as the value may not be sufficient to
recover the entire loan amount. Saleability has been explained to depend on not only the
difficulties involved in getting a court order to sell but also the location of the property
which may make it difficult to find a buyer. The following statement by a participant typifies
this sentiment. The courts don't protect the banks at all, because someone will come and use
his landed property to secure a loan and default and yet you go to court and the court will
give you the mere excuse that for moral reasons the bank cannot sell the property. Another
participant relating the problem of saleability to location observed ...a beautiful building in
the village may not be taken as a security. The whole essence of taking collateral is to sell it
when there is a default. It is hence not surprising that participants did point to it as a big
worry when taking property. As already noted, that is one reason why most lenders did not
consider the provision of collateral as sufficient to obtain credit.
Value of property
The market value of the property was also of much concern to the participants. as pointed out
earlier it does not only determine how much one can borrow but also how much protection
may be available for the lender. Despite the fact that 75% of the four MFI respondents talked
about the valuation of the property, 25% of the references were to the effect that the value is
not a big problem because SEs typically apply for small loan amounts relative to the their
property values. Another 25% were however concerned about the nature of the property and
one of them commented ...we will not accept any two byfour building roofed with grass and
those kinds of mud houses you find in a typical village. On the contrary 67% of the six UB
interviewees did speak about property values but in relation to the forced sale value of the
property. This was described by one interviewee as...how much the property will sell for
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under the worst case scenario. Another observed that the amount they lend is a percentage
(about 75%) of the forced sale value of the property.
Encumbrances on the property
About 40% of all 10 interviewees in this study expressed concerns about the possible
existence of encumbrances which could frustrate property repossession efforts. All such
interviewees were however from UBs with none from MFls having such concerns. The
encumbrances they mentioned included third party interest in the landed property held by
other individuals or lenders as well as whether or not there are any court injunctions over the
property. Whilst all of these participants talked of encumbrances in terms of third party
interest, one of them did relate it to whether or not there is some court injunction or an on-
going court case on the property. The effect of such third party interest on the property can
be seen from this illustration by one interviewee:
...Mr A brought his document for a loan, everything was genuine and we gave the loan, he
defaulted, then the court gives the order to sell but his wife comes in with moral suasion.
This is my husband, we have three children, if the court allows the bank to sell this building,
we are going to stay on the street. Meanwhile we toiled together to build it and my interest
was not taken into consideration before the house was used for this facility. They say this
and mostly the court will oblige if the woman is able to proof indirectly or directly and so the
bank is disadvantaged.
The encumbrance could also come in the form of another lender having prior claim to the
property where the property has already been used to secure a credit facility from another
lender. Without the prior claim to the property, a lender is prone to losses as other lenders'
interest will have to be catered for first. The fear of this may hold back some lenders from
accepting such properties. This is the fear expressed by one participant when he was asked a
question on the circumstances under which he would not accept landed property as collateral
for a loan .
...a report will be generated which will tell us whether that property is free of any
encumbrances, whether that property has been used somewhere or not. So when we get the
feedback that, that property has been used at another bankfor us we wouldn '1want to take it
even if there is space to accommodate our risk. Assuming you have a building that is costing
GHC500,OOOand you have taken GHCIOO,OOOjromone bank, so it is like there is roomfor
us to use the remaining but when a problem arises what happens is the first bank that
registered its interest in the property will be catered for before we are catered for. That is
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the legal requirement, so we will want take possession of a property that is free of any
encumbrances.
Availability of property insurance
Finally, about 30% of the interviewees (two from UBs and one from MFI) were also
concerned about property insurance. Those from UBs indicated that they do not compromise
on insurance because as one said ... if we don't insure it and tomorrow there is fire outbreak
and the building is burnt, we have nothing to fall back on. There were concerns about the
negative attitude of the average Ghanaian towards insurance. Nonetheless, the UBs indicated
that they do not waive that requirement; one noted that... even if it is a computer you must
insure it. Whilst some lenders consider insurance as a pre-disbursement requirement, others
referred to it as a post disbursement requirement. The comments from interviewee below
illustrate this point... we insist on insurance but not at the point of disbursement, for us when
we get the search result and the property is free of encumbrance we will go ahead to
disburse the loan but we will also go ahead to insure the property and debit the customer's
account. Another also noted that...all properties taken as security must be insured,
comprehensively, we make sure you insure before we even accept.
Indeed, the customer is made aware that the property will be insured over the term of the
loan. So each client has to give his consent and pay for the cost. Given the concern expressed
over the negative attitude of most Ghanaians towards insurance, it appears that many of the
properties are not insured consequently many of these properties would not qualify for use as
collateral unless borrowers are willing to bear the extra insurance cost. This is because
insurance is one way through which the lenders protect their interest in the property. The
only one MFI participant that did mention something about insurance, in response to the
issue of whether or not they insist on property insurance remarked ... you will chase all your
customers' away 000. Apparently he was saying that insurance is not something they insist
on when taking landed property.
The above discussion has revealed in detail the issues that lenders are most worried about
when taking landed property to secure credit facilities. In other words, it has revealed the
factors that affect the eligibility of landed property for use as collateral. These findings in a
lot of instances do confirm the quantitative findings already reported in the previous chapter.
For instance, on the issue of property ownership, no participant talked about the nature of the
land rights held by the borrower (leasehold/freehold) an indication that it is not a critical
factor and confirming the quantitative results which revealed that this factor was largely
considered as least important and one that should be ignored. Furthermore, about 60% of the
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interviewees did acknowledge that they accept only registered property. Interestingly all
these respondents were from VBs as the MFI participants admitted that they do not put
priority on landed property but when necessary they accept both registered and unregistered
property. This was also a confirmation of the quantitative finding that property must be
registered to make them suitable collateral for VBs but not for MFIs. The same applies to the
issue of property insurance and market value. The qualitative study did however provide
other important issues that were not captured in the quantitative aspects and these include the
issues of saleability and encumbrances amongst others.
7.3.2 England
The extent to which landed property may be considered as eligible for use as collateral in
any SE credit contract was reported by interviewees to be influenced by several factors (see
Table 38 below). The results show that about 86% of participants were each most concerned
about the kind of encumbrances on the property and the property's value. The use of the term
encumbrances by participants was mainly in reference to: the existence of prior mortgage(s)
on the property; the presence of restrictive covenants on the use of the property; and the
existence of a compulsory purchase order or a demolition order on the property.
Table 38: Factors Affectin2 Accentabilitv of Landed Property as Security - England
Interviewees (N=7)
ENG I ENG2 ENG3 ENG4 ENG5 ENG6 ENG7
Factors Percentage
Encumbrances ..J ..J " " ..J 86%Property's ..J ..J ..J ..J ..J ..J 86%
Value
Ease of 71%
foreclosure
Ownership ..J ..J 43%
Insurance ..J ..J 43%
Others 14%
Participants showed definite signs of worry about not having prior claim over the property
because as one participant put it... without the first legal right the facility may be as good as
an unsecured loan. These banks would not accept the property ifany of the above mentioned
encumbrances exists on the property. For instance, if the property has already been used to
secure a loan somewhere it might not be accepted. As clearly pointed out by one
participant... it is also very rare for us to do a second mortgage we would rather refinance
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the existing mortgage and take over prior claim to the property. Refinancing is one way that
lenders may try to go around or avoid the risk associated with second mortgages. In relation
to this however, some lenders may agree to do a second mortgage on a given property
provided its value is still sufficient to accommodate the mount required but this is the
furthest lenders may be prepared to go as any property that already has a second mortgaged
will not be accepted for another loan this is evidenced in the quote that follows, "If there are
already two separate charges on this property we will not accept it but one may be ok". This
is understandable because the higher the number of mortgages that already exists on a
property the higher the risk exposure for any subsequent credit secured by that property due
to reasons previously explained.
An equal level of worry was expressed about the value of the property intended for use as
security (see Table 38 above). Whilst these participants focused on the adequacy of the cover
provided by the property's value, there were concerns about the expected volatility in value
and the forced sale value of the property. After considering everything if the forced sale
value is regarded inadequate relative to the required loan amount, accepting the property
may be a problem because as a participant observed ... that will determine how much
protection the bank will get during default. In such a case the best the borrower could get is a
reduced amount which will mean their access to credit will be constrained by the inadequacy
of the property's value.
In the worst case scenario, banks tum to foreclosure of security as the means to recover
outstanding debts. Its importance was highlighted by 71% of the participants (see Table 38
above) who indicated they will most likely not accept a property if they were sure that
foreclosure will be difficult ifnot impossible. When one participant was asked to identify the
circumstances under which he will not accept a landed property, he said ... if I am reasonably
convinced that selling it will be difficult for one reason or the other, then, I will hesitate
taking it. This was how another participant expressed his worry about the ease of
foreclosure ...sometimes it can be quiet a daunting task when you have to sell the property.
So my concern will be to consider all the issues that may affect the sale and then decide if
there will be a problem or not. So what issues affect the ease with which a property could be
sold? One participant gave a hint to this question in his statement that ...I am concerned
about how easy it will be to sell that property and this will usually depend on things like its
location, accessibility to it, the facilities in it, and its state 0/ repair or disrepair.
Furthermore, issues bothering on property ownership and insurance were each of much
concern to 43% of the participants. On ownership, participants spoke about the ability of the
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borrower to provide a legal proof of ownership but there was no mention made of property
registration. Since legal ownership could be ascertained through the provision of
unregistered deeds, it could be assumed that any such documents would be sufficient
evidence for lenders irrespective of whether they are registered or not. This could be the
reason why participants talked about a wide range of issues but said nothing about property
registration. Nonetheless the researcher subsequently prompted each participant to ask
whether they would accept a property if it were not registered at the Lands Registry. All of
them agreed that they would accept unregistered property provided that their own
investigations provide a clear confirmation about the ownership of such property. In
response to the question, one participant reacted ... that's absolutely fine. Occasionally we do
encounter situations like that. So far as our investigation comes out clean and it meets the
other requirements I mentioned then it passes for use and is accepted. Another also noted
that...lf not registered, it is more difficult to take a charge over property. There are a pile of
deeds showing a series of sales to work through. The solicitors handle all such cases to
investigate the legal ownership and authenticity of the deeds. Apart from that it is not much
different from how we treat registered property. Contributing to this point another participant
also said ...As long as our lawyers can ascertain the right ownership and verify any related
documents, location and boundaries of the property there shouldn 'I be many problems.
The responses (quoted above) demonstrate and also confirm initial suspicion that banks will
not reject a landed property because it is unregistered even though some do admit that
processing such properties could be difficult. This finding is in conformity with the
quantitative finding that about 80% of respondents accept both registered and unregistered
property in England and that property must not necessarily be registered to make them
eligible for use as collateral. The 43% of participants, who talked about insurance, said they
will not accept a landed property as security unless it is insured or the owner is prepared to
insure it. However, it appears that insurance is not a big problem to these banks because it
appears property insurance is popular amongst people in this country. This notion is
confirmed by one participant who stated that...this is not usually a problem as most people
would already have insured their properties. This indicates a culture of safety in this country
which was not identified in the Ghana study. Only one participant talked about other factors
that may influence the decision not to accept a property such as the ability to provide a
planning permission for that property. Indeed without the necessary planning permissions the
property might have been put up illegally and hence subject to demolition with its associated
consequences for lending banks.
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7.4 Landed Property Registration and Loan Terms
The interviews also sought to establish whether or not borrowers who possess registered
landed property could derive any benefits in terms of the loan terms they are offered relative
to others with unregistered property. Interviewees were given a scenario involving two
borrowers of similar credit worthiness except that one possesses a registered property whilst
the other possesses an unregistered property; they were asked if they would offer the two
borrowers different interest rates, fees/commissions, loan amounts and repayment periods.
7.4.1 Ghana
Interest rates and fees
In terms of the interest rates charged, about 80% of all ten interviewees did not agree that
registered land owners are given or will be given preferential treatment in the form of lower
interest rates. About 20% however, were of the view that the registered property owners may
be offered lower interest rates. All the four MFI participants did disagree that registered
property owners are offered lower interest rates compared to 67% of the six VB respondents.
The interviewees from MFIs noted that the interest rates are not negotiable as they are often
predetermined by the institution. To show his disagreement one MFI participant quizzed ... if
the two borrowers are equally credit worthy without security. why then should we give
preferential treatment to one at the expense of the other? A VB participant also noted
that... having your property registered will not as it were influence the rate that we charge.
The possession of registered property is most likely not going to attract lower interest rates
from both VBs and MFIs. The minority who indicated they may offer lower interest rates to
registered property owners attributed this to their perception that registered property
ownership has low risk. Not only are registered property owners considered by these
interviewees as less risky but also the provision of registered property titles according to
them gives lenders more assurance than an unregistered property does. The perceived lower
level of risk associated with registered property titles may work to reduce the interest rates
charged in a manner described below by one interviewee .
...definitely the one whose property is registered at the Lands Registry is considered by us as
less risky. So in terms of the interest rate. that customer may get a lower interest rate
because we have something called the scoring sheet. We score the customers on various
points before we arrive at the interest rates that the customer will have to pay. So the one
with a registered property will get a higher score and ranked higher and the interest rates
will not be the same. Even ifwe decide to help the person that has a property not registered
at the Lands Registry. that person will definitely be paying higher interest rates. The
association of registered property titles with lower levels of risk by some lenders probably
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stems from the perception that registration provides the ultimate legal prove of property
ownership which is of prime concern to certain lenders when taking landed property. The
fear of the legal risk regarding property ownership makes some lenders seek reassurance by
taking registered property.
On the issue of the fees/commissions charged, all of the interviewees argued that such
charges are a fixed proportion of the loan amount and therefore the actual amount paid as
fees would only vary with the loan amount but the percentage is fixed and not negotiable.
Such charges cover the administration and processing cost. Both MFI and UB interviewees
noted that they charge standard fees and that will not change because a borrowers' property
is registered.
Loan amount
Just like the findings on interest rate, 80% of respondents also disagreed that registered
property owners can borrower larger loan amounts than those with unregistered property.
Four of these participants were each from MFIs and UBs. The main reason why a majority of
the participants disagree that registered property owners are allowed to borrow larger sums
compared to unregistered property owners, according to participants is the fact that the
amount one can borrow depends on some factors other than the provision of registered
property titles. This can be deduced from one UB participant's statement to the effect
that... borrowers can only ask for larger amount and we will allow it if their finances can
support such larger amounts. A MFIs respondent also noted ...with the amount, businesses
can borrow amount within certain limits that we set. When you come to usfirst, you can only
borrow up to 300 Ghana cedis for a start andfrom then onwards we can gradually increase
the amount depending on the way you went about paying the previous loans. So we will not
say because you have a registered property you should borrow more than the other. The
ability to repay a loan as evidenced by the financial strength of the borrower was thus seen as
most fundamental influence on the amount one can borrow. This is also evidence that some
MFIs have policies which sets limits or defines how much borrowers can borrow. This
process allows relationships to develop over time and the trust established reduces risk and
allows lenders to increase how much borrower may be permitted to borrow.
Only 20% of the participants agreed that registered property owners may be allowed to
borrow large amount compared to unregistered property owners and the perceived low risk
associated with the possession of registered property was the reason cited. For instance, one
interviewee's observed that ...the one with an unregistered property is seen as a risky
venture. so we may want to try them may be on something smaller so that in case of default
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the problem will not be huge on our neck. So definitely the amount we will give to a person
with unregistered property will be lower than those with registered property. The perception
that unregistered property is more risky motivates some lenders to try to find ways of
mitigating the potential losses that may be associated with this risk and this may be done by
limiting the amount such a person is allowed to borrow so that when there is default, the
banks actual losses will be minimised. Whilst a majority of participants disagree that the
registered property owners will not be allowed to borrow larger amounts, there is little
evidence from the interview that registration could still influence the loan amount that one
can borrow provided it raises the value of the property. This was deduced from the
comments of one UB participant that...the only thing the borrower stand to benefit is, the
higher the value of the property they are providing the higher the Joan amount they can
access but as to getting a concession on interest, fees and the rest, we don't have any
package of a sort. Indeed research has shown that land values do rise after registration (see
chapter three). Hence, it could be argued that property registration could increase the loan
amounts that people can borrow by increasing property values.
Repayment period
Only one interviewee agreed that the repayment time may be different for registered property
owners relative to unregistered property owners. One participant did not say anything related
to the repayment time but the remaining eight disagreed that the repayment time borrowers
are allowed is influenced by the kind of property one possesses .. The findings so far on
whether the possession of registered title influences the loan terms a borrower is offered
have been nicely summarised by a participant who observed that... we don't grant the credit
because you have security. So if the two borrowers are equally credit worthy without
security why then should we give preferential treatment to the registered property owner at
the expense of the unregistered property owner? This by implication is an admission that the
conditions offered to borrowers are independent of the kind of landed property they present
as collateral
7.4.2 England
In England, the reaction of participants to the issue of whether property registration affects
the loan terms borrowers are offered was the same as that obtained from Ghana. All seven
participants were unanimous in saying that the registered property owners in the scenario
cited earlier would not be treated differently from the unregistered property owners in terms
of the loan conditions they are offered. This was how one of them reacted to the issue ... the
primary thing we take into consideration is the ability to repay the amount involved.
Therefore if any two borrowers demonstrate a similar ability to repay a Joan, they have both
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met the most important requirement and it will be unfair to give the One with registered
property better terms than the other. This indeed points to the fact that the terms or
conditions that are woven into a credit contract are mostly a function of the borrower's
ability to service the facility being sought for. Participants also did not generally see any
reason why the two borrowers in the scenario cited earlier will be treated differently
provided both of them are able to provide a legal proof of their ownership of the said
property. On whether or not interest rates are not negotiable, a participant said ... even though
sometimes these could be negotiable, this may only be done based on the other things such
as relationship with the bank and not whether their property is registered or not. That will
not make a difference. Other things that could influence the rates charged is the level of risk
associated with the credit application but since participants in this country did not consider
the possession of unregistered property as risky, they did not consider registration as a basis
for deciding the interest rates to charge.
It was also pointed out that the fees charged are usually a fixed percentage of the loan
amount (about 1.5% but varies across banks) and not negotiable. By way of further probing,
participants were asked why fees are fixed for both registered and unregistered property
owners given that cost of verifying unregistered property may be higher. The statement from
one participant quoted below typifies the explanation provided ...fees involve money that
come to us to cover the cost of the paperwork but the search charge goes to the Lands
Registry and not us. So it's not part of our charges. Hence, even though processing
registered property may involve lower cost compared to unregistered property, it does not
influence the charges of the banks. Nonetheless the overall cost of borrowing for businesses
will be lower for the registered property owner. Regarding the cost of credit (interest rates
and fees), it was established that credit facilities are not priced based on the kind of property
(whether registered or unregistered) that is provided but rather other factors such as the
banks cost of funds, riskiness of the borrower and relationship with the lender.
Just as the cost of borrowing, all seven participants did not also agree that the possession of
registered property could allow property owners to borrow larger amounts of money than the
unregistered property owner. In the words of a participant... both borrowers can borrow any
amounts they desire provided they can service the facility. It was established that each
borrower is able to require any amount they want. The bank however, only decides whether
to grant that amount or reduce it based on the person's ability to repay. The only thing that
limits the amount one can borrow is the ability to repay and the property's value but not the
possession of unregistered property. With regard to the repayment time, all participants
debunked the notion that registered property owners are offered loan repayment period
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different from that offered to unregistered property owners. This was what one interviewee
had to say ...repayment time is flexible for all borrowers and depends on their particular
circumstances such as cash flow patterns ... Repayments could be scheduled to fit into cash
flow patterns of the business to ensure that anytime repayments are due, the business will
have cash inflow to honour its obligation. The above results have made clear that registered
property owners are not treated differently compared to unregistered property owners in
terms of the loan condition offered provided that both set of borrowers are credit worthy.
The outcome of the interviews thus reinforces the quantitative study which established that
the possession of registered property does not influence the loan terms that are offered to
borrowers.
7.5 Factors Responsible for Turning down SEs Credit Applications
The literature is inundated with arguments that the reason why SEs cannot obtain credit to
grow their businesses is the lack of registered property titles. The interviews further sought
the opinions of lenders regarding the most important factors that influence their decision not
to grant credit to small businesses. The findings from both countries are presented below.
7.5.1 Ghana
The 10 participants identified six different factors to explain why SEs sometimes have
difficulties in accessing credit. The responses have been summarised in Table 39 below. The
most important issue identified was the serviceability of the loan. This was followed by the
high risk of lending to SEs, high degree of informality in the conduct of their businesses, the
lack of suitable coIlateral, the low capacity to manage the business and other reasons in that
order of importance (see Table 39 below).
Serviceability
Majority of the participants (90%) were of the view that the problem of serviceability (the
inability of borrowers to demonstrate or proof that they can repay the amount they are asking
for) is the most critical reason why SE loan applications are unsuccessful. A participant
observed that. ..for most of those who do not get the loans they want, it is because we are
convinced that they cannot repay by looking at their incomes and expenses.
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T bl 39 Th M Ia e : e ost mportant Reasons for Turning Down SE Loan Applications· Ghana
Factors
(N=10) Poor High High Lack Low
Interviewees Serviceability Risk informality suitable Mgt. Others
collateral Capacity
GHUBI " " " "
GHUB2 " "GHUB3 " " "GHUB4 " " "GHUB5 " "GHUB6 "GHMFll :j :j :j
GHMFI2 " "GHMFI3 " "GHMFI4 "Percentage 90% 70% 60% 50% 30% 30%
On the issue of serviceability, these participants were mainly concerned about cash flows as
may be reflected by the account performance of the borrower as well as the overall
profitability of the business or its prospects. About 44% of the participants, who talked about
loan serviceability, mentioned weak cash flows as the main cause of their worries about loan
repayment. According to one participant, they are worried about weak cash flows
because ... loans are serviced from the cash flows of the borrower. If they have a cash flow
challenge meeting their repayment obligation will not be feasible. This confirms the old
saying in finance that cash is king. The business must not only be profitable but it must be
generating sufficient cash to meet its obligations or else it could go into liquidation even
though it is profitable. The borrower's ability to repay a loan could be assessed by looking at
the amount of cash the business is bringing in and how much it is taking out. The net cash
flow does not only determine how much debt one can take on (debt capacity) but also
whether at all one is credit worthy. That is to say, can the current net cash flow support
repayment of the required credit?
Regarding the relation between cash flows and credit access, one participant went on to
complain that ...customers can open an account with us ok but maturity of their payments do
not go through the account. They keep the money in the house and later come to ask for a
loan but given the turnover on the accounts these customers have. they get a smaller loan or
nothing. However. if they had brought every single penny that they had through the account
that would have given them a higher turnover to enable them access more loan. Indeed, what
this participant was referring to is the fact that sometimes, the barrier to credit access for SEs
is not that they cannot generate sufficient cash to repay loans but rather, they are unable to
provide any proof of such cash flows. Cash flows may be good but due to the poor savings
culture this may not reflect in the client's account and lenders may not have any evidence of
183
this. The lack of evidence of good cash flows causes lenders to assume cash flows are not
good just to err on the side of caution. The ability to demonstrate that loan repayment will
not be a problem will not only pave the way for the needed credit to be supplied but as note
earlier, could also nullify the need to provide collateral.
About 56% of the participants who identified loan serviceability as the key to credit access
related it to the business of the borrower. Three of them were concerned about the type of
business (e.g. farming, transport etc.) as one participant emphasised ...also the business
matters, for example we don't give credit 10 tro-tro and taxi drivers or farmers; most of our
credit goes to traders and contractors". Two were also concerned about the nature of the
business whether it is a start-up or an already established and profitable business. For
instance, one of them noted that...about 95% of all banks shy away from lending to start-ups.
The same two participants who were concerned about the nature of the business also
expressed worries about the industry within which the business operates and its prospects.
This was how one of them put it...another thing is the business prospect. May be you are
into a particular line of business and may be the business sector is declining. Sometimes we
are cautious in putting money in because if that business sector is declining then there is the
likelihood that you may not be able to service the facility being offered but if that business
sector is seen to have good prospect then we will assist you. You see now we have oil, so may
be if the business has to do with that line of business we may want to do it because it has
prospects. Even though the performance of the industry may be out of the control of the
borrower, it nonetheless affects their likelihood of obtaining credit because a declining
industry can lead to default.
High risk
The second most important barrier to credit access identified by 70% of the participants is
the high risk associated with lending to small businesses. The risks identified had to do with
the possibility of the borrower not being able to keep up with repayment obligations.
Two of these participants generally perceived SEs as highly risky. Indeed, one of them in
talking about the riskiness ofSEs said ...all these things together make them too risky to deal
with. Another noted that... these small businesses cannot be trusted that much because they
are highly susceptible to very petty issues. They can look good today and tomorrow they are
gone. This vulnerability tends to make lenders cautious in dealing with SEs. They may not
lend at all and when they decide to lend it is very restrictive.
About 57% of the seven participants who commented on risk were making references to the
credit history or track record of the borrower whilst about 14% each made reference to the
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personal life styles of borrowers, the prospects of the business and inappropriate address
systems. Thus, credit history appears to be the best proxy of default risk. One participant's
statement typified the responses regarding default risk ... if it happens that may be you have
taken moneys from other banks and defaulted you may have operated a very good account
with us but we may not give the loan. Failure to fulfil past loan repayment obligations could
have a devastating effect SEs prospect of obtaining loans now or in the future. A poor credit
history could be a good indicator of the borrower's character and Willingness to repay.
Though the ability to repay may be excellent, if willingness to repay is low as evidenced by a
poor credit history that could be disastrous for the lender and this is probably why 'ability'
alone may not be sufficient to enhance access to credit. Of course, the prospects of the
industry as noted above could also be a risk factor as it is capable of negatively influencing
the fortunes of the business and hence its ability to repay the advanced credit.
Informality
Third in the order of importance is the high level of informality in the small business sector
in the country. About 60% of all the participants identified the informal nature in which SEs
are conducted as the reason why they have difficulty lending to the sector. Two of these
participants related this problem of informality to the non-use of the banks by SEs for their
transactions as most of them prefer to keep cash at home rather than in a bank account. This
affects their account turnover and hinders their chances of getting a loan. The lack of
integration into the formal banking system denies lenders an opportunity to gather essential
financial information to assess the repayment capability of potential borrowers. This worsens
the information asymmetry and increases the credit constraint problem. Two participants
also related informality to the apparent lack of separation between business and personal
transaction. Thus, the business and the proprietor are essentially the same. As noted by one
participant... every piece of expenditure, be it personal, business or domestic, passes through
the same businesses' income and they can barely tell whether they are making a profit or
nOI. This problem is typical for most sole proprietors where the business and owner are
inseparable. Usually the personal circumstances of the owner affect the performance of the
business and vice versa which inevitably makes such businesses risky in the eye of the
lender.
However, the majority of the respondents (five respondents) who saw informality as the
cause of the credit constraint spoke of it in terms of the lack of appropriate documents and
poor record keeping by SEs. Participants pointed to the fact that most of the SEs are not able
to provide proper records of their business transactions. Their sales are not documented
neither are the businesses' expenses. They are also unable to provide formal documentary
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requirements such as the need to provide formal financial statements and banks statements
amongst others. This was what a participant had to say in this regard ... the major thing is they
don't have the right documents. Just ask one to provide their financial statement or even a
bank statement and they cannot do it or even simple receipts or invoices and they have none.
The following statement also shows the frustration of one participant regarding the lack of
financial records ... some have no records at all and in financial analysis you need records to
do analysis; they sell so much but you are not able to quantify how much they sell over a
period of time. This situation does not auger well for businesses' quest to access credit
because such records and documents are essential in assessing a credit proposal. So their
absence could lead to a wrongful classification of the borrower as high risk and hence a
decision not to advance the required credit.
Lack of collateral
As shown in Table 39 above, the lack of collateral was identified by 50% of the participants
as another very important explanation why some SEs are denied credit. It must be pointed
out that all these participants were from UBs. Not only does this confirm the level of
importance that UBs place on collateral but it also confirms that for UBs the failure to obtain
credit may be a direct consequence of the inability to provide the required collateral. Whilst
generally these participants were referring to the inability of borrowers to provide any
security at all, 40% (that is two respondents) argued that it was just not about providing the
security but that the security had to be in its appropriate form especially with regard to
landed property. The concern of these two respondents was that even where the borrower has
a landed property, they will fail to get the loan if the property were unregistered. This
sentiment is shown in this statement by one of them ... in the instance where you only have a
landed property which you want to use as collateral, if we cannot verify its ownership at the
Lands Registry then we can 'I be sure if there are no problems with it and because of that we
cannot lake it and therefore the loan will nol be given.
This does not come as a surprise at all since earlier results showed that a majority of VB
participants indicated they do not accept unregistered properties as collateral; hence in a
situation where landed property is required to trigger credit supply the lack of a registered
property will be a barrier to credit access. Interestingly, none of the MFI participants
mentioned the lack of collateral as the reason why SEs are credit constrained neither did any
make mention of property registration. This is indeed a direct confirmation of the
quantitative finding that the effect of property registration on SE access to credit varies
depending on the type of lending institution. With the benefit of previous result discussed in
this study it could be argued that even in the case of UBs the effect of property registration
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may not be very significant if borrowers without registered title could afford to provide other
more liquid forms of collateral such as fixed deposits. This is because as earlier on discussed
some VBs did indicate that they would ideally have preferred such collateral to landed
property.
Poor management capacity
The lack of managerial skills or poor management and organisation capacity of SE owners
was also recognised as a barrier to credit access by 30% of all the participants. Some
proprietors of SEs as noted by these participants do not have that experience or track record
and the managerial experience for the kind of businesses for which they seek funding and
that may be the weak point based on which they may be denied credit. The success of every
business will to a large extent depend on how well it is managed. The lack of experience in a
particular line of business may be a threat to loan repayments. Apart from the factors just
discussed, 10% of all participants each identified one other minor reason why SEs may find
it difficult to get credit for their business and these include the supply side inadequacies
(which explains insufficient number of financial institutions to cater for all the needs of the
huge SE sector), the lack of government support and finally the poor borrower-lender
relationship. The findings on the reasons why SEs are credit constrained have shown a lot of
similarities between the qualitative and quantitative findings as already discussed above. The
quantitative results revealed that the financial strength of the business and default risk are
more critical to credit access than the lack of collateral and this was confirmed in the
qualitative study. The lack of required documents was also identified by participants in the
qualitative study which they described as informality in the SE sector. The nature of the
business which was identified in the quantitative study however, did not feature prominently
in the qualitative findings. Finally the qualitative results revealed another factor (low
management capacity) and other minor factors which were not present in the quantitative
findings. Both the quantitative and qualitative findings however, point to the fact that
property registration is not a prominent cause of the SE credit constraint.
7.5.2 England
The results from England are also presented in Table 40 below. About 86% of participants
each identified the risk of default and the poor ability to service the credit facility as the main
barriers to credit access for SEs. All the participants who talked about ability to repay also
mentioned the risk of default which emphasises how these two factors are interrelated. The
issues on the ability to service the facility were centred mainly on the poor business cash
flows, unexplained fluctuations in cash flows and the inability to show evidence of sustained
profits over a period of time as well as the feasibility of the proposed repayment plan.
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Stressing on the importance of cash flow to credit access a participant made the following
observation ...cashflow is very essential. It tells us about the ability to repay the loan ...cash
is the blood that flows through the business. So if the cash inflow is not looking good, it is a
sign of potential problem. Having said that we take into consideration any associated
seasonality in the cashflows.
Table 40: Most 1m ortant Reasons for Turnin
Factors %
Poor 86%
Serviceability
High Risk .J .J .J .J 86%
No Business .J .J .J 57%
Plans
Inadequate 43%
equity
Others 29%
The respondents also highlighted the need for businesses to be able to demonstrate that cash
flows and profits shown to the lender are sustainable by showing a track record of good
levels of profits over a given period of time as may be required by the bank. In the words of
one participant...there should be a track record of sustained profits over a period and if
there were some losses in between that have to be explained satisfactorily. It is thus essential
that any short falls in cash flows or profits be satisfactorily explained as this may be due to
seasonality problem depending on the line of business. Such seasonal fluctuations may not
be a big problem as lenders often tend to schedule repayment to fit into cash flow cycle of
each business.
The 86% of participants who talked about the high risk of default did not only relate this to
the poor credit history of the business owners but also, external factors such as the political
and economic uncertainties as noted by this participant...there may be some political and
economic factors as well. For instance, businesses involved transport sector may suffer from
fuel price rise or even strikes which could affect their repayment ability. The riskiness of the
business in terms of the sector in which it operates and the general business environment as
well as the lender's own expectations about the sector's performance over the term of the
loan and how that might affect the particular business concerned were all issues raised by the
participants as potential barriers to credit access for SEs. One participant pointed to the fact
that most SEs are one man businesses and the personal indebtedness of the owner can also
affect the businesses chances of obtaining credit. He noted that...small business owners
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sometimes are to blame because they have personal debts or personal financial difficulties ...
though the business may be a good one you cannot lend to them.
More than half of all the participants (57%) also considered the lack of business plans as a
main constraint to credit access. This was a participant's response when asked what he
thought are the most important barriers to credit access ... they don't have good business plans
that give a clear projection of where the business is going and how they will get there. If you
can't demonstrate this then no one will give you a loan. A good business plan contains
information that can help lenders determine if a business is realistically profitable and worth
funding. The absence of business plans or failure to prepare them well may deny borrowers
the opportunity to sell their business in a manner that will capture the attention of lenders.
Business plans are particularly essential when banks are dealing with newly established
businesses that do not have any track record to rely on for credit. The business plan provides
projections of cash flow and profitability and details on how such projections will be met.
This allows the lender to determine if the business is sustainably viable and whether
repayments will be feasible.
Another important barrier to credit access as identified by 43% of the participants is how
much the business owner is contributing to the venture for which the funding is being
sought. One of these participants explained that...every business must demonstrate its
personal commitment by contributing a portion of the amount required so that the bank
doesn't shoulder all the risk. So if you came to us and say I need to buy an office apartment
costing £100,000. I have 50,000 can you lend me the remaining 50,OOO?I will be more
interested in your story. The owner's contribution is not only seen as a demonstration of
commitment to the venture but also it shows the confidence the owner has in its prospects
and finally it is used as a way of sharing the potential risk of default. The danger is that
borrowers who have not committed reasonable amounts themselves to the business have
nothing to lose should the business fail. This could trigger moral hard and eventually lead to
default. The above is usually a bigger problem for start-up businesses.
Finally, about 29% of participants also identified other barriers to SE credit access. These
included the relationship with the potential borrower - whether he is an existing client or
new client and the level of trust developed over the years. They also mentioned the nature of
the business - that is whether it is a start-up or an already established business and also, they
did talk about not providing collateral as a possible barrier. The absence of collateral they
noted does not cut off the borrower as they are considered for other unsecured facilities
provided by the bank. Even where clients don't qualify for any of their unsecured facilities
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the participants noted that clients may still be considered under various government
guarantee schemes run by the various banks for SMEs. Therefore it is only when all these
avenues fail that a client may be denied credit if they fail to provide their own security. The
interviews thus revealed that the lack of collateral did not feature prominently as a barrier to
credit access and this is in conformity with the quantitative findings where the lack of
collateral was found to be the least important of the four factors extracted from the factor
analysis. Furthermore none of the participants said anything about property registration when
asked to identify the barriers to small businesses' access to credit and given earlier findings
that both registered and unregistered properties are accepted, it can be concluded that the
absence of registered title to property is not a hindrance to credit access for SEs.
7.6 Summary
The aim of this chapter was to use interview data to validate the quantitative finding on
property registration and credit access in both Ghana and England. The findings discussed
above show that in most cases the interview findings were similar to the findings of the
quantitative study. In Ghana for instance the interviews confirmed that most lenders
particularly UB-based lenders do always require collateral before lending to SE and that
landed property is most preferred in practice though ideally others would have preferred
more liquid collateral. On the eligibility of collateral there was a confirmation that UBs do
insist on accepting only registered properties but that registration does not affect the loan
terms offered. The results from England were no different as discussed above. Having
discussed all the findings it is time to summarise the whole research and make conclusions as
well as recommendations that could be essential for policy and the future of research in this
field. These will be the subject matter of the next chapter.
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CHAPTERS
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter provides the summary of the whole study as well as the main conclusions
derived from the findings. Also outlined are the recommendations and contribution to
knowledge.
S.l Summary of study
The background to this study has been clearly outlined in chapter one which laid the main
foundation for this work. This chapter identified the main research questions that required
investigation, the aim and objectives of the study as well as the scope and justification of the
study amongst others. In chapter one, the immense role of small enterprises in economic
development around the globe was acknowledged. However, it was realised that despite their
importance, small businesses especially in the developing world are faced with several
challenges which hinder their growth and ability to playa leading role in the fight against
poverty. Critical amongst these challenges is the problem of access to credit. Whilst some
have linked this problem to the lack of collateral, others have argued that even the poor in
the developing countries own landed property in one form or the other that could serve as
collateral. According to the second school of thought, the available landed property
constitutes dead capital due to the lack of registered titles over them which is perceived to
make ownership of such property insecure and unacceptable for use as collateral. Property
registration is thus being promoted all over the developing world on the basis that it
guarantees ownership security, unlocks the capital potential of land by making it eligible for
use as collateral for credit which then paves the way for greater investment activities and
economic growth. The study thus sought to investigate the nature of the credit constraint and
the influence of property registration on credit access.
Chapter two reviewed the literature on property rights, property ownership security and its
economic implications. In chapter three, the researcher reviewed the literature on the concept
of landed property registration - the various systems, its economic significance and
limitations. Having done that, chapter four provided the theoretical framework for the study.
The theories of market equilibrium, information asymmetry and credit constraint were the
relevant economic theories adopted to provide the theoretical underpinnings of this research.
There was also the need to discuss the research methodology adopted in the conduct of this
research which was the focus of chapter five. This chapter broadly reviewed the available
methodologies, strategies, sampling and data collection methods amongst others before
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providing an outline of the specific ones used in this study. Having done that, the results
obtained were split into two. The quantitative results were presented and discussed in chapter
six whilst the qualitative results were discussed in chapter seven.
8.2 Conclusions
This section outlines the main findings of the study, and their possible implications using the
objectives as the themes. In what follows, the main findings of the study are outlined.
8.2.1 Nature of the SE Credit Constraint in Ghana
Access to credit remains the most important problem of a majority of small enterprises
which often exhibit a high level of desire for credit. In Ghana these enterprises are actively
involved in the activities of the formal credit market contrary to the opinion that they rely on
informal sources of funding for their business activities. The demand for credit amongst SEs
is not associated with gender, level of education or size of the business. Hence, SEs
irrespective of their associated characteristics have a high demand for credit. The desire for
credit thus cut across all the types of SEs. However, SEs are selective when it comes to
which lending institution to seek credit from. A majority prefer to seek credit from the MFIs.
The amount that borrowers want to borrow influences their decision of the lending institution
to approach. Businesses seeking relatively larger amounts select the UBs whilst those
seeking smaller amounts go to the MFIs. This is an indication that MFIs are limited in the
amount of funds they can lend due probably to limitedness of resources.
A majority of the SEs are credit constrained - they receive a significantly lower loan amount
than what they apply for or want. The amount that businesses want to borrow was associated
with their size in terms of the average amount of cash they generate per month. Therefore,
most of these business owners are genuine and have no intentions of deliberately defaulting
in repayment as there is evidence that they only borrow in accordance with what they can
afford. Lending to them should therefore not be considered as too risky and unprofitable.
The possibility of a small business being credit constrained is associated with the amount of
cash generated per month and the amount applied for. Businesses generating larger sums of
cash are less likely to be credit constrained and vice versa. The incidence and degree of
credit constraint is also higher amongst businesses applying for relatively smaller amounts.
These are the very small/microbusinesses. The incidence of credit constraint was also higher
amongst businesses that seek credit from UBs and this is probably why most SEs prefer to
approach MFIs. Evidence from this research also shows that access to credit is not reliable
for both constrained and unconstrained businesses. This means that even businesses that
reported no constraint at the time of the research could encounter constraints the next time
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they attempt to obtain credit. The most frequently reported cause of the SE credit constraint
is the lack of collateral followed by poor credit history and cash flow problems. The absence
of registered property documents has not feature prominently amongst small business owners
as a cause of the constraint. Quiet intriguing is the fact that majority of small businesses that
did not apply for credit have also shown symptoms of credit constraint. Unlike the loan
applicants, the most prominent reason why most of the non-applicants are constrained is the
cost of credit followed by the lack of tailor-made facilities. The constraint encountered by
small businesses in almost all instances emanate from supply side barriers.
8.2.2 Property registration and credit access
Ghana
Having established that the credit constraint problem amongst SEs in Ghana emanates
almost entirely from the supply-side, this became the foundation for a supply-side study
which investigated the influence of property registration on credit access as well as the
relative importance of property registration in determining success of SE credit applications.
In most instances, lenders in Ghana do not grant a credit request unless collateral is provided
and this was true for both MFIs and UBs. However, the UBs are more heavily reliant on
collateral than MFIs. The reason why most lenders require collateral before granting credit to
SE is due to the perceived high risk involved, the need for a back-up and to motivate
repayment and institutional policy. However, it has been established that there are some
extreme exceptions to the requirement for collateral depending to on the personality, social
status or profile of the borrower as well as the personal relationship of the borrower with top
management within the lending institution. The provision of collateral per se is regarded as
insufficient to trigger credit supply as there are more important factors influencing lenders
decision on whether to lend or not. This is attributed to reasons such as foreclosure related
problems and reputational issues associated with the habit of always foreclosing on collateral.
The major reason however, is the fact that lenders are more concerned about other more
critical factors like the ability to repay the required credit, the relationship with the borrower
and borrowers' character.
England
In England, lenders also uphold the importance of collateral in SE lending. However, they
are less stringent in their requirement for collateral as there are several unsecure credit
facilities that borrowers are offered. Furthermore, there are a number of government support
programs run through these lenders which permit them to lend to SEs without needing to ask
for collateral. As such, SEs in England can in most instances borrow without needing to
provide collateral. The decision to take collateral depends amongst other things on the
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amount and risk involved. Thus, even though collateral may sometimes be necessary, lenders
here do not regard its provision as sufficient to obtain credit due mainly to the fact that doing
so will amount to being an irresponsible lender and a breach of lending code.
8.2.3 Preferred forms of collateral when dealing with small businesses
Ghana
In practice, UBs prefer landed property to other forms of collateral even though ideally some
would have preferred cash and other liquid forms of security such as fixed deposits due the
ease with which such collateral could be perfected and foreclosed relative to landed property.
Landed property is preferred in practice however, because it is the most widely available and
its value to borrowers plays a bigger role in ensuring repayment than other forms of
collateral. The findings on MFIs was inconclusive since the quantitative results showed that
the most preferred forms of collateral are landed property and cash/near cash collateral
contrary to the qualitative results which indicate that only cash and near cash forms of
collateral are most preferred by MFIs with no mention made of landed property. Based on
theory it appears the qualitative result is more reliable. Though it cannot be concluded that
landed property is most preferred form of collateral for MFIs, it is true that they do accept
landed property in granting SE credit where the need arises.
Eng/and
Generally, lenders regard cash and its equivalents as well as landed property as the most
preferred forms of collateral when dealing with SEs. The kind of collateral that is most
preferred at any point in time however, varies depending on the loan amount required and
the type of facility being sought for.
In terms of landed property lenders in both countries generally regard it as most preferred.
However, both sets of lenders showed difference in preference for other forms of collateral.
8.2.4 Eligibility of landed property for use as collateral
Ghana
Though a majority of lenders consider registration as necessary to make landed property
eligible for use as collateral, there are variations between UBs and MFIs. The UBs accept
landed property only when it is registered but the MFIs are not too much bothered about
whether the property is registered or not provided the borrower can provide other alternative
documentary evidence of ownership (statutory declaration, allocation paper and unregistered
deeds). The eligibility of unregistered property varies based on the type of lender and kind of
property documents accepted. It also depends on the level of preference the lender has for
landed property. Those with higher preferences for property disagree more that unregistered
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property is eligible for use as collateral. Furthermore, lenders who find property ownership
verification much easier generally do not regard unregistered property as acceptable
collateral. The acceptance of only registered property significantly made ownership
verification easier. The acceptance of only registered property is also associated with a lower
incidence of past collateral repossession and foreclosure problems.
There are some attributes of landed property that are very critical to lenders and cannot be
ignored whilst others are important but not necessary when accepting property for collateral
purposes and could thus be ignored. The very critical attributes of property that UBs cannot
ignore include: availability of documentary evidence of ownership, market value, location,
insurance cover and evidence that the property is registered. MFIs on the other hand consider
insurance and property registration as attributes that can be ignored though important to a
certain extent. Both UBs and MFIs do not accept family owned properties due to the
likelihood of encountering resistance from some family members during default. Other
issues of concern are the saleability of the property the existence of encumbrances.
Eng/and
The issue of whether or not a property is registered is of less concern to lenders when taking
such property as collateral. Majority accept both registered and unregistered property and
this is due to the relatively high level of security enjoyed by both registered and unregistered
property owners. Here too, the perception on the ease of property ownership verification is
influenced by whether the lender accepts registered or unregistered property. Of critical
importance to lenders when taking landed property are the provision of documentary
evidence of ownership, location, market value and insurance but property registration was
perceived as an attribute that can be ignored. Lenders are also highly concerned about not
having prior claim to the property due to encumbrances already on the property and others
such as planning permission.
Lenders in Ghana generally placed higher value on property registration than their
counterparts in England probably due to the high prevalence of ownership disputes in Ghana.
8.2.5 Property registration and loan conditions
The conclusions here reflect the findings from both Ghana and England. The acceptability of
landed property is enhanced by registration especially amongst UBs but the influence of
registration is limited to that alone in that, there is no evidence that the possession of
registered property reduces interest rates or fees that the lenders charge. Neither does it cause
lenders to offer borrowers larger loan amounts or different repayment schedules. All lenders
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irrespective of the kind of property they deemed acceptable (registered or unregistered) do
not offer loan condition based on the kind of property the borrower possesses. The loan
conditions offered are rather influenced by other factors such as the loan amount,
relationship with borrowers and risk amongst others. Despite the fact that lenders in Ghana
and England exhibit different perception regarding the acceptability of unregistered property,
the loan conditions offered by both set of lenders are not influenced by the possession of
registered landed property.
8.2.6 Why lenders turn down SEs credit applications
Ghana
Several factors are responsible for the credit constraint experienced by small enterprises. The
most prominent of these identified by lenders in Ghana are the poor repayment ability, high
risk, lack of collateral, the high level of informality, the nature of the business and poor
management capacity. The lack of registered property titles even though has emerged as a
less important cause of the credit constraint than most other factors such as the ability to
repay, risk and the lack of collateral. Out of 14 possible reasons for declining SE loan
requests, the lack of registered property titles was rated as 11th important reason and was
considered as a reason that mayor may not lead to a decision to disapprove a loan
application depending on the extent to which the more critical criteria are met. It should be
reiterated that the absence of registered title does not automatically cause lenders to decline a
loan request. It only becomes a barrier when landed property is required in a particular
instance to trigger approval of an application. In such an instance, the absence of registered
titles would cause UBs not to accept the property and hence declining to approve the request
for credit. Thus though the lack of registration could be a barrier to credit access, it accounts
for a small proportion of the problem and emphasis should not be placed too much on it. In
the case of the MFIs however, the absence of such property do not constitute a barrier to
credit access since they are able to rely on other mechanisms to encourage loan repayment
and recover outstanding debts. Having established that the absence of property registration is
not a major cause of the credit constraint amongst SEs, the problem could be tackled without
embarking on the costly process of property registration. This is not to say that there is no
need for registration but the purpose of doing so should be rightly placed.
Eng/and
In England however, the lack of registered property titles was considered by lenders as
unimportant in explaining the difficulty that SEs may encounter in their quest to obtain credit.
The factors responsible for the failure of SEs to obtain credit ranged from high risk, poor
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financial strength, the nature of the business and lack of collateral in a decreasing order of
importance. Contrary to the argument of de Soto (2000) that the developed world achieved
its developed status because of property registration which allowed businesses to exploit the
capital potential of property, there was no evidence from the study in England that property
registration influences credit access. This argument should thus not be used as a yardstick for
the introduction of registration the developing countries. Collateral is just one of the factors
that lenders may consider when granting credit and property registration is of much less
importance to lenders than the others identified above.
8.3 Recommendations
The findings of this study have a number of implications for policy as well as further
research in the topic area.
8.3.1 Recommendation for policy
On the bases of these findings, there is an urgent need for interventions to tackle the problem
of credit access. Since the credit constraint amongst SE in Ghana is almost entirely a supply
side problem, policies should target lenders. Policies that will enhance the competitiveness
of the financial sector could make lenders less stringent in their requirements and hence
make it easier for businesses to obtain credit. Encouraging competition amongst lenders
could also drive down the cost of credit which is one of the major causes of the credit
constraint. There is the need to encourage the spread of MFls across the length and breadth
of the country since the success rate of credit applications is higher for such institutions.
Furthermore, since the incidence and degree of credit constraint is higher amongst the very
small business generating just a few hundred Ghana Cedis per month, they should be the
focus of any intervention schemes.
Government's support/or MFIs
The findings call for more government support for the MFls for two basic reasons. First is
the revelation that MFI do not rely much on landed property when lending to SEs and that
even when they do demand landed property, they accept both registered and unregistered
properties. Secondly, most of the SEs in Ghana use the MFls as their main source of formal
credit to fund their business activities. Hence, the absence of registration will have no
consequence on access to credit for most SEs. The few SEs that seek credit from VBs do so
because they require relatively larger amounts than they are able to obtain from MFls.
Therefore any government scheme that will channel resources to MFls for on-lending to SEs
will be a further boost to credit access. Enhancing the capacity of MFls to meet the credit
needs of SEs is particularly urgent since the study shows a higher incidence of credit
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constraint amongst those seeking credit from UBs relative to others who approach MFls for
credit. Given the fact that most properties are not registered yet, government's support for
MFIs will ensure that its potential impact on credit access is not felt by small businesses.
That said, it should be acknowledged that MFls tend to charge very high interest rates to
compensate for the risk of lending to SEs. Supporting MFls with funds for on lending to SEs
could still expose such businesses to affordability problems and perpetuate the constraint
problem unless government subsidises such credit facilities. Encouraging competition
amongst institutions could however, force the cost of credit downwards to take away the
burden of subsidies from the already overstretched budget of the state. In addition, most of
the credit applicants in this study preferred the MFIS to UBs despite the above cost
implication. This appears to suggest that these businesses do not consider the current level of
cost as excessive. Therefore, as long as cost remains within the current level, the benefits of
taking credit will outweigh its associated cost, businesses will continue to demand credit and
there will be no need for state subsidies.
Government's guaranteefor loans granted to SEs
Alternatively, programs such as the enterprise guarantee scheme in England could be
replicated in Ghana where the government undertakes to provide a guarantee for loans
granted by the main banks to SEs. Such a program will make UBs less stringent in their
collateral requirements without compromising the whole screening processes. This will
enhance credit access for businesses that approach the UBs.
Training for SE owners
Proprietors of SEs also encounter several non-credit related challenges which often tend to
affect their access to credit. Prominent amongst these are the high level of informality in the
sector (the inability to keep simple records of transactions as well as their non-patronage of
financial institutions for savings and other purposes) and the poor management capacity.
These proprietors therefore equally require training on basic book keeping. Government and
NGOs working with small businesses should make it a priority to empower such people with
basic literacy and managerial skills to run successful businesses. These will help reduce the
information asymmetry in the credit market and increase the confidence of lenders in such
borrowers with positive consequences for credit access. Promoting the integration of most
SE owners into the formal financial system is also key to enhancing credit access. A
combination of educational programs for SEs and government support scheme operated
through the financial institutions will help develop a savings culture where people will stop
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keeping cash under their pillows. This will help many people to build a profile that can
provide useful information signals to the banks in taking credit decision.
Documenting property ownership
Furthermore, it has been established that the lack of any form of documentation on landed
property ownership makes such properties unacceptable to both UBs and MFIs. Hence, the
current state of affairs where ownership of most properties is not documented at all is
something to worry about. Indeed, wide spread documentation can be achieved without
necessarily embarking on the costly process of property registration. The existing informal
documents such as allocation notes and statutory declaration should be standardised and
given full legal recognition as this will make them acceptable to lenders. Since multiple sales
cannot be detected from such informal documents, it should be made mandatory for local
chiefs to keep records of all plots of land sold within their jurisdiction to enable them avoid
selling the same property to different people. Culprits should be penalised to serve as a
deterrent to others. This will however be difficult to implement for family or individual owned
properties.
8.3.2 Recommendations for industry
Co-operation between lenders
The UBs and MFIs should also be encouraged to collaborate in providing funding for SEs.
Since MFIs tend to have a much closer working relationship with SEs than the UBs, the two
sets of institutions could devise a scheme where the UBs support the MFIs with funds for on
lending to SEs in return for some agreed percentage of the returns. This collaboration will do
away with the need for government intervention in the manner proposed above. Furthermore,
small business owners have demonstrated in this study that lending to them is profitable and
not too risky as banks may perceive. Hence, if UBs do not want to collaborate with MFIs,
they could also establish their own subsidiaries to deal solely with the small businesses based
on the techniques used by MFIs.
8.3.3 Recommendations for future studies
This research did not provide answers to all the questions on SE credit access in Ghana. The
areas that should be explored further through future research are as follows.
• On the nature of the SE credit constraint problem, future research should focus on a
much larger sample drawn from either the same city or more than one major city in
the country. This will help to determine whether these findings are applicable to
other parts of the country. Such a study should use an extensive range of
demographic and economic characteristics of loan applicants to identify what
199
determines the success rate of loan applications. Further demand side studies could
be conducted on the effect of property registration on credit access with a much
bigger sample and the results compared to the findings of this study.
• Given that the sample size used in this study was less than the minimum
recommended for factor analysis, some variables as explained earlier were not
included in the analysis. Therefore, the final factor analysis did not involve all
relevant factors and does not explain the whole problem. Future research should
consider a broader sample size and a much wider range of variables. These variables
could be identified through both literature review and also conducting in-depth
interviews with key stakeholders. Based on this a questionnaire could then be
designed around the identified variables for a large sample and factor analysis used
to identify the underlying components.
• Even though lenders do not offer registered property owners better loan conditions
compared to unregistered property owners, there is evidence that borrowers are
made to directly bear the cost of verifying property ownership. There is also
evidence that the verification time is longer for unregistered property. Since the cost
of credit emerged as one of the main barriers to credit access, future research should
focus on estimating the cost of verifying property ownership (for both registered and
unregistered property) in terms of the money and time spent in doing so. If one can
estimate the proportion of the total cost of borrowing accounted for by the cost of
verifying property ownership, it will provide a much clearer direction for policy and
debate on the relationship between registration and credit access.
• The main reason why VBs refuse to accept unregistered property is the legal
implication. Further studies could explore how MFIs manage to find sufficient
protection in the acceptance of unregistered property and this could provide useful
lessons for the VBs and change their attitude to such properties. For instance, there
is the need to find out whether MFls taking unregistered property are able to defend
themselves in court when ownership disputes arise during default.
• Future research should also look to investigate if there is a differential effect of the
deed and title registration systems on credit access.
• Furthermore, other business owners (such as building contractors, transport and
hotel service providers) that are quiet visible in the Kumasi metropolis were not
considered. These tend to be larger businesses in terms of the income they generate.
Future studies should thus focus on such businesses with larger income generation
capacity.
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8.4 Originality and Contribution to knowledge
Existing studies on SE credit access in Ghana often fall short of revealing the true nature of
the problem. This study has provided insights into the nature of the credit constraint problem
faced by SEs in Ghana. This has revealed the particular segments of the market that should
be the focus of government policy. Furthermore, even though previous studies have
examined the link between landed property registration and access to credit across the
developing world, they tend to be only demand side studies. Supply side studies are very rare
and no study has considered both the supply and demand sides together. This particular study
therefore, did not only approach the subject matter mainly from the supply side of the credit
market but also included a demand side element. The demand side looked at the nature of the
credit constraint and borrowers perception on the causes of the constraint which was then
complemented by the supply side study on the influence of registration on credit access.
Since there are no studies that have investigated the link between landed property
registration and access to credit on a comparative basis between the developing and
developed countries, the comparative approach adopted in this research has permitted the
identification of differences and similarities between the developed and developing countries.
In addition, the existing studies have primarily been interested in households and the
agricultural sector whilst this study focused on non-agricultural based SEs.
Apart from the fact that the findings of this research could inform policy decisions on
mitigating the credit constraint problem, there are other recommendations for further studies
that provide directions to studying the property registration and credit access debate in the
future. This research has also led to a number journal and conference publications (see list
below) which have contributed to the debate on the subject matter.
REFEREED JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS
• Domeher, D. (2012) Land Rights and SME Credit: Evidence from Ghana,
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Investment in Africa, Agricultural Finance Review, 72(1), pp. 87-103.
• Domeher, D. and Abdulai, R. T. (2012a) Access to Credit in the Developing World:
Does Land Registration Matter, Third World Quarterly, 33(1), pp. 161-175.
• Abdulai, R. T. & Domeher, D. (2011) Land Registration Per Se Cannot Guarantee
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BOOKS
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS IN GHANA
LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY
HENRY COTTON BUILDING, WEBSTER STREET, L3 2ET,
LIVERPOOL, UNITED KINGDOM
Please tick this box to indicate that you have read the participant information sheet attached and that
you are happy to complete this questionnaire [ ]
I. Age
Below 30yrs [ ] 30-4Syrs [ ] 46-60yrs [ ] above 60yrs [ ]
2. Gender
Male [ ] Female [ ]
3. Level of educational.
Basic education [ ] Secondary education [ ] Tertiary education [ ] No formal education [ ]
Vocational and technical education [ ]
Other (specify) .
4. Number of dependants
BelowS[ ] S-IO[ ]+10 [ ]
S. Main occupation ..
6. Number of Employees
BelowS[ ] S-IO[ ] +10[ ]
7. What is the average amount of cash you can generate from your main business per month?
Below GHCSOO[ ] GHC SOO-1000 [ ] GHCIOOI-ISOO [ ] GHCISOO [ ]
8. What is your average monthly expenditure
Below GHC 300 [ ] GHC 300 - SOO[ ] GHC SOI-700 [ ] +GHC 700 [
9. What will you say is the most important problem facing your business
......................................................................................................................................................
10. Have you applied for a loan in the last 24 months? Yes [ ] No [ ]
If No, go to questions 14 and 17
II. Which of the following institutions did you apply to
Universal Bank [ ] Rural Bank [ ] Savings and Loans [ ]
Other (specify) ..
12. How much did you apply for?
Below GHC SOO[ ] GHC SOO- 1000 [ ] GHC 1001- 2000 ] +GHC 2000 [ ]
13. Did you received the full amount applied for
Yes [] No [ ]
14. I am able to obtain credit anytime I need it
Strongly Disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Neutral [ ] Agree [ ] strongly agree [ ]
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15. What proportion of the amount applied for were you given?
Zero [ ] >zero <50% [ ] 50% - 75% [ ] >76% <100% [ ] 100% [
16. What was the main reason why you didn't obtain the full amount wanted or applied for?
17. Main reason for not applying for credit in the last 24 months.
Don't need it [ ] don't know where to get it [ ] Think I don't qualify [ ] Takes too long to
process [] don't possess required documents [ ] Can't afford interest & other charges [ ]
Couldn't get one with terms that meets my specific requirements [ ]
Otherspecify) .
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BANK OFFICIALS
LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY
HENRY COTTON BUILDING. WEBSTER STREET, 1.3 2ET,
LIVERPOOL, UNITED KINGDOM
Please tick this (.J) box to indicate that you have read the participant information sheet attached and
that you are happy to complete this questionnaire [ ]
SECTION A (About Respondent)
I. Type of institution
Universal Bank [ Savings & Loans [ ] Rural bank [
2. Age of respondent
Below 30yrs [ ] 30·45yrs [ ] above 45yrs [
3. Gender
Male [ ] Female [ ]
4. Current position
Credit officer [ ] Loans advisor [ ] Branch manager [ ] Loans manager [ ] Business manager [ ]
5. How many years of experience do you have working in your current role
Below5yrs[ ] 5-10yrs[] above IOyrs [ ]
6. Number of years at current institution
Below 5yrs [] 5·1Oyrs [] above IOyrs
SCETION B: Attitude to Collateral as a Requirement for Small Business Credit
7. To what extent do you regard collateral as a necessary requirement when dealing with small
businesses?
Not necessary [ ] Seldom necessary [ ] Mostly necessary [ ] Always necessary [ ]
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8.: The ability to provide collateral is not sufficient to help small businesses obtain credit
Strongly disagree [ ] disagree [ ] Neutral [ ] Agree [ ] strongly agree [ ]
9. Please rank the following possible forms of collateral in order of preference on a scale of 1 to
4 (where 1 = Least preferred, 2 = preferred, 3 ... highly preferred and 4 ... most
preferred). Tick (...J) the appropriate box.
Ranking
Forms of collateral 1 2 3 4
Landed property
Cash/fixed deposits
General Goods
(stock)
Automobiles
Machinery & tools
Account Receivables
Shareslbonds
life policy
T-bills
third party guarantee
SECTION C - Eligibility of Landed Property for Collateral Purposes (the following questions
relate to a situation where landed property is to be used as collateral).
10. Do you always require documentary proof of property ownership?
Yes [J No []
11. Landed property can be used as collateral even if it is not formally registered with the Land
Registry
Strongly disagree [ ] disagree [ ] Neutral [ ] Agree [ ] strongly agree [ ]
12. Where documentary proof of ownership is required for collateral purposes, which documents
are acceptable to you? (Tick all that apply).
Unregistered title deed/indenture [ ] registered title deed/indenture [ ] land title certificate [ ]
Land allocation note [ ] All of the above [ ] others (please specify) ..
13. How easy is it to verify ownership of property brought to you for use as collateral
extremely not easy [ ] not easy [ ] not sure [ ] easy [ ] very easy [ ]
14. Are you able to verify whether or not the property has already been offered as to another
lender? Yes [ ] No [ ]
15. Has there ever been an instance were you were unable to take possession of property pledged
to you as collateral because someone else other than the borrower claimed to be the owner?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
16. Ifan individual wants to use a landlbuilding owned by the whole family (family landlbuilding)
as collateral for a loan, will that be acceptable?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
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17. The following are some factors that lenders may consider when taking land-based collateral.
Please rank them in order of importance from 1 - 6 (where ranks above S mean the
attribute is critically important & CANNOT BE IGNORED, from 3 - 4 mean factor is
important but MAY BE IGNORED and below 3 means the attribute not important &
SHOULD BE COMPLETELY IGNORED). Please tick (..J) the appropriate box to indicate
how you rank each factor.
Ranks
Important Attributes of Land-based Collateral I 2 3 4 5 6
Location of property
Market value of property
Kind of land rights (leasehold or freehold)
Land Insurance
Registration of the property with the land registry
Availability of documentary proof of ownership
Please use the scenario described below to respond to each statement in question 18.
Given two borrowers who exhibit the same characteristics in terms of credit worthiness except
that one possesses a property registered at the lands registry whilst the other possesses an
unregistered property, please indicate whether you will treat the two differently in terms of the
conditions you offer them.
18. Based on the scenario above, please tick (..J) the box that corresponds with the response which
best describes how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.
Responses
Fully Disagree Neutral Agree Fully
Disagree Agree
Borrowers able to provide registered property pay
lower interest rates on loans than those who provide
unregistered property.
Borrowers able to provide registered property pay
lower fees/commissions than those who provide
unregistered property.
Borrowers with registered property titles are allowed
to borrow larger amounts than those with unregistered
_property titles
Borrowers with registered property are offered
different repayment time relative to those with
unregistered landed property
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SECTION D (Reasons for turning down loan applications)
19. Below are possible reasons why a small business' loan application may be turned down.
Please rank these reasons in order of importance from 1 to 14 (where 14 is the most
important reason for turning down the application and 1 is an unimportant reason for
doing so). Please tick (v) the appropriate box to indicate how you rank each reason. Tick only
one box for each reason
Please tick (v) the appropriate box to indicate how you
Reasons for turning down small rank each reason stated in the column to the left.
business loan applications
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Lack oflandlbuilding (to be used as
collateral)
Failure to fulfil payment obligations in
the past (Past default)
Poor cash flow
Low profitability
Lack of business records
Customer is still new to the bank
Lack of required documents
(eg. IDs, proof of address, bank
statements, cash flow)
Lack of guarantor
Bank doesn't finance the kind of
business for which credit is wanted
Lack of registered property title
Uncertainty about business environment,
personal circumstances and consequent
effect on future repayment ability
High transaction cost involved
Not experienced in running business
Little or no personal financial
contribution to business (Borrowers
equity).
Thank You
Contact Daniel: +44 (0) 1512314149
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR BANK OFFICIAL
LIVERPOOL JOliN MOORES UNIVERSITY
Title of Research: Secure Property Rights and Access to Credit
This interview is being carried out as part of a PhD research at the above institution. The purpose of
the interview is to solicit your opinions on the findings from an earlier survey carried out. It is
expected to last for about 45 minutes.
1. Landlbuilding emerged as the most preferred over all other forms of collateral/security; do
you agree and why?
2. Will you say collateral is always a necessary requirement in granting SE credit and why?
3. Does the provision of collateral guarantee the approval ofa loan request? Please explain your
answer.
4. Under what circumstance(s) will you NOT accept a landlbuilding for use as collateral?
5. What issues concern you most when taking land-based collateral
6. How do you verify ownership ofa landlbuilding being presented for collateral purposes?
• Which documents do you require as proof of landlbuilding ownership?
• Does verification take place before or after the loan approval and how does this affect
the speed with which applications are processed
• How easy or difficult is it to verify land ownership
• How long does it take to verify ownership
• About how much in monetary terms does it cost?
• Who bears the cost of verifying ownership?
7. Given two borrowers (A and B) of the same characteristics except that 'A' possesses a
landlbuilding that is registered at the lands registry whilst the other possesses a landlbuilding
That is not registered at the lands registry, will you treat them differently in terms of the loan
terms they are offered? (commission/fees, interest charges, amount and repayment time)
8. What do you think are the most important reasons for turning down SE loan applications and
why?
Thank You
Contact: Tel. +44 (0) 151 231 4149
220
CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS
LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY
CONSENT FORM
Title of Research: Secure Property Rights and Access to Credit
Name of Researcher: Daniel Domeher
School/faculty: School of the Built Environment
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information provided for the above study. I have
had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered
satisfactorily
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time,
without giving a reason and that this will not affect my legal rights.
3. I understand that any personal information collected during the study will be anonymised and
remain confidential
4. I agree to take part in the above interview
5. I understand that the interview will be audio recorded and I am happy to proceed
6. I understand that parts of our conversation may be used verbatim in future publications or
presentations but that such quotes will be anonymised.
Date Signature
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY
Title of Research: Secure Property Rights and Access to Credit
Name of Researcher: Daniel Domeher
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether to take part or not, it
is important that you understand why the research is being done and what it involves. Please take time
to read the following information. Do not hesitate to ask for clarification where necessary.
1. What is the purpose of the study?
This survey is being carried out as part of a PhD research at the above institution. It is argued that by
registering property into the national database, the evidence of registration enhances the ability of the
property owners to access credit from financial institutions. With easy access to credit, property
owners are able to undertake various investments to increase income levels and reduce poverty. The
aim of this research is to examine the relationship between land registration and access to credit on a
comparative basis between Ghana and England.
2. Do I have to take part?
No. Participation in this survey is purely VOLUNTARY. It is your right to decide whether or not to
take part. You are free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.
3. Are there any risks I benefits involved?
There are no known risks associated with completing this questionnaire. The questionnaire could be
completed at a time and place convenient to you. A copy of the results of this study could be made
available to you if so desired.
4. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?
Your confidentiality is fully assured in this study. Your personal details will not be required.
Information provided will be kept in a form that will not permit anyone to identify who provided it.
Contact Daniel: +44 (0)1512314149
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0.72%
----
1.18%
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4.98% 0 1
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2.26%
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0.48%
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19.23 % 0
19.23 % 0
----
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Document
Internals\ \GHMFll
Node
Nodes\ \Attitude to Collateral Yes
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient
---c--:-:----,---::----::--:-::--.,.---~--,---. - ---- ..
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason
Yes
Yes
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors Yes
more critical
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\Character
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\relatlonship
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors ~ -
more critical\the business
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary\Reason Yes
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary\Reason\Policy No
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes No
Necessary\Reason\Relationship
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes No
Necessary\Reason\suitable collateral not available
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property Yes
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership Yes
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed Yes
property\Ownership\documentation
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed No
property\Ownership\documentation\both
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\family No
property
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Saleability Yes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Valuation Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral Yes
Nodes\ \Preferred Collateral\preference in practice Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near cash Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near cash\ReasonYes
Nodes\ \Preferred Collateral\preference In practice\cash and near
cash\Reason\ease of foreclosure
No
Nodes\ \Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near
cash\Reason\Easy to perfect
No
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Yes 13.18 % 1
Agrelate Coverlle Number Of Codln,
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Number 01 Users
Codln.
Nodes\ \Preferred Collateral\preference In practice\others
0.90%
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference In practice\others\guarantors
Nodes\ \Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\no capacity to
handle p::_ro",p7-e;_:rt.!_y-:-c---::---:;- ._-:- --, .,-- __
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference In practice\others\reason
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\reason\no suitableN'O -
collateral available
N;des\\Preferred ColiateraT\prefe~e ~ practic~~ther~\Relationship No
No 3.38% 3
No
Ves 7.17%
7.17%
o
2
1.18%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit
Ves 4.91 %
4.91 %
Ves 7.89% o
o
2
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount\No No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time Ves
No 1.03%
1.94%
1.94%
1.03% o
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time\No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees
Nodes\ \Registered property benefit\Lower fees\No
Ves
No 1.94%
6.57% o
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates\No
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications
Ves
Ves
3.12%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High Level Informality Ves
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High Levellnformality\lack
appropriate documents and record keeping
No
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Others No
o
Nodes\\Turnlng down Credit applications\Risk Ves
0.68%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability Ves
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\The business Ves
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\The business\ Type No
Person
Nodes\\GHMFI1 No
Internals\ \GHMFI2
Node
o
No
1.94% o
3.12% o
0.91 %
1.83%
0.68%
0.68% o
100.00%
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral Ves 22.26% 0
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient Ves 2.01 % 0
- ---- ----
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not 5ufficient\Reason Ves 2.01 % 0
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors Yes 2.01 % 0
more critical
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No 2.01 %
more critical\Ability to repay
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary Ves 20.24% 3
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Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary\Reason Yes 12.46 % 0
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes No 12.46% 10
Necessary\Reason\suitable collateral not available
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property Yes 8.10% 0
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership Yes 8.10% 0
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed Yes 6.20%
property\Ownership\documentation
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\family No 1.90%
property
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral Yes 14.73 % 0
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice
-----
Yes 14.73 % 0
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practicexcash and near cash Yes 4.91 % 3
Nodes\\Preferred COllateral\preference in practice\cash and near cash\ReasonYes 0.73% 0
--_-
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference In practice\cash and near No 0.73%
cash\Reason\Easy to perfect
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others Yes 10.69% 0
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\guarantors No 2.95% 3
NOdes\\Preferred Collateral\preference In practice\others\no capacity to No 2.62%
handle property ----.
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\reason Yes 5.11 % 0
----
Nodes\\Preferred COllateral\preference in practice\others\reason\no suitable No 5.11 %
collateral available
Nodes\\Registered property benefit Yes 11.77 %
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property Yes 1.17% 0
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property\yes No 1.17%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount Yes 4.47% 0
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount\No No 4.47%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time Yes 4.47% 0
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time\No No 4.47%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees Yes 3.36% 0
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees\No No 3.36%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates Yes 4.47% 0
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lower Interest rates\No No 4.47%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications Yes 4.49% 0
----
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Risk Yes 1.66% 0._---
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications\Risk\ Track record No 1.66%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability Yes 2.82% 0
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\cash flow No 2.82 %
Person
Nodes\\GHMFI2 No 100.00%
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Internals\ \GHMFI3
Node
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral\Collateral Not Sufficient
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Collateral Not Sufficient\Reason
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other fact;;;;-V;;;
more critical----- -
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\Ability to repay
Yes 11.50% 0
7.53% 2
----
5.03% 0
5.03% 0
1.31 %
1.96%
1.75 %
3.96%
---_. __
2.06% 0
2.06%
17.63% 0
2.33% 2
13.02% 0
6.60% 0
Yes
Yes
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\Character
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Collateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No-
more critical\relationship
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\ColiateralSometimes Necessary\Reason Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral\ColiateralSometimes No
Necessary\Reason\Relationship
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed property Yes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\lnsurance Yes-----------------------Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership Yes
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed
!:pr:..:o:!:p::erty,:.<-\c:o.::w.::n::er~s:..:hir:.p\.!.:d:..:o::cu:;.m-:-e:...n_ta:..:t7-:io:-,n-c--:--c--__ .__
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\documentation\both
Yes
No 6.60% 2
2
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\family No
property
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\ownership No
disputes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\verificationYes
1.35%
2.31 %
2.75% o
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Saleability Yes 1.25%
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\informal
No 2.75%
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Valuation Yes
4.16% o
2.27%
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral Yes
4.16% o
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice Yes
1
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near cash Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near cash\Reason Yes
8.24% o
8.24% o
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near
cash\Reason\ease of foreclosure
No
2.61 %Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near
cash\Reason\Easy to perfect
No
1
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others Yes
1.54%
8.24% o
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\guarantors No
0.70%
0.15%
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\no capacity to No
~ha:..:n7d~lefP~ro~p~e~rty~~:-,:-,~__ ~_:-,:-,_~_~~-c-___ __ _ _
Nodes\\Prelerred Collateral\preference in practice\others\reason Yes 7.38% o
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\prelerence in practice\others\reason\easy to
handle
No 13.14%
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Aureaate
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\reason\no suitable No
collateral available
Nodes\\Registered property benefit Yes
Nodes\\Reglstered property benefit\Larger amount
4.23 % 2
4.80% 0
Yes 2.63% o
Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount\No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time\No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees\No No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates\No No
Nod;;~do;;;;;~ ;ppiic~iiOr1S Yes
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High Level Informality Yes
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High Levellnformality\No No
seperation of businessand personal
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High Levellnformality\non-use of No
banks
No 2.63%
4.11 %
3
o
No
Yes
4.11%
- ----
3.64% 0
3.64%
2.71% 0
2.71%
6.32% 0
1.81%
----
0.72%
----
0.88%
1.44%
3.06%
1.74% 0
1.74%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Others No
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability Yes
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\The business Yes
Nodes\\Turnlng down Credit applications\serviceability\The business\Type--- No
Person
Nodes\\GHMFI3 No 100.00%
Internals\ \GHMFI4
Node
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary Yes
15.03% 0
6.05% 3
1.34%
2.33% 0
2.33%
8.97% 3
3.69% 0
0.55%
3.13% 0
0.39%
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Alwaysnecessary\exception No
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Alwaysnecessary\Reason Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Collateral Alwaysnecessary\Reason\Risk No
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Only a last No
resort
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors Yes
more critical
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\Ability to repay
Page5of 17Reports\ \CodlngSummaryReport
227
23/07/2012 11:00
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2.74 % 1Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Collateral Not 5ufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\relationship
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed property Yes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership
Agrelate Number Of Users
Codlnl
Cove rase Number Of Codl"l
References
13.62 % 0
Yes 9.47% o
No 4.10%
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed
ro e \Ownershi \documentation
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\family
property
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownershlp\veriflcatlonYes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\informal
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\5aleability
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Valuation
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Valuation\Nature of No
property
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral - Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference In practice Ves
Nodes\ \Preferred Collateral\preference in practlcevcash and near cash Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near cash\ReasonVes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near No
cash\Reason\ease of foreclosure
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\guarantors No
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\reason Yes
Yes 0.95%
4.41 % o
No 4.41 % 2
Yes 1.74 %
2.40%
2.40%
2
oYes
13.61 % 0
----
13.61 % 0
5.32% 2
1.65% 0
----
1.65% 2
10.10%
4.09% 3
-----
4.78% 0
0.46%
---- -
4.31 %
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\reason\easy to No
handle
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\reason\no suitable No
collateral available
Nodes\\Registered property benefit Yes 2.64% o
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount\No No 2
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount Yes 0.95% o
0.95%
Nodes' 'Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time Yes 2.61 % o
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time\No No
2.61 %
Nodes' 'Registered property benefit'Lower fees Yes
2.61 %
2.61 % o
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees\No No
2.61 %
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates Yes 2.61 % o
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates\No No
0.95%
Nodes\\Turnlng down Credit applications Ves
1
4.32% o
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications\Capacity Ves
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications\Risk Ves
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications\Risk\ Track record No
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lerarchlcalName
Nodes\\GHMFI4
._------_._---- ---- --
Internals\ \GHUBl
Node
Nodes\ \Attitude to Collateral Yes
Nodes\ \Attitude to~Collateral Always ne~ry Yes
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary\Reason Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Collateral Always necessary\Reason\Back-up No
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Alwavs necessary\Reason\lack No
financial data
No 100.00%
13.43 % 0
7.39% 2
6.90% 0
------
1.29% 5
5.15%
0.39%
1.06%
6.03%
4.63% 0
4.63% 0
1.36%
3.02% 4
0.25%
0.88% 1
20.05 %
2.90% 2
1.62% 4
13.19%
6.68%
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral\Coliateral Always necessary\Reason\Motivation No
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Collateral Always necessary\Reason\Risk No
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient Yes
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral\Collateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors Yes
more critical
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Collateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\Ability to repay
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral\Collateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\Character
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\relationship
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\the business
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed property Yes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Encumbrances Yes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\lnsurance Yes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership Yes
Yes
No 6.67% 13
NO 0.17%
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\ownership No
disputes
3
1.74% 3
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\formal
No 4
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\verificationYes 5.35%
1.84%
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\insiders
No
3.07%Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\verification time and effects
No
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Yes 1.61 % 3 1
Yes 0.09%
Yes 9.84% 0
Yes 9.84%
Yes 9.84% 8
-------
HierarchicalName
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Saleability
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Valuation
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference i; practice
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near cash
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near cash\ReasonYes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near
cash\Reason\approriate for SMEs
No
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near
cash\Reason\easeof foreclosure
No
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\cash and near
~ash\Reason\Easyto perfect
Nodes\\Registered property benefit Yes
No
7.75%
2.81%
1.65 %
3.29%
2.33%
o
4
3
0
----
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
2
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property Yes 1.37%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property\ Yes No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount Yes
1.37%
1.10%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount\No No 1.10%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time Yes
Nodes\\Reglstered property benefit\Longer repayment time\No No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees Yes
1.10%
1.10%
1.10%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees\No No 1.10%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates\No No
1.53%
1.53 %
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications Yes 7.25%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Capacity Yes 0.62%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High LevelInformality Yes 2.15%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High Levellnformality\lack No
appropriate documents and record keeping
1.18%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High Levellnformality\No No
seperation of businessand personal
0.96%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Risk Yes
----- ------
Yes 0.49% 1
o
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Lack of suitable collateral
2.15%
No
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Risk\inappropriate addresssystem No 1.51 %
0.64%Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Risk\Personal profile~~~~~~~~~~------~----~~~-----.---
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability Yes 1.82 % 0
Nodes\\Turnlng down Credit applications\serviceability\Amount No 0.94 %
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\The business Yes 0.87 % o
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\ The business\lndustry No
& Prospect.-,---:_--:---:c---:_c-~--:_=--:-:::-:--: _.,-- _
Nodes\\Turnlng down Credit applications\serviceability\The business\nature No
0.24%
0.63%
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Nodes\\GHUBl
Internals\ \GHUB2
Node
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral
Aclresate Coverage Number Of Cocllne
References
No 100.00%
Ves 10.37% 0
No
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary\exception
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary\Reason
Ves 5.04% 5
3.19% 4
0.44 % 0Ves
0.18%
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary\Reason\Back-up No
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary\Reason\Policy No
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient
0.26%
Ves 5.59% 4
0.88% 3
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason Ves
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\foreciosure No
difficulties
4.89% o
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Only a last
3.74%
resort
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors Ves
more critical
No 0.26%
3
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\Ability to repay
2.4S% 6
Ves
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\the business
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Encumbrances
1.31 %
28.18%
Ves 4.93% 9
Ves 13.07 % 3
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\lnsurance
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership
Ves 3.42%
3.56% 5
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed Ves
property\Ownership\documentation
3.56% o
3.73% 6
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed No
property\Ownership\documentation\Registered
4.79%
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\ownership No
disputes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownershlp\verificationVes
4Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\formal
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\verification time and effects
No 1.77%
No 2.53%
Ves
2.81 %
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Saleability
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Valuation Ves
3.59% 8
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Valuation\Forced sale No
value
.:..::.::.:...,-,-:----:---:-:----::---------------:--:------:-c~ ---- --- ---
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral Ves 4.24 % 0
1.71 % 4
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References
Ves 4.24 % 0
-----
Ves 4.24% 4
Ves 2.80%
No 0.71 %
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice
Nodes\ \Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed property
Nodes\\Preferr;d ~~re~i;;P;:a~d-;d pr~rty\reason
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed
property\reason\immovability
Nodes\ \Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed
property\reason\persistent value appreciation
Nodes\\Registered property benefit
- -------- -----
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability ofProperty
No 2.09%
o
o 1
Ves 7.25%
1
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property\yes No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount\Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees\No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates\Yes
Ves 2.36%
o
o
o
3 1
Ves
2.36%
1.56%
1
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates\Yes\Reason
Ves
Ves
1.56%
0.18%
0.18%No
Ves 3.14%
3.14%Ves
No 1.73%
._----,------- -------- -----
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications
Ves 0.30%
5.58%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Lack of suitable collateral
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications\Risk
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Risk\Business prospect & risk
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Risk\Track record
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability
Ves
No
Ves
2
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\ The business Ves
1
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\ The business\lndustry No
& Pros ect
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications\servlceability\ The business\legaility No
Ves 7.14% o
o
3
o
o
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\ The business\Type No
No 2.33%
3.24%
3.16%
Person
Nodes\\GHUB2 No
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral Ves 11.39 % 0
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient Ves 4.08% 2
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason Ves 3.49% 0
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Only a last No 0.56% 1
resort
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2.93 % 0
Aare,ate Covera,e Number Of Codl",
References
Number Of Users
Codl!ll
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors Ves
more critical
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Collateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Oth~rTactors No
more critical\Ability to repay
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Collateral Sometimes Necessary
2.93%
Yes 7.31 %
4
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary\Reason Yes 5.65% o
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary\Reason\Ability No
to repay
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes
Necessary\Reason\Amount
Nodes\\Attitudeto Coliateral\Coliater~T Sometimes
Necessary\Reason\Relationship
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property Ves
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\documentation _
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\documentation\Registered
Ves
Yes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\ownership No
disputes
Nodes::\\=-Is-su-e-s-o-=-fc-o-n-ce-r-n-w-:-h-en-t-a-:-k'i'-ng-""la-nd"'e-d'-p-ro-perty\Ownership\~rificationYes - -
2.80%
No 2.27% 4
No 0.56%
14.20% 0
14.20% 0
5.87%
No 2.52 % 2
2.32% 4
5.99% o
No
0.99%
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\formal
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\insiders
No
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\verification time and effects
No
4.37%
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral Ves
3.63% 3
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference Yes
0.61 %
1.72%
4.18% 3
8.48% o
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash Yes
0.44%
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash\reason Ves
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash\reason\Easy to No
foreclose
1.06% o
4.89%
Nodes\ \Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash\reason\Easy to No
perfect
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice Ves
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed property Yes
2.22% o
3.04%
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed property\reason Ves
Nodes\ \Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed No
property\reason\readilyavailable
2.22% 4
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property Yes o
Nodes\\Registered property benefit Yes o3.46%
1.52%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property\Ves No 1.52%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount Ves
1.94% o
Nodes\ \Registered property benefit\Larger amount\No No
o
1.94% o
1.94%
Nodes\ \Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time Ves
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time\No No
1.94%
Nodes\ \Registered property benefit\Lower fees Yes
1.94%
1.94%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees\No No
Page 11 of 17
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References Codi!_1l
1.94% 1
8.10% 0
5.77%
0.88% 2
3.56% 2
0.51 % 0
0.51 %
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lower Interest rates\No No
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications Yes
~s~ning ~n Creditappjkatio-;;$\High[;vellntOr;;;"ality Yes
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High levellnformality\lack No
appropriate documents and record keeping
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High levellnformality\non-use of No
banks
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\lack of suitable collateral Yes
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\lack ;;-fsuitable coliateral\No No
registered property titles
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Risk Yes 1.80%
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications\serviceability
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\cash flow
Yes 2.31 %
No 2.31 %
Person
Nodes\\GHUB3 No 100.00%
--- -----------
Internals\ \GHUB4
Node
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral Yes 11.13 % 0
--. -
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient Yes 3.90%
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason
----
Yes 2.80% 0
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Only a last
-----
No 1.63%
resort
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors Yes 1.16% 0
more critical
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No 1.16%
more critical\Ability to repay
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary Yes 7.90% 4
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary\Reason Yes 6.48% 0
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes No 1.36%
Necessary\Reason\Amount
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes No 2.93%
Necessary\Reason\motivation
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary\Reason\Policy No 0.85%
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Sometimes Necessary\Reason\Risk No 1.32%
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property Yes 11.52 % 0
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership Yes 9.80% 0
---
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed Yes 2.99%
property\Ownership\documentation
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed No 2.65% 3
property\Ownership\documentation\Registered ------
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10.44%
Agrepte Coveraae Num r CiiiUIlI
References
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\ownership No
disputes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\verificationYes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\formal
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\insiders
No
No
Yes 1.26 %
0.45%
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Saleabillty
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Valuation
-N-od-e-~-\P-r-ef-e-rr-ed-C-o-II-at-er-a-I-------------------------- -~Y-e-s-------12-.5-6--%- ~---
7.80%
7.77%
Nodes\ \Issues of concern when taking landed
property\Ownership\verification\verification time and effects
Nodes\ \Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes 3.34%
1.61 %
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash\reason
7.01 % o
1.21 %
0.95%
4.84% 4
2
o
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash\reason\Easyto No
~fu~~~c~lo~s~e~ ~~ ~ ~ _
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash\reason\Easy to No
~pe~IT~e~ct~~__ ~~ __ ~~~~ ~~~ . __
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near No
cash\reason\inappropriateness of others
1.73%
1.17%
1
Nodes\ \Preferred Collateral\preference in practice 2
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed property
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed property\reason Yes
Yes 6.74%
5.64%
o 1
Yes
4.78%
1
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed
property\reason\greater motivation for repayment
No 2.54%
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed
property\reason\immovability
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed
property\reason\persistent value appreciation
No 0.65%
1
No
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others Yes o
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed
property\reason\readilyavailable
0.68%
No 0.90%
1.10%
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\others\guarantors No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit Yes
1.10%
6.69%
1
o
1
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property Yes 2.81 % o
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property\Yes No 2.81 %
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount\ Yes Yes
3.88%
3.88%
o
2
Nodes\\Reglstered property benefit\Longer repayment time Yes
2
3.88% o 1
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time\Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees
Yes
Yes
3.88%
0.53% o 1
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees\No No
o
0.53%
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates\Yes Yes
3.88%
3.88% 1 1
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates\Ves\Reason No
o
1.73%
Nodes\\ Turning down Credit applications Yes
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No 1.59% 1
----
Ves 1.37%
Yes 1.20% 0
No 1.20%
----- -
Yes 1.77% 0
No 1.77%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High Levellnformality\lack
appropriate documents and record keeping
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Lack of suitable collateral
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Risk
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Risk\Track record
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\cash flow---
Person
Nodes\\GHMFI3 No 6.07%
Nodes\\GHUB4 No 100.00%
Internals\ \GHUBS
Node
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral Yes 28.94 % 0
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary Yes 24.51 % 2
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary\exception No 6.25%
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary\Reason Yes 14.92 % 0
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary\Reason\Motivation No 8.28%
---------
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary\Reason\Risk No 6.63% 2
Nodes\ \Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient Yes 4.43%
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason Yes 3.35% 0
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\foreciosure
-------
No 1.60%
difficulties
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficie~t\Reason\Other factors Ves 1.75% 0
more critical
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Otherfactors No 1.75%
more critical\Ability to repay
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property Yes 14.99% 0
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Encumbrances Ves 3.43%
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership Yes 12.64%
Yes 3.60% 0
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed No 3.60%
property\Ownership\documentation\Registered ----
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\ownership No 5.28%
disputes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\verificationYes 5.90%
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed No 5.90%
property\Ownership\verification\formal
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Valuation Ves 2.35% 0
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2.35% 1Nodes\\Issuesof concern when taking landed property\ Valuation\Forced sale No
value
Cover",. Number Of Cadllll
References
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral Ves
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference Ves
12.51 % 0
3.43%
3.15%
------
3.07% 0
1.37%
1.70%
--- -
9.08% 1
9.08%
7.76% 0
7.76% 2 1
-- -
8.01% 0
5.75% 0
----
5.75% 1
----
5.63% 0
5.63% 2
5.63% 0
------
5.63% 2
5.63% 0
5.63% 2 1
5.63% 0
----- -
5.63%
10.36% 0
1.25% 1
-----
6.28% 0 1
- ------
6.28% 1
1.02%
1.80% 1
1.22% 0 1
1.22% 1
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash Ves
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash\reason Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash& near cash\reason\Easy to~
foreclose
Nod,;~\\Prefer~dColiateral\ldeal Preference\ca~ & near cash\reaso#;asyto No
perfect
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice Ves
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\landed property Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\landed property\reason Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference In practice\landed No
property\reason\readilyavailable
Nodes\\Registered property benefit Ves
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property\yes No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\larger amount Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\larger amount\NO No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time\No No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower fees\No No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates\No No
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications Yes
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Capacity Yes
---:-:-:c--.,----::----::----:-7:'c:-:----:~--;:----- --
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High level Informality Ves
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\High Levellnformality\lack No
appropriate documents and record keeping
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Others No
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability Yes
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\ The business Yes
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\ The business\nature No
Person
Nodes\\GHUB5 No 100.00%
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Internals\ \GHUB6
Node
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral Yes 10.70% 0
5.43 'l6
3.39% 0
- --
1.01%
2.37%
5.26%
2.96% 0
-----
2.96%
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral\Coliateral Always necessary\Reason Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral\Collateral Always necessary\Reason\Back-up No
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Always necessary\Reason\Risk No
---_ --
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Collateral Not Sufficient\Reason Yes
Nodes\\Attitude to Collateral\Collateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Otherfactors Yes
more critical
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\Ability to repay
2.96%
2.96%
-----
22.92 % 0
2.41 %
11.82 % 0
1.44% 0
1.44%
0.88%
9.48%
3.53 'l6 2
2.27% 2
3.06%
8.69%
- ---
10.86% 0
4.41 % 1
4.41 %
-----_.
2.02% 0
2.02%
1.37%
6.45% 0
6.45 %
4.14% 0
2.08%
2.05%
10.21% 0
Page160f17
Nodes\\Attitude to Coliateral\Coliateral Not Sufficient\Reason\Other factors No
more critical\the business
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property Yes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Encumbrances Yes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership Yes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed Yes
property\Ownership\documentation
Nodes\\Issues of concern when taking landed No
property\Ownership\documentation\Registered
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\ownership No
disputes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Ownership\verificationYes
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed No
property\Ownership\verification\formal
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed No
property\Ownership\verification\insiders
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed No
property\Ownership\verification\verification time and effects
Nodes\\lssues of concern when taking landed property\Saleability Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash\reason Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash\reason\Easy to No
foreclose
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\ldeal Preference\cash & near cash\reason\Easy to No
perfect
Nodes\\Preferred Coliateral\preference in practice Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed property Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference In practice\Landed property\reason Yes
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed No
property\reason\greater motivation for repayment
Nodes\\Preferred Collateral\preference in practice\Landed No
property\reason\immovability
Nodes\\Registered property benefit Yes
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Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property Yes 3.55 % °
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\lmproves acceptability of property\Yes No 3,55%
2.58%
2,58%
°Yes
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Larger amount\No No
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time 2,68% °Yes
Nodes\ \Registered property benefit\Longer repayment time\No
Nodes\ \Registered property benefit\Lower fees
No 2,68%
2,47% °Yes
Nodes\ \Registered property benefit\Lower fees\No No 2.47% 2
Nodes\\Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates
Nodes\ \Registered property benefit\Lower Interest rates\No
Yes 2,42% °
No 2.42% 2
Nodes\\Turnlng down Credit applications Yes 10,44% °
Nodes\ \Turning down Credit applications\Lack of suitable collateral
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\Lack of suitable coliateral\No
registered property titles
Yes 6,01%
No 3,62%
Nodes\\Turning down Credit applications\serviceability Yes 4,43%
Nodes\ \Turning down Credit applications\serviceability\cash flow No 2,12%
Person
Nodes\\GHMFI2 No 4,35% 2
Nodes\\GHUB6 No 100,00%
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Number of questionnaires distributed and number received - England
Selected cities & towns Number of questionnaires Number of questionnaires
distributed completed & returned
Manchester 80 32
Liverpool 59 34
Chester 44 21
Southport 10 5
St. Helens 7 3
Total 200 95
APPENDIXB
The Nature of SE Credit Constraints in Ghana
Respondent Characteristics
Table 1
education * Gender Cro•• tabulatlon
Gender
male female TotAl
Education no formal education Count 10 21 31
% within Education 32.3% 67.7% 100.0%
% within Gender 17.5% 28.4% 23.7%
% of Tala I 7.6% 16.0% 23.7%
Basic education Count 26 22 48
% within Education 54.2% 45.8% 100.0%
% within Gender 45.6% 29.7% 36.6%
% of Tala I 19.8% 16.8% 36.6%
secondarylvocatlonalltech Count 16 24 42
nieal education % within Education 42.9% 57.1% 100.00,,"
% within Gender 31.6% 32.4% 32.1%
% of Total 13.7% 18.3% 32.1%
lartlary education Count 3 7 10
% within Education 30.0% 70.0% 100.0%
% within Gender 5.3% 9.5% 7.6%
% of Tala I 2.3% 5.3% 7.6°,,"
Total Count 57 74 131
% within Education 43.5% 56.5% 100.0%
% within Gender 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Tolal 43.5% 56.5% 100.0%
Chl-Squar_ T•• t.
U'A'''A df ~raf~ie~'f'·
P•• raon Chi-Square 4.564- 3 .207
Likelihood Ratio .....817 3 .202
~n.eoa6t-:do'nln&Elr .010 1 .920
N of"Valid Cases 131
..... cell. (12.8%) haVll!!!llIlncpected count Ie •• than eo The
rnlnlrnufT1 expected count Is .....35.
Table2
Correlation.
Education AQe
Spearman's rho Education Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .029
$ig. (2-talled) .744
N 131 131
Age Correlation Coefficient .029 1.000
$Ig. (2-talled) .744
N 131 131
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Table3
Corr.,.tlon.
_p.ae OAn..nnants
Spearman's rho Age Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .673"
Sig. (2-talled) .000
N 131 131
Dependants Correlation Coefficient .1573"" 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .000
N 131 131
••. Correlation la .. Ignlficant at the 0.01 le_I (2-talled).
Table4
Carrel. alan.
_l;duc", on O..D..nd ..nl ..
Spearman'. rho Educ::abon Correlation CoefflOlant 1.000 -.HI2·
Sig. (2-tallad) .028
N 131 131
Oep.ndan", Correllilion Co.tficiftnt -.1 lO2" 1.000
S.g. (2-lftiled) .028
N 1~1 1~1
•. Corre'f't'on Is elgnjfl<:Ant at the 0 OS .ft.......(2- ........d)
Table 5
De~"d.nt •• Gender Cro ••• abulatlon
_Gender
ITO .. ....fiun. ... TntA .
Dependants belo'W 5 Count 15 18 33
% ""Ithln Depend.nbl 415.15% 154.15% 100.0%
% \N.thln Gender 28.3% 24.3% 215.2%
% of Totaf 11.15% 13.7% 215.2%
15-10 Count 37 47 84
%wlthln Dependants 44.0% 158.0% 100.0%
% \Nlthln Gender 84.9% 83.15% 64.1%
% of Tota. 28.2% 315.9% 64.1%
+10 Count 15 Q 14
% \Nlthln Dependants 315.7% 84.3% 100.0%
% vvlthln Gender 8.B% 12.2% 10.7%
% of Total 3.8% 8.9% 10.7%
Total Count 67 74 131
% \Nlthln Dependanbl 43.15% 158.15% 100.0%
% \IV.thln Gender 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 43.15% 156.15% 100.0%
Chl-&qu.r. T•• te
Value etf ~:r;;fd·..~·g·
Pearson Chi-Square .407- 2 .816
Likelihood Ratio .413 2 .B13
~n.·Oa~I-~tlo'nlnear .274 1 .801
N o'Valid Cases 131
•. 0 cella (.0%) hava expected count Ie•• than 5. The minimum
8)(p8cled count I. 6.09.
Table 6
number oI.mploye.s • Business type CrOllstabulatlon
Business !\Pe
trader Mechanic caterln!! carpenter Totat
number of em pio)ges less than 5 Count 69 4 5 3 81
% within numberof 85.2% 4.9"'" 6.2% 3.7% 100.0%
emptojees
% within Business twe 79.3"'" 23.5% 38.5% 21.4% 61.8%
%orTotal 52.7% 3.1% 3.8% 2.3% 61.8"4
5-10 Count 16 5 7 9 37
% within number of 43.2% 13.5% 18.9% 24.3% 100.0%
amplo)9as
% within Business twe 18.4% 29.4% 53.8% 64.3% 28.2%
%orTotal 12.2% 3.8% 5.3% 6.9% 28.2%
+10 Count 2 8 1 2 13
% within hum bar of 15.4% 61.5% 7.7% 15.4% 100.0%
emplo)ges
% within Business twe 2.3% 47.1% 7.7% 14.3"4 9.9"4
%orTotal 1.5°4 6.1% .8% 1.5% 9.9%
Total Count 87 17 13 14 131
% within number of 66.4% 13.0% 9.9% 10.7% 100.0%
emplo)ges
% within Business twe 100.0°4 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
%orTotal 66.4°'" 13.0"4 9.9% 10.7% 100.0"4
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Chl-Squar. T•• t.
Value df ~rsPcie~lf'
Pearson Chi-Square 64.685· 6 .000
Likelihood Ratio 46.034 6 .000
Llnear-by-Llnear 21.822 1 .000
AssociatIon
N of Valid Cases 131
a.6 cells (50.0%) have expected count 1... 8 than 5. Th..
minimum expected count Is 1.29.
Table 7
Bu.ln ••• type • Gender Croa.tabul.tlon
G..,dar~-,- .~,I.. To ....
Bualnae. type trader Count 24 63 a7
% \Nlthln Bu.ln ••• type 27.6% 72.4% 100.0%
% \Allthln Gender 42.1% 815.1% 66.4%
% of Tots I 16.3% 4B.1% 66.4%
I\Aechanlc Count 17 0 17
% 'WIthinBus'n. __ type 100.0% .0% 100.0%
0/0 ""Uhln Gender 29.8% .0% 13.0%
0/0 afTola' 13.0% .0% 13.0%
catering Count 3 10 13
0/0 Vtllthln Bu.ln ••• type 23.1% 76.9% 100.0%
0/0 Vtllthln Gender 15.3% 13.15% 9.9%
0/0 afTolal 2.3% 7.6% 9.9%
carpenter Count 13 1 14
% \Allthln Busln ••• type 92.9% 7.1% 100.0%
0/0 \lVlthln Gender 22.8% 1.4% 10.7%
% of Tots. 9.9% .8% 10.7%
Total Count 157 74 131
% \lVlthln Bu.ln ••• typ_ 43.&% 158.15% 100.0%
0/0 within Gender 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
%ofTolal 43.15% 158.15% 100.0%
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value <if ~rafcJ' SJ~'- dad
Pearson Chi-Square 47.125· 3 .000
Likelihood Ratio 55.656 3 .000
~"seoa~t:tra'nlnaar 1B.066 1 .000
N of Valid Ca ...... 131
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count leas than 5. The minimum
expected count la 5.66.
Table 8
a""rage monthly c•• h ge ... rated • Bu.I ..... type Cr.... tabulatlon
Bualness tl.<>e
Irad r Mechanl~ caterina cementer Tn"'l
8wrage monthlycssh Below GHC 500 Count 18 3 2 2 25
generated % within 8wrage monthly 72.0% 12.0% 8.0% 8.0% 100.0%
cash generated
% wllhln Bus Inea s t)ip" 20.7% 17.6% 15.4% 14.3% 19.1""
% olTotal 13.7% 2.3% 1.5% 1.5% 19.1""
GHC 500-1000 Count 32 5 4 5 46
~:~~~n~:~8emonthly 69.6% 10.9% 8.7"" 10.9"" 100.0""
% within Buslnes. t)ip" 36.8% 29.4% 30.8"" 35.7% 35.1""
% olTotal 24.4% 3.8% 3.1"" 3.8% 35.1%
GHC 1001-1500 Count 22 8 3 5 38
% within 8wrage monthly 57.9% 21.1% 7.9"" 13.2% 100.0""
cash generated
% within Busln"sa t)ip. 25.3% 47.1% 23.1"" 35.7% 29.0""
% oITotal 16.8% 8.1% 2.3% 3.8% 29.0%
+GHC 1500 Count 15 1 4 2 22
% within "".,rage monthly 68.2% 4.5% 18.2% 9.1% 100.0%
cash generated
% within Buslnesa t)ipe 17.2% 5.9% 30.8% 14.3% 16.8%
% olTotal 11.5% .8% 3.1% 1.5% 18.8%
Total Count 87 17 13 14 131
% within .wrage monthly 66.4% 13.0% 9.9% 10.7% 100.0%
cash generated
% wllhln Business t)ipe 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0""
%olTotal 66.4% 13.0% 9.9% 10.7% 100.0%
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Chi-Square T•• t.
v...... .. . ~~f:iA~:f"
Pearson Chi-Square 6.175- " .722Likelihood Ratio 6.025 " .737~n.e~~-:do'nlnear .599 1 .43"
N of Valid Cases 131
e. 11 cells (68.8%) h• ....,e>cpectedcount Ie•• than 5. The
m'nlmum ellCpectedcount la 2.18.
Table 9
Bualnea. t\.nA
OrAdA' .... chanlc eAt.rinn e.~.nt.' Tnt.t
mOSllmportant bUlln.s. lack ot fundI Count 43 7 4 8 80
problem
% within mo.t Impon.nl 71.7"'- 11.7% 8.7% 10.0"'- 100.0%
bUI in••• problem
% within BUlin ••• twa 49.4% 41.2% 30.8% 42.9% 4&.8%
'% of Total 32.8"'- &.3% 3.1% 4.8% 45.8"'-
frequent price Incream.nl Count II & II 1 17
bYluppliera
% within mo•• Impon.nt 35.3"'- 29.4% 294% &.9"'- 100.0%
bu.ine •• problem
% within BUlin ••• we 11.11"'- 29.4% 38.&% 7.1"'- 13.0"'-
% crTolA' 4.8% 3.8% 38% .8"'- 13.0"'-
lack of buslne •• space & Count 12 0 0 0 12
poor location
% within most Important 100.0% .0'l4o .0% .0% 100.0%
bu.ine •• problem
% within Busln ••• !)pe 13.8% .0% .0% .0"'- 1I.2'l4o
% otTotal 9.2% .0% .0% .0% 92%
high 1mport duty & Count 9 II 0 0 14
bureaucracy
% within most Important 84.3% 35.7% .0% .0% 100.0"'-
busin •• s problem
% within Busln••• t)fl. 10.3'4 2&.4'4 .0% .0% 10.7'4
% otTowl 8.9"'- 3.8"'- .0% .0% 10.7"'-
competition Count 11 0 0 1 12
% within most Important 91.7'4 .0% .0% 8.3'l4o 100.0'4
bUlin ••• problem
" within BUlin ••• ~. 12.8% .0'4 .0% 7.1"'- 11.2"'-
% at Tata. 8.4'4 .0% .0% .8% 9.2'4
lack of raw malerial Count 0 0 4 8 10
% ~thln most Important .0% .0% 40.0'4 80.0% 100.0'4
bUI.n ••• problem
% within Bu,ln.I' t)fl. .0'4 .0% 30.8% 42.9% 7.8%
% otTolal .0"'- .0"'- 3.1% 4.8'11> 7.11"'-
othera Count 6 0 0 0 6
% within most important 100.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0"4
bUlln •• , problem
% within Bu,ln.l. t)tle 8.9% .0"'- .0"'- .0"'- 4.0"'-
% ofTo .. 1 4.6% .0'4 .0'4 .0% 4.6%
Total Count 87 17 13 14 131
% within mo.' Important 66.4% 13.0'4 8.9% 10.7% 100.0'4
bu.lnes. problem
% within Bu.ln ••• 'W. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0"4 100.0"'-
% of Total e6.<4" 13.0% 99"'- 10.7% 100.0%
Credit market experiences
Table 10
Applied for loan In la.t 24 month•• Gender Cro•• tabulatlon
Gender
malA femAIA Total
Applied for loan In last 24 No Count 21 16 37
months
% within Applied for loan 56.8% 43.2% 100.0°,,"
In last 24 months
% within Gender 36.8% 21.6% 28.2%
% of Total 16.0% 12.2% 28.2%
Yea Count 36 58 94
% within Applied for loan 38.3% 61.7% 100.0%
In last 24 months
% within Gender 63.2% 78.4% 71.8%
% of Tolsi 27.5% 44.3% 71.8%
Total Count 57 74 131
% within Applied for loan 43.5% 56.5°,," 100.0%
in last 24 months
% within Gender 100.0% 100.0% 100.0°,,"
% of TOIsI 43.5% 56.5% 100.0%
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Chl-Squar. T•• t.
Value rlf JI>ar.: ld·e~lg. E_cl',.~!li (2- E_~U!I!li (1-RI
Pearson Chi-Square 3.6BO· 1 .065
Conllnulty Correcllonb 2.968 1 .0815
Likelihood Ratio 3.662 1 .0156
Fisher's e....ct Test .078 .043
~nse:~I-:do-n'near 3.652 1 .056
N ofVelid Cases 131
e. 0 cella (.0%) ha"" _><peetedcountless than e. Th. minimum .><pactadcount Is 16.10.
b. Computed onlyfora 2><2tabla
Table 11: Applied for loan in last 24 months • Age
Cr_.tab
Aaa
Below 30 ...... :\0-'1""'"'" AR.Rn .... An~+ Tn ... 1
Applied lor loan in la8t24 No Count 8 18 6 6 37
months % within Applied for loen 21.6% 48.6"4 13.!I% 16.2% 100.0%
In last 24 month.
%wlthlnAg .. 38.1% 29.5% 13.9% 46.2% 28.2%
% olTotal 6.1% 13.7% 3.8% 4.6% 28.2%
Yas Count 13 43 31 7 "4
% within Appllad for loan 13.80" 45.7% 33.0% 7.4% 100.00"In la8124 months
%wlthlnAge 61.90" 70.5·" 86.1% 53.8% 71.8%
% olTotal 9.9% 32.8% 23.7% !I.3DA. 71.8%
Total Count 21 61 36 13 131
% within Applied for loan 16.0% 46.6% 27.5% 9.9% 100.0%
In last 24 month.
%withlnAga 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% olTotal 16.0% 46.60'" 27.5% 9.90'" 100.0%
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value df ~rsl~·e~lr·
Pearson Chi-Square 6.772" 3 .080
Likelihood Ratio 7.078 3 .069
Llnear-by-Llnear .339 1 .560
Association
N of Valid Cases 131
a.1 cells (12.5%) ha"", e><pectedcount less than 5. The
minimum e><pectedcount Is 3.67.
Table 12: Applied for loan in last 24 months • Education
er .... tab
Education
no formal
sacondar-;..:>c
Basic ationalAechnl teruary
education education cal education education Total
~plied lor loan in last 24 No Count 11 15 8 3 37
months %within ~plied for loan 29.7% 40.5% 21.6% 8.1% 100.0%
In last 24 months
%within Education 355% 31.30'" 19.0% 30.0% 282%
%oITolal 8.4% 11.5% 6.1% 2.3% 28.2%
Yes Count 20 33 34 7 94
%within ~p"ed for loan 21.3% 35.1% 36.2% 7.4% 100.0%
In last 24 months
% within Education 64.5% 68.8% 81.0% 70.0% 71.8%
%olTolal 15.3°'" 25.2% 260% 5.3·'" 71.8%
Total Count 31 48 42 10 131
% within ~pliad lor loan 23.7% 36.6% 321% 7.6°'" 1000%
In last 24 months
%within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
%olTolal 23.7% 36.6% 32.1% 7.6% 100.0%
Chl-Squ.r_ T._t_
v ,_ ~. ~~I~· ..~If'.
Pear-eon Chi-Square 2.784- 3 .426
Likelihood Ratio 2.888 3 .409
~ ".e~61:tk,-n1near 1.635 , .21S
N Of Valid Ca ••• 131
s. 1 cella (12.l5%) h.\JI!t et)cpected count Ie •• than 6. The
rnlnlrT'lulT1 expected count a. 2.82.
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Table 13: Applied for loan in last 24 months * number of employees
Cr .... t.b
numbeCQf oml>lo, e.
I...... tt' .. n 15 15-10 +10 Total
Applied for loan In last 24 No Count 20 1. 3 37month.
% within Applied for loan 154.1% 37.8% 8.1% 100.0%
In 18&t24 months
% within nurn ber of 24.7% 37.8% 23.1% 28.2%
emplo)e ••
%ofTotal 115.3% 10.7% 2.3% 28.2%
Yes Count 61 23 10 94
% within Applied for loan 64.9% 24.15% 10.11% 100.0·A,
In Isst 24 months
% within num ber of 715.3% 62.2% 76.9% 71.8%.mplo~e.
%ofTotal 411.6% 17.6% 7.11% 71.8%
TaIBI Count 81 37 13 131
% within Applied for loan 61.8% 28.2% 9.9% 100.0%
In last 24 month.
% within numberof 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%emplo)eea
%ofTotal 81.8% 28.2% lUI'll. 100.0%
Chi-Square T•• t_
\.slue -<If_ ~r.r:..'_':.'r;>.
Pearaon Chi-Square 2.356- 2 .308
Likelihood Ratio 2.283 2 .319
~n.e~61-:tk)'nln•• r .40e 1 .824
N of Valid Ca ••• 131
a.1 cells (16.7%) hs'\4 .:»q:l'ected count •••• then e. The
minimum expected count la 3.67.
Table 14: Applied for loan in last 24 months * average monthly cash generated
Cra..t.b
awraae monthlVC8sh generated
BelowGHC G~~~go- GHfs6g01- +GHC 1S00 Total_50n
Applied for loan In 18812. No Count 7 16 8 6 37
months
% within Applied for loan 18.9"4 43.2"4 21.6"4 16.2% 100.0"4
In last 2..manIll.
~:~~:n~::~e monthly 28.0% 34.8% 21.1% 27.3% 28.2%
%ofTolal 15.3% 12.2% 11.1% 4.6% 28.2%
Yes Count 18 30 30 16 94
" within Applied to,. loan 111.1"4 31.11"4 31.9% 17.0% 100.0%
In lest 24month.
~:~~:n~::9. monthly 72.0% 65.2% 78.9% 72.7% 71.8%
"4olTotal 13.7% 22.9% 22.9% 12.2% 71.6%
Total Count 25 46 38 22 131
" within Applied to,,'oen 19.1"4 35.1"4 29.0% 111.8% 100.0"4
In last 24month.
" within .wrage monthly 100.0"4 100.0"4 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
cash gene,.aled
"'ofTolal 19.1% 35.1% 29.0% 166% 1000%
Chi-Square T•• t.
Value df ~rsrcie~I~.
Pearson Chi-Square 1.951· 3 .583
Likelihood Ratio 1.971 3 .578
Llnear-by-Llnear .373 1 .542
Association
N of Valid Cases 131
a. 0 cells (.0%) ha\18e>q>ectedcount lesa then 5. The minimum
expected count Is 6.21_
Table IS
most Important buslne ••
-oroblem
lack of fund. othe .. Total
Applied for loan in 188t24 No Count 17 20 37
month.
% within Applied for 'oan 415.9% 154.1% 100.0%
In la.t 24 month.
% within mostlrnportant 28.3% 28.2% 28.2%
busine •• problem
% of Total 13.0% 115.3% 28.2%
Yea Count 43 51 94
0,4 within Applied for 'oan 415.7% 154.3% 100.0%
In I•• t 24 month.
% within most Important 71.7% 71.8% 71.8%
bu. ine. a pr-oblem
% of Tota. 32.8% 38.9% 71.8%
Total Count 60 71 131
% within Applied for loan 415.8% 114.2% 100.0%
In I•• t 24 month.
% within moat Important 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
bualna •• problem
% of Total 4!5_8% 154.2% 100.0%
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Chl-Squar. T•• t.
Value df "1raPcie~I~. E_;:d~18i (2- E_~lld~8i (1-
Pearson Chi-Square .000' 1 .983
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000
Likelihood Ratio .000 1 .983
Fisher's E_ct Tast 1.000 .568
~nseo"6i!'tro'n'near .000 1 .983
N of Valid Cases 131
a.O cell. (.0%) ha_ a><pecled count la88 than 5. Tha minimum e><peeted count 18 16.95.
b. Computed onlyfor a 2><2table
Table 16
LendinG Inalltullon • Gender Cro•• t.bulatlon
Gender
male femal .. Total
Lending Institution Universal bank Count 7 16 23
% within Lending 30.4% 69.6% 100.0%
InstitUtion
% within Gender 17.9% 29.1% 24.5%
% of Total 7.4% 17.0% 24.5%
MFI Count 32 39 71
% Within Lending 45.1% 54.9% 100.0%
Institution
% within Gender 82.1% 70.9% 75.5%
% ofTolal 34.0% 41.5% 75.5·'"
Total Count 39 55 94
% within Lending 41.5% 58.5% 100.0%
In.tltution
% within Gender 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 41.5% 5e.5% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
Value ~rsP'SI~' Exact Si9i (2- Exact SiYi(1-df -sided side sided
Pearson Chi-Square 1.5338 1 ,216
Continuity Correctionb .989 1 .320
Likelihood Ratio 1.572 1 .210
Fisher's Exact Test .236 .160
Linear-by-Llnear 1.517 1 .218
Association
N of Valid Cases 94
a.O cells (.0%) haw expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.54.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
Table 17
LAndinglnatltutlon' Educltlon er.... llbu .. tlon
Education
.econda,.,...,c
no forma' Basic aCionalltechnl
e~r:;r,neducation education cal educalion Total
Lending Institution Universal bank Count 6 12 4 1 23
% within Lending 26.1% 522% 17.4% 4.3% 100.0%
Inabtution
% within Education 30.0% 31.6% 14.3% 12.5% 24.5%
% ofTola1 6.4% 12.8% 4.3% 1.1% 24.5%
~I Count 14 26 24 7 71
% within Lending 19.7% 36.6% 33.8% 9.9% 100.0%
Institution
% within Education 70.0% 68.4% 85.7% 87.5% 75.5%
% ofTola1 14.9% 27.7% 25.5% 7.4% 75.5%
Tolal eaunl 20 38 28 8 94
% within Lending 21.3% 40.4% 29.8% 8.5,," 100.0""
Institution
'" within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% olTolal 21.3% 40.4% 29.8% 8.5% 100.0%
Chl-Squar. T•• t.
Value df ~r-:;Pcie~lf'
Pear-son Chi-Square 3.562" 3 .313
Likelihood Ratio 3.779 3 .288
~"ae~6i!do'nln.ar 2.499 1 .114
N of Valid Case .. 94
a. 2 c.. lls (25.0%) ha_ expected count I..... than 5. The
minimum e><pected count Is 1.96.
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Constraint Status of Loan Applicants
Table 18
Loan _mount wanted
Frenuenc Percent Valid Percent C'~":;r~I:~lre
Valid Belo\N GHC 500 7 7.4 7.4 7.4
GHC 500-1000 31 33.0 33.0 40.4
GHC 1001-2000 31 33.0 33.0 73.4
+GHC 2000 25 26.6 26.8 100.0
Total 94 100.0 100.0
Table 19: Selected lending institution and loan amount wanted
Cro..t_b
_n"'nn 'n, "..... n.
U'1!~::.1 """" T. .,Loan amount wanted Below GHC 500 Count 3 4 7
% 'lNlthln Lo_n .mount .2.8% 57.111M. 100.0%
"".nted
% within Lending 13.0,% 15.15% 7.4%
In.thutlcn
% afTotat 3.2% 4.3% 7.4%
GHC ISOO-1000 Count 3 2S 31
% ""Ithln Lo.n .mount 8.7% 80.3% 100.0%
wanled
% within Lending 13.0~ 38,.% 33.0%
In.Ulutlon
% of Total 3.2% 29.8% 33.0%
GHC 100 1-2000 Count 15 2e 31
% 'WIthin Loan .mount 1e.1% 153."% 100.0%
'Wanl_d
% within Lending 21.7'% 38.8% 33.0%
Instftutlon
% afTola' 8.3% 27.7% 33.0%
+GHC 2000 Count 12 13 215
% \Nlthln Lo.n .mount <48.0% 52.0% 100.0"""
wanted
% within Lending 52.2% 1S.3% 28.8"'-
Inatltutlon
'% of Tota. 12.8% 13.S% 2e.e%
Total Count 23 71 "4
% ~Ithln Lo.n amount 24.15% 7l5.CS'Mt 100.0","
~.nt_d
% ~Ithln Lending 100.0% 100.0%. 100.0%
'n.«tullan
% of Tala' 2<4.e% 78.e% 100.0%
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value df ""t:rsI~·e~I~.
Pearson Chi-Square 13.607· 3 .003
Likelihood Ratio 13.324 3 .004
~na"o"6I!'do"'lnear
4.183 1 .041
N of Valid Cases 94
a. 1 cella (12.5%) ha'118expected count lesa than e. The
minimum expected count is 1.71.
Table 20
.... raaemonthl cash aeneralAd
BeI05~.rHC GH~cl'c?0' GHC5~~01. +G "., on To ... ,
Loan amount applied for Below GHC 500 Count 4 3 0 0 7
% within Loan amount 57.1% 42.8% .0% .0% 100.0%
applied for
!:~~'!'n-:'~';:9. monthly
18.0% 6.5% .0% .0% 5.3%
% orTolal 3.1% 2.3% .0% .0% 5.3%
GHC 600~1000 Count 12 16 3 0
31
% within Loan amount 38.7% 51.S% 8.7% .0% 100.0%
applied for
!:~~'!'n~~~ge monthly
48.0% 34.8% 7.9% .0% 23.7%
'Ko of Total B.2% 12.2% 2.3% .0% 23.7%
GHC 1001·2000 Count 2 10 14 2
28
% within Loan amount 7.''16 35.7% &0.0,% 7.1% 100.0%
applied for
~:'~~~n~:':9. monthly
80% 21.7% 36.8% 8.1% 21.4%
%ofTotal 1.5% 7.6% 10.7% 1.5% 21.4%
+GHC 2000 Count 0 1 13 14 28
% within Loan amount .0% 3.S% 48.4% 60.0% 100.0%
applied for
!:~~~n-:'~~ge monthly
.0% 2.2% 34.2% 03.6% 21.4"
% of Total .0% .8% 8.9'% 10.7"" 21.4'"
N/A Count 7 16 8 6
37
% wllhln Loan amount 18.9" 43.2% 21.6% 16.2% 100.0%
.pplied for
::~~'!'n,!:~ge monthly
28.0% 34.8% 21.1"" 27.3% 28.2%
% of Total 5.3% 12.2% 8.1% 4.8% 28.2%
TOIaI Count 2. 48 38 22
131
% within Loan .mount 19.1% 35.1% 28.0% 16.8%
100.0%
applied for
!:~~~n-:;::~~e monthly
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
%ofTotal 19.1% 35.1% 29.0% 16.8%
100.0%
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Chi-Square Te.t.
Value df ~rsr~·e~I~.
Pearson Chi-Square 70.390· 12 .000
Likelihood Ratio 80.541 12 .000
~nse~~t!'tk,'n'near 17.174 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 131
a.6 cells (30.OOk) ha"", e"Pected count le•• than 5. The
minimum expected count is 1.18.
Symmetric Measures
Value Approx SiQ.
Nominal byNominal Phi .733 .000
Cramer's V .423 .000
N of Valid Cases 131
Table 21
Proportion of loan amount recleved
Cum ulatlve
Frequencv Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid zero percent 10 10.6 10.6 10.6
Below50% 16 17.0 17.0 27.7
50% -75% 31 33.0 33.0 60.6
+76 but les s than 100% 11 11.7 11.7 72.3
100% 26 27.7 27.7 100.0
Total 94 100.0 100.0
Table 22: Wilcoxon's test for difference between loan amount wanted and amount received
Rank.
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Proportion of loan amount Negative Rank. 22· 26.55 584.00
recle"",d - Loan amount Pas III"", Renks 49b 40.24 1972.00applied for
Ties 23"
Total 94
a. Proportion of loan amount recle"""d < Loan amount appliad for
b. Proportion of loan amount recle"""d > Loan amount applied for
c. Proportion of loan amount recle"""d - Loan amount applied for
Te.t Statlatlc.b
Proportion of
loan amount
recie"""d -
Loan amount
Beelied for
Z -4.032"
Asymp. Sig. (2-talied) .000
a. Based on negative ranks.
b. WilcolCOnSigned Ranks Test
Table23
Reclewd full amount· Monthly ea.h gener.ted er.... tabuilltion
MonthlvCash generated
BelowGHC GHCMO- GHC 1001-
Tolal500 1000 1500 +GHC 1500
Reci .. ""d full amount no Count 17 26 21 • 68
% within Red .. ""d full 25.0% 38.2% 30.9% 5.9% 100.0%
amount
% within Monthly Cash 85.0% 86.7% 63.6% 36.4% 72.3%
generated
% ofTolal 18.1% 27.7% 22.3% •. 3% 72.3%
)'BS Count 3 4 12 7 26
% within Reele""d full 11.5% 15 .• % .6.2% 26.9% 100.0%
amount
% within Monthly Cash 15.0% 13.3% 36.4% 63.6% 27.7%
generated
%orTolal 3.2% 4.3% 12.8% 7.4% 27.7%
TOlal Count 20 30 33 tl 94
% within ReeleWld full 21.3% 31.9% 35.1% 11.7% 100.0%
.mount
% within Monthly Cash 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
generalad
% ofTolal 21,3% 31.9% 35.1% 11.7% 100.0%
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Chl-Squar. T•• te
Val .. df ~~,r:.·A~'fJ·
P_a.-son Chi-Square 13.044- 3 .005
Likelihood Ratio 12.714 3 .005
~n.ec:!'~i:tTo~lnear 10.446 1 .001
N of Valid Cases 94
B. 1 cella (12.5°,4) ha"", .lCp.cted count ,••• then 5. The
minimum expected count •• 3.04.
Symmetric Measures
Value Anorox. Sio.
Nominal byNominal Phi .373 .005
Cramer's V .373 .005
N of Valid Cases 94
Table24
Loan amountsDoliad lor
BelowGHC GHC500· GHfo~~OI.
+GH~ zooo Tolal500 1000
Recielllld full amount no Count 7 26 25 10 68
% within Reclelllld full 10.3% 38.2% 368% 14.7% 1000%
amount
% within Loan amount 100.0% 83.9·4 80.6% 40.0% 72.3%
applied for
%oITotal 7.4% 27.7% 26.6% 10.6% 723%
)Vs Count 0 5 6 15 26
% within Recielllld full .0% 19.2% 23.1% 57.7% 100.0%
amount
% within Loan amount .0% 18.1% 19.4% 60.0% 277%
applied for
% of Tolal .0% 5.3% 8.4% 18.0% 27.7%
Total Count 7 31 31 25 94
% within Recla""d full 7.4% 33.0% 33.0% 26.6% 100.0%
amount
% within Loan amount 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
applied for
% oITola1 74% 33.0% 330% 266% 1000%
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value df ""!rs~'e~If"
Pearson Chi-Square 18.873" 3 .000
Likelihood Ratio 19.361 3 .000
~nse~c:t!'tra'n'near
14.958 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 94
a.1 cells (12.5%) ha"", expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count Is 1.94.
Sywnmetrlc Mea.urea
Value ADorox. Sic.
Nominal byNominal Phi .448 .000
Cramer's V .448 .000
N of Valid Cases 94
Table 25: chi square test for Constraint status and Age
Cros.tab
Aae
Below30""'" ~0·45""'" 46·60'-" 60~+ Tolal
Recie""d full amount no Count 11 26 21 10 68
% within Recle""d full 16.2% 38.2% 30.9% 14.7% 100.0%
amount
% within lIge 61.1% 65.0% 84.0% 90.9% 72.3%
% olTotal 11.7% 27.7% 22.3% 10.6% 72.3%
~s Count 7 14 4 1 26
% within Recle""d full 26.9% 53.8% 15.4% 3.8% 100.0%
amount
% within lIge 38.9% 35.0',4 16.0',4 9.1% 27.7%
% olTotal 7.4% 14.9% 4.3% 1.1% 27.7%
Total Count 18 40 25 11 94
% within Recle""d full 19.1% 42.6% 26.6% 11.7% 100.0%
amount
% within lIge 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% olTotal 19.1% 42.6% 26.6% 11.7% 100.0%
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Chl-Squ.re Te.t.
Val .. df ~:r.:r.i..~.If"
Pear.on Chi-Square 5.806- 3 .121
Likelihood Ratio 6.327 3 .097
~n.eOa~i-:tr;,'nln.ar 6.166 1 .023
N ofValfd C•• e. 94
a. 2 cella (25.00/0)have expected count Ie•• than S. The
minimum expected count la 3.04.
Table 26: chi square test for Constraint status and gender
Cro•• t.b
Gender
male femal .. Total
Recleved full amount no Count 28 40 68
% wIthIn Recla_d full 41.2% 68.8% 100.0%
amount
% within Gender 71.8% 72.7% 72.3%
% of Tolal 29.8% 42.6% 72.3%_.
Count 11 16 26
0,," within Recla"",d full 42.3% 57.7% 100.0%
amount
0,," within Gender 28.2% 27.3% 27.7%
0Al, of Total 11.7% 16.0% 27.7%
Tolal Count 39 55 94
% within Recle"",d full 41.50/0 58.5% 100.0%
amount
% \Nlthln Gender 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Tolal 41.5% 58.5% 100.0%
Chl-Squar. T•• t.
~rsP,Sjlp. Exact S'~i (2- Exact Slili (1-Value df -sided sIde sIde
Pearson Chi-Square .010· 1 .921
Conllnulty Correctlonb .000 1 1.000
LIkelihood Ratio .010 1 .921
FIsher's Exact Test 1.000 .651
L1near-by-Llnear .010 1 .921
Association
N of Valid Cases 94
a.O cells (.0%) have expected count less than 6. The mInimum expected count Is 10.79.
b. Com puted only for a 21<2 table
Table 27: chi square test for Constraint status and education
Cro.. tab
Education
nofonnal
aeoondar)t\oc
ed~~~Con :~~~~~~o~lerU.. 'Yeducation ecuceuon Tolal
Reciewd full amount no Count 12 31 19 6 68
% within Recl.wd full 17.6% 45.8% 27.9% 8.8% 100.0%
amount
% within Education 60.0% 81.11% 117.9% 75.0% 72.3%
% o!Tolal 12.6% 33.0% 20.2% 11.4% 72.3%
~S Count 8 7 8 2 26
% within Recie,,"d full 30.8% 26.9% 34.6% 7.7% 100.0%
.mount
% within Education 40.0% 18.4% 32.1% 25.0% 27.7%
% olTola1 8.5% 7.4% 96% 2.1% 27.7%
Total Count 20 36 28 6 94
% within Recl ..... d full 21.3% 40.4% 211.8% 11.5% 100.0%
amount
% within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% o!Total 21.3% 40.4% 29.8% 11.5% 100.0%
Chl-Squar. Ta.t.
Value df ~~I~·e~I?
Pearson Chi-Square 3.453· 3 .327
Likelihood Ratio 3.476 3 .324
~nsa:~-:tra~lnear .180 1 .672
N of Valid Cases 94
8. 1 cells (12.50/0) ha_ e><pectedcount less than 5. The
minimum e><peetedcount Is 2.21.
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Table 28: chi square test for Constraint status and number of dependents
ero•• tab
Deoendants
below 5 5-10 +10 TotAl
Recie_d full amount no Count 16 43 9 68
% within Recle_d full 23.5% 63.2% 13.2% 100.0%
amount
% within Dependants 57.1% 76.8% 90.0% 72.3%
% of TotsI 17.0% 45.7% 9.6% 72.3%
)'BB Count 12 13 1 26
% within Recla_d full 46.2% 50.0% 3.8% 100.0%
amount
% within Dependants 42.9% 23.2% 10.0% 27.7%
% of Total 12.8% 13.8% 1.1°A. 27.7%
Total Count 28 58 10 94
% within Recle_d full 29.8% 59.6% 10.6% 100.0%
amount
% within Dependants 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Totat 29.8% 59.6% 10.6% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
Value df ~rsp·S;~.-slded
Pearson Chi-Square 5.3448 2 .069
Likelihood Ratio 5.433 2 .066
Linear-by-Llnear 5.188 1 .023
Association
N of Valid Cases 94
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.77.
Table 29: chi square test for Constraint status and monthly expenditure
er.... tab
Avera~e monthl e""end,ture
BelowGHC
300 GHC 300·500 GHC 501·700 +GHC 700 Total
Recie""d full amount no Counl 18 28 14 8 68
% within Recieved full 26.5% 41.2% 20.6% 11.8% 100.0%
amount
% within Average monthly 78.3% 73.7% 609% 80.0% 72.3%
e""and.ture
% ofTotal 19.1% 29.8% 14.9% 8.5% 72.3%
)189 Count 5 10 9 2 26
% within Recle'l8d full 19.2% 38.5% 346% 7.7% 100.0%
amount
% within Average monthly 21.7% 26.3% 39.1% 20.0% 27.7%
e""enditure
% olTotal 5.3% 10.6% 9.6% 2.1% 27.7%
Total Count 23 38 23 10 94
% within Recis'I8d full 24.5'''' 40.4% 24.5% 10.6% 100.0%
amount
% within A'I8rage monthly 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
e""enditure
% ofTotal 24.5% 40.4% 24.5% 10.6% 1000%
Chi-Square Tests
~l!;'p. Sjl~.
Value df -sided
Pearson Chi-Square 2.243a 3 .524
Likelihood RatiO 2.182 3 .536
Llnear-by-Llnear .368 1 .544
Association
N of Valid Cases 94
a. 1 cells (12.5%) ha_ expected count les8 than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.77.
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Table 30: chi square test for Constraint status and lending institution
Proportion of loan .mount reclev.d· Lending Inatltutlon eroaat.b I lionu.
Lendlno Ins mullan
un~::" ... al
MFI Total
Pooportfon of loan amount zero percent Count 6 6 10
reclevad
% within Proportion of 60.0% 60.0% 100.0%
loan amount raclewd
% wllhln Lending 21.7% 7.0% 10.8%
InatUution
% of Total 11.3% 11.3% 10.8%
Below50% Count 2 14 18
% within Proportion of 12.5% 87.11% 100.0%
loan amount reeleved
% within Lending 8.7% 19.7% 17.0%
Institution
% of Total 2.1% 14.9% 17.0%
50%·75% Count 8 23 31
% within Proportion of 25.8% 74.2% 100.0%
loan amount reclewd
% within Lending 34.8% 32.4% 33.0%
Institution
% of Total 8.6% 24.6% 33.0%
+76 but le.8 than 100% Count II 8 11
% within Proportion of 45.6% 64.6% 100.0%
loan amount recieved
% within Lending 21.7% 8.5% 11.7%
Institution
% of Total 11.3% 6.4% 11.7%
100% Count 3 23 26
% within Proportion 0' 11.6% 68.5% 100.0%
loan amount raclewd
% within Lending 13.0% 32.4% 27.7%
Institution
% of Total 3.2% 24.5% 27.7%
Total Count 23 71 94
% within Proportion of 24.5% 75.5°A, 100.0%
loan amount reciewd
% within Lending 100.0% 100.0% 100.0°A,
Institution
% of Total 24.5% 75.5% 100.0°A,
Chl..Square Teat.
Value df ~rsl~·e~I~.
Pearson Chi-Square 9.771· 4 .044
Likelihood Ratio 9.528 4 .049
~n8aoa~"-~do~near 2.3715 1 .123
N of Valid Case .. 94
a. 3 celis (30.0%) have e"Pected count less than 15.The
minimum e>ep8ctedcount la 2.45.
Table31
obtain credit anytime needed
Freauencv Percent Valid Percent C~:~':~i~
Valid strongly disagree 8 8.5 8.5 8.5
disagree 35 37.2 37.2 45.7
neither agree not 23 24.5 24.5 70.2
disagree
agree 23 24.5 24.5 94.7
strongly agree 5 5.3 5.3 100.0
Total 94 100.0 100.0
Table 32
Raclewd full amount • obtain credh 1r¥lme needed Cr .... tabulation
obtain credit anlAime needed
strongly
disaoree ~-:;rc,~~:~r=aoree StronQIV8Qreedisaaree Total
Reciewd full amount no Count 8 25 19 14 2 68
% within Reciewd full 11.8% 36.8% 27.9% 20.6% 2.9% 100.0"4
amount
% within obtain credit 100.0% 71.4% 82.6% 60.9% 40.0% 72.3%
an~me needed
%olTotal 8.5% 26.6% 20.2% 14.9% 2.1% 72.3"4
)EIs Count 0 10 4 9 3 26
% within Recle""d lull .0"4 38.5% 15.4"4 346% 11.5"4 100.0%
amount
% within obtain credit .0% 28.6% 17.4% 39.1% 60.0% 27.7%
an).time needed
%ofTolal .0% 10.6% 4.3% 9.6% 3.2% 27.7"4
Total Count 8 35 23 23 5 94
"4 within Recl.""d lull 8.5% 37.2% 24.5% 245% 5.3"4 100.0%
amount
% within obtain credit 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
an)time needed
%ofTolal 8.5% 37.2% 24.5% 24.5% 53% 100.0%
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Reported causes of the constraint faced by loan applicants
Table33
m.ln re.son for unauc ••• ful.ppllcatlon· Landing Institution Croaatabulatlon
lendlno Ins utunon
un~:.,,:al
MFI Total
main reason for lack of guarantor Count 3 9 12
unsucessful application
% within main reason for 25.0% 75.0% 100.0%
unsucessful application
% within landing 18.8% 17.3% 17.8%
Institution
% of Total 4.4% 13.2% 17.8%
Lack of landed property Count 5 13 18
% within main reason for 27.8% 72.2% 100.0%
unsucessful application
% within Lending 31.3% 25.0% 28.5%
Institution
% of Total 7.4% 19.1% 28.5%
insufficient funds In Count 2 6 6
.alAngs alc
% within main reason for 25.0% 75.0% 100.0%
unsuC8ssful application
% within lending 12.5% 11.5% 11.8%
Institution
% olTotal 2.9% 8.8% 11.8%
poor cash now Count 3 8 11
% within main reason for 27.3% 72.7% 100.0%
unsucessful application
% within Lending 18.8% 15.4% 16.2%
Institution
% of Total 4.4°'" 11.8% 16.2%
repa)m ent difficulties In Count 0 14 14
the past % within main reason for .0% 100.0% 100.0%
unsucessful application
% within Lending .0% 26.9% 20.6%
Institution
% of Total .0% 20.8% 20.6%
lack registered property Count 3 0 3
documents % within main reason for 100.0% 100.0%.0%
unsucessful application
% within Lending 18.8% .0% 4.4%
Institution
% of Total 4.4% .0% 4.4%
don't know Count 0 2 2
% within main reason for .0% 100.0°'" 100.0%
unsucessful application
% within Lending .0% 3.8% 2.9%
Institution
% Of Total .0% 2.9% 2.9%
Total Count 16 52 68
% within main reason for 23.5% 76.5% 100.0%
unsucessful application
% within Lending 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Institution
%ofTotal 23.5% 76.5% 100.0%
Constraint status of non-applicants
Table34
Frenuencv Percent Valid Percent Cw.:r~':~~
Valid Don't need It 10 7.6 7.6 7.6
Don't know where& how 2 1.5 1.5 9.2
to get It
think I dont qualify 3 2.3 2.3 11.5
takes too long to process 2 1.5 1.5 13.0
don'"t posse •• required 1 .8 .8 13.7
documents
cann't afford charges 11 8.4 8.4 22.1
terms don't meet my 8 6.1 6.1 28.2
requirements
N/A 94 71.8 71.8 100.0
Total 131 100.0 100.0
main r••• on for not applyfng for credit
SE credit constraint- Validation Output
Table 35
Fran, Percen' v, lid Percent
curnulatl'We
enc
Valid Bolo\N 30)1"'. 4 '4.8 14.8 14.8
30-45_ 15 55.6 55.6 70.4
46-60yr a 29.6 29." 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
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Table 36
Gender
F'. Percen' VAlid C~r:;,"'":!"tiva
Valid nlale B 29.6 29.6 29.8
'farn_l_ 19 70.4 70.• 100.0
Total 27 "00.0 100.0
Table 37
Freauenc Percent VaIId_p",rcent C~r:;r~l:r~l~
Valid nafonnaleducation 8 29.8 29.6 29.6
Baalc education 13 48.1 48.1 77.8
aecondary/Vocetlonalltech 8 22.2 22.2 100.0nleal education
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table 38
Dependant.
Fre_g_uenc Percent Valid Percent c~~va
Valid belowS 5 18.5 16.S 18.S
5-10 18 66.7 88.7 85.2
+10 4 14.8 14.8 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table 39
Employe ••
Cumulatt\le
FreQuency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid less than 5 20 74.1 74.1 74.1
5-10 7 25.9 25.9 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table 40
Cash per month
FreQuencv
Cumulative
Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Below GHC 500 8 29.6 29.6 29.6
GHC 500-1000 7 25.9 25.9 55.8
GHC 1001-1500 12 44.4 44.4 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table 41
Aver.g. monthly expenditure
Freauenc, Percent ~Il<t~n c~r:;:r~'::t:·
Valid Below GHC 300 4 14.8 14.8 14.8
GHC 300-500 14 151.9 151.9 88.7
GHC 501-700 8 29.6 29.6 96.3
+GHC700 1 3.7 3.7 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table 42
mo.t Important busIn••• problem
Cumulathi08
Frenuencv Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid lack of funds 1S 55.8 55.8 55.6
frequent price Increament 4 14.8 14.8 70.4
by suppliers
shop locallon not 3 11.1 11.1 81.5
conducl~ for businesa
high Import! dulles 5 18.5 18.5 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table 43
Applied for loan In laat 24 montha
Cumulative
FreQuencv Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid No 5 18.5 18.5 18.5
Yes 22 81.5 81.5 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
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Table 44
Lending Inat.tut'Gn
Free Percent. Valid
CurnulAtt'Wtenc, Porceru.
Valid Universal bank 7 25.9 25.9 25.9
Rural Bank 6 22.2 22.2 048.1
Sa\Angs end Loans 9 33.3 33.3 81.5Institution
N/A 15 18.15 18.15 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table45
Loanamount w.nt.d
Freauencv Percent Valid Porcent C't>r:;r~':~Ii"
Valid Below GHC 500 2 7.4 7.04 7.4
GHC 500-1000 6 22.2 22.2 29.6
GHC 1001-2000 6 22.2 22.2 151.9
+GHC 2000 8 29.6 29.6 81.15
N/A 5 18.5 18.5 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table 46
Recle_d full amount
Freauencv
Cum ulatl""
Percent Valid percent percent
Valid no 19 70.4 70.4 70.4
~s 3 11.1 11.1 61.15
N/A 5 18.5 18.5 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table 47
Fren 'Ancv Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent Percent
Valid strongly disagree 5 18.5 18.5 18.5
disagree 14 51.9 151.9 70.4
neither .g .... not 5 18.15 1S.15 8S.9
disagree
agree 3 11.1 11.1 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table48
Proportion of loan amount recle_d
Freauency Valid Percent
Cum ulatl"'l!
Percent Percent
Valid zero percent 3 11.1 11.1 11.1
Below50% 7 25.9 25.9 37.0
50% -750/0 7 25.9 25.9 63.0
+76 but less than 100% 2 7.4 7.4 70.4
100% 3 11.1 11.1 81.5
N/A 5 16.5 18.5 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table49
main re•• on for unauce•• ful application
Cumulallve
Freauencv Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid Lack of landed property 8 29.6 29.6 29.6
defaulted In the paat 6 22.2 22.2 151.9
don't know 5 18.5 18.5 70.4
N/A 8 29.6 29.6 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
Table SO
main reason for not applying for credit
percent
Cumulative
Freouencv Valid percent Percent
Valid Don't need it 1 3.7 3.7 3.7
cann't afford charges 4 14.8 14.8 18.5
N/A 22 81.5 81.5 100.0
Total 27 100.0 100.0
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Table 51
Rec'e""d fIJIl.m ,un
n.., -- .N/A .TOIaIobtain credit an~m. atronglydiaagr •• Count 3 0 2 IIneeded
% within obtain credit eo.O% .0% 40.0% 100.0%
anytime needed
% within Recl.""d full 111.8% .0% 40.0% 18.11%
amount
% at Tota' 11.1% .0% 7.4% 1811%
di.agree Count 10 3 1 14
% within obtain OI'8dlt 71.4% 21.4% 7.1% 100.0%
an)4Jrn. n.eded
% within R.eI.Wld full 112.8% 100.0'110 20.0% 111.11%
amount
% ofT..,1a1 37.0% 11.1% 3.7% 111.11%
neithar agr •• not Count 4 0 1 8
disagr ••
% within obtain credit 80.0% .0% 20.0% 100.0%
.n~m. n•• dad
% within R.cI .... d lUll 21.1% .0% 20.0% 18.11%
amount
%ofTotill 1~_8% .0% 3.7% 18.11%
agree Count 2 0 1 3
% within obtain credit 811.7% .0'110 33.3% 100.0%
.n)time n•• ded
% within R.ct .... d full 10.5% .0'110 20.0% 11.1%
amount
% of Tatal 7.4% .0% 3.7% 11.1%
Total Count 111 3 II 27
% within obtain credit 70.4'110 11.1'110 18.5% 100.0'110
.n)'tim. n•• dad
% within Red.Wld full 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
amount
%-ofTatal 70 .•% 11.1% 18.11% 100.0%
Table 52: Proportion of Loan Amount Actually Received and Constraint Status - Ghana
Proportion of loan N=22 Valid % Constraint
amount received Status
zero 3 13.6 Fully constrained
a licants
<50% 7 31.8 Partially
50-75% 7 31.8 constrained
>76% but <100% 2 9.0
applicants
100% 3 13.6 Unconstrained
a licants
APPENDIXC
Property Registration and Credit Access in Ghana and England
Respondents' characterlstlcs » Ghana
Table 1
yr. at ourrent poeltlon • 'n_tllutlon Type Croa.t.bul.tlon
In.tltu "on VD_
U"~::l,:·1 MFI Tala'
ya at current po. Ilion Belowei)ll"a Count 14 25 3"
% wlthl" ~ at ourrent 35.""," 84.1"'" 100.0","
po.aUon
% within Inatltutlon Type 24.8% 49.0% 38.1%
% otTatal 13.0% 23.1% 36.1%
S-10yra Count 26 16 46
% within )W'e at currant 80.8% 3".1% 100.0%
poa'lton
% within Inatitutlon Type 4 ...1% 35.3% 42.8%
% arTotal 25_Gcw. 18.7% 442.8%
10)ll'"a+ Count 'I' 8 23
% within ~ at ourrent fIlS.2OM. 3•. 8% 100.0%
poaltlon
% within Inatttution T)tp. 28.3% 18.7% 21.3%
% arTola' 13.8% 7."% 21.3%
Total Count 57 II' ,08
% within )Ir8 .t aurrent &2.8% <47.2% 100.0%
poaition
% within Inatltutlon T)Ip. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% otTotal e2.8% "7.2% 100.0%
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'\.alue ..., ~r.fd·o~'~·
Pearaon Chi-Square 7.095- :2 .02Q
Likelihood Retlo 7.168 :2 .0:28
~".eoa61-:tfo'nlne.r 15.948 1 .0115
N of Valid Calle. 108
Table 2
yre .t Inatltutlon • Inat'tut'on Type Croa.t.bul.tlon
Institution Tvn..
unt!:::: .1 MFI Total
yr-a at In.tltutlon le •• ~an 6 Count 14 20 34
% within ).4"8.t InaUtution 41.2% 158.8% 100.0%
% within InaUtution T-yp. 24.8% 3Q.2% 31.5%
% at Total 13.0% 18.8% 31.5%
6-10 Count 27 18 42
% within )iII"'8 at Inatltutlon 84.3% 38.7% 100.0%
% within In.tUutlo" T-yp. 47.4% :2Q.4% 38.0%
% at Tota. 28.0% 13.Q% 38.0%
10+ Count 18 18 3:2
% within Y. at InatltuUon 00.0% 80.0% 100.0%
% within In.tltutlan T)t'P. 28.1% 31.4% 2Q.8%
0/0 ctTotal 14.8% 14.8% 29.8%
Total Count 57 51 108
% within yr. at In.Utudon &2.8% 47.2% 100.0%
% within Inatltutlon Twa 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% at Tota' 82.8% 47.2% 100.0%
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value df ~~~'e~'f'
Pearson Chi-Square 4.167- 2 .124
Likelihood Ratio 4.208 2 .122
Llnear-by-Llnear .563 1 .453
Association
N of Valid Cases 108
:;.ge"c":~~ ~.r;.~rsa~~'f.ected count les8 than 5. The minimum
Table 3
position • Age Cros.tabulatlon
Aaa
Below 30vrs 30-45vrs +45vrs Total
position credit officer Count 16 28 10 54
% within position 29.6°"- 51.9% 18.5% 100.0%
% within Age 69.6% 53.8% 30.3% 50.0%
% of Tala I 14.8% 25.9% 9.3% 50.0%
loans manager Count 6 23 12 41
% within position 14.6% 56.1% 29.3% 100.0%
% within Age 26.1% 44.2% 36.4% 38.0%
% of TOlal 5.6% 21.3% 11.1% 38.0%
branch manager Count 1 1 11 13
% within position 7.7% 7.7% 84.6% 100.0°"-
% within Age 4.3% 1.9% 33.3°"- 12.0%
% of Tala I .9% .9% 10.2% 12.0%
Tala I Count 23 52 33 108
% within position 21.3% 48.1% 30.6% 100.0%
%wlthln Age 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 21.3% 48.1% 30.6% 100.0%
Value df ~rsfd·e~,g·
Pearson Chi-Square 23.873- 4 .000
Likelihood Ratio 22.900 4 .000
~naeoa~i-:do-nlnear 14.803 1 .000
N of Valid Case. 108
a.2 cell .. (22.20/0) ha\l& e>epected count leas than 5. The
minimum expected count ,& 2. 77 ~
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Respondents' characteristics - England
Table 4
yr. at current poaltlon * poeltlon Cro•• t.but.tlon
coetuon
A~O\ll·:':r. ~~~I~~:~m~r::::;::r. Tnta
~. at current position Below5)K8 Count 10 lIi 1 26
% within )irS at current 38.5% 57.7% 3.8% 100.0%
position
% within position 28.3% 32.8% 11.1% 27.4%
I%. of Total 10.5% 111.8% 1.1% 27.4%
6-10)l1'1li Count 17 111 II 41
% within )n 8' current 41.5% 38.6% 22.0% 100.0%
p08ition
% within position 44.7% 32.8% 81.8% 43.2%
% of Total 17.9% 15.8% 9.8% 43.2%
+10)l1'1li Count 11 16 1 28
% within.,... at current 39.3% 87.1% 3.8% 100.0%
position
% within poslUon 26.9% 34.8% 11.1% 211.8%
% of Total 11.6% 16.8% 1.1% 29.5%
Total Count 38 46 11 115
% within ~ at currant 40.0% 48.4% 11.6% 100.0%
position
°4 within position 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 40.0% 48.4% 11.8% 100.0%
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value df ~rsrcie~I?
Pearson Chi-Square 8.831" 4 .065
Likelihood Ratio 9.145 4 .058
Llnear-by-Llnear .008 1 .929
Association
N of Valid Cases 95
a. 3 cells (33.3°k) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum e>Cpectedcount is 3.01.
Table 5
yr•• t current poeltlon • g.nd. Cro•• tabulatlon
aenda
"'Ale fA"'BI .. TotAl
~a at current position Below 5)1'". Count 22 4 26
% within )01"'8 at current 64.6% 115.4% 100.0%
position
% within genda 32.4% 14.8% 27.4%
% ofTolal 23.2% 4.2% 27.4%
15-10ys Count 26 13 41
% within yra at current 68.3% 31.7% 100.0%
position
% within genda 41.2% 48.1% 43.2%
% of Tata' 29.15% 13.7% 43.2%
.10yrs Count 18 10 28
% within vrs at current 84.3% 315.7% 100.0%
position
% within genda 26.15% 37.0% 29.15%
% of Tolal 18.9% 10.5% 29.15%
Total Count 68 27 95
% within yrs at current 71.8% 28.4% 100.0%
position
% within genda 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% afTotal 71.6% 26.4% 100.0%
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value df ~rseie~I~.
Pearson Chi-Square 3.122" 2 .210
Likelihood Ratio 3.364 2 .186
~nse~6.-!';ra'n'near 2.659 1 .103
N of Valid Cases 95
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
e><pected count is 7.39.
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Table 6
yr. at curr.nt po.ltlon· Aga Cro •• tabulatlon
Aaa
Reln~ ..n~. ..n_A5"", +MI TnlAI
~. at current po.ition Below5:yra Count 17 7 2 26
% within I'" at currant 65.4% 26.9% 7.7% 100.0%
position
%wlthln Ag. 100.0% 20.0% 4.7% 27.4%
% ofTolal 17.9% 7.4% 2.1% 27.4%
5-10)11". Count 0 27 14 41
% within I'" at current .0% 65.9% 34.1% 100.0%
position
% within Ag.. .0% 77.1% 32.6% 43.2%
% of Tolal .0% 28.4% 14.7% 43.2%
+101'" Count 0 1 27 28
% within I'" at current .0% 3.8% 98.4% 100.0%
position
%wlthln Aga .0% 2.9% 62.8% 29.5%
%ofTolal .0% 1.1% 28.4% 29.5%
Tolal Count 17 35 43 95
% within I'" at curr ..nt 17.9% 38.8% 415.3% 100.0%
position
%wlthln Ag. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% tOO.O%
% of Tolal 17.9% 36.8% 45.3% 100.0%
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value df ~rsfcie~lf'
Pearson Chi-Square 89.011- 4 .000
Likelihood Ratio 92.221 4 .000
Llnear-by-Linear 56.605 1 .000
Associatoon
N of Valid Cases 95
a. 1 cells (11.1 %) ha_ expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count Is 4.65.
Attitudes to collateral as a requirement for small business credit - Ghana
Table 7
Frea.uenc~ Percent Valid Percent C~':r':,,':~I-
Valid not necessary 3 2.8 2.8 2.8
seldom nece.aary 13 12.0 12.0 14.8
lT1o.Uynace.aary 37 34.3 34.3 49.1
al'Wa)'S nece •• ary 55 50.9 50.9 100.0
Total 108 100.0 100.0
Table 8
How nec•••• ry I. coll.tar.l· 'n.tltutlon Type Croaatabulatlon
Institution T\lD8
un~~~al MFI Toosl
How necessaryi. not necessary Count 0 3 3
collateral % within How nece •• ary .0% 100.0% 100.0%
Is collalaral
% within Ins titutlon T),pe .0% 5.9% 2.8%
% of TOlal .0% 2.8% 2.8%
seldom nece.aary Count 2 11 13
% within How nece.sary 15.4% 84.6% 100.0%
,. collateral
% within Institution T~ .. 3.5% 21.6% 12.0%
% ofTolal 1.9% 10.2% 12.0%
mosdynece •• ary Count 15 22 37
% within How necessary 40.5% 59.5% 100.0%
la collateral
% within Institution T~. 28.3% 43.1% 34.3%
% of Tolal 13.9% 20.4% 34.3%
always necessary Count 40 115 55
% within How nece.aary 72.7% 27.3% 100.0%
la collateral
% within Institution T~e 70.2% 29.4% 50.9%
%ofTolal 37.0% 13.9% 50.9%
Tolal Count 57 51 108
% within How necessary 52.8% 47.2% 100.0·'"
la collateral
% within Institution T~. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
%ofTotal 52.8% 47.2% 100.0%
259
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value ~rsfc. Sig.df -8 ded
Pearson Chi-Square 21.652· 3 .000
Likelihood Ratio 23.809 3 .000
~nse~~;-!'tb'nlnear 21.104 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 108
a. 2 cells (25.0°,,")ha"", e>epectedcount lesa than 5. The
minimum expected count Is 1.42.
Table 9
Ranks
Ins Illullnn TvnA N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
How necessaryls Universal bank 57 66.40 3785.00
collateral
MFI 51 41.20 2101.00
Total 108
T•• t Stattetlc.-
How
necessary .a
collateral
tv\ann-VVhltney U 775.000
Wllco>ClOnW 2101.000
Z -4.594
Asyrnp. 81g. (2-talled) .000
a. Grouping Variable: Inatltutlon
T)lpe
Table 10
t-ta<w n.c •••• ry I_ oollat_rat • a-nder Croeatabulatlon
-" .. r j ..s:
mal .. femal .. Total
How neca •• aryl. not nee•••• ry Count 3 0 3
collateral
% within How naoe ••• ry 100.0% .0% 100.0%
I. collateral
% within gander 4.3% .0% 2.8%
","otTotal 2.S% .0% 2.8%
•• Idom n.ce. a.ry Count 8 5 13
% within How n.o •••• ry 81.5% 38.5% 100.0%
la colletaral
% within gander 11.4% 13.2% 12.0%
% ofTatal 7.•% •. 8% 12.0%
moatiyn.ce ••• ry Count 23 14 37
% within How neoe •• ary 82.2% 37.8% 100.0%
I. collateral
% within gender 32.8% 311.8% 34.3%
% of Tota' 21.3% 13.0% 3•. 3%
.Iw.~ neee•• ary Count 36 19 55
% within How nea. ••• ry 88.5% 34.5% 100.0%
I. collateral
% withingender 111.4"'- 110.0% 110.9%
fM. of To_I 33.3% 17.e-Mo eO.9%
Total Count 70 38 108
% within How neoe ••• ry "4.8% 38.2% 100.0%
le coliater.1
% withingender 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 114.8% 3!s.2% 1000%
Chl-Squ.re Te.t.
Valuft df ~r.fcJ·..~i9.
Pearson Chi-Square 1.814- 3 .612
Likelihood Ratio 2.785 3 .428
~n.e~~I-:do-nlnear .114 1 .736
N of Valid Cases 108
•. 3 cells (37.t5%) have encpeoted count Ie •• than ei. The
minimum expected count I. 1.06.
Table 11
Correlation.
How
Me
necessary I.
collateral
5pearman'8 rho Age Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .009
51g.(2-taIl8d) .925
N 108 108
How necess8ry 18 Correlation Coefficient .009 1.000
collataral
5ig. (2-tallad) .925
N 108 108
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Table 12
Correlation.
How
necessary I.
In~ ~i~ncouateret
Spearman's rho How necessary is Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .029collaleral
Sig. (2-tailed) .763
N 108 108
)Ks at institution Correlation Coefficient .029 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .763
N 108 108
Table 13
Corr.latlon.
How
necessary •• ~ etcurrent
coueteret Dosilion
Spearman'. rho Hownace.aaryi. Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .060
collateral Big. (2-talled) .1535
N 106 108
)irS at current position Correlation Coefficient .060 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .535
N 108 108
Table 14: collateral not sufficient to trigger loan supply (CONOSUFF)
CONOSUFF
Cumulali\18
FreQuencv Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid disagree 7 6.5 6.5 6.5
Neither agree nor 23 21.3 21.3 27.8
disagree
agree 51 47.2 47.2 75.0
fullyagree 27 25.0 25.0 100.0
Total 108 100.0 100.0
Table 15: Mann-Whitney test for CONOSUFF and type of lender
Ranks
tris tltutlon TvnA N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
CONOSUFF Unh....rsal bank 57 54.58 3111.00
MFI 51 54.41 2775.00
Total 108
Test Statistics·
CONOSUFF
Mann-Whitney U 1449.000
WilcolCDnW 2775.000
Z -.030
Asymp. Sig. (2-talled) .976
a. Grouping Variable: Institution
Type
Table 16: chi square test for CONOSUFF and gender
CONOSUFF· a-nct.r Cro •• t.bul.tlon
n
I I To.a
CONOSUFF disagree Count 4 3 7
Elq).cted Count 4.15 2.15 7.0
% \Nlthln CONOSUFF 157.1% 42.9% 100.0%
% "",.thln gender 15.7% 7.Q% 8.5%
% of Tohl' 3.7% 2.8% 8.15%
Neither agr •• nor Count '15 8 23
di.agre. ElCp_ctad Count 14.8 8.1 23.0
% VII'thln CONOSUFF 815.2% 34.8% 100.0%
% \!IVlthln gender 21.4% 21.1% 21.3%
"",,orTola' 13.9% 7.4% 21.3%
.gr •• Count 31 20 151
ElCp_et.d Count 33.1 17.9 151.0
% within CONOSUFF 80.8% 3Q.2"M. 100.0'"
% within gender 44.3% 52.ft% 47.2%
% afTola' 28.7% 18.f5% ....7.2%
fully.gr •• Count 20 7 27
ElCp_o_d Count 17.15 9.15 27.0
% VIIlthln CONOSUFF 74.'% 215.9% 100.0%
% within gender 28.0'" , 8.4'" 25.0%
% orTola' '8.8% 8.15% 25.0%
Total Count 70 38 10a
E)CJl'ected Count 70.0 38.0 108.0
% 'WIthin CONOSUFF ft4.8% 315.2% 100.0""-
% within gender '00.0% '00.0% 100.0%
% or Tolal 84.8% 35.2% 100.0%
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Value df ~~r:i ..~I~.
Pearson Chi-Square 1.561- 3 .668
Likelihood Ratio 1.601 3 .6159
~n.e~6i!»lTo-nlnear .683 1 .406
N of Valid C81!!1es 108
•. 2 cell. (25.0D/o) have expected count I••• than e. The
minimum expected count la 2.46.
Table 17: correlation between CONOSUFF and experience
Correlation.
~n~~~~~nt r.ONOSUFF
Spearman's rho ~ at current position Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.046
Sig. (2-talled) .644
N 108 108
CONOSUFF Correlation Coefficient -.045 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .644
N 108 108
Table 18: correlation between CONOSUFF and age
Correlation.
CONOSUFF Aae
Spearman's rho CON05UFF Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .000
51g. (2-talled) .996
N 108 108
Age Correlation Coefficient .000 1.000
51g. (2-talled) .996
N 108 108
Table 19: correlation between CONOSUFF and number of years at institution
Corralatlon.
CONOSUFF
~s at
Ins titution
Spearman's rho CON05UFF Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.090
5ig. (2-talled) .354
N 108 108
~ st Institution Correlation Coefficient -.090 1.000
51g. (2-talied) .354
N 108 108
Attitudes to collateral as a requirement for small business credit - Eng/and
Table20
How nece •• ary I. collateral
Freauency
Cumulative
Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid seldom necessary 23 24.2 24.2 24.2
mostly necessary 52 54.7 54.7 78.9
always necessary 20 21.1 21.1 100.0
Total 95 100.0 100.0
Table 21
Correlatlona
How
necessary Is ~ at current
collateral -nosltion
Spearman's rho How necesseryls Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.348"
collateral 8ig. (2-talled) .001
N 95 95
)'I'"S at current position Correlation Coefficient -.348" 1.000
5ig. (2-telled) .001
N 95 95
**. Correlation Is significant at the 0.01 lewl (2-talled).
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Table 22
How n.c•••• ryI. coll.t.r.l· g.nd. er_.t.bul.tlon
cenda
mal.. fnmele TotalHow necessary ia seldom necessary Count 15 8 23collateral
% within How necessary 65.2% 348% 100.0%la collateral
% within genda 22.1% 29.6% 24.2%
% ofTolal 15.8% 8.4% 24.2%
mostly necessary Count 40 12 62
% within How neceBaary 76.9% 23.1% 100.0%
la collateral
%within gende 588% 44.4% 114.7%
% ofTolal 42.1% 12.6% 114.7%
always necessary Count 13 7 20
%within How necesaary 65.0% 35.0% 100.0%
Is collateral
% within Gonda 19.1% 25.9% 21.1%
% ofTolal 13.7% 7.4% 21.1%
Tolal Count 68 27 95
%within How necesaary 71.6% 28.4% 100.0%
la collateral
% within Gonda 100.0·"'" 100.0·"'" 100.0%
%ofTolal 71.6% 28.4% 100.0%
Chl-Squ.re T•• t.
Value df '1~I~'eSJr'
Pearaon Chi-Square 1.613- 2 .446
Likelihood Ratio 1.609 2 .447
Llnear-by-Llnear .002 1 .9aOAssociation
N of Valid Cas .... 95
a. 0 cells (.0%) ha\le expected count les. than 5. The minimum
expected count la 5.68.
Table 23
Collateral Not sufficient
Cumulative
Freouency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid disagree 11 11.6 11.6 11.6
Neither agree nor 14 14.7 14.7 26.3
disagree
agree 20 21.1 21.1 47.4
fullyagree 50 52.6 52.6 100.0
Total 95 100.0 100.0
Table 24
Correlations
ys at current Collateral Not
position sufficient
Spearman's rho ys at current pas iUon CorrelaUon Coefficient 1.000 -.177
5ig. (2-tailed) .086
N 95 95
Collateral Not sufficient CorrelaUon Coefficient -.177 1.000
5ig. (2-tailed) .086
N 95 95
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Preferred forms of collateral- Ghana
Table25
Friedman Test for different forms of collateral
Rank.
Mean Rank
Land 8.60
C.ahtn)(8d Deposit 7.00
Stock ~.20
h.Jtornoblle. e.8~
Machinery ~.99
AccountReclevablaa 3.35
LIf'ePollcy 3.21
aharealbond. 3.88
T-BlIIs 7.01
third party Guarantees 6.95
Test Statistics·
108
410.971
9
.000
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.
a. Friedman Test
Table 26: Wilcoxon test for landed property and T-bills
Rank.
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
T-Bills - Land Negatiw Ranks 59a 38.80 2289.00
Posltlw Ranks 15b 32.40 486.00
Ties 34·
Total 108
a. T-Bills < Land
b. T-Bills > Land
c. T-Bills" Land
Test 5tatisticsb
T-Bills -
Land
Z -5.0658
As}fflp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000
a. Based on positive ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Tables 27: Friedman's test
Rank.
Mean Rank
T-Bills 2.63
Cashlfixed Deposit 2.59
third party Guarantees 2.67
Automobiles 2.12
Table 28: Friedman's test
Ranks
Mean Rank
T-Bills 1.99
Cash/fixed Deposit 1.97
third partyGuarantees 2.04
Table29:
Test Statistics·
108
17.319
3
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig. .001
a. Friedman Test
Test Statistics·
N 108
Chi-Square .482
df 2
Asymp.5ig. .786
a. Friedman Test
N MeRn R..nk Slim of RAnks
Machinery- Automobile. Negat,_ Hank. 49· 39.79 1949.60
Poslti_ Ranks 26b 3~.63 900.60
Tie. 33c
Total 108
a. Machlnerye Automobile.
b. Machinery'" Automobile ..
c. Machlnery- Automobiles
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Teat Statlatlcab
Machlnery-
Automobiles
Z -2.862"
Asymp. 8ig. (2-taUed) .004
a. Based on positiw ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
30: Friedman's test
Test Statlatlcs-
Ranks N 108
Chi-Square 2.116
df 2
Asymp.5Ig. .347
Mean Rank
Machinery 2.10
Stock 1.95
shareslbonds 1.94 e. Friedman Test
Table 31: Wilcoxon test for account receivables and life policy
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
LlfePolicy- Negathle Ranks 31· 30.81 955.00
AccountReclevables
Poslthle Ranks 2gb 30.17 875.00
Ties 48°
Total 108
a. LltePolicy< AccountReclevables
b. LitePolicy > AccountReclevables
c. LltePolicy- AccountReclevables
T.st 8tatl.tlo."
L~~g~l~r-
Reclevables
Z -.316·
Aayrnp. Sig. (2-t8l1ed) .752
8. Ba.ed on positive ranks.
b. Wllco"",n Signed Ranks Test
Table32
Corr.latlon.
Land In~u~l~n
Spearman'. rho Lend Correletlon Coefficient 1.000 .244"
Sig. (2-t8l1ed) .011
N 108 108
yr. at Institution Correlation Coefficient .244" 1.000
51g. (2-telled) .011 "
N 108 108
-. Correlation Is significant at the 0.05 le"",1(2-telled).
Table 33
Correlation.
Land
)II'B at current
oosition
Spearman's rho Land Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .072
51g. (2-telled) .460
N 108 108
)II'B at current pas Ition Correlation Coefficient .072 1.000
51g. (2-telled) .460
N 108 108
Table 34: Friedman Test
Ranks
Institution Tvoe Mean Rank
Uni"",rsal bank Land 3.61
T-Bills 2.23
Ceshlflxad Deposit 2.02
third party Guarantees 2.14
MFI Land 2.54
T-Bliis 2.35
Cashlflxad Deposit 2.54
third party Guarantees 2.57
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T•• t Statl.tlc."
Uniyeresl bank N 57
ChI-Square 73.305
df 3
Asymp.Slg. .000
MFI N 51
ChI-Square 1.378
df 3
Asymp.Slg. .711
a. Friedman Test
Preferred forms of collateral- England
Table 35: Friedman Test
Ranks Test Statistics"
Mean Rank
Prefor Land 2.07
Cash 2.01
T-bills 1.92
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.
95
1.730
2
.421
a. Friedman Test
Table 36: Friedman Test
Ranks
Mean Rank
accout receivables 1.99
Prefor Shares/bonds 1.98
Prefor third party 2.03
Guarantees
T•• t Statl.tlc."
N 95
Chl-Squar. .192
df 2
As)mp.Slg. .909
•. Friedman Teat
Table 37: Wilcoxon's test
Rank.
N Mean Rank Sum Of Ranks
machines and tools- NS9ath ... Ranks 27" 27.83 751.50
Prefor LlfePolicy Poslth.e Ranks 30b 30.05 901.50
TIes 38°
Total 95
a. machines and tools < Prefor LlfePolicy
b. machines and tools> Prefor LlfePolicy
c. machInes and tools" Prefor LlfePolicy
T•• t Statl.tlc.b
machines
and tools-
Prefor
LlfePollcv
Z -.619"
Asymp. Sig. (2-talled) .538
a. Based on negath.e ranks.
b. WilcolCOnSigned Ranks Test
Table 38: Wilcoxon's test
Rank.
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Prefor Automobiles - Negath.e Ranks 18- 25.06 451.00
Prefor Stock
Poslth.e Ranks 28b 22.50 630.00
Ties 49°
Total 95
a. Prefor Automobiles < Prefor Stock
b. Prefor Automobiles> Prefor Stock
c. Prefor Automobiles - Prefor Stock
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Test 5tatlstlcsb
Prefor
Automobiles -
Prefor Stock
Z -1.101-
As}mp. 51g. (2-talled) .271
a. Based on negative ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Table39
Correlation.
)t'I'". lit current
_f'r8fo_r_Land_p_osltlon
Spearman's rho )'I"sat current position Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .137
Sio. (2-tAlled) .185
N 95 95
Prefor Land Correlation Coefficient .137 1.000
Sig. (2-tAlled) .185
N 95 95
Table 40
Corr.'etlon_
Prefor .and ~
Spearman'. rho Prefor Land Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.109
81g. (2-lalled) .29<4
N 95 95
)'r& at In&tltulion Carr-elation eoemalent -.109 1.000
Big. (2-talled) .29<4
N 95 95
Table 41
Corralatlon.
How
necessary I.
Prefor Land collateral
Spearman's rho Prefor Land Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.111
51g.(2-tAlled) .284
N 95 95
How necessary is Correlation Coefficient -.111 1.000
collataral
51g.(2-tAlled) .284
N 95 95
APPENDIXD
Eligihility of landed property for use as collateral
Ghana
Table 1: Registration not necessary to make landed property eligible collateral (RENNEC)
RENNEC
Freouenc Percent Valid Percent
C~,,:,ulall_
Valid atronglydisagree 18 16.7 16.7 16.7
disagree 31 28.7 2a.7 <45.<4
Neither agree nor 18 16.7 18.7 82.0
disagree
agree 28 24.1 2<4.1 88.1
strongly agree 15 13.9 13.9 100.0
Tala I 108 100.0 100.0
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Table 2
In.lllullon T...,.
Un~~,~sl
MFI ...LlliI.LRENNEC atronglydisagree Count Hi 3 10
% within RENNEC 83.3% HI.7% 100.0%
% within In.tltution T)'p. 28.3% 5.D% HI.7%
% of TOlal 13.9% 2.8% 18.7%
disagree Count 23 8 31
% within RENNEC 74.2% 211.8%. 100.0%
% within Institution T)'p. 40.4% 15.7% 28.7%
% of Total 21.3% 7.4% 28.7%
Neither agree nor Count 7 11 18disagree
% within RENNEC 38.9% 81.1% 100.0%
% within Institution T)'p. 12.3% 21.8% 18.7%
% of Tolal 8.11% 10.2% 18.7%
agree Count D 17 26
% within RENNEC 34.8% 611.4% 100.0%
% within In.tJtutJon T)tp. 15.6% 33.3% 24.1%
% of TOlal S.3% 115.7% 24.1%
strongly agree Count 3 12 115
% within RENNEC 20.0% SO.O% 100.0%
'% within Instftutlon T)'p. 5.3% 23.15% 13.11%
% of Total 2.S% 11.1% 13.9%
Total Count 57 51 108
% within RENNEC 52.S% 47.2% 100.0%
0/0 within Institution T)!p. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of TotBl 152.S% 47.2% 100.0%
RENNEC·'".thutlon Type Cra. ••• bul.tlon
Chi-Square T.... S;mmelric Measures
Value df ~r.i~·e~ir
Pearson Chi-Square 23.748' 4 .000
Likelihood Ratio 25.152 4 .000
Linear-by-Linear 21.930 1 .000
Association
N of Valid Cases 108
Value ~o~Sjg_
Nominal by Nominal Phi .469 .000
Crame~s V .469 .000
Nof ValidCases 1088.0 cells (.0%) hall!! e"Peeled count I.ss than 5. The minimume"Pected count Is 7.08.
Table3:
Correlation_
RENNEC Pn.far_jJo'lQ
Spearman'. rho RENNEC Correlation CoeffiCient 1.000 -.1QO·
Sig. (2-tall .. d) .049
N 108 108
Pretor Land Correlation CoeffiCient -.190- 1.000
Stg. (2-tall .. d) .049
N 108 108
•. Corretatlon la slgnlflcant.t the 0.05 'a .....' (2-talled).
Table4
Corr.'.t'on.
Documentatio
RENNEC n verification
Spearman's rho RENNEC Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.208-
Sig. (2-lalled) .031
N 108 108
Documentation Correlation Coefficient -.208' 1.000
wrificatlon
Sig. (2-talled) .031
N 108 108
•. Corre'ation ia Significant at the 0.05 ,.. """ (2-talled).
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Table 6
R.po ••••• lnn prnbl.fT1. due
eo Dwn • ..-.hlp d'.put.. In p ••• 2
no
_. T.
RENNEC • trangly dl. agr •• COLint 13 & ,&
% within RENNEC 72.2% 27 .• % 100.0%
% within Rapo ••••• lon 10.3'" 17.8% 1II.7'Mo
problem. due to
own.,..hlp dl.pu_ In p•• t
2,...
% o'Tot.1 12.0% •. 8% 18.7%
dl •• gree Count 24 7 31
% within RENNEC 77.4% 22.8% 100.0%
% within R.po ••••• lon 30.0% 211.0% 2.7%
problema due to
owner.hlp d'apule In p•• '
2,...
% arTota' 22.2% fI.S%. 2ft.7%
Neither agree nor Count 14 4 ,.
dl.agre. % within RENNEC 77.8% 22.2% 100.0%
% within Rapo••••• ,on 17.5"'- 1".3"'" 1ft.7%
problem. due to
Dwn .... hlp d'.puta In p•• '
2,...
% arTola' 13.0% 3.7% 1ft.7%
.gr•• Count 17 .. 28
% within RENNEC eS.4% 34.8% 100.0%
% within R.po ••••• lon 21.3% 32.1% 24.''''-
problem. due to
owner.hlp d'apUle In p•• '
2,...
"Ht or Total 111.7% 8.3% 24.1%
atronglyagr •• Count 12 3 ,&
% within AENNEC 80.0% 20.0% 100.0%
% within Repo ••••• lon 111.0% 10.7"'- 13.8%
problem. due to
own ..... hlp dl.put. In p•• ,
2,...
% olTotal 11.1% 2.11% 13.8%
Total Count BO aB 108
% within RENNEC 74.1% 211."% 100,0%
% within Rapo ••••• ,on 100.0'% 100.0'Mo 100.0%
problem. due to
owna ....hip d'.pule In p•• t
2,...
% alTotal 74.1% 2e.8% 100.0%
~-Iue t. ~~rci::,·g·
Pearson Chi-Square 1.638- 04 .602
Likelihood Retlo 1.601 04 .S09
~n.aoa~":tTo'n'n•• r
.020 1 .eee
N of Valid Caaea 10e
e. 3 cell. (30.0%) h.~ .xp.ct.d count I••• then 5. Th.
minimum .,q::>ected count t. 3.8Q.
Table 7
RENNEC·v.rlfylng encumbrance. Cro•• tabulatlon
verlt\<tngencumbrance-
no -- Tota.RENNEC atronglydl •• gr•• Count 4 14 1B
% w.thln RENNEC 22.2% 77.8% 100.0%
% within \ll8r1tytng 21.1% 18.7% 18.7%
encumbrance.
·J{,ofTola' 3.7% 13.0% 16.7%
dieagre. Count 3 28 31
% within RENNEC 11.7% "0.3% 100.0%
% within _rltylng 18.8% 31.8% 26.7%
encumbrances
% of TotBl 2.6% 28.11% 26.7%
Neither agree nor Count 8 13 18
disagree % within RENNEC 27.6% 72.2% 100.0%
% \Nlthln \Mrlfylng 26.3% 14.8% 16.7%
encumbrance.
% ofTotBl 4.6% 12.0% 18.7%
agree Count 3 23 28
% within RENNEC 11.8% 88.8% 100.0%
% within _rltylng 18.8% 28.8% 24.1%
encumbrance.
% of Total 2.8% 21.3% 24.1%
.tronglyagre. Count 4 11 15
% within RENNEC 26.7% 73.3% 100.0%
% within _rltylng 21.1% 12.4% 13.11%
encumbrance.
% of Total 3.7% 10.2% 13.9%
Total Count 1" 89 108
% within RENNEC 17.6% 82.4% 100.0%
% within ~rtf'ylng 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
encumbrance.
% of Total 17.6% 82.4% 100.0%
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Chl-Squar. T•• t.
Value _sj_f ~r-:;I':·i ..~lg.
Pearson Chi-Square 4.403- 4 .364
Likelihood Ratio 4.428 4 .3S1
~n8eoa6i:da"'lnear .136 1 .712
N of Valid Cases 108
a.4 cella (40.0%) ha_ e"Pected count Ie•• than 5. The
minimum expected count 1.2.64.
Table 8
Freauenc ~en Valid P~rc ..nt C'f:-r;;r~':,~'~
Valid extremely not esay 9 8.3 8.3 8.3
not ••• y 16 14.8 14.8 23.1
not.ure 22 20.4 20.4 43.S
eaay 44 40.7 40.7 84.3
\lerye •• y 17 1S.7 1S.7 100.0
Total 108 100.0 100.0
Table9
Docum.nt.tlon v.rWlc.tlon • In.'Hutlon Type; Croe.'.bu"tlon
1".""10" ~
un~,!:,:",:.' MFI T,
axtrem elV not eas y Count 2 7 Cl
% within Dooum.nwtlon 22.2% 77 .• " 100.0%,-,-",jcation
% within InaUbJtlon T)Ip. 3.&% 13.7% a.3%
% of Tow' 1.0% 8.8% 8.3'%
not_.ay Count 4 '2 H.
% w'th'n Cocum_nwtlon 210.0"" 710.0"" 100.0%
\MrinoaHon
% within InaUtutlon Twa 7.0"" 23.15""' 14.8%
'" of Tota. 3.7% 11.1% 14.8%
notaur. Count '2 '0 22
% wlth'n Documan"'Uon 64.5% 48.15% 100.0'"
\Mrlflcatlon
.,. within Inatitution T)lpa 21.1% 18.8% 20.4%
% of TOIa' 11.1% 8.3% 20.~%
_.ay Count 27 '7 44
% wlth'n Documentation 81.4'" 38.8% 100.0%
\4r1ncaUon
'Kt within Inatltutlon TW. "".4% 33.3% 40.7%
'Kt afTolal 2&.0% 1&.7'" 40.7%~rv···Y Count '2 " '7% within Dooum.nwtlon 70.8% 20 ....% 100.0%
'_"rlflcetlon
% within In.Utution T)Ip_ 21.1% 8.8% 10.7%
% afTowl 11.1% 4,8% 15.7%
Count 107 ", ,oa
% \Nlthln Oocum_n""on 62.8% 47.2% 100.0%
'_"r1flcaUan
% within Inatftutlon T')'p. 100.0'16 100.0% 100.0%
% arTolal &2.8% <47.2% 100.0%
Documentation
\IOrlflcetion
Total
Chi-Square T•• t.
Value df ~rsrcie~I?
Pearson Chi-Square 11.818- 4 .019
Likelihood Ratio 12.239 4 .016
~SeOa~I-!'tra'n'near 10.645 1 .001
N of Valid Caaea 108
a. 2 cells (20.00k) ha_ expected count lea. than 6. The
minimum expected count is 4.25.
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Table 10
Documentation twes
Both
ONLY regislered &
reglslered u~regI81ar8d
documenls ocuments Tolal
Documentation elClremelynot easy Counl 3 6 9
I18rification %within Documentation 33.3% 66.7% 1000%
I18rincation
%within Documentation 5.9°A, 10.5% 8.3%
twes
%ofTolal 2.8% 5.6% 8.3%
noleasy Count 5 11 16
%within Documentation 31.3% 68.8% 100.0%
I18rification
%within Documentation 9.8°A, 19.3% 14.8%
twes
%of Total 4.6°A, 10.2% 148%
not sure Count 5 17 22
%withIn Documentation 22.7% 77.3% 100.0%
I18rification
%within Documentation 9.8% 29.8% 20.4%
twes
%olTotal 46% 15.7% 20.4%
easy Counl 25 19 44
% within Documentation 56.8% 43.2% 100.0%
....rif.cation
%within Documentation 49.0°A, 33.3% 40.7%
twes
% olTotal 23.1% 17.6% 40.7%
I18ryeasy Count 13 4 17
%within Documentation 76.5% 23.5% 100.0%
I18rification
% within Documentation 25.5% 7.0% 15.7%
twes
% olTotal 12.0°A, 3.7% 15.7%
Total Count 51 57 108
%within Documentation 47.2°A, 52.8% 100.0%
IIBrification
%within Documentation 100.0°A, 100.0% 100.0%
twes
% olTotal 47.2% 62.8% 100.0°,4
Documentation _rlfleatlon· Documentation type. Cros.tabulatlon
Chl-SquaraTa.t.
Value df ~rsfci..~P·
Pearson Chi-Square 15.092· 4 .005
LIkelihood Ratio 15.746 4 .003
~n.e~~I-!'do-nln.ar 10.055 1 .002
N of Valid Cases 108
a.2 celis (20.0°A» ha"", e>Cpected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 4.25.
Table 11
.....rlMna encum brances
nn \#OR Total
Institution Type Uni\oersal bank Count 7 50 57
% within Institution Type 12.3% 87.7% 100.0%
% within .....rlfylng 36.8% 56.2% 52.8%
encumbrances
% of Total 6.5% 46.3% 52.8%
MFI Count 12 39 61
% within Institution Type 23.5% 76.5% 100.0%
'Yo within "",rlfylng 63.2% 43.8% 47.2%
encumbrances
% of Total 11.1% 36.1 % 47.2%
Total Count 19 89 108
% within Institution Type 17.6% 82.4% 100.0%
% within "",rlfylng 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
encumbrances
% of Total 17.6% 82.4% 100.0%
Institution Type * verifying encumbrance. Croa.tabul.tlon
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Chi-Square T•• ,.
_Value df ""tr.f:JR~lg. e)CBct StI3i_(2- e~~t B,I!1\ (1-
Pearaon Chi-Square 2.349- 1 .125
Continuity COrTectlonb 1.1537 1 .201
Likelihood Ratio 2.361 1 .124
Fisher'. Exact Teat .136 .100
~n.e~6.-:j';,'nln •• r 2.32B 1 .127
N of Valid Case. 10B
a.O cell. (.0%) h.~ expected count I••• than &. The minimum expected count I. 8.Q7.
b. Computed only for _ 2x2 table
Table 12
Document.tlon type •• verifyingencumbrance. Cra..tabulatlon
""nMno encumbrance.
no ,,",s Total
Documentation t~e. ONLY registered Count 10 41 61
documents
% within Documentation 18.8% 100.0%BO.4%
twe.
% within _nllAng 112.8% 48.1% 47.2%
encumbrance.
% of Total 9.3% 38.0% 47.2%
Both registered & Count 9 48 57
unregistered documents
% within Documentation 111.8% 84.2% 100.0%
twe.
% within ""nllAng 47.4% 113.9% 52.8%
encumbrances
%ofTotal 8.3% 44.4% 52.8%
Total Count 19 89 10B
% within Documentation 17.8% 82.4% 100.0%
twe.
% within ""nllAng 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
encumbrances
% of Total 17.8% 82.4% 100.0%
Val, ... dr -~'p.
Big. E,.ct 8.'3:. (2- E""'~ltd';'.'3:.(1-
Peartlon Chi-Square .271- 1 .603
Continuity Correotlonb .071 1 .788
Likelihood R.tlo .270 1 .803
FI.h.r-. E"_ot Teat .823 .3g4
~n.eC::'-!'tk.'r.ln •• r
.215& 1 .80&
N afvalld C •••• 108
•. 0 cell. (.0%) ha~ .lCpected eaunt 1. __ than 5. The minimum .Mp.oted count I. 8.87.
b. Computed onlyfDr. 2x2 tabl.
Table 13
er.... tab
Ion at InsUtuUon
less than 5 11·10 10+ Total
DocumentaUon !)pes ONLY registered Count 16 21 14 51
documents
% within Documentation 31.4% 41.2% 27.5% 100.0%
!)pe.
% within )11'11 at Institution 47.1% 110.0% 43.8% 47.2%
% of TOlal 14.8% 19.4% 13.0% 47.2%
Both registered & Count 18 21 18 57
unregistered documents
% within Documentation 31.8% 38.8% 31.6% 100.0%
twes
% within )11'11 at InstibJtion 52.9% 50.0% 56.3% 112.8%
% of Tota! 16.7% 19.4% 16.7% 52.8%
Total Count 34 42 32 108
% within Documentation 31.5% 38.9% 29.6% 100.0%
twe.
% wlthln)ll'1l at InstibJUon 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
%ofTotal 31.5% 38.9% 29.6% 100.0%
Chl"&qu.r. T•• t.
Value df ~raFct·..~I~.
Pearson Chi-Square .285· 2 .867
Likelihood Rallo .28e 2 .867
~n.e:'6.-:do'nlnear .067 1 .796
N ofVslld Cases 108
:~e~~~ ~~~ r:~~~ectedcounl Ie•• then 5. The ",Inlmum
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Table 14
va at current ecsutcn
Bolow5-n 5·10ws 10ws+ TOlai
Documentation twas ONL Y reglslered Count 14 25 12 51
documents
% within DocumentaUon 27.5% 49.0% 23.5% 100.0%
twes
% within ~ at current 35.9% 54.3% 52.2% 47.2%
position
% of Total 13.0% 23.1% 11.1% 47.2%
Both registered & Count 25 21 11 57
unregistered documents
% within DocumentaUon 43.9% 36.8% 19.3% 100.0%
twes
% within ~ at current 64.1% 45.7% 47.8% 1528%
position
% of Total 23.1% 19.4% 10.2% 1528%
Total Count 39 48 23 108
% within DocumentaUon 36.1% 42.8% 21.3% 100.0%
twel
% within )f"8 at current 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
position
% of Total 36.1% 42.6% 21.3% 1000%
Chi-Square Te.ta
Value df ~rsfd·e~I~.
Pearson Chi-Square 3.170· 2 .205
Likelihood Ratio 3.203 2 .202
Llnear-btcLinear 2.058 1 .151
Assocla on
N of Valid Cases 108
a.O cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count Is 10.86.
Table 15
Repo•••••• on problem. due to owner. hlp dJ.put. In "..t 2 yr •• 'natttution Type ero •• tabul.tlon
Institution T\'D.
Un~~,:.1 MFI Tolal
~~~~~:,s,,-::~~r;':.?!-:,r:;:.no Count 46 34 60
% within Repo ••••• lon &7.&% 42.5% 100.0%In past 2 )11"8 problema due to
ownership dispute In paat
2)1n1
% within Inatltutlon Two 80.7% 88.7% 74.1%
'% of Total 42.8% 31.&% 74.1%
)lOs Count 11 17 28
% """IthlnRepos •••• lon 39.3% 80.7% 100.0%
problema due to
ownership dl.pute In p•• t
2)1n1
% within Institution Two 19.3% 33.3% 215.9%
% arTola' 10.2% 115.7% 215.9%
Total Count 57 111 108
% within Repo ••••• lon 52.8% 47.2% 100.0%
problems due to
ownership dispute In past
2)11"8
% within Institution Two 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 112.8% 47.2% 100.0%
Chl-Squor. T•• t.
~rs.P'SII~. Exact SI8i (2- Exact 5'8- (1-Value df -stded side side J)
Pearson Chi-Square 2.761· 1 .097
Continuity Correctionb 2.078 1 .149
Llkalihood Ratio 2.769 1 .096
Fisher's E>cactTest .125 .075
~nse:~i!>to~lnear 2.735 1 .098
N of Valid Cases 108
a.O cells (.0%) haw expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count Is 13.22.
b. Com puted only for a 2><2lable
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Table 16
Repos •••• lon problem_ due to owner.hlp dlsput. In peat 2 yr •• Document.tlon type. Croaatabulatlon
Doc~m ..nl lion tvo ...
Both
ONLY registered &
d~~~·':'''';-~~ Uctn~~~~~e~~d TnlAI
~~~~~!~~i~nhr;':N!~r:;t:'no Count 46 34 80
In paBt2l/1"8 % within Raposseaslon 57.5% 42.5% 100.0%problema due to
ovvnerahlp di.put. In pa.t
2)""11
% within Documentation 110.2% 611.11% 74.1%
!}<pea
% of Total 42.6% 31.5% 74.1%
)l8S Count 5 23 28
% within Repossesalon 17.9% 82.1% 100.0%
problema due to
ownership dispute In past
2l1"8
% within Documentation 9.8% 40.4% 25.11%
!}<pea
% of Total 4.6% 21.3% 215.9%
Total Count 151 57 108
% within Reposse •• lon 47.2% 52.8% 100.0%
problema due to
ownership dispute In pa.t
2)11'B
% within Documentation 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
!}<pea
% of Total 47.2% 152.8% 100.0%
Chl-Squar. T.ata
Value df "1rsfcje~lp.
E)(8;~~I~i (2- E_:~~I~i (1-
Pearson Chi-Square 13.078" 1 .000
ConUnuItyCorrection" 11.536 1 .001
Likelihood Ratio 14.013 1 .000
Fisher's Exact Test .000 .000
Llnear-by-Llnear 12.957 1 .000
Associallon
N of Valid Cases 108
a.O cells (.0%) ha"", e"Pected count less than 5. The minimum e"Pected count la 13.22.
b. Com putad only for a 2><2table
Table 17: Friedman's test
Rank.
Mean Rank
Location 3.66
Market value 4.62
Land rights 1.63
Land insurance 2.90
Registration 3.43
Documentation 456
N
Chi-Square
df
A" mD. Sia.
10B
194.210
5
.000
e. Friedman Test
Table 18: Wilcoxon's test
an ..
N Maan Rank Sum of Ranks
Documentation - Mari<et Negative Ranks 17- 17.32 294.50
value Positive Ranks 15" 15.57 233.50
Tiea 76·
Total 108
R k
a. Documentation < Mari<et value
b. Documentation> Mari<et value
c. Documentation - Mari<et value
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Test Statistics"
Documentation
- Market value
Z -.583-
Asvrno. Sig. (2-talled) .560
a. Based on positive ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Table 19:
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Market value - Location Negative Ranks 23- 38.17 878.00
Positive Ranks 62b "4.79 2777.00
Ties 23°
Total 108
a. Market value < Location
b. Market value > Location
c. Market value - Location
Te..t St.tl ..tlc....
Market value -
Location
Z -4.246-
Asymp. Sig. (2-talledl .000
a. Based on negative ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Teat
Table20:
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Documentation - Location Negative Ranks 22- 38.75 852.50
Positive Ranks 5gb 41.84 2468.50
Ties 27c
Total 108
a. Documentation < Location
b. Documentation > Location
C. Documentation - Location
Te..t Statistics"
Documentation
- Location
Z -3.882-
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000
a. Based on negative ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Table 21:
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Registration - Location Negative Ranks 50· 51.54 2577.00
Positive Ranks 40b 137.95 1518.00
Ties 18e
Total 108
a. Registration < Location
b. Registration > Location
c. Registration = Location
Test Statistics"
Registration -
Location
IZ -2.155"
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .031
a. Based on positive ranks.
h. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Table 22:
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Land insurance - Location Negative Ranks 54" 39.82 ~150.50
Positive Ranks 21b 33.31 ()99.50
Ties 33e
Total 108
a. Land Insurance < Location
b. Land insurance >Location
c. Land insurance = Location
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Test Statistlcs"
Land insurance -
Location
Z 3.882"
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000
a. Based on positive ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Table 23:
Ranks
~ Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Registration - Land Negative Ranks 35" 145.89 1606.00
insurance
Positive Ranks 52b 142.73 ~222.00
Ties 2Ie
Total 108
a. Registration < Land insurance
b. Registration >Land insurance
c. Registration = Land insurance
Test Statisties"
Registration -
Land insurance
Z -1.320"
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .187
a. Based on negative ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Table 24
Ranks
~ Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Land rights - Land insurance Negative Ranks 65" 48.70 3165.50
Positive Ranks 20b 24.48 489.50
Ties 23c
Total 108
a. Land rights < Land Insurance
b. Land rights > Land insurance
c. Land rights = Land insurance
Test Statistics"
Land rights -
Land insurance
~ -5.930
a
~symp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000
..a. Based on positive ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Table 25: Man-Whitney test for the land attribute between UBs and MFIs
Institution Tvpe N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Location Universal bank 57 61.31 3494.50
MFI 51 46.89 2391.50
Total 108
Market value Universal bank 57 56.75 3234.50
MFI 51 51.99 2651.50
Total 108
Land rights Universal bank 57 57.03 3250.50
MFI 51 51.68 2635.50
Total 108
Land Insurance Universal bank 57 67.74 3861.00
MFI 51 39.71 2025.00
Total 108
Registration Universal bank 57 64.49 3676.00
MFI 51 43.33 2210.00
Total 108
Documentation Universal bank 57 55.80 3180.50
MFI 51 53.05 2705.50
Total 108
Ranks
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Test Statistics·
location Market value land riohts land insurance Reoistration Documentation
Mann-lNhitney U 1065.500 1325.500 1309.500 699.000 884.000 1379.500
WilcoxonW 2391.500 2651.500 2635.500 2025.000 2210.000 2705.500
Z -2.468 -.872 -.911 .... 761 -3.576 -.501
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .014 .383 .362 .000 .000 .616
a. Grouping Variable: Institution Type
Table26
Correlations
yrw at current
nostnon Reolslrallon
Spearman's rho yrs at current position Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.195'
Sig. (2-tailed) .043
N 108 108
Registration Correlation Coefficient -.195- 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .043
N 10B 10B
*. Correlation Is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table27
Correlations
Registration RENNEC
Spearman's rho Registration Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.331 -
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000
N 108 108
RENNEC Correlation Coefficient -.331
..
1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000
N 108 108
**, Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table28
Documentation
Reaistration verification
Spearman's rho Registration Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .241
Sig. (2-tailed) .012
N 108 108
Documentation verification Correlation Coefficient .241 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) ,012
N 108 108
Correlations
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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England
Table29
Registration not nec ••• ary
Cumulative
Freauency_ Percent Valid Percent P~rcent
Valid disagree 4 4.2 4.2 4.2
Neither agree nor 26 27.4 27.4 31.6
disagree
agree 42 44.2 44.2 75.8
strong Iy agree 23 24.2 24.2 100.0
Total 95 100.0 100.0
Table30
Corralatlon.
Registration ye III current
not necessary position
Spearman's rho Registration not Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.002
necessary
Sig. (2-talled) .9815
N 915 915
ys at current position Correlation Coefficient -.002 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .985
N 95 95
Table 31
Correlations
Regis tra IIon
not necessary Prefor Land
Spearman's rho Registration not Correlallon Coefficient 1.000 -.160
necessary
Sig. (2-tailed) .121
N 95 95
PreforLand Correlation Coefficient -.160 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .121
N 95 95
Table 32
Corralatlons
Registration Documentallo
not necessary n verification
Spearman's rho Registration not Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .028
necessary
Sig. (2-talled) .788
N 95 95
Documentation Correlation Coefficient .028 1.000
wrification
5ig. (2-talled) .788
N 95 95
Table 33
Documentation type.
Cumulative
Freauency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Valid registered documents 19 20.0 20.0 20.0
both registered and 76 80.0 80.0 100.0
unregistered documents
Total 95 100.0 100.0
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Table 34
Documentallon type •• ~. al current _It Ion Croaelabulallon
~ et current Do,IUon
~. 5-10"" +10"" Tolal
Documentabon twas registered documents Counl 5 6 6 111
% wtthln DocumentaUon 26.3% 31.6% 42.1% 1000%
twe.
% within )T'S .1 currenl 19.2% 14.11% 21111% 20.0%
position
% alTatal 11.3% 11.3% 84% 20.0·4
both registered end Counl 21 35 20 711
unregistered documents
% within Documentation 27.11% 411.1% 26.3% 100.0%
twea
% within )T'S et current 80.11% 854% 71.4% 80.0%
position
% olTotal 22.1% 38.8% 21.1% 80.0%
Tolal Count 26 41 28 115
% within Documenlation 27.4% 43.2% 29.15% 100.0%
twes
% within )T'S al current 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
pas Ilion
%olTolal 27.4% 432% 295% 100.0%
Chl...Squ.r. T•• t.
Val" .. df ~:r-:f::J ...":.lfI·
Pearson Chi-Square 2.033- 2 .362
Likelihood Ratio 1.979 2 .372
~n.eo~-~do;'lnear .775 1 .379
N of Valid Cllses 95
e. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count I••• than 5. The minimum
.><peeled count I. 5.20.
Table 35
Documentation typeS· yrs allnslltutlon Crosslabulallon
~atlnstitution
less than 5 5-10 10+ Total
Documentation twes registered documents Count 7 10 2 19
% within Documentation 36.8% 52.6°,4 10.5% 100.0%
twes
% within )fS at Institution 17.1% 27.8% 11.1% 20.0%
%oITotal 7.4% 10.5°,4 2.1°,4 20.0%
both registered and Count 34 26 16 76
unregistered documents
% within Documentation 44.7% 34.2°,4 21.1% 100.0%
twes
% within )fS at Institution 82.9% 72.2% 88.9% 80.0%
%olTotal 35.8% 27.4% 16.8% 80.0%
Total Count 41 36 18 95
% within Documentation 43.2°,4 37.9°,4 18.9°,4 100.0%
twes
% within ys at institution 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% oITotal 43.2°,4 37.9% 18.9% 100.0%
Chl-Squar. T•• t.
Value df ~rsi~·e~lp.
Pearson Chi-Square 2.470· 2 .291
Likelihood Ratio 2.500 2 .286
Llnear-by-Llnear .019 1 .892
Association
N of Valid Cases 95
s.1 cells (16.7%) haw expected count tess than 5. The
minimum expected count Is 3.60.
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Table 36
Documentation type •• poeltlon Cros.tabulatlon
oolition
loan. business branch
ad"sors manaaers managers Total
Documentation !)pes registered documents Count 7 10 2 19
% within Documentation 368% 52.6% 10.5% 100.0%
!)pes
% within position 18.4% 21.7% 18.2% 20.0%
% of Total 7.4% 10.5% 2.1% 20.0%
both registered and Count 31 36 II 76
unregistered documenls
% within Documentation 40.8% 47.4% 11.8% 100.0%
!)pes
% within pos ltion 81.6% 78.3% Bl.8% ao.o%
% of Total 32.6% 37.9% 9.5% 80.0%
Total Count 38 46 11 95
% within Documentation 40.0% 48.4% 11.6% 100.0%
!)pes
% within position 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
%ofTotal 400% 48.4% 11.6% 100.0%
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value df ~rsPcie~I~.
Pearson Chi-Square .1698 2 .919
Likelihood Ratio .169 2 .919
Llnear-b)l"Llnear .024 1 .877
AssociatIon
N of Valid Cases 95
a.1 cells (16.7%) ha"", expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.20.
Table37
Reglatratlon not nec •••• ry· Documentation type. Croa.tabulatlon
Documentation t-..oel
both
regl.tered
and
d~~~·~"e~~ udnO~~~!."n'::.d Total
Registration not disagree Count 0 .. ..
necessary
% wtthln Regiab-.tlon not .0% 100.0% 100.0%
necessary
% within Documentation .0% 5.3% 4.2%
!)pe.
% of Tata. .0% 4.2% 4.2%
Neither agree nor Count 7 19 28
elisagree
% within Registration not 28.9% 73.1% 100.0%
necessary
% within Documentation 36.8% 25.0% 27.4%!)ope.
% of Total 7.4% 20.0% 27.4%
agree Count 9 33 42
% within Registration not 21.4% 78.8% 100.0%
necessary
% within Documentation 47.4% 43.4% 44.2%
!)ope.
% of Total 9.5% 34.7% 44.2%
.tronglyagree Count 3 20 23
% within Registration not 13.0% 87.0% 100.0%
neces8ary
% within Documentation 15.8% 28.3% 24.2%
!)ope.
% of Total 3.2% 21.1% 24.2%
Total Count 19 78 95
% within Registration not 20.0% 80.0% 100.0%
neces.sty
% within Documentation 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%!)ope.
% of Total 20.0% 800% 100.0%
Chi-Square Test.
Value df ~rs rr_ie~lr'
Pearson Chi-Square 2.52S- 3 .470
Likelihood Ratio 3.330 3 .343
Llnear-b)l"Llnear .314 1 .575
Association
N of Valid Cases 95
a. 3 calls (37.5%) ha"", expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count Is .SO.
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Table38
Correlation.
Documenlallo )"'II al current
n ~riflcAtlon nosltlon
Spearman's rho Documenlation Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .032
llerification
51g. (2-lalled) .757
N 95 95
)"'II at current position Correlation Coefficient .032 1.000
51g. (2-talled) .757
N 95 95
Table 39
Correlation.
DocumentatJo
In~I~I~nn ""rifiearion
Spearman's rho Documentation Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .027
Io<9rification
Sig. (2-lalled) .792
N 95 95
YII at Institution Correlation Coefficient .027 1.000
Sig. (2-lalled) .792
N 95 95
Table 40
Documentation verification· Documentation type. Cr08.tabul.tlon
Documentation lI.I>e.
both
reglBtered
and
regilltered ud~regia...red
Totaldocuments QC ments
Documentation notassy Count 0 5 5
Io<9rlficalion
% within Documentation .0% 100.0% 100.0%
wrification
%within Documentation .0% 8.6% 53%
!)peB
% of Total .0% 5.3% 5.3%
notaure Count 0 21 21
% within Documentation .0% 100.0% 100.0%
"",rlfleslion
% within Documentation .0% 27.6% 22.1%
!)pea
% of Total .0% 22.1% 22.1%
easy Count 8 17 25
% within Documentation 32.0% 68.0% 100.0%
"",rlfleslion
% within Documentation 42.1% 22.4% 26.3%
!)pes
%ofTotal 84% 17.9% 26.3%
""'ryeslIY Count 11 33 44
% within Documentation 25.0% 75.0% 100.0%
""rlfleslion
%within Documentation 57.9% 43.4% 48.3%
!)pes -% of Tolal 11.6% 34.7% 46.3%
Total Count 19 76 95
% within Documentation 20.0% 60.0% 100.0%
"",rlfleslion
% within Documentation 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
!)pe.
% of Total 20.0% 80.0% 100.0·,4
Chi-Square Te.t.
Value ~:rs'P. Sig.df -sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 9.438· 3 .024
Likelihood Ratio 14.247 3 .003
Llnear-by-Llnear 5.243 1 .022
Association
N of Valid Cases 95
a. 3 cells (37.5%) ha_ e)(J:)ected count les s than 5. The
minimum expected count is 1.00.
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Table 41
Repossession problema due to ownership dispute· Documentation type. Cro •• tobulatlon
Document tion t",",OA
both
r glatorod
and
J~~~S~-~~~u"n~~3~!!,,,':'..d Tn',,'
~~f~~~~s,;~;thr;~?~~7:t~no Count 16 73 91
0/0 within Repossession 19.6% 60.2% 100.0%
problems due to
ownership dispute
0/0 within Documentation 94.7% 96.1% 915.6%
!).pes
% arTOlBl 16.9% 76.6% 95.6%
yes Count 1 3 4
% within Repossession 25.0% 75.0% 100.0%
problems due to
ownership dispute
0/0 within Documentation 5.3% 3,go/0 4.2%
!).pes
%ofTotal 1.1% 3.2% 4.2%
Total Count 19 76 95
% within Repossession 20.0% 80.0% 100.0%
problems due to
ownership dispute
% within Documentation 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
!).pes
% ofTolal 20.0% 60.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Teata
Value df ~:rsr:ie~lp. EXB;i~~I~i (2-
Exact Sll1i (1-
side
Pearson Chi-Square .0658 1 .798
Cantin uity Correctlonb .000 1 1.000
Likelihood Ratio .062 1 .804
Fisher's Exact Test 1.000 .597
Llnear-by-Llnear .065 1 .799
Association
N of Valid Cases 95
B.2 cells (50.0%) have e><pectedcount less than 5. The minimum e><pectedcount Is .80.
b. Com puted only for a 2><2table
Table 42
Hypothesis Test Summary
The distributions of Market value
1 Land insurance, Documentation
and Location are the same.
Related-
Samples
Friedman's
Two-Way
Analysis of
Variance by
Ranks
Retain the
.167 null
hypothesis.
• Null Hypothesis Test 51g. Decision
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.
Table43
I Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision
Related-
The median of differences between Samples Re~ectthe
1 Registration and Land insurance Wilcoxon .000 nu
equals O. Signed Rank hypothesis.
Test
Hypothesis Test Summary
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.
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Table 44
Hypothesis Test Summary
I Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision
Related-
The median of differences between Samples Re~ect tho1 Registration and Land rights Wilcoxon .014 nu
equals O. Signed Rank hypoth sis
Test
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.
Table 45
Correlations
Prefor Land ReQlstration
Spearman's rho Prefor Land Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.085
S19. (2-teiled) .412
N 95 95
Registration Correlation Coefficient -.085 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .412
N 95 95
Table46
orr. a on..
yrs at current
Re.glstratlon position
Spearman's rho Registration Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .008
Sig. (2-talied) .953
N 95 95
yrs at curront position Con-elation CoeffiCient .008 1.000
Sig. (2-talied) .953
N 95 95
C 1 01
Table 47
Correlations
Registration yrs at institution
Spearman's rho Registration Correiation Coefficient 1.000 .039
Si9. (2-tailed) .709
N 95 95
yrs at institution Correlation Coefficient .039 1.000
Si9. (2-tailed) .709
N 95 95
Table 48
CorrelatIons
Documentation
Registration verification
Spearman's rho Registration CorrelationCoefficient 1.000 -.040
Sig. (2-tailed) .703
N 95 95
Documentation verification CorrelationCoefficient -.040 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .703
N 95 95
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Table 49
Registration • Documentation type. Cro •• tabulatlon
Documentation Ivoss
both reglslered
and
reglster.d unregistered
documents documents Tot ..1
Registration Least Impon_nt count :3 0 12
% within Registration 25.0% 75.0% 100.0%
% within Documentation 15.8% 11.8% 12.8%
types
% of Total 3.2% 0.5% 12.8%
Le •• lmponant Count 8 21 27
% within Regl_tratlon 22.2% 77.8% 100.0%
% within Documentation 31.8% 27.8% 28.4%
type-
% of Total 8.3% 22.1% 28.<4%
Quiet Imponant Count 8 20 28
% within Registration 23.1% 78.0% 100.0%
% within Document_tlon 31.8% 28.3% 27.<4%
type.
% of Total 8.3% 21.1% 27.<4°..,
Imponant Count 2 1<4 18
% within Registration 12.8% 87.8% 100.0%
% within Documentation 10.15% 18.<4% 18.8%
type_
0.., of Total 2.1% 1<4.7% 18.8%
Very Imponant Count 1 II 7
% within Registration 14.3% 85.7% 100.0%
% within Documentation 8.3% 7.0% 7.<4%
types
0.., of Total 1.1% 8.3°'" 7.<4°..,
Moat Imponant Count 1 II 7
% within Registration 1<4.3% 85.7% 100.0%
% within Documentation 15.3% 7.9% 7.<4%
types
D.., of Total 1.1% 8.3% 7.<4%
Total Count 10 78 95
% within Registration 20.0% 80.0% 100.0%
% within Documentation 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
- ;quare ests
Asymp. Sig. (2-
Value df sidedl
Pearson Chi-Square 1.2738 5 .938
likelihood Ratio 1.346 5 .930
linear-by-Linear .849 1 .357
Association
N of Valid Cases 95
ChiS T
a. 4 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 1.40.
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APPENDIXE
Property Registration and Loan Conditions
Ghana
Table 1: Friedman's test
Ranks Test Statistics·
Mean Rank
Interest 2.69
fees 2.54
Amount 2.43
repayment time 2.34
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.
108
5.498
3
.139
a. Friedman Test
Table 2
ero.stab
Documentation type.
Both
ONLY registered &
registered unreg)stersd
documents document_ Total
Interest strongly disagree Count 7 14 21
'I(, Within Interest 33,3'1(, 68,7'1(, 100,0'1(,
'I(, within Documentation 13,7'1(, 246'1(, 194'1(,
types
'I(, of Total 6,6'1(, 13,0'1(, 19,4'1(,
disagree Count 18 21 39
'I(, within Interest 46,2'1(, 63,8'1(, 100,0'1(,
'I(, within Documentation 35,3'1(, 38,8'1(, 36,1'1(,
types
'I(, of Total 18,7'1(, 19,4'1(, 36,1'1(,
Neither agree nor Count 14 14 28
disagree 'I(, Within Interest 50.0'1(, 50,0'1(, 100,0'1(,
'I(, within Documentation 27.6'" 24,6'" 25,9'1(,
typ.s
... or Total 13,0'" 13,0'" 259'1(,
agree Count II 5 16
... within Interest 69,S'" 31.3'" 100,0'1(,
'I(, Within Documentation 21.6'1(, 8,8'1(, 14,8'1(,
types
'I(, of Total 10,2'1(, 4,6'1(, 14S'I(,
atronglyagree Count I 3 4
'I(, Within Interest 25,0'" 75,0'" 100,0'1(,
'I(, Within Documentation 20 ... 5,3'1(, 3,7'1(,
types
'l(,orTotal ,9'" 2,9'1(, 3,7'"
Total Count 51 57 108
'I(, Within Interest 47.2'" 62,8'1(, 100,0'1(,
'I(, within Documentation 100,0'" 100,0'1(, 100,0'1(,
types
'I(, of Total 47,2'1(, 62 a% lOO 0%
Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig.
Value df (2-slded)
Pearson Chi-Square 5.498" 4 .240
Likelihood RatiO 5.629 4 .229
Llnear-by-Llnear 1.994 1 .158
Association
N of Valid Cases 108
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count Is 1.89.
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Table3
ero.stab
Documentation type.
ONLY real~t~trad &
reglstlJrad unrwglw;ter.d
document. document. Tot.,
fees stronglv disagree Count 11 14 25
"'wlthln fit •• 44.0" e5.0" 100 0 ..
~ within Dotum.nfaflon 21.11" 24.11" 231 ..typ ....
.. ofTolal 10.2'1& 130'1& 231 ..
dl&agrse Count 20 22 42
"'wlthln f••• 4 7.8'1& 62.4'1& 100 0 ..
.. Within Documentation 39.2'1& 38.11'1& 38 11'1&typ ....
... of Total 18.!I'I& 20.4'1& 389 ..
Neither agree nor Count 1 t 12 23dlsagre.
"within f••• 47.8'1& 62.2'1& 1000 ...
... within Documentation 21.11'1& 2t.l" 21.3"tyP ....
CM" orTota' 102'1& 11.1 '1& 21.3'1&
agree Count II 2 8
.. within fee. 75.0'" 25.0" 100.0'"
CM.. within Dacum.nfatlon 11.8'1& 3.5'1& 7.4'"types
... of Total 5.11'1& 1.11'1& 7.4'1&
strongly agree Count 3 7 10
"'wlthlnfe •• 30.0'1& 70.0'" 100.0'"
.. within Documentation !I.9'1& 12.3'1& 113...typ ....
... ofTolal 2.8'1& 11.5'1& 113...
Total Count 6t 67 108
"'wlthln f••• 47.2'1& 52.8'1& 1000 ...
% Within Documentation 100.0'1& 100.0'" 100 0 ...typ ....
... of Total 47.2'1& 528 ... 1000'"
Chi-Square Test.
Value df A({_~I~e~l)g.
Pearson Chi-Square 3.777" " ."37Likelihood Ratio 3.905 " .419Llnear-by-Llnear .001 1 .971Assoclallon
N of Valid Cases 108
8.3 calls (3D.D'II»have e)(pected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count Is 3.78.
Table 4
Crosstab
Documentation types
Both
ONLY registered &
registered unregistered
documents documents Total
Amount strongly disagree Count 11 23 34
'1&within Amount 32 ..... 87.11'" 100.0'"
., within Documentation 21.B'" 40.4'" 31.5'"
types
'1&ofTotel 10.2'" 21.3" 31.5 ...
disagrU8 Count 17 13 30
'1&Within Amount 58.7'1& 43.3'1& 100.0'"
... Within Documentation 33.3'1& 22.8'" 27.8'1&
types
'1&of Total 15.7 ... 12.0'" 27.8 ...
Neither agree nor Count 11 14 25
disagree
... Within Amount 44.0'1& 58.0'" 100.0'"
'1&Within Docum ..ntatlon 21.8'" 24.8'" 23.1'"
types
'1&ofTot ..1 10.2'1& 13.0'1& 23.1"
agree Count 12 7 HI
'1&Within Amount 63.2'" 36.8'1& 100.0'1&
., Within Documentation 23.5 ... 12.3'" 17.8"
types
.. ofTolal 11.1 '1& 11.5'1& 17.8'"
Total Count 51 57 109
'1&Within Amount 47.2'" 62.8'1& 100.0'"
'1&Within Docum ..ntatlon 100.0'1& 100.0'" 100.0'1&
types
'1&Of Total 47.2'1& 528 .. 1000'"
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Chi-Square T....
Value df A(1_r:;I~..~I>g.
Pearson Chl-Squ.re 6.130· 3 .105
Likelihood Retlo 6.222 3 .101
Llnear-bv-Lln •• r 3.31 iii 1 .06eA&&oclatlon
N of Valid Cases 10e
TableS
B.O cells (.0%) hBve expected count Isa8 than IS.The minimum
expected count Is 8.97.
era.... ..,
Documentatton typ ••
ONLY r.gl~t'!t:!d &
,eOistered unreg.stered
document' documents Tot.,
repayment time strongly d'.agree Count 19 16 33
.. WIthin r.paym.nt tim. 54.5'" 45.5 ... lOO 0...
., WIthin Docum.ntaflon 35.3'" :211.3'" 30 II...typ••
ftb of Tota' 1117... 1311... 30 II...
dlsagr •• Count II :20 31
... within r.payment tim. 35.e .. e•.5" 1000,
.., Within Documentation 21.e ... 35.'''' 287 ...IYP ••
.. of Total ID.'''' 195 ... 297 ...
Neither agr.e nor Count " 18 IIIdisagree .. Within repayment tim. ~518'" 411'''' 100.0'"
....Within Documentation 41.2'" ai.e ... le 1...IYPa •
... of Total le 4'" 1117... 381 ...
.gre. Count I 4 15
CM, Within r.payment time 20.0'" 90.0'" 1000 ...
~ within Document.tlon :2.0'" 7.0'" 411...type.
"orTota' .11'" 3.7 ... 48 ...
Total Count 51 157 108
.. Within rep.ymenttlme 47.2'" 52.9'" 100.0'"
.. wtthln Document.tlon 100.0'" 100.0'" 1000 ...IYP ••
.. of Tota' .7.,., 1128'16 lOO 0...
Chl-Squ ..~eTests
Value df ArI-r;:I~·e~I;;J.
Pearson Chi-Square 4.597· 3 .204
Likelihood Ratio 4.749 3 .191
Llnear-bY-LInear .290 1 .590Association
N of Valid Cases 109
Table 6: Friedman's test
Ranks
a. 2 celis (25.0%) have expected count tess than 5. The
minimum expected count Is 2.36.
Documentation types Mean Rank
ONLY registered Interest 2.79
documents
fees 2.47
Amount 2.51
repayment Ume 2.23
Both re~istered & Interest 2.60
unregis ered documents
fees 2.61
Amount 2.35
repayment time 2.45
England
Table7:
Test Statistics-
ONLY registered N 51
documents
Chi-Square 6.305
df 3
Asymp. Sig. .099
80th registered & N 57
unregistered documents
Chi-Square 1.911
df 3
Asymp. Big .591
a. Friedman Test
Conelatlons
yrs at current
tnterest position
Spearman's rho Interest Correlation CoelTiclent 1.000 -.094
Sig. (2-talled) .367
N 95 95
yrs at current position Correlation CoelTiclent -.094 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .367
N 95 95
289
TableS
Correlations
Interest
yrs at
Institution
Spearman's rho Interest Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .023
Big. (2-talled) .827
N 95 95
yrs at Institution Correlation Coemclent .023 1.000
Big. (2-talled) .827
N 95 95
Table9
Interest· Documentationtype. Cro.st ..bUlatlon
Documentation type.
both
registered
and
registered unregistered
documents documents Total
Interest strongly disagree Count J 16 Iii
'II>within Interest 15.8'11> 84.2'11> 100.0'11>
'II>within Documentation 15.8'11> 21.1'11> 20.0'11>
types
'II>of Total 3.2'11> 18.S'II> 20.0'11>
disagree Count Ii 26 35
'II>within Interest 25.7'11> 74.3'11> 100.0'11>
'II>within Documentation 47.4'11> 34.2'11> 36 S'II>
types
'II>of Total 9.5'11> 27.4'11> 36.8'11>
Neither agree nor Count 3 17 20
disagree 'II>within Interest 15.0'11> B5.0'll> 100.0'11>
'II>within Documentation 15.B'II> 22.4'11> 21.''11>
types
'II>of Total 32'11> 179'11> 21.1'11>
agree Count 4 14 18
'II>within Interest 22.2'11> TT.B'II> 100.0'11>
'II>within Documentation 21.1'11> lB.4'11> 18.9'11>
typ ....
'II>of Total 4.2'11> 14.7'11> 19.9'11>
strongly agree Count 0 3 3
'II>within Interest .0'11> 100.0'11> 100.0'11>
'II>within Documentation .0'11> 3.9'11> 3.2'11>
types
'II>of Total .0'11> 3.2'11> 3.2'11>
Total Count 19 76 95
'II>within Int .. rest 20.0'11> So.0 'II> 100.0'11>
'II>within Documentation 100.0'11> 100.0'11> 100.0'11>
types
'II>OfTotal 20.0'11> SO.O'll> 1000'11>
Chi-Square Tests
As:r.mp. Sig.
Value df ( -sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 2.043· 4 .72e
Likelihood Ratio 2.621 .. .623
};;~nse:c'i!'tio'n'near .077 1
.781
N ofVafld Cases 95
a.5 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count Is .60.
Table 10
Conelatlons
fees/commis vrs at current
slon position
Spearman's rho fees/commission Correlation Coemclent 1.000 -.045
Sig. (2-tall .. d) .662
N 95 95
yrs at current position Correlation Coemclent -.045 1.000
Sig. (2-tall .. d) .662
N 95 95
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Table 11
Conelatlons
faas/commle yre at
elon Institution
Spearman's rho fees/commission Correlation Coemclent 1.000 .124
Sig. (2-talled) .231
N 95 95
vrs at Institution Correlation Coemclent .124 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .231
N 95 95
Table 12
foos/commlsslon • Documentation typos Crosstabulallon
Documentation types
both
registered
and
registered unregistered
documents documents Total
fees/commission strongly disagree Count 7 15 22
%withln 31.B'II. 69.2% 100.0%
fees/commission
% within Documentation 36.9'11. 19.7'11. 23.2'11.
types
% of Total 7.4'11. 15.9'11. 23.2'11.
disagree Count 4 29 33
%wlthln 12.1'11. B1.9% 100.0'11.
fees/commission
% within Documentation 21.1'11. 39.2'11. 34.7'11.
types
% of Total 4.2% 30.S'II. 34.7'11.
Neither agree nor Count 4 16 20
disagree %wlthln 20.0'11. BO.O'll. 100.0%
fees/commission
% within Documentation 21.1'11. 21.1% 21.1%
types
% of Total 4.2'11. 16.9'11. 21.1%
agree Count 2 9 11
%withln 19.2'11. 91.e'll. 100.0'11.
fees/commission
% within Documentation 10.5'11. 11.9'11. 11.6'11.
types
'II. OfTotal 2.1'11. 9.5'11. ".e'll.
strongly agree Count 2 7 9
%wlthln 22.2'11. 77.9'11. 100.0%
fees/commission
% within Documentation 10.5'11. 9.2'11. 9.5'11.
types
% of Total 2.1'11. 7.4% 9.5%
Total Count 19 76 95
%withln 20.0'11. 90.0% 100.0'11.
fees/commission
% within Documentation 100.0'11. 100.0'11. 100.0'11.
types
% of Total 200'11. 90.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Tes1s
ASimp. Big.
Value df ( -sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 3.25101 4 .517
Likelihood Ratio 3.197 4 .525
Llnear-by-Llnear .24S 1 .619
Association
N of Valid Cases 95
a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 1.S0.
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Table 13
Corralatlon.
yrs at
Institution Amount
Spearman's rho yrs at Institution Correlation Coefficient 1 .000 -.076
Sig. (2-talled) .482
N 91'1 91'1
Amount Correlation Coefficient -.076 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .462
N 95 95
Table 14
Corr..... lon.
Amount
yr. at curr ..nt
posilion
Spearman's rho Amount Correlallon Coefficient 1.000 -.046
Sig. (2-talled) .858
N 95 95
yrs at current position Correlallon Coefflcl ..nt -.046 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .656
N 95 95
Table 15
Amount· Documentationtype. Croa.tabulatlon
Documenlationtwes
both
reglslered
and
reglslared unregistered
documents documents Tot,,1
Amount stronglydisagree Count 5 24 29
%within Amount 17.2% 82.8% 100.0%
%within Documentation 28.3% 31.6% 30.5%
twes
%ofTotal 5.3% 25.3% 30.5%
disagree Count 6 21 29
%withinAmount 27.6% 72.4% 100.0%
%within Documentation 42.1% 27.6% 30.5°A.
twes
%of TalaI 8.4% 22.1% 30.5%
Neitheragreenor Count 6 15 21
disagree %withinAmount 28.6% 71.4% 100.0%
%within Documentation 31.6% 19.7% 22.1%
I)pes
%of Tolal 6.3% 15.8% 22.1%
agree Count 0 16 16
%withinAmount .0% 100.0% 100.0%
%withinDocumentation .0% 21.1% 16.6%
twes
%of Tolal .0% 16.6% 16.8%
Total Count 19 76 95
%withinAmount 20.0% 60.0% 100.0°A.
% within Documentation 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
twes
% ofTolal 200°A. 80.0% 100.0°A.
Chi-Square T•• t.
Value df ~r.I~·..~Ir-
Pearson Chi-Square 6.145- 3 .105
Likelihood Ratio 9.125 3 .028
~nSa:cit!'Ik,"'lnaar .827 1 .383
N of Valid Cases 95
B. 2 cells (25.0%) have 8)(J)ected count Ie•• than 8. The
minimum expected count la 3.20.
Table 16
Corr.l.tlon.
maturity
yr. at current
poaition
Spearman'. rho maturity Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.221'
Sig. (2-lalled) .031
N 95 95
)II'S at current pos ilion Correlation Coefficient -.221' 1.000
Sig. (2-lalled) .031
N 95 95
•• Correlation Is significant at the 0.05 le"",1 (2-talled).
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Table 17
Correlations
maturity
11'"8 at
Institution
Spearman's rho maturity Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .037
Sig. (2-talled) .725
N 95 95
yrs at Institution Correlation Coefficient .037 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .725
N 95 95
Table 18
Documentationtwes
both
registered
and
registered unregistered
Totaldocuments documents
maturity strongly disagree Count 7 26 33
%withinmaturlly 21.2% 78,8% 100,0%
0/0 within Documentation 36.8% 34,2% 34.7%
types
% ofTolal 7.4% 27.4% 34.7%
disagree Count 4 22 26
% within maturity 15.4% 84,6% 100,0%
0/0 within Documentation 21.1% 28,9% 27.4%
types
0/0 of Total 4.2% 23,2% 27.4%
Neither agree nor Count 6 25 31
disagree 0/0 within m alurlty 19,4% 80,6% 100.0%
0/0 within Documentation 31.6% 32,9% 32,6%
types
%ofTotal 6,3% 26,3% 32,6%
agree Count 2 3 5
%withinmaturity 40,0% 60,0% 100.0%
0/0 within Documentation 10,5% 3,9% 5,3%
types
% afTotal 2,1% 3.2% 5.3%
Total Count 19 76 95
% within maturity 20,0% 80,0% 100.0%
0/0 within Documentation 100.0% 100,0% 100,0%types
%ofTotal 20.0% 80.0% 100.0%
maturity'" Documentation typos Cro •• tabulatlon
Chi-Square Tests
Value df ~rsFrie~lr'
Pearson Chi-Square 1.6358 3 .652
Likelihood Ratio 1.454 3 .693
Linear-by-Llnear .145 1 .703
As eoote tlorr
N of Valid Cases 95
a.2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 1.00.
APPENDIXF
Why Lenders Turn down Small Business Credit Applications
Ghana
Table 1: Friedman's test
Hypothesis Test Sunll'nary
Null Hypothesis Test 51g. Decision
The distributions of Past Default,
1 Poor Cashflow, High Vulnerability
and Poor profitability are the same.
Related-
Samples
Friedman's
Two-Way
Analysis of
Variance by
Ranks
Retain the
.125 null
hypothesis.
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.
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Table 2: Wilcoxon's test
Rank.
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Lack guarantors - Lack Negative Ranks 24- 13.96 335.00
property
Positive Ranks 2b 8.00 16.00
Ties 82°
Total 108
a. Lack guarantors < Lack property
b. Lack guarantors> Lack property
c. Lack guarantors = Lack property
Teat Statlstlcab
Lack
guarantors -
Lack property
Z -4.185-
Asyrnp. Sig. (2-talled) .000
a. Based on posith.e ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Table 3: Friedman's test
Ranka Test Statistics·
Mean Rank
New customer 1.95
Lack records on 2.09
business transactions
Inadequate borrower 1.95
equity
N 108
Chi-Square 2.182
df 2
Asymp.Slg. .336
a. Friedman Test
Table 4: Friedman's test
Ranka T•• t St.tl.tlc.-
Mean Rank
Lack experience 1.89
Lack registered title 1.94
Lack required documents 2.16
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.
108
5.666
2
.059
a. Friedman Test
Table 5: Wilcoxon's test
Ranka
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Business type - High Negative Ranks 33- 28.82 951.00
Transaction cost
Posltlw Ranks 31" 36.42 1129.00
Ties 44°
Total 108
a. Business type < High Transaction cost
b. Business type> High Transaction cost
c. Business type = High Transaction cost
Teat Statlstlca"
Business type
- High
Transaction
cost
Z -.641-
Asyrnp. Sig. (2-talled) .521
a. Based on negatiw ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Table 6
uck reglat.rad tit... Documentation type. Croe.tabul.llon
DocumenlaUon l}-y.,e.
Both
ONLY Algi. tared &
reglatered unregl.tared
document. documents Tota'
Lack registered dUe unimportant Count 0 24 24
% within Lack regla • .-.d .0% 100.0% 100.0%
tm.
% within Documentation .0% 42.1% 22.2%
t)Ip ••
% of Total .0% 22.2% 22.2%
leallt Important Count 0 24 24
% within Leek regl.tered .0% 100.0% 100.0%
Uti.
% within Documentation .0% 42.1% 22.2%
t)Ip ••
% afTotaf .0% 22.2% 22.2%
Important Count 13 8 111
% within Leek regl.tered 08.•% 31.8% 100.0%
Utle
% within Documentation 215.15% '0.15% '7.8%
t)Ip ••
% of Total '2.0% 15.8% '7.8%
Wiry 1mporta"t Count 38 3 41
% within Lack reglatered 82.7% 7.3% '00.0%
titl.
% within Documentation 74.15% 15.3% 38.0%
t)Ip ••
% of Tola' 3&.2% 2.8% 38.0%
Total Count 151 57 108
% within Lack registered 47.2% 52.8% 100.0%
Utle
% within Documentation 100.0% '00.0% 100.0%
t)Ip ••
% arTolal 47.2% &28% '000%
Chi-Square T•• t.
\/Blue df "(:r.fci ..~lf·
Pearson Chi-Square 80.372- 3 .000
Likelihood Ratio 104.223 3 .000
~n.eoa~-!>tk,'n'ne.r 72.417 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 108
a.O celie (.0%) have expected count Ie•• than 5. The minimum
expected count la 8.97.
Table 7
Corralatlon.
Lack
registered title PreforLand
Spearman's rho Lack registered uue Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .066
Sig. (2-talled) .497
N 108 108
Prefor Land Correlation Coefficient .066 1.000
Sig. (2-talled) .497
N 108 108
Table 8
High Tran.actlon coat· Documantatlon type. Croa_tabulatlon
Documentation twe.
Both
ONLY registered &
registered unregistered
documents documents Total
High Tranaaction coat unimportant Count 28 36 64
% within High 43.8% 58.3% 100.0%
Transaction cost
% within Documentation 54.9% 63.2% 59.3%
twa_
%ofTotal 25.9% 33.3% 59.3%
least Important Count 22 20 42
% within High 52.4% 47.6% 100.0%
Transaction coat
% within Documentauon 43.1% 35.1% 38.9%
tw"s
%ofTotal 20.4% ,8.5% 38.9%
Important Count , 1 2
% within High 50.0% 150.0% 100.0%
Transaction cost
% within DocumentaUon 2.0% 1.8% 1.9%
twe•
%ofTotal .9% .9% 1.9%
Total Count 51 57 108
% within High 47.2% 152.8% 100.0%
Transaction coat
% within Documentation '00.0% 100.0% 100.0%
tw·a
% of To.sl 47.2% 52.8% 100.0%
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Chl-Squar. T•• t.
Value df
Asrap, Sig.
( -sided)
Pearson Chi-Square .764- 2 .682
Likelihood Ratio .764 2 .682
Llnear-by-Llnear .678 1 .410
Association
N of Valid Cases 108
a. 2 cells (33.30/0)have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count Is .94.
Mann-Whitney test for type of lender and reasons for turning down loan applications - Ghana
Rank.
I.,S tltutian T\A')A N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Lack property Universal bank 57 63.61 3625.50
MFI 51 44.32 2260.50
Total 108
Past Default Universal bank 57 56.41 3215.50
MFI 51 52.36 2670.50
Total 108
Poor Cashflow Universal bank 57 55.71 3175.50
MFI 51 53.15 2710.50
Total 108
Poor profitability Universal bank 57 56.71 3232.50
MFI 51 52.03 2653.50
Total 108
Lack records on Universal bank 57 59.46 3389.50
business transactions
MFI 51 48.95 2496.50
Total 108
New customer Universal bank 57 60.20 3431.50
MFI 51 48.13 2454.50
Total 108
Lack required documents Universal bank 57 62.79 3579.00
MFI 51 45.24 2307.00
Total 108
Lack guarantors Universal bank 57 59.00 3363.00
MFI 51 49.47 2523.00
Total 108
Business type Universal bank 57 54.87 3127.50
MFI 51 54.09 2758.50
Total 108
Lack registered title Universal bank 57 70.71 4030.50
MFI 51 36.38 1855.50
Total 108
High Vulnerability Universal bank 57 53.96 3075.50
MFI 51 55.11 2810.50
Total 108
High Transaction cost Universal bank 57 58.38 3327.50
MFI 51 50.17 2558.50
Total 108
Lack 8lCperience Universal bank 57 63.43 3615.50
MFI 51 44.52 2270.50
Total 108
Inadequate borrower Universal bank 57 62.04 3536.00
equity MFI 51 46.08 2350.00
Total 108
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Rotated COn1ponent Matrix-
Comoonont
1 2 " 4 '"Poor profitability .971
Poor Cashflow .970
High Vulnerability .945
Past Default .942
Lack guarantors .947
Lack property .920
Lack required documents .793
Lack registered title .765
Lack records on .741
business transactions
inadequate borrower .918
equity
Lack experience .8B1
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varlmaxwlth Kaiser Normalization.
8. Rotation converged In 5 Iterations.
England
Table 9: Friedman's test
Test Statistics'
N
Chi-Square
df
95
36.200
3
Ranks
Ao>ymp. Sig. .000
Mean Rank
poor cash flow 2.63
poor profitability 2.71
high vulnerability 2.48
past default 2.18 B. Friedman Test
Table 10: Wilcoxon's test
Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
past default - Lack Negative Ranks l' 21.50 21.50
property Positive Ranks 74b 38.22 2828.50
Ties 20c
Total 95
a. past default -c Lack property
b. past default> Lack property
c. past default = Lack proparty
Test Statlstlcsb
past default-
Lack property
Z -7.627"
Asymp. Sig. (2-talled) .000
a. Based on negative ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Table 11: Friedman's test
Test StatistiCS-
Ranks N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp.Slg.
95
4.532
2
.104
Mean Rank
inadequate experience 2.03
Inadequate equity 2.11
New customer 1.86 8. Friedman Test
Table 12:Wilcoxon's test
~ Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision
Related-
The median of differences between Samples Reject the
1 inadequate equity and Lack Wilcoxon .000 null
property equals O. Signed Rank hypothesis.
Test
Hypothesis Test Summary
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance leloel is .05.
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Table 13: Friedman's test
Test Statistics·
Ranks
Mean Rank
Lack of guarantor 2.37
Lack required documents 1.49
Lack records on 2.14
business transactions
N 95
Chi-Square 61.739
df 2
As)111p.Sig. .000
a. Friedman Test
Table 14:
Ranks Test Statistics·
Mean Rank
High transaction cost 2.08
Business twe 1.98
Lack registered title 1.93
N 95
Chi-Square 2.149
df 2
As)111p.Sig. .342
a. Friedman Test
Table 15: Chi square test
Leek registered tnle • Documentl!ltlon type. Cro.atebulilltlon
Documentation typas
both
reglstared
and
registered unregistered
documents documents Total
Lack registered 11118 unimportant Count 15 54 69
'II. within Lack registered 21.7'11. 78.3'11. 100.0'11.
title
'II. within Documentation 78.9'11. 71.1'11. 12.11'11.
types
'II. of Total 15.8'11. 56.8'110 12.6'110
least Important Count 4 16 20
'II. within Lack raglstered 20.0'110 80.0'110 100.0'11.
title
'II. within Documentation 21.1'11. 21.1'11. 21.1'110
types
'II. of Total 4.2'11. 16.8'110 21.1'11.
Important count 0 6 6
'110within Lack registered 00'110 100.0'110 100.0'110
tltl.
'110within Documentation 0.0'110 7.9'11. 11.3'11.
types
'110of Total 0.0'110 11.3'110 6.3'110
Total Count 19 76 95
'II. within Lack registered 20.0'11. 80.0'11. 100.0'11.
title
'II. within Documentation 100.0'110 100.0'110 100.0'110
types
'110of Total 20.0'110 BO.O'llo 100.0'110
Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig.
Value df (2-slded)
Pearson Chi-Square 1.630" 2 .443
Likelihood Ratio 2.805 2 .246
Llnear-by-Llnear 1.072 1 .300
Association
N of Valid Cases 95
a. 3 cells (50.0'1&)have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count Is 1.20.
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Table 16: Chi square test
High tran.aetlon co•• Documentation type. ero .... bulatlon
Documentation types
both
registered
and
registered unregl.tered
document. documents Total
High transaction cost unimportant Count lJ 44 67
"" within High transaction 22.S"" 71.2"" 100.0""
cost
"" within Documentation 6S.4"" 579"" 600""
type.
"" or Total lJ.7"" 46.3"" 110.0""
least Important Count II 32 JB
"" within High transaction 15.S"" B4.2"" 100.0"
cost
"" within Documentation 31.6" 42.1"" 40.0"
type.
"" of Total 6.3"" 3J.7'1& 400'1&
Total Count 19 76 95
"" within High tran•• ctlon 20.0"" BO.O"" 100.0"
cost
"" within Documentallon 100.0"" 100.0"" 100.0""
types
"" of Total 200'1(, BD0'1(, 1000'1(,
Chi-Square Teet.
Asymp.Slg. Exact Sig. (2- Exact Sig. (1-
Value df (2-slded) sided) Sided)
Pearson Chi-Square .702· 1 .402
Continuity Correctlonb .332 1 .565
Likelihood Ratio .718 1 .397
Fisher's Exact Test .445 .285
Llnear-bv-Llnear .694 1 .405
A.soclatlon
N of Valid Cases 95
•. 0 cell. (0.0'11.)have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count Is 7.60.
b. Computed only for .. 2x2 table
Table 17
KMO and Bartlett's Test
Bartlett's Test of
Sphericity
Approx. Chi-Square
df
Sig,
238,865
55
,000
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,533
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Table 19
Component Matrix·
Component
1 2 3 4
Lack of guarantor .689
Lack property .649 -.404
Inadequate experience .610 .561
poor cash flow -.455 .650
poor profitability -.533 .617
Lack records on .528 .429
business transactions
New customer .459
high IIIJlnerability .817
past default .775
Inadequate equity .591 .601
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a.4 components extracted.
Final Factor analysis - England
Correiaiioo Malrlx'
lack property
poor high Lack of poor cash inadequate Inadequate
profitabili~ \\Jlnerabili~ pastdefaun Quarantor now el()enence equity
Correlation Lack property 1.000 ·.203 -.104 -.032 .555 -.185 .191 .14&
poor profitability -.203 1.000 -.075 -.117 -.157 .640 -.036 -.112
high wlnerability -.104 -.075 1.000 .643 .019 -.117 .038 .049
past default -.032 -.117 .643 1.000 .096 -.094 .027 -.040
Lack of guarantor .555 -.157 .019 .096 1.000 -.073 .314 .235
poor cash now -.185 .640 -.117 -.094 -.073 1.000 -.002 ·.017
inadequate elljlerience .191 -.036 .038 .027 .314 -.002 1.000 .617
inadequate equity .146 -.112 .049 -.040 235 -.017 .617 1.000
Sig.(I-tailed) Lack property .024 .157 .381 .000 .037 .032 .079
poor profitability .024 .235 .130 .064 .000 .365 .141
high wlnerability .157 .235 .000 .421 .t29 .359 .319
past default .381 .130 .000 .178 .183 .396 .351
Lack of guarantor .000 .064 .427 .178 .240 .001 .011
poor cash flow .037 .000 .129 .183 .240 .493 .434
inadequate elljlerience .032 .365 .359 .396 .001 .493 .000
Inadequateequity .079 .141 .319 .351 .011 .434 .000
8. Determinant: .114
Imler •• d Correlation Matrix
poor high Lack of poor cash Inadequate Inadequalt
Lack orooertY orofitabililV wlnerabililV oast default auarantor fow e>q>enence eauilV
Lack property 1.535 .068 .182 .038 -.820 .204 -.039 -.003
poor profitability .068 1.779 -.113 .179 .134 -1.109 -.140 .237
high wlnerability .182 -.113 1.775 -1.139 .003 .204 .046 -.197
past default .038 .179 -1.139 1.776 -.172 -.083 -.102 .243
Lack of guarantor -.820 .134 .003 -.172 1.590 -.138 -.291 -.069
poor cash ftow .204 -1.109 .204 -.083 -.138 1.752 .042 -.130
Inadequate .",en.nee -.039 -.140 .046 -.102 -.291 .042 1.716 -1.006
Inadequate equity -.003 .237 -.197 .243 -.069 -.130 -1.006 1.681
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KMO and Bartlett'. Te.t
Bartlett's Test of
Sphericity
Approx. Chi-Square
df
519.
196.846
28
.000
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sam piing Adequacy. .542
AntI-image M.trIc••
Lack property prJ.:ililV wln~~ahbilirv I D•• 'defaul' a~~n~r
poorCllh ~!~Un~! tnl~:!I~~1tIft w
Mti-image eowriance Lack property .652 .025 JJ07 .014 ·.336 .076 ·.015 ·.001
poor profilabillty .025 .562 ·.036 .067 .Q47 ·.3511 ·.046 .on
high wlnerability .067 ·.036 .564 ·.361 .001 .068 .015 ·.068
past default .014 .057 ·.36t .563 ·.06t ·.027 ·.034 .08t
Lack of gUIIlIn10r ·.336 .047 .oot ·.08t 0828 ·.060 ·.107 ·.028
poor cash ftow .076 ·.356 .066 ·.027 ·.060 .571 .014 ·.0014
Inadequate e~rienC8 ·.015 ·.0016 .016 ·.034 ·.107 .014 .5113 ·.348
Inadequate equity ·.OOt .079 ·.068 .081 ·.026 ·.0014 ·.349 .595
AnH-image COfTelalion Lack property .597' .0011 .110 .023 ·.625 .t24 •.024 ·.002
poor profilability .0011 .535' • .Q64 .101 .oao ·.528 ·.oao .137
high wlnerability .110 ·.084 .496' ·.842 .002 .118 .027 -, 114
paltdefault .023 .101 ·.842 .495' •.102 ·.0017 ·.059 .140
LIck of guarantor ·.525 .080 .002 ·.102 .802' ·.063 ·.176 ·.0012
poor cash flow .124 ·.628 .116 ·.0017 ·.083 .618' .024 ·.078
Inadequa. ellParienea ·.024 ·.080 .027 ·.059 ·.176 .024 .5611' ·.583
Inadequate equity ·.002 .137 ·.114 .140 ·.042 ·.078 ·.593 .538'
•. Measures of SamplingAdequa~MSA)
Commune.lt •••
Initial Extraction
Lack property 1.000 .797
poor profitability 1.000 .816
high \lUlnerablllty 1.000 .822
pas t default 1.000 .830
Lack of guarantor 1.000 .794
poorcaah flow 1.000 .825
Inadequate experience 1.000 .799
Inadequate equity 1.000 .825
Extraction Method: Principal Component
Analysis.
ColTlpon.nt M.trlx·
Com anent
1 2 '" '4Lack of guarantor .684 .525
Lack property .626 .531
Inadequate experience .604 .443
Inadequate equity .579 -.469
poor profitability -.560 .537
paa t default -.724 .453
high vulnerability -.721 .50S
poor cas h flow -.4S3 .433 .572
Extraction I\IIetnod: Principal Component AnalysiS.
e.4 components extracted.
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Reproduced Ccrrtlalionl
Lack orooertv ora'::ilitv
high Lackol poor cash lnadtHlualt In~:~ ..IIJlnerabilitv I oastdefautt euaranor now ."'enence
Reproduced Correlation Lack property .797' -.241 -.lSO -.033 .753 -.185 .194 .108
poor profitability -.241 .816' -.098 -.099 -.133 .815 -.oSO -.116
high IIJlnerability -.150 -.098 .822' ,811 ,029 -,107 ,088 .037
pastdefauh -.033 -,099 ,811 .830' .131 -,109 ,007 -,048
lack of guaranklr .753 -.133 .029 .131 .794' -.064 .346 .244
poor cash now -.185 .815 -.107 -.109 -.Q64 .825' .033 -.038
inadequate e~rience .194 -.OSO .088 .007 .346 .033 .799' .799
inadequal8 equity .108 -.116 .037 -,046 .244 -,038 ,799 .825'
Residual' lack property .038 .046 .001 -.196 .001 -.002 .037
poor profitability .038 .023 -.017 -.025 -.175 .014 .004
high IIJinerability .046 .023 -,188 -.010 -.olD -.030 .012
pastdefauh .001 -.017 -.168 -.035 .015 .020 .ooa
lack of guaranklr -.198 -.025 -.010 -.035 -.009 -.032 -.009
poor cash now .001 -.175 -.010 .015 -.009 -.035 .021
Inadequal8 e~rience -.002 .014 -.030 .020 -.032 -.035 -.181
Inadequal8 equity .037 .004 .012 .008 -.009 .021 -.181
Ellradion !.ethod Principal Component Mal)6is .
•. Reproduced communalities
b. Residuals are compu1ed between obseNed and reproduced oorrelations. There are 4 (14.0%)nonredundant residuals with absolute wlues greater Ilan 0.05.
Rotated Component Matrix·
Com anent
1 2 3 4
past default .907
high \lUlnerablllty .899
poor cash flow .904
poor profitability .892
Inadequate equity .904
Inadequate experience .874
Lack property .871
Lack ofguarentor .861
Extraction Method; Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method; Varlmsxwlth Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation con_rged In 5 Iterations.
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigemelues Ellfraciion Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total %ofVariance Cumulatiwo", Total % of Variance Cumulatiw% Total %ofVariance Cumulatiw%
1 2.203 27.542 27.542 2203 27.542 27.542 1.658 20.729 20.729
2 1.743 21.788 49.330 1.743 21.788 49.330 1.651 20.639 41.368
3 1.483 18.538 67.869 1.483 18.538 67.869 1.636 20.449 61.817
4 1.081 13.507 81.375 1.081 13.507 81.375 1.565 19.558 81.375
5 .431 5.383 86.758
6 .400 4.998 91.756
7 .369 <4.612 96.369
8 .291 3.631 100.000
Ellfraction Method: Principal ComponenlMalysls.
309
APPENDIXG
Comparison between Ghana and England
Rank.
Count'" N Mean Rank S rn of Ranks
Land Ghana 108 104.23 11257.00
England 95 99.46 9449.00
Total 203
Cashlflxed Deposit Ghana 108 87.31 9430.00
England 95 118.69 11276.00
Total 203
Stock Ghana 108 118.11 12755.50
England 95 83.69 7950.50
Total 203
Automobiles Ghana 108 131.77 14231.50
England 95 88.15 8474.60
Total 203
Machinery Ghana 108 99.37 10731.60
England 95 104.99 9974.50
Total 203
AccountReClevablea Ghana 108 76.27 8237.50
England 95 131.25 12488.60
Total 203
LlfePolicy Ghana 108 82.75 8937.00
England 95 123.88 11769.00
Total 203
aharealbonda Ghana 108 85.44 9228.00
England 95 120.82 11478.00
Total 203
T-Bill .. Ghana 108 90.23 9744.50
England 95 115.38 10981.50
Tolal 203
third party Guarantees Ghana 108 112.88 12191.00
England 95 89.83 8515.00
Total 203
Test Statistics'
Cashllillld kcount tin! partt
Land Deposit Stock hJtomobiles Mlchlnery Recievables lifePoliev shareslbonds Hills Guarantees
Mlnn.!M1llneyU 4889.000 3544.000 3390.500 1914.500 4845.500 2351.500 3051.000 3342.000 3858500 3955.000
WlcolDllW 9449.000 9430.000 7950.500 6474.500 10731.500 8237.500 8937.000 9228.000 9744.500 8515.000
Z ·.676 -4.079 -4.529 -8.156 ·.720 -8.984 -5.300 ·4.415 ·3260 ·2.946
AI)IT1p.Sig. (2.failed) .499 .000 .000 .000 .m .000 .000 .000 .001 .003
a. Grouping Variable: Country
Documentation type •• Country Croa.t.bulatlon
Country
Ghana Enaland _Tolal
Documentation twas ONLY registered Count 51 19 70
documents % within Documentation 72.9% 27.1% 100.0%twe.
% within Country 47.2% 20.0% 34.5%
% of Total 25.1% 9.4% 34.5%
Both regis tared & Counl 57 76 133
unregistered documents % within Documentation 42.9% 157.1% 100.0%
twes
% within Country 52.8% 80.0% 8S.I5%
% of Total 28.1% 37.4% 65.5%
Total Count 108 95 203
% within Documentation 53.2% 48.8% 100.0%twes
% within Country 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 53.2% 46.8% 100.0%
Chi-Square T•• t.
Value df ""7:r.:Ir:.·e~'fl· E_~,td~:;I\ (2- E_~d::":Ji (1-
Pear.on Chi-Square 16.678- 1 .000
Continuity Correctlonb 15.3915 1 .000
Likelihood Ratio 17.077 1 .000
Flaher-. Exact Te.t .000 .000
~nlle:;i-:do-nlnear 16.497 1 .000
N afValid Case. 203
a.O cell. (.0%) have .lCp.ctad count I••• than e. The minimum expected count 1.32.78.
b. Computed only for _ 2x2 tabl.
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Symmetric Measures
Value Annrox. Sio.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .286 .000
Cramer's V .286 .000
N of Valid Cases 203
Rank.
Count" N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Documentation Ghana 108 85.20 8202.00
_rification England 95 121.09 11504.00
Total 203
Registration not Ghana 108 81.78 8832.50
necessary
England 95 124.98 11873.50
Total 203
How necessary Is Ghana 108 115.98 12523.50
collateral
England 8182.5095 86.13
Total 203
Collateral not sufficient Ghana 108 82.72 10013.50
England 95 112.55 10692.50
Total 203
Test Statistics-
How
Documentatlo Registration necessary Is Collateral not
n verification not necessarv collateral sufficient
Mann-Whitney U 3316.000 2946.500 3622.500 4127.500
WilcoxonW 9202.000 8832.500 8182.500 10013.500
Z -4.521 -5.393 -3.893 -2.536
Asymp. 8ig. (2-talled) .000 .000 .000 .011
B. Grouping Variable: Country
VlertfyinGi.nculTlbranc .... Country Croa.t.bulat.on
Countrv
oh'ana I=n~'an'" Tn.nl
'\IIII8rl~ng encumbrances no Count 19 0 HI
% within YI!Irtf)Ang 100.0% .0% 100.0%
encurnb,...noe.
% within Country 17.8% .0% 8 ....%
% of Tolal 9 ....% .0% 9 ....%
)'Ba Count S9 95 1S",
% within _rltylng ...8 ....% 61.S% 100.0%
.ncum branes.
% 'WIthinCountry 82.4% 100.0% 90.S%
% cfTota. <43.8% ...e.e% 90.e%
Total Count 10a 95 203
% 'WIthin "",rltying 63.2% "'S.8% 100.0%
encumbrances
% wolthln Country 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% ctTotal 63.2% 4S.8% 100.0%
Chi-Square T•• t.
Value df ~~IP .._~I~.
E_:!rl~I!'I;(2- E_~cI~13;(1-
Pearson Chi-Square 18.439· 1 .000
Continuity Correctlonb 16.423 1 .000
Likelihood Rallo 25.702 1 .000
FI_her'. Exact Teat .000 .000
~n.~~'!'tk,'nln.8r 18.348 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 203
e.O celie (.0%) h.~ e,.:>ectedcount Ie•• than 5. The minimum expected count la 8.89.
b. Com puled only 'or a 2x2 table
Syn"lmetrlc Me •• ur ••
Value Annrox. Sin.
Nominal byNomlnal Phi .301 .000
Crame ... V .301 .000
N of Valid C........ 203
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Rank.
<"':. tn.tn. N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Interest Ghana 108 101.88 11003.00
England 95 102.14 9703.00
Total 203
feea/cornrniaaion Ghana 10B 100.20 10822.00
England 95 104.04 9BB4.00
Total 203
Amount Ghana 10B 102.31 11049.50
England 95 101.65 9656.50
Total 203
repayment Urn. Ghana 10B 103.93 11224.50
England 95 99.Bl 94Bl.50
Total 203
Te.t Statlstlc.-
fees/commis repa}llTlent
Inlerest slon Amounl time
Mann-Whitney U 5117.000 4936.000 5096.500 4921.500
WllcolGOn W 11003.000 10822.000 9656.500 9481.500
Z -.032 -.483 -.083 -.526
As}llTlp. Sig. (2-talled) .974 .629 .934 .599
a. Grouping Variable: Country
Rank.
.COIIn"",, N l\AeanRank Sum of Ranks
Location Ghana 108 86.37 9327.50
England 95 119.77 11378.50
Total 203
Market \lalu. Ghana 108 99.52 10748.00
England 95 104.82 9958.00
Total 203
Land right. Ghan. 108 102.33 11051.50
England 95 101.83 9654.50
Total 203
Land In.urance Ghana 108 83.38 9004.50
England 95 123.17 11701.50
Total 203
ReglatraUon Ghana 108 119.76 12934.50
England 95 81.81 7771.50
Totel 203
DocufTl.ntaUon Ghana 108 108.88 11521.50
England 95 96.68 9184.50
Total 203
T.st Statistics-
Land rlohts
Land Documentstio
Location Marl<etvalue Insurance Reolstratlon n
Mann-WhitneyU 3441.500 4862.000 5094.500 3118.500 3211.500 4624.500
Wllco>onW 9327.500 10748.000 9654.500 9004.500 7771.500 9184.500
Z -4.221 -.715 -.088 -4.980 -4.674 -1.304
....~p. 51g. (2-tsllsd) .000 .475 .930 .000 .000 .192
a. Grouping Varl.ble: Country
Repo ••••• lon probl.m. due to own.r.hlp dl.put. In pa.t 2 yr. * Country Cro •• tabulatlon
Countn.
Ghana _England .Total
~~~f:~~~~I~hr~d?!~7:t'!
no Count 80 91 171
% within Repos •• aalon 46.B% 53.2% 100.0%In pa.t2)11".
problema due to
ownarahlp diaput. In pa.t
2)11".
% within Country 74.1 % 95.B% B4.2%
% of Total 39.4% 44.8% B4.2%
)18. Count 28 4 32
% within Reposse •• 'on 87.5% 12.5% 100.0%
problems due to
owner. hlp dispute In pe.t
2)11".
% within Country 25.9% 4.2% 15.8%
% of Tolal 13.8% 2.0% 15.8%
Total Count 108 95 203
% within Rapo ••••• lon 53.2% 48.B% 100.0%
problems due to
ownership dispute In paat
2 )11".
% within Country 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 53.2% 46.8% 100.0%
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Value df "1'rsi~'e~~}~' E_~d~i3; (2- Exa~d~3) (1-
Pearson Chi-Square 17.949- 1 .000
Continuity Correctionb 16.351 1 .000
Likelihood Ratio 20.123 1 .000
Fisher's E_ct Test .000 .000
~n.e:~-:do-r:near 17.860 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 203
Chl-Squar. T•• t.
a. 0 ce"s (.0%) ha_ expected count lass than 5. The minimum expacted count is 14.98.
b. Com puted only for a 2><2tsble
Symmetric Measures
Value Approx.Sio.
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.297 .000
Cramer's V .297 .000
N of Valid Cases 203
Rank.
r.....mt~ N t\Aean Rank SUrTl of Ranks
Documentation Ghana 106 106.68 11521.50
England 95 96.68 9184.50
Total 203
Lack property Ghana 106 126.19 13629.00
Englend 95 74.49 7077.00
Tots I 203
P•• t Default Ghana 106 105.75 11421.50
England 95 97.73 9284.50
Total 203
Poor C•• hflo\N Ghana 108 101.10 10919.00
England 95 103.02 9787.00
Total 203
Leek record. on Ghan. 10a 137.07 14804.00
bu•• n••• tran.actlon. England 95 62.13 15902.00
Total 203
Bu.ln ••• type Ghan. 108 105.53 11397.00
England 95 97.99 9309.00
Total 203
L.ek guar.ntor. Ghan. 108 143.59 15508.00
England 95 154.72 15198.00
Totel 203
L.ek .lq:>.r'ence Ghan. 10S 95.67 10332.00
England 95 109.20 10374.00
Tote I 203
High VUlnerability Ohen. 10S 101.02 10910.00
England 95 103.12 9796.00
Tote I 203
Poor pronteb"lty Ghan. 106 98.22
10608.00
England 95 106.29 10098.00
Tote I 203
Leek ragl.tared tid. Ghan. 106 133.04 14368.00
England 915 66.72 6338.00
Tote I 203
In.d_qu." borro'W'.r Ghana 108 107.76 11638.50
.qulty England 95 95.45 9067.50
Tote I 203
N.w cu.tonl.r Gh.n. 108 122.79 13261.50
England 915 78.36 7444.50
Tote I 203
Lack required dooument. Ghan. 10S 140.08 15129.00
England 915 5S.71 5577.00
Tote I 203
High Tr.n •• cUonco.t Gh_n. 10S 102.70 11092.00
England 915 101.20 9614.00
Totl'll 203
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